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Harold Cherniss has charged that Aristotle is guilty of
unfairness in both his reports and criticisms of Presocratic
philosophers.

These charges--with reference to Democritus at

least--are without any real foundation.

It can reasonably--in

the light of other ancient information which we have about
Democritus--be held that Aristotle's reports of his teachings
were accurate and that his criticisms were justified.
Aristotle's reports and criticisms of Democritus are
taken up in terms of four major issues which divide these two
men:

the existence of permanent atomic units, the existence

of a void, a knowledge of reality by correspondence, and his
treatment of the four 'causes'.
Taking these points up in order, we observe that Aristotle rightly points out that on none of these four issues was
Democritus' teaching warrented by the empirical facts.

As to

the existence of atoms, Aristotle points out that there is no

'

reason why division must stop at a given degree of smallness,
that atomic doctrine is an unwarranted denial of the empirical
evidence which we have for continuity, and that atomism is
founded on a mistaken notion of the meaning of 'what is'.

2

Secondly, although void was posited to account for.motion, it fails to do so.

The existence of void as that which

is absolutely intactible cannot in principle be supported by
any real evidence.

Void--like the atoms--was proposed . because
of a mistaken notion of what 'what is' and 'what is not'
.

means.
Furthermore, if our knowledge of the real world of
atomically structured physical objects is by a correspondence
which is both vague and inconsistent, we are after all reduced
to relying on the very phenomena which the atomic theory had
rejected.
Finally, Democritus' atomism, since it recognizes only
an infinite series of absolutely determined forced motions,
makes of all the universe an utterly mechanical device with
absolutely no distinction between mechanical and natural
even.ts, between animate and inanimate objects--a distinction
which seems obvious.
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INTRODUCTION
The Problem
In 1935 Harold Cherniss published his well-known book,
Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy. 1

Its general

tendency is to show that Aristotle's reports of the teachings
of the Presocratic philosophers are not to be implicitly and
naively trusted, because Aristotle is guilty of verbal misrepresentations of texts which we possess, guilty, in fact, of
conflicting passages on the san1e point, of "wilful misrepresentation" (page 352), of trying to twist and distort Presocratic
theories in order to set them into bold relief and thus more
firmly establish his ovm theory.
But this is no new discovery on Cherniss' part; the problem had been recognized for at least some thirty years at the
time of the publication of his book. 2 Cherniss' work is in
that respect merely the systematic culmination of those earlier
efforts.

But the mere fact that Cherniss has had predecessors

in his serious doubts about Aristotle's reliability in regard
1 Harold Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic

Philosophy (reprint, Nevi York: Octagon Press, 1954).
'
2 The reviewer of Cherniss'
book in Revue de Tiletanhysiaue
et ~ Horale, XLIV (1937), supplement to the April issue, pp.
11-12, points out that Rivaud was the first to recognize the
problem. Others who questioned Aristotle's reliability in this
respect likely go back even further in time, but that is not
important.
1

•

2

to the Presocratics has not yet and is not likely to lessen the
impact of this work in the area of Presocratic scholarship.
Much is to be said for its insights, for its exhaustive scholarship, and for its relentless adherence to its central thesis.
It is not likely soon to have a rival of the same scope.
Indeed, Cherniss' efforts to cast into bold relief the
tendentiousness of ancient literary reports of the Presocratics
has already long since found imitation and continuance in the
work of J. B. McDiarmid.3

The latter contends in substance

that Theophrastus is not to be trusted either as an independent
source of information on the Presocratics, but that he rather
uncritically repeated what Aristotle had said and has at times
conflated two distinct reports by Aristotle.

Thus, instead of

helping us better to understand Presocratic teachings and theories, Theophrastus only confuses the issue and is "even less
trustworthy than Aristotle,. (page 133) himself.
But this approach has implications not only for the reports of Aristotle and Theophrastus themselves, but also for
the bulk of the doxographic tradition, which in one way or another seems to be basically dependent on Aristotle and Theophrastus.

Thus, to cast doubts on the reports of Aristotle and

Theophrastus is to cast that same sort of--and perhaps even
more

serious-~doubt

on the'doxographic tradition as a whole,

in which, if conjecture on that score is correct, there are
3John B. r.IcDiarmid, "Theophrastus on the Presocratic
Causes, 11 Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, LXI (1953),
85-156.

3
further corruptions due to the influence of Stoic and Epicurean teachings.

In the face of such doubt and distrtist we could

do little in most cases but despair over the prospects of any
insight at all into Presocratic philosophy;4 we would in many
cases be relegated to guessing about fragments snatched out
of context.
But, to return to Aristotle himself, these are indeed
serious charges to lay at the door of a philosopher of the
caliber of Aristotle, especially since he himself is so acutely aware of consistency and of the varying meanings of words.
It is true that in many cases the terminology of the· report
does not belong to the predecessor in question but to Aristotle himself, and that to one who is not aware of this practice of Aristotle such usage of Aristotelian terminology may
indeed be misleading.

But this is not the major charge which

is made against Aristotle; he is charged rather with presenting a wrong teaching, with deliberate alteration of the theories of the Presocratics, with setting up 'straw men' to
knock down, with giving conflicting reports about the same theory.

Such charges even under ordinary circumstances are only

to be made for grave reasons, and not on the weak and conjectural evidence presented by Cherniss; but in Aristotle's case
one ought reasonably be doubly hesitant to make such charges.
4This is substantiated by many and was pointed out in
particular by A. E. Taylor in his review of Cherniss' book in
~' XLVI (1937), 247-250; if one discredits Aristotle and
considers the Theophrastan doxographical tradition as infected, there is too little to go on.

4

Furthermore, Jaeger, in his review of Cherniss' book,5
points out that Cherniss is making the same sort of error that
he accuses Aristotle of making:

he measures Aristotle by a

standard alien to him; Cherniss' attitude itself becomes unhistorical; and the only difference is that Aristotle does it not
unconsciously in behalf of a philosophical world view, while
Cherniss does it consciously and in behalf of a historical
6
truth.
Thus, paradoxically, Cherniss fails to consider adequately Aristotle's own view-point, fails basically to consider
the question of whether or not Aristotle's remarks were justified apart from the question of whether by our modern philosophic and scientific standards Aristotle was right or wrong.
There is, on the other hand, a growing tendency to revive
some trust in Aristotle's accounts of Presocratic philosophers
while taking into consideration the criticisms which Cherniss
has offered.

w.

One general attempt in this direction is that of

K. C. Guthrie, both in his general account, "Aristotle as

Historian," 7 and in his particular accounts of the Presocratics
in his~ History of Greek Philosophy. 8 He does point out that
5werner Jaeeer, in his review in American Journal of Philology, LVIII (1937), 350-356.
~ ~
6Roughly this same criticism is taken up by w. K. c.
Guthrie, "Aristotle as Historian, 11 Journal of Hellenic Studies,

LXXVII (1957), 35-41.

'

?Ibid.

8w. K. c. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosonhy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962--); the first three
three volumes deal with the Presocratics.

5

Aristotle is usually quite careful to indicate where his·report
ends and his criticism begins, to distinguish his reports from
the logical conclusions he draws from the teachings of the Presocratics, to distinguish secondary in.formation from what he
has learned about the teachings more directly.

Thus Aristotle

is represented as being a better source of information than
Cherniss had given him credit for; and Aristotle is indeed to
be trusted, if only we take the trouble to read him carefully.
This is substantially the point at which the problem of
the reliability of Aristotle as a witness to the teachings of
the Presocratics stands.

No one thus far has attempted to do

Cherniss' work again and subject all of his remarks about Aristotle's reliability to closer scrutiny; that would indeed be
an awesome task!
Nestle has suggested that there are two feasible ways to
approach this problem:

one is to concentrate on individual

thinkers, and the other is to concentrate on the main problems
which Aristotle raises.9

It would seem to be equally reason-

able--if not more reasonable--to combine both methods, to examine Aristotle's criticisms of an individual author in terms of
the philosophical issues that Aristotle sees as being at stake.
This approach would have the advantages to be gained by both
methods; it

wo~ld

allow a !omewhat closer scrutiny of the re-

ports and criticisms of Aristotle; it would concentrate on
9wilhelm Nestle's review of Cherniss' book in Philologische Wochenschrift, LVI (1936), cols. 1329-32. Nestle says
iliat Cherniss was right in chosing the second alternative.

6

fundamental and specific issues between Aristotle and the philosopher involved, and thus not suffer from having to jump
back and forth from one philosophical school to another, as
Cherniss is forced to do; it would avoid the mistake of 'lumping philosophical schools together' without a precise indication of the respect in which their teachings are different.
Indeed, there is a prospect of a clearer and fairer account of
Aristotle's reports and criticisms of the Presocratic philosophers to be gained by using this approach.
In more recent years the atomic theories of modern physicists have centered an increasing amount of interest on the
relative contributions of two imposing figures of ancient
Greece--Democritus and Aristotle--to this modern system.
perhaps because of

Democri·~us'

So,

advocacy of atomism in the an-

cient world, there seems to be a natural tendency to sympathize with his position and perhaps also a latent inclination
to read into its ancient form some of the modern aspects of
atomism and to assume in the light of modern science that in
some instances Aristotle's criticism of it 1vas wrong or misguided.

Because of this a closer examination of the issues

which Aristotle sees as dividing his position from that of Democritus and his reasons for rejecting the latter's atomism
would seem to be

particula~ly

interesting and profitable.

But there are also further reasons for chosing to reexamine Aristotle's reports and criticisms of Democritus in
particular.

Aristotle on several occasions makes a point of

1
praising Democritus not only for the broad scope of his theory10 but also for his consistency in including all things
into a single, unified, rational system, and beginning with
nature just as it is. 11 This certainly implies that Aristotle
was well acquainted with Democritus' theory and considered it
as a unified whole, and that particularly in Democritus' case
Aristotle was not likely guilty of picking at individual doctrines without

at

least a fundamental glance at the place of

such doctrines in the context of the whole system.

It indi-

cates in Aristotle a high degree of respect for the teachings
of his rival, teachings which we thus have every reason to expect that Aristotle will treat fairly.
Thus Aristotle's criticism of Democritus might be in a
sense considered critical.

For, if on closer examination we

do indeed find Aristotle's reports and criticisms reasonably
fair and justified, it becomes more likely that this will also
be the case with other Presocratics; if, on the other hand, we
tend to find Cherniss' charges of unfairness substantiated, his
case for similar treatment of the other Presocratics will receive even more support.
It seems therefore both feasible and reasonable to exam-

ine more critically the reliability of Aristotle over against
't

lOGen. e.t Corr. 1.1, 315a35: ne;pi a'ITavrrwv c.ppovrr(oal.
1.8, 324b35-325al: ne;p\ navrrwv.
11 Gen. et Corr. 1.8, 325al-2:
ev& A.oy41 • • • 6.px-f)v
no,r.ouµcvol xa'Ta ~OOlV , 1nep eo~Lv.
~

--'

#

.\(,

I

,

8
the teachings of Democritus:

the issues between them are

rather clearly drawn; and we have on Aristotle's part an implicit claim for the honorable treatment of his rival.

There

is every reason to expect that charges like those of Cherniss
can thus be profitably investigated.
Furthermore, what is undertaken in this paper is only a
beginning, for it would seem both reasonable and profitable
to continue this sort of an investigation in two further directions.

First of all, in regard to the teachings of Democ-

ritus himself, it seems equally important to examine the reports and criticisms of his teachings i.n other ancient philosophical authors who contribute substantially to the information which we have about Democritus--primarily, Theophrastus,
Cicero, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, and Simplicius.

Their own

treatment of Democritus and his teachings is likely to reflect
a changing concern with the various philosophical issues that
were current during the lives of these ancient authors.

What

can be learned from such a chronological investigation may
well run parallel to and illuminate the development of the
doxographical tradition.

At any rate it will put us in a bet-

ter position to understand and appreciate the information that
they do give us about Democritus.
Secondly, it seems

e~ually

appropriate and necessary to

examine Aristotle's reports and criticisms of other major Presocratic authors, for, though it is not likely, Democritus may
be a special case, and what is found to hold true in regard to

9

Aristotle's use of Democritus' teachings may not hold true
with regard to other Presocratics.

There is also too much

danger in gathering philosophers into schools, for a specific
criticism may apply in different respects to different individuals of the same school.

These men need to be treated as

distinct individuals as much as possible in order to be properly understood.

This is not to deny any similarity of doc-

trine between individuals--such similarities will be inevitable when a number of men approach a problem in the same way
--but only to insure that we understand precisely in what respects they are similar and in what respects they are different.

Only so can Aristotle's accounts be more fairly judged.

The Method
More specifically, the format to be followed here will
be to examine Aristotle's treatment of Democritus in terms of
the major philosophical issues which divide them; and Aristotle himself can best tell us what these issues are.

There

are, as seems evident from reading Aristotle, three such fundamental issues:

the meaning of 'what is' and of 'what is

not', the problem of sense-perception and knowledge, and the
question of the adequacy of Democritus' explanation of physical objects and events.

The first of these is readily broken

dovm into two ·sub-problems:'

the existence of permanent atom-

ic units and the existence of a void.

The second issue will

be seen to involve as well the problem of the soul, of the
reality of •secondary qualities', and of the mutual generation

10

of the elements.

The third is more readily recognizable ·as

the question of the 'four causes'.
Within each of these major issues it seems reasonable to
review and check the teachings of Democritus as they apply to
that particular issue.

Wherever possible and appropriate this

will be done with reference to Democritus' own terminology,
being careful to distinguish it and the teaching it involves
from any limited and technical meaning which is peculiar to
Aristotle.

It should thus be possible to avoid the trap of

letting Aristotle's arguments carry without any real justification for them.
In connection with this examination of original terminology there is to be a more detailed examination of Aristotle's report of the teachings involved in each issue.

This

is to include as well some acknowledgement of the background
and basis of the particular doctrine, the philosophical issue
to which Democritus was speaking, and then a reasonable

ac~

count of the doctrine along with any obvious implications.
Then, on the basis of the above, 'there is to follow in
each instance an examination of the criticisms which Aristotle
directs against the teaching involved in the issue at hand.
This examination will be primarily concerned with the question
of whether or not Aristotla's criticisms are justified, whether or not they are warranted by the teaching he is opposing
and by his basis for judgment.

As interesting as the question

may be, there will be no primary concern with the matter of

11

whether either Aristotle or Democritus is right or wrong.in
terms of advanced modern science or in terms of the unique
philosophical issues of modern philosophy--indeed, there may be
no definitive answers to those sorts of questions at all.
Nor, for that reason, will this paper be primarily concerned with what Democritus might have said in reply to these
criticisms unless there is some substantial evidence to support such a reply.

To proceed otherwise would be to read into

the teaching of Democritus something which is not in fact
there; it would lead us into pure speculation and conjecture,
and that is of no real help.
Finally, this paper is written under several assumptions
and specifications Vlhich will become more apparent as one

But it may not be out of place here to forewarn the

reads on.
reader.

First of all, there will be no attempt made here to

distinguish in fact the teachings of Leucippus from those of
Democritus.

Though there has been sone debate on the question,
one may on the whole safely take their teachings together. 12

The few instances in which Leucippus alone is cited in Aristotle can be shown from parallel citations to involve teachings which apply to Democritus as well.

Nothing can really be

gained for our purposes by entering into the problem of separating and distinguishing ·t,lhese two men.
Secondly and obviously, there will be no treatment of a

.£.!...!.,

12 Following Guthrie, 4.History of Greek Philosophy, .21?.•
vol. 2, p. 382, note c

12

teaching or criticism by 'schools' without a clear specification of the respect in which Democritus is to be classed or
criticized in that way.

In this connection the term •atomist•

is intended to refer specifically to Leucippus and Democritus,
and thus for all practical purposes to Democritus himself, unless a broader use of the term is specifically indicated.
Finally, the problem will be approached without assuming
with Cherniss that Aristotle is unfair.

This is to be a cau-

tious attempt to read what Aristotle has to say about Democritus carefully and without prejudice, hesitating without grave
reason to find Aristotle guilty of gross misrepresentation.
Aristotle likely had access to the works of Democritus, could
read him in context, and knew what he was talking about much
more so than we do who have no such complete or coherent primary source available.

This seems to be the only way of deal-

ing effectively with the problem without getting involved in
the circularity of checking Aristotle by a doxographic tradition which is in turn dependent on Aristotle's own accounts.
Thus, what is proposed here is a re-evaluation of Aristotle's criticisms of Democritus, one written to show that
this position of trusting Aristotle is not only just as tenable as that of Cherniss, but even more reasonable; it is
written to demonstrate in fact that Aristotle is after all
basically reliable, if only we take the trouble to read and
understand him and to assess precisely what it is that he is
saying in regard to Democritus.

CHAPTER I
WHAT CONSTITUTES A REAL UNIT?
The Problem
As was specified in the Introduction, it will be the approach of this paper to examine Aristotle's accounts of Democritus in terms of the basic issues which divide the teachings
of the one from those of the other.

Now one of the most ob-

vious and fundamental issues which separate them revolves
around the question of what constitutes a real unit.

In gen-

eral, it is quite obvious that it was Democritus' position
that the only real unit was a permanent, impassible, and minute body of matter which he called an 'atom'; whether considered alone or as a part of a physical object this atom retained in eternal actuality its character as the only real,
unit.

Aristotle contends, on the other hand, that there is

not sufficient justification for positing such an indivisible
atom as a true and permanent unit, that such a theory runs
counter to both logic and empirical evidence.
This issue is truly a fundamental one, for Democritus
explained

eve~ything

else in terms of such atoms as real units

in specific positions and motions in the void.

So herein lies

as well the foundation and roots of the issue of the structure
of physical objects (whether they are as individuals a contin-

13

14
uum and so an actual unity, or composed of atoms and thus an
actual multiplicity), of the types of motion that are possible, of the operation of the sense-organs and the intellect,
of the types of definitions and explanations that are possible,
and thus of the whole system of Democritus' thought over
against that of Aristotle.

The further implications of this

fundamental issue will become more evident as we proceed and
consider these other problems separately; but, for the time
being, we might simply note that Democritus applied this explanation in terms of atomic units throughout his system with
an extraordinary consistency, and Aristotle praised him for
it. 1 The atom as the real unit was fundamental to and consistent with the whole system of Democritus.

Thus the issue

raised by Aristotle is a vitally important and critical one.
Furthermore, intimately involved in the question of what
constitutes a real unit is the important question of the divisibility of physical objects, the question whether such division can be carried out indefinitely or not, whether it can
be carried out until it reaches an infinite multitude of dimensionless points or must stop short of this.

But it is-

precisely in connection with this question that a problem of
interpretation arises, the problem of whether Democritus' atom
is mathematically or intellectually as well as physically indivisible, with the majority of recent writers holding that
1 Gen. ~ Corr. 1.8, 324b35-325al:
nepl m1;rwv evi

'Aoycv

oo~

01wp(xa.01 At:UXl1l'Tt:Os xa'l

Be

µaA&o~a

t;T)µoxpl~Os•

xa&
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they were likely indivisible in both respects. 2

There is no

disagreement on the fact that Democritus held his atoms to be
physically indivisible, and so the current issue lies only
with their mathematical indivisibility. And this question, as
Sinnige rightly points out, 3 is answered basically in terms of
the philosophical heritage within which Democritus spelled out
his answers.
2 r.1uch has been written on this problem. Among the most
significant works are the following: Ingeborg Ha."'Dlner-Jensen,
11
Demokri t UI1d Platon° in Archi v fur Geschichte der Philosonhie,
XXIII (1910), 92-105, 211-229; V. E. Alfieri, Atonos Idea:
l'origine del concetto dell' atomo !!.§:1 pensiero greco (Florence: Le Honnier, 1953);S. J..iuria, aDie Infinitesimaltheorie
der antiken Atomisten 11 in Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte
der Mathematik, Abteilling B, Band ~Heft 2, 1932, pp. 106-185
(Luria contends that there are 'atoms' in two senses~ that is,
that there are 1) physically indivisible atoms and 2J 'atoms'
which are., theoretical parts of the physicall;y indivisible
atoms); Jurgen Eau, Zu:n Problem des Infinitesimalen bei den
antiken Atomisten (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1957); David J.
iurley, Tv10 Studies in the Greek Atomists: Study I, Indi visible Marnitudes; Stud~ II, Aristotle and Enicurus sz.g Voluntary
Action Princeton, Hew Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1967).
Beyond these Guthrie, History, II, 503-507, believes that
the evidence points to the fact that the atoms are both physically and mathematically indivisible; :hurley agrees. Gregory
Vlastos (cited by both Guthrie and Purley, though not in print
as nearly as I knovr) contends that the atoms are mathematically
divisible. G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge: University Press, 19'b'OT, p. 408, likewise
indicate that they were divisible in thought, though not in
fact. Theo Gerard Sinnir;e, Watter and fnfinitr ig the Presocratic Schools and Plato (Assen: Van Gorcum and Company,
1968), holds that Der:tocritus' theory was basically Ionian in
character and was thus concerned with physical, not mathematical divisibil~ty; he furtllermore contends that the Eleatic
context in which this question is raised is introduced by Aristotle in order to criticize Democritus; therefore, he would
contend, it is misleading to rely on the context in Aristotle
in attempting to determine Democritus' own answer to this most
important question.

3.QE. c~., especially pp. 164-167.

16
Any attempt to answer this question must come to grips

with the account of Aristotle, for he is our chief witness to
the teachings of Democritus in matters regarding the problems
both of mathematical divisibility and of Democritus' philosophical heritage; and Aristotle's testimony is pivotal,4 if
the question is to be answered with any sort of
at all.

~robability

At any rate, we may tentatively·make some general re-

marks about Aristotle's account of Democritus' teaching on the
matter of divisibility and indivisibility.

There seems to be

no doubt that Democritus' atoms were physically indivisible;
Aristotle calls the atom

anae~~

(Gen. et Corr. 1.8, 326al);

and the general agreement on this point is so wide that we may
use this as our starting-point in the examination of Aristotle's account of Democritus with respect to mathematical divis. ibility.

As we do, it will prove highly probable--any higher

degree of certainty on this moot question does not seem posi ble--that Democritus held that his atoms were mathematically
divisible, that physical division is largely an illusion (all
atoms are and remain distinct); and so mathematical division,
although it is conceivable, simply does not in fact apply to
physical objects.
~

Terminology
It will "be helpful, 'before entering upon an examination

4Mau, .2J2.• £il., p. 24, seems quite right when he states:
Wenn wir dieser Frage von Aristoteles abweichen, dann wagen
wir uns auf das Gebiet der reinen Konjektur. 11
11
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of Aristotle's accounts and criticisms of Democritus, to ·consider some of the more essential terminology which was used by
Democritus for his 'atoms' as true physical units.

This will

help us to clarify in a preliminary way the position of Democritus and to focus our attention on its uniqueness.

Where both

Aristotle and Democritus use a single term in different ways,
there will be an attempt to indicate such essential differences.
First of all, there is, according to the witness of Plutarch, a usage of the term {ofa for an atom, 5 emphasizing
rightly the 'shape' of atoms, which, we shall see, is important
for the structure of physical objects. 6

Although this term may

have been used by Democritus, Aristotle tends to avoid it in
reference to the atoms of Democritus--likely because of its
moaning in Plato--and prefers instead to use the term

ax~µa,

by

which he also translates Democritus' ovm term pucrµo<,;.
e ( va ~ 6 e: n:av'ta 'ta<;
loea<,; un' au'tou xa~ouµevat;. This would ~ive us the
feminine form <hoµo<; ( l5 ta , •undivided. shape'. fut, since
.Aristotle, as we shall see, regularly connected the adjective
ci:toµo<; with a neuter noun, for the sake of consistency the neuter form a'toµov will here be used to indicate the •atom'.
.

5Plutarch Ad versus Coloten, llllA:

a'toµou~,

6 compare Cyril Bailey, The Greek Atomist.s and E,picurus
(reprint, New York: Russell and Hussell, 196'4J, p. 118. The

consideration of the importance of 'shape' will be taken up
more fully in chapter three of this paper.
I shall in this papc:rt be using the term 'physical object'
to desienate that external being which is confronted by the
senses, and the term 'phenonenal object' to indicate that same
object as we perceive it. r..rhus for Democritus the 'physical
object' nay be a mass of atoms and void, while the same object
as phenomenal might be a continuous, hard, brown desk. This
distinction between 'physical object' and 'pheno~enal object'
is of utmost importance in considering :Der.iocritus' teachings.
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How, aside :from the emphasis on shape or :form in the terminology, there are in Democritean usage several adjectives
which indicate that the atom was a three-dimensional shape
which was packed solid and full.

Simplicius, for instance,

gives witness to a fragment of Aristotle's work, On Democritus,
in which the term vao't6v ('closely pressed and packed') is
attributed to Democritus. 7
used the term

~A~pec;

Likewise, Democritus evidently also

('full') to indicate this same fullness

and solidity; 8 and Aristotle himself says that Democritus used
this latter term to signify that which truly is, 'to ov,9 and
to indicate thereby one of his basic elements, cr'to1xerov • 10
Thus Democritus• atom is to be taken as 'solidly full'.
There is another term with related significance which
goes back at least as far as Democritus, 11 the term otv; it was

7simplicii in Aristotclis de Caelo Co::nmentaria, vol. VII

of Corrunentaria in--Xristotelem Graeca, ed. by I. L. Heiberg
(Berlin: GeorgeReimer, 1894), p. 295, line 5.
8 John Burn.et, Early Greek Philosophy (reprinted in Cleveland and New York: World Publishing Company, 1957), p. 337,
believes that Leucippus used it in this sense and that he had
borrowed it from itielissus.
9Lieta. 4. 5, 1009a28-29: oJ'toc; 'to xevov xa) 'to 11:Atipet;
---:::-re O'HCUV
~
- .1u1Lupxq._v
,L
I!.
'
,
,.,
.f
01!0 CJ)t; xa
µt;pOt;,
xa ( 'tOl 'tO
µ.ev
ov
'tOv'tWV
11
e(va' 'tO oe µl] ov -- He LOemocri tus] says that 'the empty' and
'the full' are likewise at any given part, and yet that one of
these 'is' and the other 'is not•. 11
&

(

.. 10r,Ieta • .J..4, 985b5: , ~T}µoxp,-i;oc; a'to,xeia. µev 'to 'K/..fipet;

xa\ 'tO XEVOV d

VUI •

11 Kurt von Fritz, Philosonhie und spracb.licher Ausdruck
bei Demokri t, Plato u....-1d Ari stotcles (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1963), p. 18, claims that the term goes
back to Leucippus; 13ailey, .£:£• .£.il., p. 118, traces it back to
Democritus.
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obviously quite artificially and consciously created for ·its
sheer contrast to
space'.

o6~~v,

'nothing•--a term for 'void' or 'empty

Thus, if oev is to have any unique significance at

all, it must be the direct contradictory to 'nothing', and so
it must be that which is fully and simply a thing, pure matter,
packed solid and full.
Furthermore, the very term 'element' (o'Tolxerov) is one
that goes back to Democritus, as von Fritz remarks; 12 the ·term
was used by Democritus in a sense noticeably more primitive
than the meaning it has for Aristotle, in a sense that is much
closer to that of the individual and distinct 'elements' of the
alphabet.

Aristotle's use of the letters of the alphabet to
illustrate the shape, position, and placement of the atoms 1 3

very likely goes back to Democritus himself, as the latter drew
out this metaphor to illustrate, for one thing, the varying
shapes that his elements were to have.

Thus, in the light of

the Democritean use of this term for the atomic unit, we may
further safely attribute to the atoms of Democritus the fact
that they, while distinct and separate from one another, differ
quite specifically from one another in shaue and are used in
conjunction with one another to build physical objects.
12 op. cit., pp. 24-25.
o-i;olxefO\i"' for Aristotie is a primary constituent of
tbings, which i"s in kind not divisible into another kind: et;
OU ouyXEL'Tal ~pCrt-ou evunapxov~oc aolalpe~ou 'TQ el5El el,
~'T epov d eo<, --I:Teta. 5. 3, 1014a26-27; it is something whose
continued bisection results only in something of the same kind,
as water is only divisible into smaller bits of water.
1 3r.reta. 1.4, 985bl5-19.
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Likewise, in this connection, von Fritz traces and· expounds another Democritean term, this time one much more
unique in Greek philosophy, puoµo<.;; 14 its meaning may be taken
to be roughly 'form' or 'shape'.

The use of this term in

Herodotus 5.58 for the 'shape' of letters is very interesting
for its appropriateness to the use of o'to&xef'ov, though it is
iess metaphoric than the latter.

Its use is quite appropriate

to the atoms of Democritus, for it does not signify the 'perceptible form'--as does e{oo,--but the 'objective law or principle of the atom's form' as it realizes itself in its own
motion, quite apart from any outside influence; it is a unique
combination of

forr~

and movement.

And this is the term which

Aristotle regularly translates or interprets as oxfiµa, or
'shape 1 ; 15 and, in so doing, he has abstracted from it--as he
. does also with 'tpo~~ and o&a8&y~--the idea of motion; he has
taken it in the isolation of an instant and thus proposes to
examine it simply inasmuch as it is a 'shape', or, if you will,
. 1 uni' t • 16
as a perr.ianent ph ysica

Finally, there is the term most usually connected with
14.QE •

.£!..!., pp. 25-26.

15:weta. 1. 4, 985bl5: 't'OU't(uv a E d µ'Ev puoµo, axiiµa ta'!:, v.
16 This is not to imply that Ariototle does an injustice
to Democritus' ato:n in thi~ respect; he certainly does recognize and deal vii th the asnect of its motion. Indeed, immediately following his exposition ,of puoµo<.; as oxii1-1:a., he raises
the qu~stion of wotion: 1Cep'• Oe XlV~OE:W<;, o8ev Tl 'Jl:W<.; \.htap.;el
-ror, oua,, xa.'• OU't'Ol • • • pq8uµw<; O.cpcf'oa.v --I.Ieta. 1.4, 985bl920. But we shall be dealine with that question separately in
the second and third chapters.
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the name and teaching of Democritus--' the atom' ( a-r;oµov) •·

It

indicates not only that Democritus' unit is and remains 'uncut', but also that it is at least physically indivisible. 1 7
Aristotle uses the term quite often of Democritus' unit, 1 8 but
he usually distinguishes the term as it applies to Democritus'
atoms from his own meaning of that term by adding the noun
oWµa or µtye8o<;

or both to this adjective • 1 9

And this usage

of the term a-r;oµov, Bailey feels, can be traced all the way
back to Leucippus, 20 and it is in fact attested by the fragments of Democritus. 21
Thus, in the light of the above Democritean terminology,
we may reasonably give a preliminary description of Democritus'
physical unit.

It has a given shape or form (Cota,

~uoµoc;

);

l7It is described by Aristotle as a~aet~ (~. et Corr.
1.8, 326al); see also above, p. 16.

18 see H. Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus (Graz: Akademische
Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, reprinted 1955), p. 120. There may

be implicit here a certain amount of 'question-begging' on the
matter of mathematical divisibility in that Bonitz' list of
uses of this term as applied to the atons of Democritus is
entered under the heading 'mathematice'.
l9For example, Physics 8.9, 265b29, Gen. et Corr. 1.2,
315b29, and Caelo 3.4, 303a21. The Democritean terminology
( totq ~uoµ6~ nA~pec; ,vaa-r;6v) certainly indicates that this
is a justified addition.
20 -

.2.:2. •

.t '
.21:_.

p • r-73 •

21 rt is tn a frag.nen~ quoted by Sextus Empiricus, fragment 6889 in Hermann Diels and V/alther Kranz, Die Fragmente ~
Vorsokratiker, 3 vols., (Berlin: Weidmannsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1960-1961).
Guthrie, Iiistory, II, 395, note 2, seems to have overlooked that passace and asserts that 3.'t"oµo~ in its feminine or
neuter form "does not occur in any actual fragment of Democritus."
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various atons have a variety of shapes and are used in the
construction of physical objects

(cr~olxeiov

); these shapes are

not simply outlines, but are solids and fully packed
vaa~ov),

(1tA.~pec.;,

and thus have extension and are in fact minute bodies;

they are, furthermore, the simple and absolute antitheses to
•void', and, as such, are 'what is'

(O~v, ~o

3v); they are and

remain undivided and are physically indivisible

(a~oµov

).

It may at this point be both appropriate and helpful to
indicate briefly Aristotle's own use and application of the
term

a~oµ.ov,

not only because it will help clarify and keep

distinct the teachings of these two men on the matter of divisibility, 22 but also because Aristotle's own use of that term
will indicate the major areas in which he criticizes the
teaching of Democritus on what is the true physical unit.
Bonitz, evidently quite correctly, distinguishes two fundamental meanings of the term a~oµ.ov for 1'!..!'istotle. 23 First of
all, there is a sense in which Aristotle uses the term in reference to physical division.

It is Aristotle's position that
every magnitude is constantly divisible into magnitudes; 24
and thus the only things that can remain undivided in this
22 sinnige, on. cit., p. 145, conflates Aristotle's meaning with that of Democritus, and thus he makes nonsense of it;
he defines it, as used by Aristotle of Democritus' atoms, as
"indivisible np,gnitudes wh~ch are the result of a process of
infinite division." (Italics mine.)
2 3S22.. cit. , p. 120, under <hoµ.o~ •
24 Physics 6.2, 232a23-25: 1r0'.v µ€yt:8o~ d<. µ.t:y€8T) Olalpe~ov (0€6e~x;a•, yap o~L aOuva~ov t~ &~oµwv elva( ~' ouvex€~,
µ~ye80~

0

t:O~lV ~nav OUVeX€~).

23
sense are the instant in time, the 'instantaneous now', and
the dimensionless point. 25 In this sense the a~oµov is not a
•unit', for one can never by conjoining such

a~oµa

produce

either an extent of time or an actual physical magnitude; it
is the point §:.!which one divides something and not that into
which one actually divides something.
In this respect, as we shall see, Aristotle's criticism
of Democritus'

a~oµov

will be that as a magnitude it will

reasonably be further divisible, that physical division can
only end in a 'point', which is no unit at all.
Aristotle's second fundamental use of the term

a~oµov

is

a logical one.

In this sense the term refers to individual
members of a species; 26 these a~oµa are described by Arist·otle
in the Categories as simple units and numerically one, and
they are that of which genus and species are predicated. 27
And this sense of the term is also carried through by Aristotle
25 Caelo 3.1, 300al4: ~O yap VUV ~O a~oµov O~OV O~Lyµ~
ypaµµi'jc;; ~o~(v--"for the indivisible 1 nov1 1 is like the point on
a line." Here Aristotle makes the same point about the 'indivisible now' as he makes in On Generation and Corruntion 1.2
about the 'indivisible point'"; that is, that continuous time,
like a continuous magnitude, vlill be annihilated if one could
succeed in carrying out the division igi£ 'nows•.
26 The term is also used in other senses, for example, of
species which are not capable of further division, but none of
these other usages seem critical or important to the issue at
hand.
.
'
2 72, lb6-7: ·~d7rt-w<; Oe ~~ Cl:rcoµa xa\ tv dp&Sµlil • Also 5,
3a38-39:, ~o ~EV doo, xa~a ~ou a-r6µou xa~T)yoper~a&, ~o Oe
ytvo, xa L xa-i;a ~ou e'{ l:·ou<; xa'L xa~a ~ou 6.~6µou.
Such indi vi dual things, as &-i;oµa, are never predicated of a subject, though
genus and species are predicated of them.

24
in the Itletaphysics. 28

Thus, for Aristotle, the real a~oµa in

this universe are basically the primary substances, the individual objects such as Socrates; it is the individual which is
numerically indivisible:
a(pE~ov

ap1t8µ~

p.ev oJv

~0 xae' 'txao~ov

aot -

(Meta. 10.1, 1052a31-32).

With regard to this meaning of the term

a~oµov

in Aris-

totle, Aristotle's criticism of the position of Democritus is
that, since Democritus'

a~oµov

remains an actual unit, he de-

nies the unity of that which we perceive to be a unit, the
individual primary substances.

This criticism, as we shall

see in the second chapter of this paper, applies as well to
the positing of a void, inasmuch as the void in an object is
that which actually separates it and keeps it from being a
continuous unit.
Democritus Posits the Atom as the Unit
But, before elaborating on Aristotle's criticisms, it
will be necessary to look more closely at the teachings of
Democritus as they apply specifically to this issue of what
28 E.g., 3.3, 999al5-16:

ex

µev oJv ~ou1wv µUAAOV ~a(-

VE~at ~a ~n\ ~WV a~oµwv xa~DyopouµEVU apxal

E(Vat ~WV yevwv--

"and so of these that which is predicated of individuals seems
more of a principle than the genera. 11 See also W. D. Ross,
Aristotle's Meta~hysics, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
~958), I, 224, ~ 7; II, 30~.
Other passages in which the term
is so used are.~. 3.1, 995b29; 3.3, 998bl6, 999al2; 10.8,
l058al8, 19, 20.
I shall not be entering into the ontological significance of an individual patch of white which is present in an
object. For a recent discussion of that question see James
Duerlinger, "Predication and Inherence in Aristotle's Categories" in Phronesis XV, 2 (1970), 179-203. Such individuals
seem to depend for their existence on primary substances.
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constitutes the real unit in the world of physical objects.
First of all, it seems quite evident from Aristotle--and
we have no real reason for rejecting his witness 2 9 __ that
Democritus' positing of the atons had its basis in empirical
evidence, even though in some respects he had made some concessions to Eleatic arguments; his theory was one vn1ich, he
felt, did not do away with the validity of appearances.
This empirical foundation is indicated by Aristotle in
his Ii!etanhysics, 4.5, 1009a22-30.30

There Aristotle asserts

that Democritus, among others, caTJle to his view "as a result
of what is percei ved 11 (ex i;wv

a{ 08TftWV

--1009a23), as a result

of the appearance of contraries in the same phenomenal object
(1009a23-25).

But such contraries did not lead Democritus to

deny the witness of the senses altogether, but rather to claim
that both such contraries are true and are in fact due to the
existence of atoms and void at any given part of the object
(1009a25-30); ator.is and void then are posited because of empirical evidence and are intended as well to explain empirical
2 9still Paul Hatorp, _Forschungen ~ ~schichte des
Erkcnntnisuroblcms im Al tertu::.i C.-iildcsheim: ~eorg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, reprinted 1965), p. 165, note 1, v1ou1d reject it; he clair:lS, 11 von allcr Sinnesvrahrnehi11ung· ausdrucklich
wird die yvria(ri yvc4tri unterschieden."
Bu·t; there is no real discrepency betv.reen the witness of
Aristotle and that of Sextus E~piricus on this point; Aristotle
is quite justified in his re'marlcs on the empirical foundations
of atonis.:n, as vlill be shovm in chapter three of this paper.

30rt is iater in the s&~e chapter, at 1009bl3-15 (~o
,a,v6µEvov xa~a ~~v a1aeriaiv i~ dv6~xri, &Arie~, E[va( ,aotv)
that Aristotle vii tnesses to the 'truth' of sense-perception for ·
Democritus.
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facts.
The empirical foundations of Democritus' atomism are
again taken up in Qg

Generation~

Corruution 1.2; quite

early in that chapter the Democritean dictum regarding truth
in appearances is mentioned by Aristotle (315b9-10) precisely
in connection with the atoms (~a ox~µa~a--315bll), the appearance of contraries in a physical object (315bl2), and the construction of physical objects out of atoms, which in this
respect act just like the letters which make up words (315bl415).

A number of lines later in this same chapter (316a5-14)

Aristotle indicates two basic approaches to the positing of
atomic bodies, the approach through logic and the approach
through observation and the study of nature:3 1
"The reason why vrn have not the power to comprehend
the admitted facts is our lack of experience[D ane&p!~.
Hence those who have lived in a more intimate com.>nunion
with the phenomena of nature are better able to lay down
such principles as can be connected together and cover a
wide field; those, on the other hand, who indulge in
long discussions without taking the facts into account
are more easily detected as men of narrow views. One
can see, too, from this the g-reat difference v1hich exists
between those whose researches are based on the phenomenon of nature and those who inquire by a dialectical
method. 1!,or on the subject of atomic magnitudes one
school maintains their existence on the ground that
otherwise the 'ideal triangle 1 will be many, \Vhile Democritus would appear to have been convinced by arguments
germane to the subject and founded on the study of
nature. 11
Democritus is obviously put'into the group of those who formu3lThe translation is that of E.

s.

Forster in Aristotle
~ PassinG-away:,
On the Cosnos, edited by .b. S. .Porst er and D. J. .Purley
TCarnbridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 175, 177.
Qg Sonhistical Hefutations, On Co:ning-to-be
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lated their theories on the basis of a study of the natural
objects of the world; and what follows in the chapter is an
account of Democritus' reasons for positing indivisible bodies.
Thus precisely the indivisibility of these atoms, Aristotle indicates, was posited because of empirical evidence.
In the discussion of divisibility that follows in the chapter
(316al4-317a31) a physical object with extension is in question (o~a ~' efva' xa) µtyeeo, --316al5); and exactly where
the

is to lead to atomic bodies, the term for divi-

argu.~ent

sion(~ 8pd~,,--316b30)

has strong physical and empirical

overtones; and, indeed, the reason given for positing atomic
bodies is to avoid reducing the physical object to a total
illusion:
316b30-32:

xal
'

'
N
~o
~av

oe ouoev aAA
\

I

'

I

I

''
..,#
~
~a,vuµevov

--31 6 a29; also

ou~e ~µa o~ov ~e OlalpEO~Vai xa~a ~av o~µELOV (ou

yap ouva~ov) aAAa µ~XP' ~ou.
Again, in On Generation and Corruution 1.8, the empirical foundation of the indivisible atom is in evidence.

At the

beginning of the chapter Aristotle remarks that Leucippus and
Democritus made their principle accord with nature just as it
is;3 2 and again the reason given for the indivisibility of the
atoms is one apparently based on sense-experience:
objects are broken up

(Bpade~a,,

more readily th.an small

one~

compare 8pd.,, at 316b31)

(326a26).

Aristotle makes the statement:

larger

Also in this chapter

nBut Leucippus thought that he

had accounts which agree with sense-perception and do not do
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av1ay with generation or corruption or with the movement and
multitude of things. 1133 It was thus a consideration of the
phenomenal world that led Democritus to his theory of indivisibles, a theory which, incidentally, also involved accounts
which did not utterly deny the validity of sense-perception,
but vrere in agreement ·with it.
How, in addition to considerations of empirical evidence,
the other major factor which led Leucippus and Democritus to
posit atomic bodies was the arguments of the Eleatics on division.

There is a hint of this in On Generation

and

Corruntion

1.8, 325al-29; there first the fact that Leucippus and Democritus made their principle accord with nature is mentioned
with praise; immediately thereupon Aristotle presents a summary and critique of general Eleatic teaching (325a2-23),
including their teaching of the necessary unity and impassibility ( 6.x(vryi:ov) of that which is ( -i;o ()v), the lack of void
and hence of motion, and including especially the argument:
"For if ('r1hat is] is everywhere divided, nothing is one, and
so there are not even many thin.:;s, but the sum total is
empty."34

This reasoning, Aristotle says, brought them to dis-

reeard sense-perception and sinply to follow their reasoning,
and brought them to the point of madness of denying any real

'
331.8, 325a23-25: AeOXl~~o<;; 5' exelV ~~ST) Aoyou~ Ol~lVe~

.l
~
I
'
.,,
,,
1tRO<;; 'l:T)Y ato8T)atv oµoA.oyovµ.eva
A.t..yoV'l:eC
oux
avatplJoouotv
ou'l:e
y€veoiv ou~e ~8opav ou'l:e x(vT)alv xa\ -i;o ~A~8o~ ~wv ov-i;wv.
34325a8-9: el µev rap nav~~ Btatpe'l:ov, o68ev elVal ev,
l:xJ'l:e o6ee no'A.A.a, a'A.A.a XeVOV '1:0 OAOV.
'

'\

"

t

~
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difference betv1een ice and fire.

Aristotle then goes on·to

mention the argu.111ents of Leucippus in agreement with senseperception (325a23-25, cited in note 33, above).

The extreme-

ly strong implication is that Leucippus (and .Democritus) formulated their teaching as in some sense a reply to the Eleatic
position, for, Aristotle says, Tiemocritus held that what really exists is an absolute plenum (325a28-29:

e

x aµ 7C A. T)8 ~

~o yap xup(w~

Sv

3v ) •

And it is evidently to this reply that Aristotle refers
in Physics 1.3, 187al-3, when he says:

"But some gave in to

both argu:nents, both to the argument that everything is one,
if 'what is' has [only] one meaning [an absolute one

J,

and to

the argument from 'dichotomy', replying to the former that
'what is not' exists, and to the latter by positing atomic
magnitudes."35

But there is no further mention in this pas-

sage as to what this argur.aent from 'dichotomy' is.
One possible identification of this argument from 'dichotomy' is the first of Zeno's paradoxes described at Ph;z_sics
6.9, 239bll-14, that one cannot move because, before reaching
one's goal, one must first reach the half-way point, and,
before reaching that, one must first go half that distance, and
then first half the latter distance, ad infinitum.

This argu-

'

35evtot o·• ~vtl:iooav ~oi'<. t..oyot' t'tµq>o-r~po1~, ~Q µev o-r1
~
'L
'
1\
.!\
!I'.
I/_
'
\
11
'
I
nuv~a cV,
ELI ~o
ov
cV
ODµa ( VEL, u'tl
cO~L ~o µT) ov, 't~ OE EX ~T)'
lhxo-roµ(c:c, (hoµa 1Co1fioav'te:<, µ£y€8D.
Por recent agreement

identifying the 'E.v Lo 1 vii th the ato:nists see Cherniss, .2.12.• cit.,
p. 75, note 303; David J. .Furley, .21?.• cit., p. 81; W. D. Hoss,
Aristotle 1 s Physics (Oxford: Clarendon I-Tess, 1955), p. 481.
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ment is twice referred to by Aristotle as involving 'dichotomY'

(rcb o•xorcoµei'v--239bl8-19;

and ref,) o&xo'l:"oµ(q. --239b22).

3ut a more likely candidate is the argument identified
by

Purley as 'Argu,~ent A' of Zeno; 36 it seems much more appro-

priate to the account given by Aristotle in _Qg Generation and
Corruution 1.8, especially 325a8-9, and to the argument as
outlined in the same work at 1.2.
this:

The argument is roughly

if 'what is' is many, it must be both infinitely small

and infinitely large.

If it has magnitude, it may be infi-

nitely bisected into parts with magnitude, and an infinite
number of finite magnitudes is infinitely large; but, if it
consists of indivisible units, what is indivisible has no magnitude, and so the unit has no mae;nitude.
This argument of Zeno's depends for its force, as Furley
himself points out, 37 on the practical applicability of mathematical division to physical objects, one which results in
physical division; otherwise Zeno's argument might apply as
well to any Eleatic beine with magnitude; and it depends as
well on the complete and simultaneous exhaustion of this division.

It is Zeno's point that the practical application of

divisibility everywhere raises specific difficulties with phenomena:

if 'what is' is everY'vhere divided, then either the

whole object

i~

reduced to'nothings and is nothing but a sheer

36.£2. • .£.i!., pp. 63-69.

This is substantially the same
one that :aoss, Physics, pp. 479-480, suggests.
372.:!2.· cit., pp. 67-68. Furley further states that Zeno
was responding to Anaxagoras in uarticular (p. 76).
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illusion, or each magnitude is inf'initely large--and this too
is directly contrary to empirical evidence.
Democritus basically accepted these Eleatic consequences
for the phenomenal object and agreed to its illusory character.

But his foundation in the study of nature would not let

him agree to the actual, physical application of such division
to the physical object.
So it seems evident that it is precisely the impossibility of physically carrying out mathematical divisibility on
the physical object that Democritus posits as a response to
Zeno's dilemma.

The physical object only seems to be contin-

uous, he would say; but it actually is and remains divided
into atoms; any apparent division of that object is in fact
illusory, for it is not continuous in the first place.

But

the atoms themselves, although they have actual bulk and are
full

(TIA~pe~,

naµTIA~p£~,

vao~6v

), are and remain 'uncut';

mathematical division has no practical application to the
atoms; division there may be conceived in that one might mentally trace li.nes on atoms at which these atoms may be mentally divided.
out.

But such division cannot be physically carried

That this was likely the nature of Democritus' response

will become more evident as we further examine Aristotle's
account of Dem-0critus' tea~hings on the atom.
The major passage in which Aristotle accounts for Democritus' response to Zeno's dilemma is to be found at On Generation and Corruntion 1.2, more specifically at 316al4-317a31.
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It is precisely immediately prior to this passage that Democritus is praised for his being persuaded by arguments

11

found-

ed on the study of nature" (cpuotxoi<; A.6yot<; --316al3) rather
than being simply led by a "dialectical method" ( A.oytxw<;
oxonouv~£<;--316all);

and what follows this purports to illus-

trate exactly that point--more consideration of the study of
nature than of logical argumentation (316al4).
It will be helpful first to sketch generally the argument of the passage as a whole (316al4-317a31), including as
well Aristotle's criticisms--and thus see the passage as a
whole--and then go on to take up the individual parts of the
passage, reserving Aristotle's criticisms for separate consideration later.
The passage begins with what amounts to a recapitulation
and elaboration of what Furley has designated as Zeno's 'Argument A' (316al4-316b9), along with a special _variation supplied by Aristotle (316b9-14).3 8 Then follows what is evidently Democritus' response to this argument, that since a physical object cannot be composed of dimensionless points, there
must be undivided bodies with size; but this, Aristotle says,
involves difficulties taken up elsewhere (316bl4-18).

So

Aristotle says that the problem will have to be examined in a
new light; and.this he doeStby introducing the concepts of
'potency' and 'act' to help clarify the situation, this time
38Furley, .£.12.• cit., pp. 84-85, and Ross, Physics, p.
480, both identify this 'Argument A' with 'the argument from
dichotomy'.
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reaffirming the infinite divisibility of any magnitude into
smaller magnitudes (316bl8-29).

Thereupon he reintroduces the

argument for atomic magnitudes, stating that, since physical
division cam1ot go on forever, it must end, in order to preserve the phenomenon of generation and corruption (316b29317al ); thus, Aristotle says, the position of the atomists
rests on a logical error, for they have taken the •everywhere•
in 'divisible everyi.vhere' collectively instead of distributively, only in the impossible sense of

'everJ~vhere

at once',

but have overlooked the possible sense of •at any of all possible points' (317al-12).

Thus there is no division into what

is indivisible, but only into increasingly smaller magnitudes
(317al2-17).

But generation and corruption are events which

happen to the object as a whole, while the atomists claim that
what happens to all--no more or less--of the physical object
(that is, shifts of the atoms in that physical object) is
alteration (317al7-31).
Thus, what we have in the first portion (316al4-b9) of
this whole passage is basically Zeno•s 39 argument on the divi39since we posses neither Zeno's argiL~ent intact nor any
other independent witness to Democritus' formulation o:f it, it
is impossible to distinc;uish precisely the contribution of each
of these three au.t11ors to its presentation in Aristotle. But
that is not of major importance; it is generally agreed that
this was essentially the ar~nent considered by Democritus and
the one to which he responded b;y" positing ato:uic mae;ni tudes.
Cherniss, .2..2• cit., :p. 113, expresses some hesitancy, but admits that it is consistent with other reiriarks by Aristotle
about Leucippus a.."1.d Dem.ocri tus. Even Sinnige, .2.E.• cit., who is
quite concerned to separate Dcnocritus from the :Sleatic tradition, ad!ni ts Eleatic influence on Democritus.
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY.
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sion of any magnitude into dimensionless points, as received
and considered by Democritus and reformulated by Aristotle.
The basic argument is clear enough and is stated at the outset:

II

...

if one should posit that any body with magnitude

is divisible everY'vhere, and that this is possible. For what
will there be which escapes division? 1140 If it is divisible
everywhere, the object will be constructed out of 'nothings'
and be nothing but an appearance ( £x
'1'

LI~

Oc ouocv uAA

1

1

,L

~atvuµcvov

µ~ocvo~

• • • xa)

'to

~av

__ 316a28-29), or it will consist of

dimensionless points which again can constitute no magnitude
(316a29-30).

AQ~it

division everywhere, Democritus says, and

there will be no physical object at all.
Thus far the

argu.~ent

as considered by Democritus has

placed strong emphasis on the actual, physical carrying out of
the division and on the difficulties engendered by it. 41 Now
Aristotle introduces his ovm variation of the difficulty
(316b9-14), in which he considers the object as divided everywhere in potency ( TCUY'tr.J

apa

Ot ~prytal ouvaµcl --316bll-12).

Even so, Aristotle says, the same difficulty is encountered;
nothing is left but the (points of) division:
~apa -r~v Oia(pcatv; --316bl2.

The physical object cannot be

constructed out of these nor be dissolved into them, for there

'
40
.
,,
~
'
316al5-17: ct 'tt<; 8c(D oG:µa 'tl c(vat xat µtyt:So<;
~
,L
""
,L
'
,,
"
'
Xuv-i;v.
ulalp£1:uV,
xat' 'l:OU'tO
uuva-ruv.
't ( yap
co-rat oncp
'tDY
ota(ptatv ota~cuyct;
S<.

41 one might note: x6.\v d -i;oiho yevo1-ro (316al9); &.'v
61atpe:8f.l (316a21); oq1p~aew (316a24); oq)p~µtvov (316a25)-- all
of which stress the actual carrying out of the division.
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is no way in which one can actually separate out such points
or qualities from continuous extension.
.Aristotle has already made

so~e

Also, in the process,

progress toward answering the

difficulty by hinting that such an infinite division may be
reached in potency, and that one cannot divide a magnitude

--

into points.
This brings us to what is apparently Democritus' re-

sponse to the difficulty (316bl4-16), along with Aristotle's
remark about other difficulties which this response generates
(316bl6-18).

The argument in which the response of Democritus

is formulated is an enthymeme:

"And so, if indeed magnitudes

cannot be constructed out of contacts or points, (and if magnitudes raust be constructed out of something with magnitude),
it is necessary that there be undivided bodies which are still
magnitudes. 1142
Furley claims that Democritus' response was also concei ved by him as being a solution, something \Vhi ch would block
the argument of Zeno, namely, a conceptually indivisible magnitude. 43

:But it is a bod~,r with magnitude that Democritus claims

is indivisible, not a sheer magnitude without any substance to
it (although even the latter would still fail to block Zeno's

42 wo~' El~EP aOuva~ov

es

d~wv

DO~lyµwv

elval ~a

µEytS~, UVayx~ ElVUl oWµa~atao&a(pe~a XUl µeye8~.
I have taken cio& a(pe~a as 'undivided', in the sense that

what it qualifies remains physically indivisible, as that
which hn.s no proper parts into v:hich it can in fact be further
divided. The use of 'magnitudes' here certainly implies that
what rcl:1ains after the physical division has stopp9d is at
least conceptually or mathematically divisible.

43.QE.. cit., pp. 85-86.
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argument, which ·would apparently hold for any magnitude); and
hoW Democritus could have followed Zeno's arguments at all

and supposed that such a body with magnitude is conceptually
indivisible is itself beyond comprehension.
atomic bodies of

De~ocritus

Lloreover, those

have specific shapes--angular,

round, straight-edged (Physics 1.5, 188a25-26)--and they do
come in various sizes (Caelo 3.4, 303al5); and to suppose that
such atoms could be conceptually and mathematically indivisible seems to be stretching things too far.

Thus Furley seems

to be wrong about their 'conceptual indivisibility 1 ; 44 but his
contention will be discussed a little more fully

lat~r.

The physical object, Democritus felt, cannot itself be a
sheer illusion, really reduced to nothing at all; he was compelled by the study of nature rather than by dialectic, by
theory.

His study of nature, his consideration for natural

phenomena, forced him to reject 'divisible everywhere'; so he
rejected it where it counted as far as he vms concerned, in
the sense of the physical division of the physical object.

He

saw no way out of the difficulty but to seT'arate the two kinds
of division, the physical from the conceptual.
Zeno's argument, along with the appearance of contraries
in the same phenomenal object, may well have convincea. Democritus that th9 phenomenal
object as it really is.

44 This, as

~bject

is not after all the physical

The phenomenal object appears contin-

we shall see later, is further supported at
316b29-32, where Democritus' response to 'divisibility everywhere' is repeated.
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uous; and conceptual division may well apply to it without
affecting the physical object at all.

On the other hand, as

far as the atomic magnitude is concerned, Democritus apparently simply denied that it had any practical application there,
and so he rendered it, he felt, totally innocuous.

And he

might very well have said that conceptual division is onJ.y
that--conceptual, that it exists only by convention (voµy).
The next section in this passage (316bl8-27) is a difficult one as it stands in the text.

If we take the text as it

is, one must adrnit that here Aristotle is doing two things.
First of all, he is doing precisely what he says he is doing;
he is reviewing the difficulty about 'division everyv1here'--a
difficulty which led to the positing of atomic magnitudes-from the beginning:
316bl8-19.

Bto ~UAtV

Es

apx~~ ~DV a~op(av Aex~eov

As was the case with his previous presentation of

this difficulty, he begins with a perceptible body which is
divisible (316bl9) and ends with the body vanishing into nothing (316b25-27).
But there is then a problem with the interpretation of
this passage, for it is generally taken to be Democritus' own
restatement of the difficulty with division, a difficulty
which led him to posit atoms.

And this is basically the posi-

tion of Verdenius and Waszink; for they take this whole passage from 316bl8 to 34 to be a Democritean

argu.~ent

for atoms;

but in interpreting the passage in that way they rightly feel
obliged to delete significant portions of the text--all those
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dealing with 'potency• and 'act'.45
only be used as a last resort.

But such deletions should

Sinnige too takes the passage

through 316b34, along with this section--apparently without
deleting the references to 'potency' and 'act•--as a unit and
concludes that Aristotle is only demonstrating the existence
of atoms in the framework of his own thinking. 46 But this too
is unsatisfactory, for the empirical considerations of 316b2934 do in fact seem to be those of Democritus. 47 Furley admits
that it is basically Aristotle's reformulation of the difficulty, but that Democritus might well agree with him; 48 but it
is pure speculation as to what Democritus might do with the
'potency' and 'act' which is introduced in the passage.

Thus

the only reasonable course to take is to assume that 316bl8-27
is, for one thing, a sur.nmary statement by Aristotle of the
difficulty.
4 5w. J. Verdenius and J. H. Waszink, Aristotle On Coming~-be and Pass.:~.11€£-away:
Some comments (Leiden: .ti. CBriil,
196bJ, pp. 11-14. This is really the only reasonable alternative if the passage represents only Democritus' analysis of
the difficulty.

46..QE. • .£.!.!., p. 147.
47see H. H. Joachim, Aristotle On Coming-to-be ~
Passin_g-awa_y (Reprint, Hildesheim and New York: Georg Olms
Verlag, 1970), p. 84. Joachim does not explicitly say that
316bl8-27 is Aristotle's reformulation of the difficulty about
division, but he seems to imply it. If he does in fact intend
that, then I be.lieve that h~ is right.
48.Q.E.. ci~., pp. 90-91. He also claims that Aristotle is
introducing 'potency' and 'act' to show that they cannot solve
the problem; but, as we shall see, they are precisely the
means by which a solution to the problem is reached.

.,,,.
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But it is obviously more than that.

Aristotle is not

merely restating the difficulty, he is also taking us a step
closer to its solution.

He had already brought us the first

step of the way to a solution at 316b9-14, where he had introduced 'potential division everywhere•, and pointed out that
one cannot actually divide a magnitude into points.

He now

takes us the second step toward a solution by using 'potency'
and 'act' to show that there are two distinct meanings for
1t:UV'tlJ.

But, before beginning an analysis of Aristotle's reasoning here, it will be necessary to clarify the meanings of
01a1pe:'to~

and

aoia(pe'to~

cause some obscurity. 4 9

in this passage; these apparently
The difficulty is noticed immediately

in the first sentence, where a magnitude is said to be aoia(pe'toV

at any point in actuality; if 6.01 a(pe'tov

there means

'indivisible', either the formulation belongs to Democritus and
not to Aristotle, and one must then attribute a distinction
between 'potency' and 'act' to Democritus; or Aristotle himself
believes that there is some point at which a magnitude is not
divisible. Neither alternative is acceptable. 50 Furthermore,
the disjunction
xal

(oux

• • • lip.a

• • • EV'teA.e:xe(q. '

aoia(pe'toV

61~p~µevov __ 316b23-24) seems to support the meaning 'undi4

9Joachi~,
instance, in the
his solution--to
really solve the

'

op. cit., p. 83, recognizes the problem, for
conjunction of ouvaµe1 with o&aLQE'tOV. But
take ouvaµe1 more_ closely with e:(va1 --does not
problem.

50Hence Verdenius and Waszink felt justified in excising
portions of the text.

r'
'
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vided'.

.And So, in this analysis, 6talperco<;; and a6La(pc:'t.oc; --

especially when qualified by OUVaµtl--Will be taken in the
sense of 'divided' and 'undivided•. 51 This has the advantage
of making sense of the passage as a whole and of making that
sense more apparent.
The difficulty, Aristotle strongly implies at 316bl9-27
already, with 'divisible everywhere' is that 'everywhere• has
two distinct meanings.

These two meanings are distinguished

and specified in the first two sentences of the passage:
• • • ~µa 'Jt<.1V't1J

' • • •
µev

22).

'to'

(316bl9-

And the concepts of 'potency' and 'act' are applied to

both meanings to show that they are indeed different.
first meaning of

'Jtav't~

is xae' d'tLouv

o~µeiov

, 'at

~

The
of all

its points'; and, by applying 'potency' and 'act' to this
meaning, Aristotle shows that there is absolutely no difficulty engendered by it at all (oooev a'to'Jtov--316b20); indeed,
a magnitude may be both divided and undivided at any point, as
long as the first applies potentially and the latter actually.

51 compare Liddell, Scott, Jones, Mckenzie, Greek Knglisfl:
Lexicon under 'a6La(pe'to<;;, I' and 'oLalpe'toc;, I'; both 'divided' ana 'undivided' have at least some precedent in Aristotle.
The transfer from one meaning to the other is quite easy in
Aristotle, because before an object is 'actually divided' it
must be 'potentially divided', that is, 'divisible'.
Thus ouvaµ El o i alp t'tov, which is frequently translated
as 'potentially divisible': that is, 'able to be divisible',
which at best is redundant, simply makes better sense as
'potentially divided' or 'divisible'.
This view has even more support when one considers that
Aristotle hinself refers specifically to the ambiguity of this
word, aota(pe~o<;;, in On the Soul 3.6, 430b6, where he says:
'to 0' aoLa(pE'tOV ErC£,l0t~ TfO'UvaµE:l 1)' evepye(q,.
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Indeed, the whole difficulty with 'divisible everywhere'
is engendered by the second meaning of naV't'l;J, aµa
all its points at once'.

nav't~--'at

That meaning does not even seem to

apply 'potentially', much less 'actually'; for, if it did apply 'potentially', that potentiality might be actualized:

yap Buva'tov, x~v ytvot't0--316b23.

el

But that potency is one

which cannot be actualized in such a way that the magnitude
remains both undivided and divided (for these are contradictions), so as to save the magnitude from annihilation:
~o'te aµa e{Val aµcpCJ) ~V'tef.exe(q:, 6.01a(~e-i;oV

316b23-24.

XUL

'
oux

611;JpT)µtvov

(The only sense in which the potency 'ITUV'tr.J

'
01atpe'tov
can be actualized is the first sense of 'at any
point':

at.t.' Olr.JpT)µevov xae' O'tlOUV OT)µerov --316b24-25.)

Thus it is more precisely aµa

naV't'l;J

o La' p e'l:bV which raises the

difficulty that was so puzzling at 316al4-b9; and this is what
reduces the body to nothing and seems to force us to reconstruct it out of points or 'nothings'; this is what was not
possible (316b25-27); and the application of 'potency' and
'act' have made this quite evident.
This brings us to another statement of the problem of
'divisible everywhere' and Democritus' response by positing
atomic magnitudes (316b28-34). 52 In the previous statement of
the problem and Democritus'' response the division was viewed
as complete and then ruled impossible; now the problem is

52 Joachim, .2.E.· cit., p. 84, specifically identifies this

as reproducing "the experiential basis of the Atomists' theory. 11
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viewed from a different vantage point--before tho division is
actually completed.

It is evident that an object is divided

into constantly smaller and distinct magnitudes (316b28-29).

But, Democritus claims, this infinite division cannot in fact
be carried out to its end, .!.!2£ can it actually take place at
all the points of the object (note that Democritus uses xa~a
nav

o~µErov

in contrast to Aristotle's xae'

d~louv o~µEiov

).

Thus actual division must only go to a certain magnitude
(316b29-32), and so there must necessarily be undivided magnitudes

(a~oµa µ£y€e~)

which make up the physical object; and

generation and corruption will take place by the separation
and association of these atoms (316b32-34).
It is noteworthy that in the above passage there is a
strong emphasis on physical division. The introduction of the
term
epuwl' (316b30) 53 contributes noticeably to this empha-

n

sis.

Furthermore, the statement that a magnitude cannot be

divided at all its points (316b31) seems to admit that there
are points on it at which it cannot in fact be divided.

Thus

all of this as well argues against Furley•s contention that the
atom of Democritus is conceptually as well as physically indivisible.
Excursus:

Against 'I!lathematicallx Indivisible'

It may

be

"

appropriate here to say a few words about

Furley's proposal that Democritus• atoms are conceptually (or,
53see Joachim, loc. cit.
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mathematically) indivisible as well as physically indivisible.54

Furley's arguments are basically three:

1) only a

mathematically indivisible atom would block Zeno's argument;
2) Aristotle

a~~onishes

the atomists for coming into conflict

with mathematical sciences (Caelo 3.4, 303a20-24), and this
can only refer to their positing mathematically indivisible
magnitudes; and 3) Simplicius says that the atom of Democritus
has no parts and thus must be conceptually indivisible.
54on. ~., pp. 85-101. Guthrie, History, II, 503-507,
had independently come to the same conclusion. Furley's account is the most complete and so will be used here •.
T..richael C. Stokes, ~ and T.:1any i.n Presocratic Philosophy
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), basically accepts
Furley's analysis, although he does find inadequate Furley's
answer to the question why the atomists emphasized so heavily
the hardness of the atom (p. 232).
It seems evident that there may be some confusion in regard to the terminology used; and this may be generating some
of the difficulty. Thus I shall specify the following usages: 1) 'conceptually divisible'--in the mathematical sense,
one can conceptually divide any magnitude; 2) 'theoretically
divisible'--that which has distinct parts into which it can be
divided (as a chair is divisible into legs, seat, and back);
and 3) 'physically divisible'--that which can in fact be physically divided (water, for example--if we neglect molecules
and such--can be so divided, although it does not appear to
have proper parts into which it can be divided),
It is, I contend, in senses '2' and '3' that atoms are
indivisible, hence the emphasis both on their hardness and on
their lack of parts.
Qua atom, the atom is not 'divisible' into further parts,
for the atomic body is defined as the lowest physical part. It
seems to be indivisible qua atom rather than™ magnitude.
In :.Ietaphysi cs 5. 6, 1016b3-6 Aristotle speaks of things
which do not a&nit of division in thought (ooa µ~ 'lxu ota(peotv ); thus.man aua man 'does not admit of division, nor does
magnitude~ magnitude (i.e., what is a single magnitude; if
that were divided, it would no longer be a sinele maenitude).
~his i,s particularly true of primary substances (xa't ri;o1hwv
ooa ouo(c.t). And Aristotle says that Democritus' atoms are
identifiable as substances (~. 7.13, 1039all).
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As to Furley•s first argu.ment, that only a matheoaticallY indivisible atom would block Zeno's argument, one must
admit that it has the merit of simplicity.
factors which weigh against such an answer.
factors have already been mentioned:

But there are
Some of these

there is the fact that

Democritus is supposed in-this respect to have been swayed by
a study of nature rather than by dialectic, and the fact that
the atoms have specific varieties of shapes and come in different sizes; there is a strong and conscious emphasis on physical division, not only throughout the passage as a whole, but
particularly noticeable at 316b29-34, where the argument is
more evidently Democritus' own (where it also seems implied
that there are points on objects at which they cannot be
divided).
Let us consider first the only statement in the passage
which really seems to say that there are mathematically indivisible magnitudes; this is to be found at 316bl5-16:
elval owµa~a UOla(pE~a xat µEy~8D.

much with

oWµa~a a6La(pe~a,

avayxD

The problem here is not so

for this obviously means bodies

which are physically indivisible, such that one cannot in fact
divide them.

But what meaning are we to give to

a~)la(pE~a

Its most apparent meaning is 'indivisible magnitudes';
and here is wh?re the diffi'culty lies. 55 Magnitudes are propµEy~8D?

55sinnige, .££• .£1!., p. 146, claims that this is certainly not Democritus' view, but Aristotle's erroneous opinion
of what Zeno concluded fro:r.i his ovm argument.
But, let us assume, as we have thus far in this paper,
that it is basically Democritus' response.
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erties of bodies; physical division applies to bodies; so.in
what sense are we to take

\

n6ta(pe~a

as applied to magnitudes?

Are the minute physical bodies physically indivisible because
there are mathematically indivisible magnitudes?

Or are there

some maenitudes which remain undivided because the physical
bodies of which they are properties cannot be 'theoretically'
or 'physically' divided?

The latter seems to be the case for

Democritus; he was more influenced by nature than by dialectic.
But, even so, let us assume for the moment that a6ta(pe~a µEyes~

is still

a~biguous;

yet, when it becomes more evi-

dent in the passage that the argument is Democritus' own, the
term used there is less ambiguous:

a~oµa

•••

µeyte~

(316b32), 'uncut magnitudes•.
The question may then be raised as to whether Democritus'
response was really intended to block the argument of Zeno
after all.

Aristotle nowhere says that it was.

We need to

return to a consideration of Physics 1.3, 187al-3.

All that

Aristotle says there is that the atomists made some concessions
to the argument from 'dichotomy' when they proposed 'uncut
magnitudes ( eveoooav • • •

~~

Oe

ex~~~ ClXO~oµ(c~, a~oµa

TIOlDOUV~E~ µeyte~).

But Physics 1.3, 187a1-3 also mentions a second argument
to which the atomists 'made some concessions•.

It may be help-

ful to consider briefly that second argument and the response
of the atomists; there may be some similarity between the vmys

,,..
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in which the two responses of the atomists were made.
second Eleatic argument is roughly:

The

if 'what is' has one

meaning, then 'what is not' (the void) does not exist, and all
that is is one; there is no multiplicity or motion.5 6 What
then is the atomists' response?

They argue (as was evident

also in the argument for atoms) from empirical evidence to the
impossibility of the conclusion:

there obviously is motion;

and, if motion, then the void exists.

They allow the premise,

but avoid the evidently impossible conclusion by adding another sense of 'what is', though still retaining the absolute
sense of 'is'--the void is simply and absolutely 'what is
not'.

They concede that 'what is' has one meaning, but feel

compelled by empirical evidence to admit that 'what is not'
also 'is'.

This does not block the argument, it hedges on it

by claiming two absolute senses of 'is'.
Something similar appears to happen with the response to
the argument from 'dichotomy':

if an object is divisible ev-

erywhere, the object is reduced to nothing.

As above, empir-

ical evidence will not allow the atomists to deny the reality
of the physical object.

Again, they apparently allow the pre-

mise, but argue for two senses of 'divisible':

1) there is a

sense in which things are divisible everywhere, and in that
sense it

appli~s

to the phenomenal object, and if that is di-

visible everywhere, "then the whole thing is nothing but an

56r have added the consideration of motion here from On

Generation and Corruption 1.8, 325a27, which seems to
to a similar argument.

refer~
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appearance; 1157 2) there is also a separate and distinct sense
of 'divisible' which applies to the physical object, and in
this sense 'divisible everywhere' does not apply.

This like-

wise does not block the argument of Zeno, but only hedges on
it by claiming two senses of 'divisible'.
So, not only is it equally possible that Democritus' response was not intended to block Zeno's argument, but in the
light of the distinction which Democritus obviously made between the physical object and the phenomenal object it is also
more likely that he did not intend to block it.
Furley's second argument, from the conflict with mathematical sciences, is equally doubtful.

On the assumption that

atoms were only physically indivisible, mathematical science
would have no real, practical application; their only application would be to phenomenal objects--which arc not in fact
real.

This would seem to be as much a fight against mathemat-

ical science as the conceptually indivisible atom; indeed, the
passage quoted above (Caelo 3.4, 303a20-24) mentions the rejection of phenomena almost in the same breath with the conflict with mathematical science.

Democritus• physically indi-

visible atom thus robbed mathematics of its real significance;
and it is .Aristotle's continuing contention, especially in Qg
Generation and Corruption

i.2,

that mathematics does indeed

apply to reality in a practical way.

So, not only is Furley's

57 Gen. et Corr. 1.2, 316a29: xa'1 'to nav DD ouoev aA.A. +,'
~a1v6µev~ Sinniee, ou. cit., p. 145, rightly marks this as
applicable to Democritus' teaching on sensation.
1
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contention here not necessary (it is not the only feasible
alternative), but neither is it the more likely one.
Furthermore, Furley cites Democritus' 'Cone problem', as
mentioned in Plutarch, to support his claim. 58 But this too
might simply show that mathematical division applied only to
phenomena, and not to any real objects; it says nothing at all
to substantiate Furley•s claim.
Furley's third argument is equally indeterminate.

Sim-

plicius' claim that Democritus' atoms are partless is countered
by another claim, again in Simplicius, that they have parts. 59
Furley recognizes this, but prefers to believe that they are
partless and for that reason mathematically or conceptually
indivisible.

But even this does not follow; that they have no

parts likely implies for Democritus that there are no proper
parts into which the atom can be divided; they were not to be
like the 'elements' of Anaxagoras, which always could be further divided into proper parts (Zeno's arguL'lent may well have
convinced Democritus that Anaxagoras was wrong in this re-

5B.9.:P.• cit., p. 100. The problem is cited in Diels-Kranz
at 68Bl55. If""'a cone is divided parallel to its base, the
circle a·t the bottom of the top section will be either equal or
unequal to the top of the bottom section; if equal, the cone
becomes a cylinder; if unequal, the side of the cone is not a
continuous straight line.
59simnlicii in Aristo'telis Phvsicorum Libros Quattuor
Priores Co:nmentaria;- vol. IX, and Simnlicii in .AristoterrsPh;;rsicorum Libros Quattuor Posteriores Comi~entaria, vol. X in
Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, both volumes ed. by Hermann
!hels (Berliii: George iteirner, 1882-1895). Simplicius says
that the atoms have no parts at vol. X, p. 925, lines 13ff .,
and that they do have parts at vol. IX, p. 82, line 1.

,,,,.

49

spect).

That Democritus' atoms had no parts most likely meant

for him precisely that they were 'theoretically' and 'physically' indivisible.

Thus there is no real contradiction to

the other statement by Simplicius that atoms do have parts,
for Aristotle points out that, since they have magnitude, they
do indeed have parts of a sort and, as such, they are for an
Aristotelian that which can at least theoretically be divided.
Again Furley's argument is shown to be ineffective; he has not
supported his contention that they were mathematically indivisible.

Thus, in this respect too Democritus' atoms were more

likely 'physically' indivisible but 'conceptually' further
divisible.
Hore on Democritus' Atom as the Unit
-------

Thus driven by Zeno's argument on divisibility and by

empirical considerations--contraries in the same phenomenal
object--to deny that the phenomenal object is real and to hold
that the physical object is composed of physically indivisible
bodies, Democritus posited his atomic bodies as that which
really exists, as

~o

ov.

Although his response is in terms of

Eleatic 'being' (and 'not-being'), and although Democritus
still uses 'is' in an absolute sense--like the Eleatics in this
respect--yet the meaning of 'what is' for Democritus is differ-

'

ent enough that he nay also be considered apart from the Eleatic tradition, in that his 'being' has body, is in motion, has
bulk, and is in fact perceptible (although not actually seen
or, perhaps, felt in isolation).

Democritus' being is in fact
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constitutes physical objects and acobjects.
It is in this respect that Aristotle at Metaphysics 4.5,
1009a27-30 rightly puts Democritus in the tradition of Anaxagoras, for, like Anaxagoras, he had attempted to account for
such contraries in the phenomenal object.

But Democritus ac-

counts for them by referring them to the prime contraries,
•what is full' and 'what is empty•, that is, 'what is' and
•what is not'.

Precisely as such contraries these elements

are present at any given section of the physical object:
d~lOUV

UTIUPX£lV

xae'

µepo~--1009a28-29.

Aristotle describes a little more fully the way in which
the atoms accounted for the varieties of contraries in phenomenal objects at Physics 1.5, 188a22-26.

Here again, according

to Aristotle, Democritus proposed 'the full' as 'what is' (~o
TIAnpe~ • • • ~~ ov--188a22-23); and the atoms are there de-

scribed as having different shapes

(crx~µa~o~

yeywv1wµevov

ayWVtOV, £08U TIEpl~Epe~--188a25-26) in terms Of contraries.
These then are some 60 of the prime atomic and physical contraries which help accotint for contraries in phenomenal objects.
Aristotle once more says that Democritus specifies 'the
full' as 'what is' at netaphysics 1.4, 985b4-10; this time he
adds the term
vacr~ov--to

cr~epeov

('so~id')--obviously

describe the atom.

a reflection of

The atom is thus to be consid-

60 others, such as those contributed by the relative position of an atom, will be more fully discussed in the third
chapter in connection with the structure of physical objects.

r
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ered as more than merely being 'full' or 'full being' in the
abstract sense; it is an absolutely solid physical substance;
it is full (and undifferentiated) matter.

Such atoms (along

with the void) are the physical matter which constitutes physa'l-ria oe -rwv ov-rwv rcaurca We; uA.T)V--985b9-lO.

ical objects:

The varying size of these atoms also contributes to an
explanation of phenomenal characteristics of physical objects.
Aristotle cites the fact that the atomists made the distinctions between water, air, and other objects ones due to size
(aepa

Be

xal uowp xal rcdA.A.a µeye8e1 xat µ1~po'tT)'tl OLeiA.ov--

Caelo 3.4, 303al4-15), with the distinction being obViously
the size of the atoms constituting these objects.

Furthermore,

the generation of one such object from another is due to the
.

\

separating out of the largest atoms: 'ta µey10-ra o4i.a-ra EXXpLvoµeva, ~ao\ 6

1

OU'tW y(yveo8a1 uowp xa1 depa xa~ y~v e~ alA.~-

A.wv--Caelo 3.4, 303a27-29.

This evidently means that water,

for example, is composed of a variety of atomic sizes, with
more larger atoms than, for instance, air.

This accounting

for differences between objects by the sizes of atoms they
contain is supported by a similar account by Aristotle of
Democritus' theory at .Q!1 the Heavens 3.7, 305b22-26.
So every other thing that there is is composed of these
atoms with their varying shapes and sizes:

ex owµarcwv UOLa1-

percwv rcdA.A.a ouyxeio8a1 --~. et Corr. 1.1, 314a21-22.

But be-

cause of the apparent infinite variety of phenomenal differences, they proposed an infinite number of atoms:

aTie1pa rc~
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cpa' vop.eva, 't"U oxfiµa'i;a 3.1tE:l pa e1tOlT)OUV --Gen. et Corr. 1.2,.

315b9-l0.

61

These atoms themselves are and forever remain the same,
whether as part of a physical object or apart from it in isolation.

There is no change in the atom itself, not even to

account for change in the physical (or in the phenomenal) object; the atom~ none of the 'secondary qualities' (e.g.,
color, heat, relative hardness) nor can it receive one.
thus described by Aristotle as being
326al).

a1ta8e~ (~.

It is

et Corr. 1.8,

The only 'motion' that is possible for it is locomo-

tion, the movement of the
the void. 62

other~Tise

changeless atom through

All other motions are explained by the atomists simply
and solely in terms of that locomotion.

The generation and

corruption of a physical object for them amounts to no more
than the addition and substraction of atoms of that group that
constitutes the object in question; alteration is explained
simply by the shifts of those atoms already in the object. 63

61 For their infinite number see also Physics 3.4, 203a20
and Caelo 3.4, 303a6. Leo Elders, Aristotle's Cosmology
(Assen: Royal van Gorcum, 1966), p. 301, note 1, suggests
that we should rather speak of an indeterminate number. But,
one wonders, if the number of different shapes--as a sub-set
of atoms--is also infinite, might not 'infinite' after all be
quite appropriate?
. '
62 See Physics
.
' ou'tol
'
' xa'ta'
8.9, 265b24-26: xal' yap
't"T)V

't"OTIOV x(VT)OlV XlVeroea, 't~V q>UOlV AEYOUOlV (~yup Ola 't"O xevov
I 't"OTI~
') •
x ( VT)Ot~ cpopu,(.IeO'tlV XUl' - tw~ EV

6 3Gen. et Corr. 1.2, 315b8-9:

otaxp(oet µev xal ouyxp(oel ylvea,V-xa1 cp8opav, 't"Uset OE xat 8EOel aAAO(WOlV.

r
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,,

Thus, for instance, the generation of air from water takes

'

place by the separating out of the largest atoms (Caelo 3.4,
303a27-29).

The coloration of an object actually takes place

by change in the position of the atoms in that object (~. ~

----

corr. 1.2, 316al-2); and the change from a fluid state to a

solid state in the same object similarly takes place only by
such shifts

(~.

et

.2..2..!:£• 1.9, 327al6-19).

Thus, in the

midst of all phenomenal change, the atoms themselves remain
absolutely unchanged.
Indeed, it is because these atomic shapes retain the
function of their various shapes that the characteristics which
we ascribe to the physical object are explained.

Fire is ex-

tremely mobile and penetrates objects quite readily and so
breaks them up precisely because the spherical shapes which
constitute it have and retain those characteristics even when
they are parts of the physical object which we call fire; and
soul is extremely sensative to motion and thus is also able to
set other things into motion for the same reason
404a2, 6-8).

(Ai.~ima

1.2,

Objects appear to us black or white, they appear

to have particular flavors because the atomic shapes in such
objects are of a certain variety

(~.

4, 442bll-14).

Thus it

is an essential part of Democritus' system of the explanation
of the

charac~eristics

of phenomenal objects that the atoms

retain their shapes and the specific functions of those shapes,
that they remain impassible, that they remain always the same.
Thus, the atoms themselves can have no potency.

Charac-
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rterized by being simple and unqualified matter, by having a
specific shape and size and, perhaps, weight, 64 they simply
are, in an Eleatic absolute sense of 'is'; they are one of
those things which always is ('tl

a{

e\ • • • 'eo'o v --Physics 8.1,

252a33), and to which as a sufficient principle Democritus
refers as the causes that explain nature. 65 These physical
atoms are therefore in eternal actuality.
Furthermore, since it is and remains such a physical uni-

ty and theoretically indivisible, Democritus' atom is identifiable as the real substance.

This, Aristotle claims at :Weta-

Ehysics 7.13, 1039a9-10, is what Democritus taught; the passage in which this citation is found (1039a7-ll) may be translated as follows: 66
"And so, if the substance is a single thing, it will
not consist of substances existing in it, and in this way
·Democritus is right, for he says that it is imP.9ssible
for a unity to be generated out of two things &,toms] or

6 4'£he question whether the atoms have weight will be
discussed in chapter two.
65 PfJ.YSics,8,.l, 252a)2-35: voµ(se&v apx~v e(va& iaO'-tT)V•
l~av'f)v,, el.~'Il a&£~ ; • . E:O'IlV • • • ecp' d' 6T)µOXpl't'O<; avayel
~a<; ne:p&
~uoe:wc; Ul~la,.
,,
T) ~~

• 6 ~1039a9-10 reads: aouva't'oV ye\p e(va( ~TJOL\I EX ouo tv

e:vo, ouo ye:v€o8at. The uoint that Aristotle makes here in
citing Democritus is that two~actual atoms as substances can
not constitute a new unity, nor can a single atom contain two
(or more) ac·t;ual •sub-atoms'. See Hoss, I:Ietaphysics, II, 209,
211.
.
'
Cherniss, ou. cit., p. 341, note 18, savs that Aristotle
is reading into the physical doctrine of atomism his own metaphysical principles. But, if Democritus had not held precisely
the position that _Aristotle here attributes to him, had he admitted either that atoms ::nay merge to form a unified physical
object, or that they may actually be divided into 'sub-atoms'
the physical object would be reduced to nothings, an illusion.

r
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Lan

for two things to arise from what is one
he makes his atomic magnitudes substances."

atoraj~ for

Aristotle here makes at least one point quite clear about Democritus' atoms, that is, that they intentionally and by definition do not consist of further atoms as actual parts.

This

may very \Yell mean that Democritus 1 atom was indivisible in
somewhat the same sense that a substance for Aristotle was indivisible, that there are no actual substances as parts in it
into which it can be divided, that the atom was thus not indivisible because its magnitude was mathematically indivisible,
but simply because it had no proper parts into which it could
be divided.
But the point about
v~aeaa

aouva~ov

I

S::.

#

E:X uUO

• • •

(1039a9-10) is not quite as clear.

t\
E:V

• • • ye-

Ross evidently takes

this as meaning "a single atom cannot be produced out of two
atoms. 1167 But that does not seem to be quite the point that
Democritus was making with this statement; and that Aristotle
evidently did not take it that way becomes clearer from the
two other instances in which Aristotle.quotes this teaching of
Democritus.

The first of these is from On Generation and Cor68
FUPtion 1.8, 325a34-36:
•
•
•
and when they [the atoms] are set together and
involved with one another, they produce physical objects.
And a multitude would not arise from what is truly one,
nor would ·what is one' arise from those things which are
11

67noss, hletaphysics, II, 209.
68 XU&'

OUV~&

~oG xa~'aA~8E&aV
1

noAAWV ev, aAA

e ~µe:va
L
s::."' XUl
' ne:p&X~Exuµe:va
"\
-'
uE
yEVVav.
~Vos oux €v YEV{o8al ~AD80~ ouo' lx

e:(vaL

~ou~'

aouva~ov.

.

~
~WV aA~8Ws

eX
I

>;

u~
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truly many, but it is impossible that they would."·
The second passage is at .Q!1. the Heavens 3.4, 303a6-8: 69
•
•
•
and [they claim] that max1y things are not generated out of what is one [the atom] nor is one thing
generated out of what is many (the atoms], but all
things are produced by the invOlvement and scattering
around of these atorns. 11
11

In both these passages the generation or structure of physical
objects is connected with Democritus' claim, and it is most
likely that to which this second part of Democritus' claim is
to be connectea. 70 The claim then is that when atoms congregate to form a physical object they do not in fact form a unity.

Here then is

lik~ly

an explicit denial on Democritus'

part that the physical object is a real unity, a claim, therefore, that the phenomenal unity of the object is nothing but
an illusion.
Thus now, taking both parts of Democritus' claim together, inasmuch as the atoms cannot be further divided in themselves, and inasmuch as these atoms, when they form a physical
object, do not in fact form a real unity, these atoms are the
only true and physical unit that there is.
60..
'
~at

"I " I '
'
,,
I
..,
Ill.
TIOnna
YlYVE09at
OU'r£
EX
~OAAWV ~v,
aA.A.' -i;ij 'tOU'rWV ouµ'Jt/...oxij xa't 1t:£plnaA.<iC.:El 'JtUV'ra yEvva'.o8at.
I

follow
p.

It

OU~

~lders,

I

1 -

£~

j,

'

~vo,

op. cit., p. 300, and Kirk and Raven, Sl!?.• cit.,

418, in tranSTatingnEplrraA.asEt

as 'by scattering around 1 •

70 Joachim, ou. cit., p. 163 rightly identifies the

xa-i;, aA.~O E~ av

tv

-i;o

With-:ni'e individual atom and the 'IQ a/...T)8W<;
n:oA.A.~ with an aggregate of atoms, which, though forming a perceptible body, never constitute a real unit. And, if this is
the meaning of Democritus' clair::t here in On Generation and
9orruption 1.8, 325a34-36, then tnis is evidently the way in
Which this same claim of Democritus is to be taken in the passage at LletaEhysics 7.13.
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Aristo_t}_e 's Cri ticisr:i: Against t~
jjenial of the Unity of the Physical Object
In the world of nature for Aristotle it is the individual physical object, the primary substance, which is 'one'
thing in the strictest sense of the term; upon its unity de(~.

pends not only accidental unity

5.6, 1015bl6-36), but

also unity in species, in genus, and by analogy (1016b311017a3).

It is this primary substance which is 'one' by con-

tinuity: ~wv

oe

xae' tau~a ~v AEyoµevwv ~a µEY Aeye~al ~Q

auvex~ elva, (1015b36-1016al).71

And it is this which is 'one'

in the primary sense, for its o6a(a (substance, informed matter) is one; and it is 'one' because it is continuous, because

µeva

"'
~v

~
.J..
I
(
#
#
wV
., oua
a µLa,
µLa
OE'

(1016b8-9).

n ouvexe
J\

(

q

oe

xp&tw~

ef6El

~Ady~

~a

its form is one and its definition is one:

n
1\

AEyo-

\

And this is the first major point on which he

criticizes the teaching of Democritus on·the atom as the real
physical object and unity.
But it is not only the teaching that there are atomic
shapes in reality that negates the real unity of the physical
object, but also the doctrine of the void, which in the physical object separates those atoms which constitute that object.
And there are in Democritus' teaching a number of phenomena
which are explained more

fr~m

the point of view of the void--

such as, expansion, contraction, growth, and motion.

And,

71 Two thines are continuous when they have a single
boundary in common (Physics 5.3, 227a21-23). If two parts are
to become a unity in the strict sense, it is necessary that
they have this boundary in common.
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although these explanations too involve an unnecessary and
unreasonable denial of the unity of the individual physical
object, they will be considered in chapter two of this paper
in connection with the doctrine of the void.

The discussion

here in this chapter will be limited to those of Aristotle's
criticisms which trace this denial of the unity of the physical object more immediately and directly to the teaching that
there are atomic shapes.
Specifically, Aristotle's criticisms of atomic shapes in
this respect is that such atoms not only deny obvious and evident unities, 72 but also do not, and cannot in principle, account at all for all the facts.
First of all, if one argues from empirical evidence--and
the atomists evidently did--Aristotle claims in On

~

Heavens

3.8, 306b3-5, 9-15, that a doctrine of differentiation of simple bodies by basic shapes is unreasonable.

This criticism

seems to be directed not only against Plato's views, but also
against any attempt in general to reduce the simple bodies to
shapes:

OAW~ OE 't"O ne:1pffo8a1 't"U d:n:A.ff

eo't"1--306b3-4.

0

a Wµarca axT)µa't"(l;;e:iv at..oyov

Such attempts are cited as being unreasonable

in the first place because, in that case, the simple bodies
cannot fill up a whole or constitute a material continuity
(306b4-5).

Bu~,

more

empirical evidence

impo~tantly,

(~a(ve:'t"aL

in the second place, we have

--306b9) that simple bodies do

72 That such a denial is, furthermore, unnecessary and
thus unwarrented will be shown in the latter part of this
chapter.
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adjust their form to suit their container, especially water
and air.

If the basic shape of the element remains, it will

certainly not fill its container as a whole: 73 06 yap ~v
~~~E~o nav~ax~ ~ou nEp1£xov~o~ ~6 OAOV--306bl2-13; and that

would be contrary to empirical evidence.74

Thus, to account

for simple bodies in terms of specific shapes is to deny the
wholeness and continuity of such a body and to deny empirical
evidence.

Aristotle reasonably chose empirical evidence:

~avEpov 0~1

~o~E

oux EO~lV ~p10µ€va ~a ox~µa~a a6~wv --306bl4-15.

A second basic unity which Democritus by his atomic theory denies is the real unity of the individual animate creature.

This is a unity of a higher order, for it is one sup-

plied by nature itself and is not artificially imposed on the
creature. 75 It was Democritus' view that soul consists of
spherical shapes; 76 this, by itself, strongly implies that soul
7 3Elders, .2..E.• cit., p. 323, remarks on OAov: "It signifies a coherent and substantial unity (Aristotle's outlook is
fro.:n the outset different from that of the atomists). 11
It is precisely such a OAOV which is at issue with Democritus, and thus the argument here applies to Democritus'
position as well.
74Ibid., p. 322, where Elders rightly remarks: "Aristotle makes here a very important criticism on a point overlooked by Plato, viz. of how space, not informed by figures,
can be real."
I do not doubt that this criticism is directed primarily
against Plato; but it involves the citation of empirical evidence against any view tha~ holds a reduction of simple bodies
to specific shapes that is significant.
75 r1Ietaphysics 5. 6, 1016a4: µaAAOV tv 't"a qnfo E1 ouv EXTi t)
'tlXV'l'J.
El5~

~ 6 see~ for, example, Anima 1.2, 404a2:

nup xaL

~uxnv ~fyEL.

~~oµwv ~a o~aLpo

""

is not a continuum and cannot itself be a unified thing.
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Fur-

thermore, if, as Democritus seems to hold, this soul is scattered throughout the percipient body (Anima 1.5, 409b2), and
soul is taken to be some sort of body itself, then there will
actually be two bodies in the same place; the animate creature
itself will really consist of two bodies (409b3-4).

It will

not be a unity at all.
Furthermore, Aristotle objects specifically to Democritus' theory of alteration on the same grounds at Q!! Generation
Corruption 1.9, 327al5-22.
-and
change of the same body

The example cited there is the

(~o a~~o

oWµa--327al6) from a liquid

to a solid;7 7 this, Democritus claims, occurs by the shifting
of positions of the constituent atoms:
anep AEyet ~Y)µoxpt~o~--327al8-19.

Here Aristotle appeals to

empirical evidence (opwµEV--327al6) for the continuity of the
physical object before

ouvexe~

ov

and during

o~e µ~v uypov o~e

oe

and after the change:
~eTIY)yo~ --327al7. 78 The object

was and remained a continuous whole throughout the process of
change; empirical evidence again contradicts the position of
77r take the most reasonable referents to be the xp6o~aA

Ao~ at 1. 8, 325a22 and the uou)p at 326a34, al though it is not

essential to the argument that they be so identified.
I

EO'r l

7 8Also 327a22:

anav

~ypov, O'CE OE OXAY)pov xa) 'ITETIY)yo<;:

V •

Cherniss, .2.E.• cit., p. 105, contends that here Aristotle
seems quite naive in that Aristotle should expect to~ the
atoms moving. But Cherniss' emphasis is wrong; Aristotle says
that we have empirical evidence for the continuity of the object during alteration, not that he fails to see the atoms moving. This makes a great deal of difference, for thus the burden of proof is on Democritus, not on Aristotle.
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Democritus.
The same thing is true with regard to Democritus' theory
of generation and corruption, for he taught that generation
and corruption occur by the addition and subtraction of atoms
from the mass of atoms \'lhich constitute the physical object
(~.

et Corr. 1.2, 315bl6-17); this means that for Democritus

a new object is generated whenever a single atom is added to
the original group.

This too is contrary to empirical evi-

dence, for, as Aristotle points out at

~

Generation and Cor-

ruption 1.4, 319bl4-17, generation and corruption occur precisely ·when the physical object changes ~ .e_ whole, ?9 and
nothing :perceptible persists as an identical substratum--as
when seed changes to blood, or water to air.

When a physical

object changes, it is obvious that the kind of change which
involves generation or corruption is a change of the object as
a whole, and not just some (perhaps minute) part of it.
Furthermore, not only does Democritus' theory negate
phenomena, but also, Aristotle points out, precisely in connection with the mutual generation of the simple bodies the theory
of atomic shapes cannot even in principle account for the facts
of phenomena, although they were supposed to do exactly that.
Aristotle's criticism of this inconsistency in atomism is

' p. 108, and Verdenius and Was79see Joachim, .£1?.· cit.,
zink, £E· cit.' p. 17' on the meaning of oA.ov here.
'..lhe pas~aae is as follows: O'l:QV o' oA.ov µc:1:af3aA.A.1jl WO
un:oµtvovrco<; UlCJ.gT)TOU 1:1VO£; W£; U'T[OXEl!-LeVoU 'T.OU QU't"OU at..A. 01'ov
tx 't"~' yov~, a~µa naari, ~ ~~ ~Oa1:o£; d~p ~ ~~ dfpo' nav'l:~' ~Owp
ytvc:a,, ~ori 'to 1:01ou1:ov, 't"ou
~eopa.
'

oe

r
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to be found at .Qg

~Heavens

3.4, 303a24-29.

The atomis·ts

are there said to have differentiated the •traditional elements•--earth, air, and water--by the size of the atoms which
constitute those elements:

aepa

µEy€8EL xa\ µLxpo~n~L 6La~€pELV

xal YDV xa& UOWP--303a25-26.

This is not to say that

water, for example, is composed of atoms all of one size, but
rather that one particular size of atom predominates in the
group, which is composed of all sizes of atoms.

One of these

•elements', they further claim, is generated from another when
the largest atoms are separated out; for example, 'earth' becomes 'water' when the largest atoms are separated out from
the 'earth'; and this is the way in which the mutual generation
of 'elements' takes place (303a27-29).
But this, Aristotle rightly points out, generates an in• t ion:
•
t erna1 cont ra d ic

303a24-25. 80

'

,

Evav~1a

"I. L

A~YElV

au~ou~
I

'\

-~

au~oi~
""'

1.
uvayxn
--

The contradiction obviously lies in the fact that

when the largest atoms separate out from the earth, and water
is thus forned, there are evidently no such 'largest atoms' in
the water which results from this process so that 'earth' can
again be generated out of it.

If these 'largest atoms' are an

essential constituent of •earth', and if 'earth' can in turn be
generated from 'water', then the water must contain them; but

'
80Elders; .2.E.· ill·, fails
to point out \vhere the contradiction lies. Cherniss, .2.E• cit., p. 6, assumes that it lies
with contradicting the fact that the process of change is eternal, and that on atomist grounds it must cease; but this is not
an internal contradiction in the atomiots' system.
Cherniss concludes from this fact that the refutation
rests on a false account of the atomists' theory.
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they will be lacking to the 'water' because they have beeri
separated out.

Here is where the contradiction lies, and this

is exactly where Aristotle says that it lies:

unoA.c:(\lfel yap

ae'l 't"U µey1o'ta owµa17a exxp1 voµevu --303a27-28. 81

Thus the atom-

ists, although they claim to account for the mutual generation
of the elements, in fact cannot do so without self-contradicti on.
Thus, in summary, although Democritus had begun with
phenomena and indeed tried to preserve them with accounts of
reality which were in harmony with them (A.oyou, Ol't&ve, np6,
\

,,

t

.t

~

't"DV UlOGDOlV oµoA.oyouµeva A.cyov'te' --Gen.

et~·

1.8, 325a23-

24), he ended by negating many of the opinions and facts of
observation: noA.A.a 't"WV evooswv xa) 't"WY

~a1voµevwv XU't~

a'{o8Do&v O.va&pet\L--Caelo 3.4, 303a22-23.

'tnv

Not only did he deny

the real and empirical unity of the physical object, but also
in some cases his theory did not even fit the admitted facts
as it was supposed to do.
But the denial of phenomena and empirical evidence in itself is not so serious a charge, if that denial is justified in
some respect.

But Democritus' justification of that denial was

made on two grounds:

1) the problem of 'division everywhere'

81 Both Cherniss, loc. cit., and Simplicius, On~ Caelo,
612.26-613.4, s~e the point~the criticism as being that of
the 'ceasing of generation', evidently in anticipation of the
criticisill offered by Aristotle at On the Heavens 3.7, 305b2026. But Aristotle's criticisms differ in these two places; at
On the Heavens 3.4 the point is made that unoA.e(\lfe:t • • • 'ta
~ytori;a. owµ,a'ta, while at On the Heavens 3.7 it is uTioA.e(nc:iv
't"DV ts a'A.A~AWV y€veOlV.
~ ----
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seemed to Democritus to indicate that the continuous appearance of phenomenal objects was an illusion and that this 'division everywhere' simply did not apply to the real physical
object at all; and 2) since empirical evidence must be basically reliable, the problem of contraries in the same object
indicated that the physical object must be distinguished from
the phenomenal object.
But Aristotle does in fact show that Democritus' assumption was not really justified, that Democritus' conclusion
about atomic magnitudes was not a warrented one, because it
was not necessary.

He does this by showing that Democritus'

solution to the problem of 'divisible everywhere' was based
on a mistake in logic and by showing that the problem of contraries in the same object can reasonably be settled without
resorting to an extreme and unwarrented rejection of empirical
evidence.

This demonstration by Aristotle that Democritus'

rejection of phenomena on two counts was not justified will be
discussed in the next two sections of this paper, the first
dealing with the problem of 'division everywhere', and the
next with contraries in the same object.
Aristotle's Criticism:
'Division :t;verywhere' Holds
Democritus had baseJ his rejection of phenomena partly
on the problem raised by Zeno involving 'divisible everywhere'.
Aristotle, in reply, points out that Democritus' conclusion is
not warrented by his premises, that the positing of indivis-
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ible atoms rests on a mistake in logic, and that thus Derilocritus' rejection of phenomena is not justified in this respect.
And the passage in which Aristotle's reply to Democritus'
position is most direct and explicit is at On
porruEtion 1.2, 316bl9-317al7.

Generation~

In the first portion of this

passage (316bl9-27), as we have already pointed out, Aristotle
shows that there are two distinct meanings of

;rav'tr.J

('every-

where' ) in 'divisible everywhere', the one distributive and
the other collective--'at any of all the points' and 'at all
the points at once'.

But it is only the second of these mean-

ings which generates the difficulty, the meaning 'divisible
everywhere at once', for this is the only one which actually
reduces the body to 'nothings'.
So, having rightly established the two senses of 'everywhere', Aristotle is now ready to show that Democritus' conclusion (that there must be atomic magnitudes) does not follow
from the premises he accepts, that it involves an unnoticed
mistake in logic

(Aaveavel napaAoytsoµevo,

precisely this mistake that he points

~ut

--317al-2); and it is
82
in 317a2-12:
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Verdenius and Waszink, £12.• cit., pp. 14-15, point out
that T. W. Allen's conjecture at 317all 'otnlpE'tov· (oux 'E:a'tl
t> e ~ 06 yap ' was not necessary and ma;y be omitted without
changing the meaning of the passage.
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"Since one point is not next to another point, 'divisible everY1vhere' is in one sense a property of magnitudes, and in another sense it is not a property of magnitudes.
"Whenever it is proposed [that 1 divisible everywhere'
is a property of magni tudesJ , it is thought that there
is a point both anywhere and everywhere [on that magnitude at which such di vision is to occur], and thus that
'divisible everY1vhere' necessitates the division of the
magnitude into nothing, for there is a point everywhere
[collectively] on it. So, on that assumption, the magnitude must be composed of either contacts or noints.
"But there is another sense of 'everywhere•,""namely,
that there is one point at any given place on the magnitude, and so all the points of 'everywhere' are taken
distributively, one at a time.
"But there is no more than one [point at a time which
one can take for such divisiozj), because the points are
in fact not next to one another; and so [in this sense
again, since one can never in fact arrive at a point next
to a point and thus take them collectivelyJ the magnitude is not 'divisible everywhere'; for, if the magnitude
is divisible ['everywhere' collectively, and] if it is
divisible at its middle, it will also be divisible at
the point right next to that; but it is not, for moment
is not next to moment, nor is one point next to another. 11
Thus Aristotle rightly points out that the mistake in
logic 8 3 rests on the ambiguity of the term rcavi;r.i ('everywhere')
as it was used by Democritus in formulating his conclusion; it
has both a distributive and a collective sense.

So, to put the

atomists' argument into the form of a syllogism:

A) 'what is

"divisible everywhere 11 (collective sense) can be resolved into
nothing'; B) 'any body is "divisible everywherett (distributive
sense)'; therefore C) 'any body can be resolved into nothing'.

83Furleyl ££· .£_:ij_., p~ 92, translates the wo~e 06 xav~r.i
at 317a9 as 11 and so they are not everyvrhere." His "they" evidently refers to 'points'. But Aristotle would hardly admit
that, for it would mean that the magnitude is not in fact divisible everywhere in either the collective or the distributive
sense and would drive him to admit that Democritus was right
after all and did not commit an error in logic. If this is
what Furley means, he seems to be wrong.

r
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The middle term, 'divisible everywhere', was used equivocal-

ly.84

But, since Democritus' rejection of a real 'divisible

everywhere' for physical objects was grounded on the validity
of this argument which Aristotle has now shown to be fallacious, and since Democritus' relegation of the phenomenal object to 'illusion' was at least partially based on the validity of this argument as well, Aristotle has quite rightly
shown that Democritus had no adequate reason in this respect
either for the positing of atoms or for his doubts about phenomena.
Indeed, Aristotle goes on to say (317al2-17), there is a
division of a body (and a reconstruction of that body out of
its parts), but it is a division which neither results in indivisible bodies nor exhausts all the points of the body, but
one which simply and constantly results in smaller and smaller
magnitudes:

UAA

1

el,

µ1xpa xa1

EAa~~w ea~(

--317al6.

There is

no adequate reason for stopping the division at some specific
magnitude.

But the reason, according to Aristotle, that such

division may continue without exhausting all the points is to
be found in the very nature of 'infinite', which he takes up
elsewhere.
Now it is in the third book of the Physics where Aris-

'
8 4so Joachim, .2.E.· cit.,
p. 84. Sinnige, .2.E.• cit., p.
148, sees the 'inconsistency' as lying in the incompleteness
of the di vision, for the atom--like the 'cxnp t cµa of 316bl-must be still further divisible, if it has magnitude, and if
it is to be reduced to something mathematically indivisible;
this is certainly a valid criticism of Democritus' position,
but it is not the one which Aristotle makes here.
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totle takes up the nature of the infinite, more specifically,
in chapters six and seven.

His definition of the infinite is

•such a quantity that one can always take as part of it something outside of what. has already been taken•. 85 This means
that what is infinite is by its very nature something which is
never really attained, because it is never stationary, it always stays outside of our grasp; it is simply its nature to be
always in process:
207bl4.

060£ µEVE'

This means that by its very definition it is only

potential, never actual:
1~:ITElPOV.

~nEtpov

~ ane,p(a aAAU y(ve~a' --3.7,

OU od'

t

oe

Ae(nE~a' oJv cuvaµEl

~o ouvaµEl

o'v

elva' ~b

AUµ(3civE,V • • • o\hw XUl

ia~ai lvepyE(q--3.6, 206al8-21. 86

The most obvious application of such a notion of the
infinite is to numbers--what Aristotle would call 'infinite by
addition' (npoaeeaE,--3.6, 206al5).

Numbers have a lower lim-

it, the unit, but have no upper limit, because one can always
exceed in thought any number, no matter how high (3.7, 207bl-

3, 10).
In this respect the infinite by bisection resembles that
by addition, for in any given magnitude every assigned magnitude is surpassed in the direction of smallness (3.7, 207b3-4).
This means that there is by definition always a smaller magni-

'

, 8 5Ph~sics 3.6 1 207a7-8: &netpov µcv oJv la~tv oJ xa~h
noaov AUµf VOUOlV UlE( ~l AU~erv io~lV ~~w.

86 There is, however, Aristotle admits, a sense in which
we can speak of the 'actuality' of an infinite, but only in
the sense that a finite extension actually contains an infinumber of progressively smaller parts--206bl2-15.

~
tude than any assigned small magnitude.
...............
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And the bisections of

any magnitude are infinite; so, as the infinitely high number
is always only potential, never actual, likewise the infinitely small magnitude will be always potential, never actual; it
can always be exceeded in the direction of smallness. 87 Hence
such division can never

12.;z::

definition be exhausted.

Thus also Democritus was not justified in stopping the
actual division arbitrarily at a specific magnitude; his fears
about the actual exhaustion of the 'division everywhere' were
by the very nature of the case unfounded.

'Division every-

where', while it is nossible, is precisely such a potency as
cannot in fact be actualized.
Furthermore, since Aristotle has now shovm that Democritus has no adequate reason for stopping actual division at a
specific magnitude, there is no reason why Democritus' atoms
themselves should not be subject to further (infinite) divisibility.

Any given Democritean atom is certainly 'continuous';

it is defined as being 'full' or 'absolutely full' (nADPE,,
~aµnA~p£,);

it also has magnitude; and as such it itself is

divisible infinitely:

"And it is evident that everything con-

tinuous is divisible constantly into further divisible parts"

Physics 6.1, 23lbl5).

87 Physics 3.7, 207bl0-13:

aneLpoL yap a( oLxo~oµ(al
ouvaµEL µev EO~LV, EVEpyE(q o' ou• UAA
acl ~nEpPUAAEL ~~ AaµpavdµEVOV nav~b, ~plaµfvou TIA~8ou,.

~OU µey£8ou~.

~~E
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This means that the atom is indeed no better off than the
'borp,oµa described at On Generation and Corruntion 1.2, 316a34-·
b2.

This 'particle' is conceived as having resulted from the

division of a body with magnitude; and so, if this 'particle'
is a body of some sort, the same argument applies to it as applied to the original body; it too should be divisible in the
same sense:
au~o~ Aoyo~--316bl-2.

Again, Democritus had likely argued that his atoms were
physically indivisible in that they had no proper parts into
which they could be divided, that is, parts like those of the
'elements' of Anaxagoras.

But Aristotle points out in Qg

~

Heavens 3.4, 303a29-b2 that as geometrical shapes the atoms do
indeed have parts of a sort into which they could be divided;
they can be divided into further and simpler geometrical shapes
as their parts, 88 for instance, into a variety of pyramids:
~a

be

ox~µa~a nav~a OUYXEl~a'

ex

nupaµ(owv, ~a µev EU8uypaµµa

88 The argument is directed primarily against Democritus'
theory of an infinite variety of atomic shapes; and Aristotle
shows that by dividing atoms into a finite nwnber of simple
shapes, the variety of shapes of atoms would not be infinite.
Furley, .£.:£• cit., p. 98, believes that since Aristotle
applied this argun1ent against the atomists "with hostile intent 11, the atomists must not have conceived of their atoms as
being reducible in this vmy. But, even so, that does not es-·
tablish Furley's conclusion of a mathematically indivisible
atom.
'
Cherniss, .2.E• cit., p. 7, objects to the use of this argument by Aristotle on the grounds that he is using a doctrine of
Plato--that material body is constructed out of discrete and
imi~aterial form--to refute Democritus.
But the source of the
argument is immaterial; its applicability is the only real
issue.

"'

i

e~

EU8uypaµµwv, ~ OE o~arpa e~ OX'l:W µop(wv--303a31-bl.

Thus
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the atoms themselves may very well have parts, and there is no
reason why they could not be divided into these parts.
Furthermore, Aristotle says at On Generation and Corrun-

-

tion 1.8, 326a24-29 that Democritus' physically indivisible

atoms were quite small, but there were no large ones; and this,
Aristotle says, is quite reasonable, because larger things are

broken up (8paue1:al--326a26) more easily than small things.
Indeed, it may very well be this empirical consideration that
the degree of breakability depends on size that contributed to
Democritus' notion that the atoms' indivisibility is partially
a function of their size.

Again, there is a strong emphasis

on physical divisibility.

But, Aristotle points out in reply,

such physical divisibility is relative; it is only a matter of
the comparative ease or difficulty with which it can be carried
out.

This, it seems, is already implied in o&aAUE1:a& pqo(W<;--

326a27.

Democritus, he says, thus gives no adequate reason

why indivisibility is a property of small things but not of
large ones:

1:0 vE av&a&pE1:0V
"

$:. \

, $:.

,

u
OAW~

·'
Ola' 1:l, µaAAOV
vnapxel '"!:WV

µc:yaAwv -i;ot<,: µ&xpor<.:; (326a28-29). 8 9

Thus, again, there is in

atomic theory no real reason why atoms could not in fact be

8 9on Furley's hypothesis of mathematically indivisible
units (Furley ~oes not con~ider this passaGe) for Democritus
Aristotle would be saying that Democritus has given no adequate
reason for there not to be larger mathematically indivisible
units as well as smaller ones!
But the passage is evidently directed against physicall~
indivisible atoms; and Aristotle is right in saying that there
is no adequate reason for physical indivisibility to be a
property of one magnitude rather than another.

72
further divided.
And so, in summary, Aristotle has quite consistently and
rightly shown that Democritus was not justified in positing
indivisible atoms; Democritus had dravm unwarrented conclusions
from the problem of 'divisible everywhere', and thus he had no
adequate reason for making his atom indivisible.

And this

means, further, that in this respect at least Democritus' repudiation of phenomena was also unwarrented.
Excursus:

On Aristotle's Jilinimae Partes

It may be objected that Aristotle too has limits to which
actual division can in fact take place, and that thus his objections to atornism are weakened.

Such a doctrine of limits in

minimum size or in division is his teaching on minimae partes.
And the passages in which this teaching is found follow.
Physics 1.4, 187b20-30:90
"Clearly, then, neither flesh nor bone nor anything of
that sort can proceed indefinitely far either in enlargement or in diminution.
"Again, if all such things are already present in one
another, and do not come into existence, but are merely
separated out after being there all along, objects getting their appellation from whatever is present in most
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abundance; and if anything can come to be out of anything, for instance water be separated out from flesh,
and flesh from water; and if only a limited quantity of
stuff is needed to do away with a limited quantity of
stuff: it plainly follows that everything cannot be in
everything. For suppose that some flesh is removed from
some water, and then more flesh extracted from what remains: even if the yield is lower each time, there will
still always be some quantity smaller than any yet
yielded."
Aristotle is here replying to the teaching of Anaxagoras which
implies that there is no minimum size for things like flesh
and bone.

What Aristotle has established in the first sen-

tence of this passage is that for any part of an animate body
(such as flesh or bone) there is a maximum size above which
~~minimum

size below which it cannot go and still be the

flesh or bone of an animate body.

In the direction of large-

ness, he contends in effect that we cannot suppose that there
is, for example, a hundred-foot bone which is still the bone
of an animal, for there is obviously an upper limit to the
size of any given animal.

That is clear enough.

But there is

also a lower limit--and this he uses against Anaxagoras.

What

Aristotle evidently has in mind is that as one continually bisects a piece of bone, eventually one will reach a point at
which the two halves resulting from the bisection will be too
small to be bone.

Likely the latter two halves will be simple
or elemental bodies--earth, air, fire, and water. 91 But here

'

91 Ross, Physics, p. 486, says that this is not to be
taken as a contradiction of the doctrine of infinite divisibility, but only that there is a lowest limit to the size of a
portion of flesh. Charlton, .212.• .£!_!., p. 65, suggests--I believe rightly--that there is a point in division at which one
arrives at elemental bodies.
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there is no hint that the bisection might not thereafter.be
able to continue,

~infinitum.

Physics 6.10, 24la33-b2:9 2
"The limit of increase is the complete magnitude answering to a thing's proper nature; the limit of dimiution is the loss of this."
This passage makes approximately the same point that the previous passage from the Physics made:

a man, for example, can

only increase or decrease within upper and lower limits and
still retain his essential nature as a man.

Q£ the Soul 2.4, 416al5-18:93
"For the increase of fire is indefinite as long as
there is material to be burned, but of all the things
formed by nature there is a limit and a [proper] ratio
of both their size and their increase; and these are
marks of soul, but not of fire; they belong to ratio
rather than to matter. 11
Here Aristotle is replying to the view that the nature of fire
is simply the reason why nourishment and·growth take place;
and he says in reply that we must also have a reason for growth
into a certain form and limit, and fire alone as matter does
not supply an adequate reason for growth in a certain way.
Fire alone as matter has no limit on size or increase, whereas
complex (ouvLo'taµtvwv--416al6) natural substances do.
In none of these passages is it supposed that any magni92 au<:.110E.Wt;;
J:;'./.
\
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The 'translation' is Ross' 'analysis' in his Aristotle's Physics, p. 418.
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tude is physically indivisible at some point.
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The only thing

that they do seem to indicate is that for some things--complex
physical objects--there is a lower limit to their size, if
they are indeed to remain what they are.

And it seems as well

implied that there is no such limitation on the 'simple bodies'.

And this is substantiated by a passage from

On~

Heavens 3.3, 302al5-18; there Aristotle defines the nature of
an 'element'.

It is

11

that into which other

complex

bodies

are divisible and is present in the latter either potentially
or actually; • • • but the element itself cannot be divided into parts differing from itself in kind. 1194 This certainly implies that such a 'simple body' can indeed be constantly divided into progressively smaller parts without limit.
Aristotle's Criticism:

'What~'

has many meanings

Aristotle has thus quite rightly shown that in one respect Democritus' reasons--the problem involved in 'divisible
everywhere'--for positing atoms and relegating phenomena to an
illusion were totally inadequate.

But Democritus also had a

second reason for his rejection of the phenomenal object as
real, and this was the appearance of contraries in the same
phenomenal object.

This had led him to accept an Eleatic ab-

solute sense of 'is' for his atoms (along with a similarly ab-

'
94 'eo'tw O~ O'tO t XE: i OV 'tWV owµchwv, d c;
-i;ciA.A.a a~µa'ta <5 & pE:i'Cat, evuTiapxov ouvaµt:& 1)' lve:pye:(q. • • • O.U'tO 0 I EO'tt v
6.01a(pe:rc;ov de;. £rc;epa 'tQ e:'loet.
Similarly at I.ietanhvsics 5.3,

o'

0.l

1014a31-34, where Ross, r.I.etanhysics, I, 294, rightly says:
",the p1:!;Ysical elements • • • are only divisible into µop& a
oµo

El

OT)."
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solute sense of 'what is not' for his void). 95

The atom is

the only thing that really exists; it simply always is and remains the same, not in itself subject to any change.

And on

this count too Aristotle shows that Democritus' positing of
atoms and rejection of the phenomenal object was completely
unwarrented.
To take up first the atomist acceptance of an absolute
sense of 'is', Aristotle points out at Physics 1.3, 187al-10
(the very passage in which he had said that the atomists yielded to Eleatic arguments) that this not only unduly limits the

meaning of 'is', but also makes it unintelligible •

.Aristotle

points out here that 'is' may be used in two senses, an 'absolute' and a 'particular' sense--'x does not exists• and 'xis
not some particular thing'--and there is a real difference between the two senses.

"For, 11 Aristotle says,

11

even though

'what is not' cannot ~without qualification [simply exis-ii},
there is no reason why it might not refer to something which
'is not some particular thing'. 11 9 6 Indeed, Aristotle goes on
to imply, 'what is' in itself is unintelligible apart from
being some particular thing.9 7
951,Ietaphysics 1.4, 985b5-7; 4.5, 1009a27-30; Physics 1.5,
188a22-23.
96 Physics 1 ••
3 1 8 7a5-'6 :
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Aristotle again takes up the meaning of 'is' with more
specific reference to Democritus in Metaphysics 4.5.
im.,~ediately

There,

after his statement that Democritus posited 'the

full' as 'what is', Aristotle takes up this two-fold meaning
of 'what

l.' ciCJi l o•

"in one way they are correct, but in another

way they are in error, because 'what is' has two meanings. 11 9 8
These two meanings evidently refer to the two senses of 'what
is' referred to in Physics 1.3, that is, 'simply exists' and
'is a particular thing•. 99

Thus there is one way in which

something can come into being out of 'what is not', in the
sense that something can come into being out of 'what is not
that particular thing', but is some other thing.

For example,

a red apple can come into being out of what is not a red apple,
but is a green one; or, air can come into being out of what is
not air, but is water.

On the other hand, this is not true of

the other meaning of 'is' ('simply exists'), for nothing can
come into being out of what does not exist at all (1009a32-33).
Thus Aristotle has shown that there is no need or justification
for restricting the meaning of 'what is' to only one meaning;
and in the sense of 'what is some particular thing' it has as
many senses as there are things to which it can refer.
Thus, having established the two meanings of 'what is'

98Netaphisics 4.5
A.cyooot '1"pO'JtOV

6e

'

1009a31-32:

'1"lVU 6.yvooifotv•

'1"p6nov µcv '1"tva 6pew,
'1"0 yap o'v ACY£'1"Ut OlXWt;.

99Ross, Eetaphysics, vol. 1, ad loc., says nothing in his
commentary about the two meanings of 1 vn1at is'; his 'Analysis',
p. 273, indicates that he believes the two meanings are 'is
potentially' and 'is actually'.
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and the application of the former--'what is some particular
thing'--to the phenomenal world, Aristotle goes on to introduce the concepts of 'potency' and 'act' and use them to help
clarify the difficulty about contraries in the same object
(1009a33-36).

For, he says, using the former sense of 'what

is', the same thing can simultaneously both be and not be;
for example, a green apple can both be (a green apple) and not
be (a red apple); it cannot, of course, both 'be' and 'not be'
simultaneously in the same respect.

For the same apple cannot

be both a green apple and a red apple at the same time in actuality; but it can at the same time be actually a green apple
and potentially a red apple.

Thus it is quite reasonable for

the same object to be two contraries, as long as it is not actually both at once.

This also meansf Aristotle implies, that

the atomists had no good reason for contravening empirical evidence because of the appearance of contraries in an-object.
Concluding Remarks
The atomists, Aristotle says, had rightly started with
empirical evidence and had indeed attempted in some degree to
account for it and preserve it.

But, in spite of their proper

beginning, they felt compelled to relegate the phenomenal object to the realm of illusion and to posit indivisible bodies
as that which really is.

'The

grounds on which they felt jus-

tified in making these claims were that they felt that such a
claim was the only reasonable way to solve two problems:

the

problem of 'divisible everywhere• and the problem of •contra-
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rieS in the same phenomenal object•.

Both problems seemed to

them to point to the fact that the phenomenal object was to be
distinguished sharply from

~he

physical object.

The problem

of division led them to posit atomic bodies in order to save
the physical object from the same sort of annihilation which
they felt the phenomenal object had already suffered by being
divided to nothing.

The problem of contraries led them simi-

larly to posit atoms and void as that which 'is' and that
which 'is not' to account for the contraries in phenomenal
objects.
But Aristotle, as we have now seen, has quite cogently
pointed out that both their reasons were not valid ones.
Division everywhere does not annihilate anything; and contraries in the same object can be quite reasonably explained
without resorting to unwarrented speculation.

In regard to

both these problems the concepts of 'potency' and 'act' had
shown the way in solving them.

These concepts had clarified

the distinctions between the two meanings of 'divisible everywhere'; and Aristotle had shown that the 'infinite' in 'infinite bisection' is a potency which in the very nature of the
case cannot be actualized.

'Potency' and 'act' had likewise

provided a reasonable solution to the problem of contraries in
the same object.

'

CHAPTER II
THE PHOBLE::I OF PLACE

Introduction
A direct corollary to the

assu.~ption

that there are im-

mutable atomic bodies, that is, that there is no true unity in
physical objects, is the theory that there is a void, an empty
place in which and into which these atomic bodies can move, a
void which keeps them wholly distinct from one another, even
when they congregate to form physical objects.

Both theories,

both of the atoms and of the void, together were formulated in
response to Eleatic doctrine;

ai.~d

so, in a certain sense, the

two theories are really two aspects of the same theory.

And

we might thus have considered them together under a single
topic, for there are difficulties which Ari.stotle raises which
both these theories share.

But, on the other hand, there are

also certain problems and difficulties which attach to each of
these theories and concepts as distinct from one another; and
in this respect Aristotle is quite right in giving separate
consideration--at

Physi~s

1·6-9--to the problem of the void.

And so we may also deal separately with this theory and with
Aristotle's objections to it.
We have already dealt with the vocabulary of the void to
a certain extent when we dealt with the terminology used for
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the atoms, for the atoms and the void are defined and de.:..
scribed as absolute contraries to one another.
that which is solid and full

( O't e:p E:O V 1

11:~.T)p €{.

) ;

The atom is
it is, in the

absolute sense of the term, 'what is' ( 'to' "ov ) ; 1 it is the only
thing of which we can really have any direct and positive experience.

The void is the only other 'thing' which, according

to Democritus, there is in the same, absolute sense 9f 'what
is'.

And it, in contrast to the 'full' atom is that which is

•empty' (

rco

xevov). 2

This void, as a 'thing', is intended to

be a direct contrary to the atoms; whatever the atoms are, it
is not that.

As the atom is absolutelx solid, full, and im-

passible, the void is absolutely empty and passible.

Whatever

else one might say about Aristotle's going out of his way to
search out contraries in the Presocratics and finding them even
in Eleatic doctrine,3 he is certainly right in finding them
here in Democritus, for here they are quite distinct and quite
primary.

And, inasmuch as the atom is 'what is', the void is

'what is not' (rco

µ~

ov)--a term which was very likely used by

Democritus himself, in that his atoms and theory of the void
were both formulated in response to Eleatic thought.

He also

probably used the pair of contrary terms cited in the first
chapter (pages 18-19):

'thing' and 'no-thing' (otv, ouotv).

Democritus' quite consistent claim is that both of these
1 Physics 1.5, 188al9-24; I·Ietanhysics 1.4, 985b4-10.
2 Ibid,

3cherniss, .2.E.• cit., pp. 52-52, makes this charge.
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'things' exist equally, the one as much as the other.
And this is certainly a consistent claim, for the one implies
and almost necessitates the other, so much so that, as we shall
see, Aristotle's arguments against the void at times overlap
and duplicate his

against Democritus' atoms.

argui~ents

In suJn.rnary, Aristotle's primary objection to a void as
some separately existing 'thing' is that of making a noun or
substance out of what is obviously an adjective or attribute,
a property of body--extension.

We might tentatively distin-

guish the ways in which Aristotle proceeds to raise this basic
objection and in this way organize what he has to say about
the problem.

In the first place, Aristotle objects to the void

as something internal to physical objects; as something internal to them it not only keeps the parts of the object separate
and keeps them from forming a true unity, 4 but also, although
the void was supposed to explain the expansion, compression,
and weight of physical objects, it fails to do this adequately.
Secondly, the void, as something external to physical objects,
offers only a 'material' explanation of the motion of atoms and
nothing more than that; it leaves unanswered the question, important to Aristotle, as to whether their motion is natural or
constrained; 5 it offers nothing but a mechanistic explanation
'l

4 rn this .respect we have already considered Aristotle's
objections in connection with the concept of the atom--a failure to account for the true unity of any physical object.
5This question, as we shall see, will only receive some
kind of satisfactory answer when we consider the question of
'cause' and 'necessity' in the fourth chapter.

r
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of the proper place and motion of physical objects, and, at
that, an inadequate explanation.

And finally, but most impor-

tantly, the assumption of its existence rests on an intrinsically unverifiable supposition that one can abstract qualities
from bodies and assume that such qualities can exist apart
from the body from which it was abstracted; and this, in turn,
is connected with a misunderstanding of what meanings 'what
is' and 'what is not' can have.

----

Criticism of the 'Internal Void'

---~~~- ~ ~

Now, as we take up these objections individually, we may
consider first the difficulties which Aristotle raises against
a void that is considered as 'internal to physical objects•.
By a void 'internal to physical objects• we shall mean that
void, that empty space, which is within the outer limits of
what we call a physical object--the empty space in the object
in which its constituent atoms move and clash and rebound.
That void may be considered a 'part' of the whole physical object, and thus, in a sense, not separable from that object.
For one thing, such a void would keep the object from
being a truly unified object.

The principle of atomism by it-

self, as we have seen, provides sufficient grounds for raising
this objection; and now the,principle of the internal void
provides even further grounds.
At Physics 3.4, 203a20-23 Aristotle attributes to Democritus (and to Anaxagoras) a teaching which amounts to saying
that that which is boundless is continuous by contact:

'tlJ d.cpf.)
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'

ouvexe~

~ ,,
'to ane,pov

,

~aa,v.

6

This is obviously meant by Aris-

totle as a Democritean description of the universe as a whole,
without any specific reference to physical objects.

Rut the

situation in the universe as a whole is no different in principle from what is true of physical objects,? for the latter
also have void within them.
And that this void is there within those objects is
shown by the fact that Aristotle explains at On Generation and

-

-

Corruption 1.8, 326al-3 that for the atomists 'being affected'
(naoxe,v) occurs to a physical object only through the void.
Furthermore, all the atoms in a physical object are obviously
not everywhere in contact with each other; if they were, Aristotle would not in this same work (1.9, 327a8-10, 24-26) have
6 cherniss, .££• cit., p. 27, note 104, uses this citation
to show that Aristotle was presenting arguments against atomism both at .Qn the Heavens 1.7, 274bl8-22 and at Physics 3.5,
204a34-b22. But this hardly seems likely. In the former passage Aristotle is talking about corporeal elements (o~ia is
used at both 274a30 and bl9); each of two or more such corno~ elements, he says, cannot be infinite.
In the Physics
Aristotle is again talking about cornoreal elements (enloxonouµev nept -i;wv a{oeryrwv--204b2--and~the constant repetition
of owµa seems to bear this out); indeed, in the whole course
of this particular argument he is not considering the void at
all, for at least at one point in the argument (205a35-bl) one
of the unthinkable alternatives would be: 1) yap xevov '£0-i;ai
The void presents special difficulties of its own, since
any void can be filled with a body.
Aristotle does indeed object to infinite extension itself, but primarily on the,grounds of its being beyond any
comprehension;· but this is another matter.

-i;,.

7uan, or any living creature, is apparently described by
Democritus as a 'universe in miniature'--compare Diels-Kranz
68B34. The same is likely to hold for any and all physical
objects: they are alike in that they are a composite of atoms
and void; and it is in this respect that they resemble the
universe.

r
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raised the objection to the atomism of Democritus that with

such atoms the physical object does not change 'as a whole'-that is, when one atom is affected, they all are.
Indeed, the void in physical objects is precisely that
which keeps the units or atoms separate and distinct, and thus
keeps the physical object from being a true unity.

And in

fact Aristotle at Physics 4.6, 213a33-34 explicitly attributes
to Democritus a concept of the void which does exactly that:
it divides (or, 'takes apart') any whole physical object and
keeps it from being a continuous whole. 8 The refutation of

the void as having this characteristic (that of breaking up
the unity of things), which is essentially the same as that
characteristic which it has for the Pythagoreans, does not lie
in the general objection which Aristotle raises against the
concept of the void at 4.7, 213b31-214all,9 but in the arguments which he raises against those atomistic thinkers who
would deny the essential unity of physical objects, the very
arguments we have already examined in the first chapter of this
80' oiaA.aµf30.ve:t -ro nuv oWµa oo'te: e:fvai µil ouve:xtc.
It is
interesting to note at this point that, as the teachings of
Democritus and the Pythagoreans were indeed alike inasmuch as
they constructed objects out of the smallest possible units
(atoms, numerical units), so their doctrine of the void is
alike inasmuch as it separates things both in the universe at
large and in individual ob~ects. See Physics 4.6, 213b23-29,
especially 26-27, where void for ~he Pythagoreans separates
the numerical units: xa', -ro{h' dvat npwrnv £v -roi'<;; &pieµoi<;;·
\

'tO

'
\
J.:i.
yap
XE:VOV ulOplsE:lV
#

'

't~V

~f

~vOlV

I

aU'tWV.

9compare Cherniss, .2.1?.• cit., p. 148, who says that this
is the only criticism involved; he further says that this
criticism holds only aeainst the Pythagoreans; but their view
is like Democritus' in this respect; hence both are liable.

r
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paper.
At Physics 4.6, immediately after mentioning Leucippus'
and Democritus' theory of the void as that which is internal
to physical objects and as that which thus breaks up their
unity, Aristotle presents three (or, perhaps, four) arguments
which they10 use to support the positing of such a void, and
then he adds a special Pythagorean version of the doctrine of
the void, which in certain respects is quite like that of the
atomists.

The first of these arguments is that the void is a
necessary condition for locomotion. 11
Immediately thereafter there follows at 4.6, 213bl4-18 a
second argunent for the void based on empirical evidence, that
physical objects obviously do compress and contract.

The pro-

ponents of the void hold that the ability of objects thus to
compress is due to an internal void
object to be compressed.

<~a evov~n

XEVU) in the

The illustration cited is that of

wine taken from a jar, put into skins, and then put back into
the jar along with the skins--there now being room for both
lOApparently Leucippus and Democritus primarily are meant
here, although they are not specifically mentioned. Cherniss,
~· cit., p. 150, assu,~es that the reference is to these atomists, and there seems to be no compelling reason for saying
that he is wrong. Indeed, as we shall see, though Cherniss
feels that at least one of the arguments in Aristotle's refutation does not really affect the atomist position, all--except those directed agains~ a sort of void which is substantially air--are quite appropriate.
11 This matter will be taken up presently as a separate
item, although the foliowing arguments taken up here do involve the locomotion or positioning of the atoms within physical objects.
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wine and skins in the sane amount of space; there is no apparent qualitative change in the wine and no apparent change in
the

a.,~ount

of wine.

Against this Aristotle argues at 4.7, 214a32-bl that it
is not a necessary explanation, 12 that other explanations of
this phenomenon are certainly possible without resorting to a
non-empirical void.

Aristotle's own explanation of this phe-

nomenon is that part of the contents are squeezed out of the
wine when it is compressed, just as when water is compressed
and extrudes some of the air in it. 1 3 And so there is an
explanation just as reasonable--and more reasonable, Aristotle
would likely say--than that of a void.

Hence, in this case,

the void is not necessary.
A third argument, presented next at 4.6, 213bl8-22 to
support the contention that there is a voia, 14 is that the
observable process of the body absorbing food and growing by
12 214-a32-33:

0€: xat nuxvouo8ai µ-f} de;. 'to
Compare the reformulation of this refutation by Simplicius, in Physicorum, p. 660, lines 2ff.: oux
avayx~ • • • OUVU'tUl yap . . . .
'

I

~

\

xevov aA.A.a cSia.

•

E:vo£xe'tal

•

•

l3r am not sure what sort of empirical evidence, if any,
Aristotle had for this latter example; all that we can say
about it is that for him it very probably was formed on the
analog'/ of squeezing the pits out of olives.
14 we may indeed have here two separate arguments, each to
be considered o.n its own me~its. They will here be treated
together, though hopefully without neglect of the distinctness
of each. ~enri Carteron, Aristote Physique, 2 vols. (Paris:
Societe d'.Edition 11 Les Belles Lettres 11 , 1956-1961), I, 137,
presents them as a single argument. Besides, Aristotle himself takes up the reply to both at once; his answer to one he
takes to be a sufficient refutation of both: d o' au~0,
A.oyoc; xa't en\ 'tfjc 'te(j)pai;;--215b9-10.
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means of it seems to require empty spaces in the body into
which the food can go in order to provide increase in size in
the nourished body.

First there is presented the empirical

fact of the growth of the physical object.

That this takes

place through the void is supported first formally on the
grounds that, since both the nourishment and the nourished object are corporeal and the former must penetrate the latter
for growth to take place, this penetration and subsequent
growth must take place through the void, for two totally corporeal substances cannot occupy the same place at the same
time.
This formal argument for the void is then further supported by an appeal to empirical evidence (µap1:upLov

0 {;--

213b21):

a jar containing some substantial amount of ashes
(or, perhaps, some powder or chemical) 15 will receive as much

water as if the ashes were not there; obviously, the argument
would continue, the water was absorbed into the void in the
ashes--or, vice versa.

If, as seems to be the case, this lat-

ter argtunent is part of the general argument from 'growth',
then it is probably intended as a more apparent illustration by
analogy of what likely goes on inside the body, showing how the
food is first absorbed into the body before (or, as) it brings
about actual increase.
l5The solution to the problem by Eudemus, as cited by
Simplicius, in Physicorum, p. 662, lines 25-29, seems to indicate that Some chalky powder (1:(1:aVo(;) WaS involved, US well
as a process of burning ( xa( Ea) ·with some resultant vapor
( a'tµ ( c; ) •

r
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Aristotle takes up the reply to this argument at 4.7,
214b2-10, showing that, of the two kinds of increase in size,
the void is totally otiose in explaining the one and involves
itself in further difficulties in explaining the other.

In

the first place, he contends, not every instance of increase
in size need be attributed to the addition of some matter to
the physical object; and one very clear case in point of this
is the generation of air (vapor, steam) from water.

Assuming

that this increase in size takes place in an enclosed container and that there is thus no question of the entry of void
from the outside to produce the expansion nor of the entry of
anything solid, 16 then there is also no question of the necessity of corporeal interpenetration through a void, for nothing
new at all enters into the expanding object.

Thus, for this

·kind of increase in size the void is not necessary; there is a
better alternative explanation, better because the void is
utterly useless here to explain this phenomenon.
Now at 214b33ff. Aristotle takes up the argument proper
for the void in that he takes up specifically the question of
growth by means of some nourishing substance, and, along with
it, the question of the 'water and the ashes'; he sees both of
these as parts of the same question and, in effect, answers
them together •.

'

16 some of these assumntions are taken from On the Heav~ 3.7, 305bl0ff., where there is a parallel accOUn.t of the
phenomenon of the chanee of water into air. The additional
point is made there that the expanded vapor will burst its
container--evidently an appeal to empirical evidence.

r
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Aristotle says, first of all, that these arguments for
the void involve even further difficulties. 17 Assuming, he
asserts, that void is to help account for the growth of a physical object by means of nourishment, one is forced to accept
what amounts to one of the four alternatives which he lists:
1) the whole body does not grow, 2) the nourishment is not

corporeal, 3) two bodies can be in the same place, and 4) the
whole physical object is empty and void.
Cherniss 18 sees in this refutation by Aristotle a paradox:

if growth is to be explained by means of void in the bo-

dy, then the whole body is void.

And for the paradox to hold

Cherniss says that Aristotle must assume three conditions,
which he identifies with the first three of the above-mentioned
alternatives:

the body grows as a whole, nourishment is cor-

poreal, and two bodies cannot occupy the same place.

Cherniss

then rejects the validity of Aristotle's argument by pointing
out that the atomists do not accept the first condition--that
the body grows as a whole.

But this is to miss the point of

Aristotle's criticism.
Simplicius' account of this passage is quite helpful not
17 cherniss, .2.l2.• cit., p. 150, argues that Aristotle says
that this type of an explanation by means of a void is selfcontradictory. But there i~ no self-contradiction until one
also assumes along with the theory of the void 'growth everywhere• for the physical object. But Aristotle does not say
that the account is self-contradictory, but only that it is a
hinderance, that it 'gets in its own way': au~o~ au~ov
eµnoo(sel--214b5.
18.Q..E.. cit., p. 150.
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onlY in outlining the argument, but also in showing preci'sely
what is at issue in the arguement, that is, the question of
the nourishment and growth of a physical object as a whole. 1 9
Indeed, the atomists could not on principle accept any of the
latter three of Aristotle's alternatives and would likely have
had no qualms about identifying the first with their position.
But this first alternative, as Simplicius aptly points out, is
a matter of empirical evidence; the object does grow as a
whole. 20 So the argument against the void as accounting for
l9rn Physicorum, p. 661, especially lines 31-32. According to his analysis the argument seems to resolve into a series of alternatives thus:
I. Either food is not body (Aristotle's second item), or
II. Food is body; but then either
A. Growth and nourishment do not take place everywhere
(Aristotle's first item), or
B. Growth and nourishment do take place everywhere; but
then either
1. Body passes through body; two bodies can simultaneously be in the same place, or
2. Body passes through nothing; the nourished object
is void.
Presented thus one sees Aristotle's alternatives rather as
pairs of alternatives.
20100. cit., p~ 661, lines 32-33: ~nep eo~~ nap~ ~~v
evapyEl<i'V':""°

-

·

Cherniss, .212.• cit., p. 150, points out that Aristotle's
argument against the atomist position can only hold if the
body increases everywhere, but that Aristotle's own theory was
that there was no material increase everywhere; and he cites
in support of this On Generation and Corruption 1.5, 32lb22322a4. He is quite---r'ight in this--respect, but there is in fact
no discrepancy between Ari~totle's argument and his teaching
here. There is by Aristotle's theory growth everywhere, but
only in one of two senses, in the sense that the whole object
everywhere (assuming a simple object) grows. But there is not
increase everywhere in the sense that the particular piece of
matter added to the object is distributed everywhere in that
object; inasmuch as that piece of matter is distinguishable at
all, it may remain as matter in one part of the object. This
is not to say that the whole object does not grow everywhere,

92

growth reduces to an argument against those who would deny the
real, continuous unity of a physical object; and precisely as
such it is uniquely appropriate to the atomists' position at
its very foundations; it certainly does not fail, as Cherniss
says it does, to take into account those who assume minimal
quanta.
The second aspect of this argument, the argument from
the water poured upon some ashes, shows exactly the same weakness as the first. 21 Neither Aristotle nor Simplicius write
their reply out in detail; they do not specify their argument
against the positing of the void to explain this process of
absorption.

Hence, if we may put it into the form of the sets

of alternatives suggested by Simplicius, it goes like this:
I) either the ashes are not body at all (in which case the
but only that the piece of matter as such may not be everywhere in the grown object. But Cherniss has neglected to cite the sense in which
increase everywhere in a growing object does take place, and
this might well have shown him how the theory and argument of
Aristotle are not inconsistent with one another. The whole object does grow in 'form'; its form may.increase like the increase in size of the arc of a circle (to use Aristotle's own
example) or like a balloon being inflated or like water when
more water is added; the continuous mass of matter in the object grows as more matter is assimilated to it; there is no
portion in it or on it at which this growth is not evident,
even though the piece of added matter may remain somewhat localized. When more air is blovm into a partially inflated
balloon, the whole balloon jncreases in size--so too does the
air inside--as.a continuous whole. Atomism, along with its
doctrine of the void, cannot on principle account for such
growth everywhere in a physical object.
21 Although Aristotle had a constructive solution to the
example cited in the first aspect of the argument from growth
to the positing of the void, he has no physical solution to
the difficulty cited here; but Simplicius does provide one.
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argument for the void is destroyed), or II) the ashes are· body;
but, if they are body and the jar receives an amount of water
equal to the amount received when the jar was totally empty,
then A) either the water does not penetrate everywhere in the
jar (which is contrary to evidence), 22 or B) it does penetrate
everywhere; but, if the latter is the case, then either
1) there can be two bodies in the same place, or 2) water is
not body, but empty and void; and neither of these latter two
are acceptable alternatives.
argu,~ent

Thus, as in the first part of the

'growth everywhere' was the key issue, so it is that

role which is taken up by 'penetration everyv1here 1 in this
second phase of the argument.

Both are central, both seem for

Aristotle to be a matter of empirical evidence, and both raise
the central issue of the essential unity of the physical object; and it is on these grounds that Aristotle thus criticizes
those who hold to a void--it contravenes. empirical evidence.
At Physics 4.6, 213b15-18 the problem of compression was
raised in connection with the difficulty about the wine, the
skins, and the jars; this was a specific problem in that there
was no change of quality or essence involved, and Aristotle had
answered it as such and in those terms (4.7, 214a32-b2).

Then

22 That this is also a matter of empirical evidence seems
to be supported by a passage at On the Heavens 3.8, 306b9ff.
Aristotle is there talking about the elements having specific
sha~es, and he refutes this notion by claiming that evidently
(~alve~al) water accommodates itself to the shape of its con~,ainer and fills_ it _everywhere as ~ continuo:-is v1ho~e: OU yap
v ~n~e~o nav~ax~ ~ou nepL€xov~o~ ~o oAov.
Water is also used
to illustrate the unity of parts in a true combination as a
continuous whole at On Generation and Corruption 1.8, 326a33ff.

~\
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immediately thereafter the specific problem connected with
•growth' and the void had been raised (4.6, 213bl8-22); and
Aristotle in his reply and analysis of this problem had first
raised and then given a preliminary answer to what he felt was
the more general problem--that of increase in general (4.7,
214b2-3)--before replying (214b3-10) more specifically to the
argument that had been raised; and at that point he does not
say much more about the general problem of change.
But Aristotle rightly sees that there is considerably
more at stake here than specific answers to specific arguments, for these specific answers and arguments have not yet
really gotten to the heart of the matter.
cific

argu.~ents

Indeed, these spe-

do in principle raise the larger question of

the role of void in the expansion and contraction of physical
objects in general, and it is this larger question which Aristotle takes up at Physics 4.g. 2 3

And the specific form that

this larger question takes is whether recourse to the void is
the only feasible one of a set of alternatives, that is,
whether void is necessary to explain expansion and contraction:
i
\
'I XEVOV E(Val l~ &v&yx~,·

VE08a1

OU'X.

evotxe'tal

ouµn1AEroeal y~p xai OUVEXEWCE(-

aA.A.w,. 2 4

Now for Aristotle the basic

meaning of 'necessary' seems to be that there is no other
23Chernfss, ~· cit.," pp. 153-154, argues that Aristotle's criticisms do not actually meet the special arguments
for this thesis, but falls back on the fact that the void does
not explain natural motion. As we proceed it will hopefully
that Aristotle does meet them and how he meets them.
24 216b28-30.

r
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feasible alternative, that it simply cannot be otherwise and
s:;.
~
'L
"
25 And this
still make sense: 'l:O µT) eVuexuµevov
u'A'Aw' EXEL v.
\

\

1

is precisely what Aristotle intends to show about the 'necessity' of the void, that, as an explanation, it involves further serious difficulties and that it is not the only reasonable alternative; that there is indeed another alternative
which is, besides, consistent with the essential unity of physical objects.
The first argument (216b30-33) against such an explanation of expansion and contraction in terms of the.void is that
internal void, inasmuch as it is conceived as something separate and distinct, labors under the same difficulty as the void
in general does, namely, that it is--as pure extension--an unwarrented abstraction of a property that we perceive only in
connection with physical objects.

This criticism is an impor-

tant one and will be taken up separately later.
Secondly, if the void here is, on the other hand, not
conceived of as something separate from physical objects, not
something distinct, but is still in and part of physical objects in some sense, 26 then it cannot explain any kind of
change at all, including expansion and contraction, for it will
25 rietauhysics 5. 5, 1Ql5a34. This Aristotle says is basic
to all the other senses in which 'necessary' is used: xa'l:a
'l:oG~o ~b dvayxafov xa; 'l:d'A'Aa 'Afye'l:a( nru, axav~a ~vayxara-1015a35-36.
26 simplicius, in Physicorum, p. 684, lines 24-25, describes this as that which disperses throughout the object in
small 9its, but is still nQt separate from the object: xa'l:a'
µtxpa evecr~apµevou • • • xat µ~ xwpto'l:ou.
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-

thus not be that in which (or, into which) movement occurs:

-

'Kl

vfioewt;; a'{ri;,ov oux o\hw 'CO

XEVOV

~ ev ~

--217al-2.

Indeed-,

under those conditions there is only one type of change that
it could explain, and that with a little more reasonableness,
and that is the upward motion of physical objects:
J.
X l V qO E Wt;;

,,

a L'C l 0

V

• • •

ou

nao~t;;

And, as Aristotle goes on

to point out, it does not even do a sufficiently adequate job
of that. 27 Aristotle is here certainly not simply falling
"back upon the thesis that it cannot explain natural motion.1128

He insists that the argument is part of a disjunc-

tion:29

either the void is conceived of as something separate

or not.

Under the first alternative there is the difficulty

about void being an unwarranted abstraction, and in the second
there is the difficulty that it fails to be able to explain
that which it was intended to explain.
Having thus shown that the theory of the void is untenable on either one of the two alternatives just mentioned,
Aristotle now proceeds to show that it is indeed not necessary,
that it is not the only feasible alternative to account for
expansion and contraction.

These can be explained much more

reasonably, Aristotle feels, in terms of a single matter cap27This criticism wil~ be taken up separately in the next
section in conjunction with the question of the void as an
explanation of motion.
28 ch
.
.t
erniss,
.2.£• ..£!._.,
p. 154 •
29 el µEV • • • d 0 t-..216b30-33.

r
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able of contrary qualifications and in terms of potency and
act.

There will in this way be change, the universe will not

absurdly bulge (as some had apparently supposed would be the
only alternative to the void), and there is thus no need for
an unwarrented void.

This sort of account which Aristotle

offers as a counter-proposal will then more fully and adequately explain the expansion of water into air and the contraction
of air into water.

Water, actually of a given volume, is
(O~AOV

potentially larger; and it is quite evident

oe--217a27)

that this must be the case, for when water changes into air,
it does so by retaining the same matter, by not taking on anything else in addition.30

And not only does this do a better

job of explaining the phenomenon without encountering the
above difficulties, but it also has the added advantage of
accounting as well for the real unity of the physical object
and the real identity of that whole object as it undergoes some
change in quality (e.g., becomes hotter):
xa& µavov.

xa1 µ(a DA~ ao~wv--217al0-ll.

,

~
ecr~l

"

~o

, '

au~o

'
nuxvov

And both the unity,

as we have seen, and the identity of such a physical object

are given in empirical evidence.

----

The Internal Void and Locomotion
~~~~

~~

Aristotle has thus

fa;

shovm that void is not necessary

to explain the types of 'motion' which, by Aristotle's own

UA~

30 217a27-28:

o~av y~p

Es

uoa~o~ aDp yev~al, ~ a6~D

ou npoaAa~oGoa ~l aAAo • Evidently this means taking on
neither additional matter nor any additional void.
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standards,

~ay

be classified as not directly involving the

locomotion of physical objects, primarily increase and decrease.

But it is of the essence of ato::.nism to reduce all

types of movement to locomotion.

imd so Aristotle must deal

specifically with that question.

And this he takes up early

in his discussion of the reasons for positing the void to
explain movement in general.
The Eleatics had argued that there is no real motion,
for

1

vn1at is' is 'one and immoveable' and that motion is im-

possible without a void.

'Void', they argued, is 'what is not'

and hence does not exist at all.

The atomists conceded to the

Eleatics that motion is impossible without a void, but proposed that 'what is not' does nevertheless exist.31

Motion,

for the atomists, was a matter of empirical evidence and could
only, they felt, be explained by positing an existing void.
Thus the atomist argument for the existence of the void rests
basically on the empirical fact of motion:
viously motion, there must be void.

since there is ob-

Void is a necessary con-

dition for motion and is precisely that in which such motion
must occur:

ev ~ XlVCi'tal --Physics 4.7, 214a25.

But, as Aristotle rightly points out, void is not a neeessary con d i•t•ion f or mo t•ion:

,,

corr' v, et' vat

, __ 214a26.'

~evov

11'..
,
ouveµta
vJ;I

I

L

avuyx~,

etI

,

xLVDOt~

And in this respect the Eleatics

3lGen. et Corr. 1.8, 325a25-28: [Aeux&nno~ oµOAQy~oa~
• • • -roi'ZQ£ ~ 7V'Xarraoxeuaz;:ouot v w<;; oox 6.'v x(VDOL v oJoav
~v
'
'
,,
u,eu XeVOU- 'tu_t 'Te XeVOV
µDov,
xa&' 'TOU- ,,OV'TO~ ouoev µDov ~DOJV
etva1. For evidence of a similar nature of the influence of
Eleatic arguments, see Physics 1.3, 187al-3.
I

'

"'
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--and Helissus in particular--were wrong ( Me)d ooov 'f>..ae e:

--214a27-28) when they argued that motion was imposeible without a void.

And so the atomists' justification for positing

a void is weakened.
In the first place, Aristotle points

o~t,

motion in gen-

eral (not restricted to locomotion) certainly does not require
a void, for 'alteration' is quite possible without B.void:

aAAO l ouo8a&

yap

'tO

nA.i)p e:c;

EVO exe:tta1

--214a28.

Secondly--and

here the argument specifically affects the atomists' position-void is not even a necessary condition for locomotion; it is,
he argues certainly possible to explain locomotion without
resorting to the positing of void or empty space; one can explain locomotion simply by positing a circular interchange of
parts in motion. 32 And so void is not necessary to explain
either motion in general or locomotion in particular•
Furthermore, Aristotle claims, there is empirical

evi~

dence ( oi)Ao\l--214a31) for the occurence of locomotiotl in full
and continuous substances (-cwv ouve:xwv--214a3l-32); }'1.e cites
the exa....'D.ple of liquids.

Liquids are seen to be cont:inuous

substances, filling every part of their containers.

Eddies,

circular movements, evidently occur in such continuot.lS liquids.
And so in these cases at least we have evidence of ttie occurrence of locomotion without entailing a void into wh~Ch the

3 2 214 a 29 - 31 : OU• 0'c 'tT)V
'
.. 'tOTCOV
,
'
,
XQ'tQ
Xl, Vi")OIV•
aµa yap
e:vo~xe:~al ,une:sieyai a>..>..~Aotc;, ouoe:voc; OV'tOt; OlQO't~µc'tOC xwptO'tOU
napa tta owµa-ca -ca x1vooµe:va.
It might be validly contended that motion coulil not begin
in a plenum, but it can certainly~ there.

r

f
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moving parts of water must move.

Thus empirical evidence con-

firms the fact the void is not necessary for locomotion.

And

the atooists' positing of void as a necessary condition for
motion is thus unwarrented.
In what sense then is the void to explain the locomotion
of physical objects?

It may do so, as was pointed out earli-

er, only in one of two conceivable ways:

as something sepa-

rate from corporeal substance (as that in which movement takes
place), or as something internal to physical objects (in some
sense not conceived as apart from them).
dealing thus far

~ith

Since we have been

the 'internal void', we take up the ex-

planation of locomotion in terms of it first.
There are two major sections in which Aristotle deals
specifically with this problem:

~ 4.2.33

Physics 4.9, and.£!! the Heav-

An internal void can account for the locomotion of

a physical object only as an explanation of its weight.

And,
since the void by definition has absolutely no heaviness, 34 it
can explain only either the 'natural upward movement' of phys-

ical objects or their relative lightness--that is, the fact
that object A is lighter than object B.
The case against the former of these two views Aristotle
33cherniss, 22.• cit., p. 211, note 253, rightly points
out that On ~ Heavens 4.~, 308b30-309al8 is talking primarily about complex bodies, and that the question of the weight
of the individual atoms is not specifically mentioned at this
point.
- 3 4Physics 4. 7' 214a2-3: X£VOV, EV ~ µ T)O tv eo-i; l {3apu fi
XOU<pOV •
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presents first at Physics 4.9, 216b35ff. 35

If an internal

void explains the natural upward motion of objects, as inflated skins raise nets in the water,3 6 then void must have a motion of its own (which is impossible) and a distinct void to
which it (the void) naturally moves (which is absurd); it will
leave unexplained a natural downward motion (since, in that
case, all things are moving upward at different speeds).
Furthermore, at

On~

Heavens 4.2, 309bl7ff. Aristotle

raises the objection that, if the internal void is like the
external, all void would then move upward and all solid downward; and so there is nothing to keep the solid and the void
from being and staying totally separate.

Indeed, if the void

is to have natural movements and, as the proportion of void in
an object increases, its speed increases, it follows then that
separate void ought to move at an absolute speed (which is inconceivable and thus again impossible).3 7 Thus it is in this
sense that void cannot explain locomotion.

By itself this

argument of Aristotle's does not render the supposition of a.
void untenable, but it has at least shown in Aristotle's view
that void fails to explain motion and weight in one way.

It

35Although this apparently does riot directly affect Democritus, still it seems best to include it, for the argument
against Democritus' void g~ins effectiveness by its inclusion;
it shows that-Aristotle is in fairness attempting to exhaust
all the possibilities, that there is no sense in which the
void necessarily and adequately explains motion.
3 6Ross, Physics, ~ 12.£., p. 593.
37Physics 4.9, 217a6ff.
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is further only a .E§:!:! of Aristotle's refutation, the whole of
which will show that there is .E-.2. way in which it can explain
motion.
Aristotle has thus shown that the void of the atomists
cannot explain the movement of an object, in that it 'causes'
the 'natural upward movement' of that object.

And he further

maintains that such void cannot account for the •relative
weights' of objects, that is, that one object is lighter (or
heavier) than another.

Besides, such an explanation of the

•relative weights' of objects in terms of the void which they
contain involves one in contradicting empirical evidence.
This matter of relative weight is
Heavens 4.2, 309alff.

ta....~en

up at .Q!l

~

Aristotle readily admits that those who

posit solid atoms (in contrast to those who claim that things
are made up of geometrical figures--en(neoa) are better able
to account for the relative weights of various physical objects.

For example, the ato1!lists quite reasonably and consis-

tently propose to explain the fact that A is lighter than B,
quite apart from their bulk--indeed, even when A is larger than
B--by saying that A has more void than B.3 8

Thus 'more void'

is for them in all cases the explanation or cause (both

a'{ rr;,

ov

and ot a' 1:ourr;o are used) of less weight in any given physical
object.

'I:

But, as Aristotle says, this sort of account is not

38 This can be put into the form of a syllogism (and Aristotle is likely to have thought of it in those terms) as follows, with the 'middle term' as 'cause' or 'explanation':
A has more void; more void means lighter; and therefore A is
lighter.
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precise enough to explain adequately even the relative weights
of physical objects.

In order to give this type of explanation

the precision it requires, one must say that A is lighter than
B not only because A contains more void, but also, one must
add, because A contains less solid matter than B.

Failure to

make that addition will involve one in the absurd consequence
that a large amount of gold, because it contains more void, is
lighter than a small ~~ount of fire.3 9 All instance of A containing more void than B do not coincide with those in which
A is lighter than B; thus, Aristotle remarks, Democritus' explanation fails, because of its lack of precision, to explain
relative weight.
Furthermore, even granting such precision, Aristotle
shows at On the Heavens 4.2, 310al-15 that Democritus' explanation in terms of atoms and void cannot adequately account
for the phenomenon of 'absolute weight', the tendency of some
bodies to move in a given direction, as fire moves upward naturally and earth moves naturally downward.

Aristotle has

shown at Physics 4.9 that void cannot be a positive factor in
the upward motion of things; and he repeats that argument here

in~ the Heavens. 40

But, if void has no positive influence in

39w. K. c. Guthrie, ~istotle On the Heavens (Cambridge:
Harvard UnivePsity Press, ~60), p. jj6, note a, rightly explains against Stocks that there is no question here of the
ratio of solid to void in a given physical object.
40 4.2, 309a33-b29; Aristotle repeats some of the points

he had made in the Physics and adds others--for example, the
likelihood of the absolute separation of all void from all
solid.
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explaining lightness, then, although the atomists posit contraries as elements, they are no better off than those who explain weight in terms of only one natural element.
But why should this be so?

Aristotle's refutation of

Democritus' attempt to account for absolute weight in terms of
void is as follows (310al-14).

Let us assume, as Democritus

does, that there are two contraries, namely, atoms and void
(310al), and that these are to be identified respectively with
that which is absolutely heavy and absolutely light.41 The
difficulties with this latter part of the assumption have already been outlined by Aristotle at 309b20-29,

nai~ely,

that

this leaves us without an explanation of their motions (the
void itself was to explain motion, and it leaves us in the
unreasonable position of having to explain the motion of the
void by means of the void).

And so there is now no reason why

these two contraries should not simply be and remain separate
and distinct from one another, each in its own natural place.
And so the only feasible alternative is to remove from
the void any positive influence on the weight of the physical
object; and so the only real factor in the weight of physical
objects will be their atoms.
But still, even granting the positive influence of both
atoms and void on the wei~hts of objects, we will still be
41 r am assuming with Simplicius, de Caelo, p. 691, lines
19-21, that this is an enthyme:ne with the specified assumption
to be supplied as part of this areument. This assumption is
expressed by Aristotle earlier in the text, at 309bl8-20.
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without an adequate explanation of how the intermediate things
between these two absolutes (that is, composite bodies) are
heavier or lighter than one another (310a2-3), 42 neither in
terms of the amount of 'full' and 'void' in such an object nor
in terms of a proportion of •full' to 'void' in it.

This

Aristotle had already pointed out earlier in this chapter of

--

On the Heavens; so let us take up these criticisms now.
First of all, Aristotle had said, the quantity of atoms

and void in two different elements will never explain fully
their differences of natural motion.

This, it seems evident,

becomes quite clear when one attempts to work this out in a
specific instance.

Assume that the natural motion of a speci-

fic element is worked out in terms of the amount of atoms over
against the amount of void; a given sample amount of water
will have a downward tendency measurable in terms of the excess
of full over empty in it.

But, if this is the case, then there

will be an amount of water great enough so that the difference
between downward and upward pull (that is, the numerical excess
of full over void) is greater than that excess in a small
amount of earth, so that--contrary to evidence--the water will
be heavier than the earth.

Although Aristotle nowhere explic-

42 Guthrie, On~ He~vens, p. 340, note 3 (evidently following Alexander--Simplicius, de Caelo, p. 692, lines 12-15)
explains that what is meant bythe 'intermediates' here is air
and water, on the grounds that two of the bodies have been accounted for. But this implies that the full and the empty are
being thought of in terr:i.s of earth and fire, which hardly seems
lilcely. It is more likely that the reference is to all four
elements (or, rather, to composite bodies); see Simplicius,
loc. cit., lines 2lff.

--
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itly makes this refutation (probably because no one had·ever
held this hypothetical view), this seems to be the tendency of
the refutation that he does make at· 309a31-b2.

Thus purely

quantitative excess or defect will not explain the differences
of natural motions of the elements.
But an explanation in terms of proportions of solid to
void in the elements will not really help either, for, while
it may satisfactorily account for.differences between elements, it will not explain a phenomenon that occurs in connection with two different quantities of the same element.

Larg-

er amounts of the same element are seen to have faster natural
motions; for example, a larger amount of earth will move downward more rapidly than a smaller amount.

And, since the pro-

portion of full to empty must remain the same in the two different amounts of the same element, proportion must fail here
too to provide an adequate explanation (309b8-17).
So Aristotle has introduced all of these considerations
to show that, if full and empty are simply taken as contrary
principles of motion, there can be no explanation of the
weights of the elements relative to one another.

He now goes

on to show that with such principles of motion one could not
explain either the weight of these elements relative to these
two absolutes., that is, ts show precisely how each of the elements is heavier than the void and lighter than the full.
Both full and void are absolutes (like zero), and so an atom
moving through the void would have to move at an absolute
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speed, which is inconceivable (Physics 4.8, 215a24-216a25) in
relation to any known speed.

But void as a contrary absolute

must also move at an absolute speed (Physics 4.9, 217a6-10).
Thus, since both are absolutes, it will be impossible to conceive or formulate any relationship between either of them
and the elements.
Thus Aristotle is right when he says that an explanation
of motion which takes the full and the empty as principles of
motion--as absolute heaviness and absolute lightness--cannot
in the end explain the relative weights of the elements.
This means that the only view open to Democritus was
that any natural motion or absolute weight--and the evidence
that we have for such motion and weight--was only an illusion;
it means that there is no such thing as that which is absolutely light (µ~e' dTIAWs

elva'

µ~eev xou~ov--310a9-10), that ob-

jects 'move upward' because of some pressure ( UAA
ex8Al~6µevov--310al0).

1
•••

~

This is exactly what Democritus had

done; the very term used here

(ex8Al~oµevov

) is, with some

variations, used repeatedly in an accoilnt of breathing which
is specifically attributed to Democritus. 43 Such a view then
denies natural motion and absolute weight altogether, and thus
cannot in principle account for some of the phenomena which it
had intended

~o

preserve, for it must hold that a large amount

of fire or air is heavier than a small amount of water or
43 on Breathing 4, 47lb24ff ., where the following forms
are used: EX0Af~eooa,, ex8A(~ov~os, 8A(~lV, OUV8A~~ov.
Compare a similar account at Qg the Soul 1.2, 404al0-13.
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earth, and this is contrary to empirical evidence, and thus
impossible (310al2-14).
Thus we have seen that as an internal principle of motion the void cannot in fact account adequately for the specific examples of motion it claims to account for, nor can it in
principle account sufficiently for the weight of physical objects or of the elements themselves--either in a relative or
in an absolute sense of weight.
The Void Considered as Senarate
-We have thus far- been considering the void as something
internal to physical objects, as something conceived of as not
separate from them; and we have seen that as such the void can
not adequately account for phenomena.

We pass now to a con-

sideration of the void as something separate, as that in which
things are in motion (

ev

~ xiver~a&),

no matter whether those

things be atoms or the physical objects which are constructed
from these atoms.

And Aristotle will show that considered as

such the void cannot account for locomotion--neither that of
physical objects nor that of the atoms themselves.

And he will

further show that, since qualitative changes in physical objects are reduced by the atomists to the locomotion of the
atoms, the void will not afcount also for such changes in physical objects.
But before beginning with Aristotle's criticis::is it may
be appropriate to point out that Aristotle seems to present a
fairly consistent picture of the role of the void in the theory
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of the atomists; he regularly describes it as the necessary
,
condition of locomotion, primarily for the atoms: ou • • •
x(VT)OlV el µ~ xevov. 4 4 He, furthermore, explicitly denies that
the atomists looked upon the void as in any sense an efficient
cause of motion:

'tOlUU'tY)V

• • • ouoeµ(av a{'t(av

.45

In spite

of the fact that there is no evidence to support the supposition that the void is anything more than a necessary condition
of motion, Guthrie seems to feel that Leucippus and Democritus
looked upon the void as being something more, something more
like a "positive cause of motion. 1146 But, if this 'something
more like a positive .cause of motion' comes close to being a
concept of an efficient cause or of a 'final cause'--in the
sense of that place to which an atom naturally moves--then it
is inconceivable that Aristotle would not only have failed to
44 Physics 4.6, 213b5; see also 4.7; 214a24.
45Physics 8.9, 265b23-24. The reference is to a type of
cause like 1 Love' and 'Strife' in Empedocles and the 'Tiiind' in
Anaxagoras. This is further supported b~ S~mp~icius, In Physicorum, p. 1318, lines 3lff.: ol no&TJ'tlxou Oe µY) µvriae€v-n;<;;
a(rc(ou.

46Guthrie, History, II, 398-399.

In speaking of the void
as a sine oua non of movement he says: "I would nevertheless
doubt""""Yilietner ~appeared so to Leucippus and Democritus" (p.
398, note 2); and then he speaks of their anmver as "corning at
a stage in the history of thought when the need for a positive
cause of motion was entani?led with the lack of a true conception of the void 11 (p. 399 Jt. The only evidence which he cites
to support his supposition seems to be the passage in which
Aristotle says that void is the cause of motion, Physics 4.8,
214bl6-17: a't'tlov • • • x1v1jot:wc;. But this seems to say no
more tnan 4.7, 214a24, where the void is a'{-rLov xlv1joeu)c; ourcwc;
w~ EV ~ XlVEl'rQl.
And this is the point that Simplicius, ..!.!!.
Physicorum, p. 658, lines 16-20, and p. 664, lines 3ff ., makes
in discussing this issue.

r
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mention it, but also would have said so positively that the
void was not an efficient cause and that the atomists deny any
kind of final cause.

So, in view of the lack of any evidence

to the contrary, we have no recourse but to follow Aristotle
and agree that the atomists likely looked upon their void as
no more than a necessary condition of motion.

Hor did they

need any more than that, inasmuch as they claimed eternal motion for their atoms, as Guthrie rightly points out. 47
But there is considerably more at stake here than simply
the question of the locomotion of atoms; all other kinds of
'motions' of physical objects are affected as well.

For the

void is conceived of as separate even when it is internal to
what we call physical objects; it was posited as a response of
Leucippus to the

argu,~ent

that there could be no motion if

there were no separate void, and that there could be no multiplicity without that which keeps them apart. 48

And Leucippus'

response was that the void does indeed exist, that there is a
radical multiplicity of atoms ( a:rre:t pa .,-;o n/\T)8oi;;--325a30), and
that there is no essential unity either of the universe in
general or of physical objects.

The only true unit for him is

the atom, and there is no real unity apart from the unity of
J. "\ .t.e
~ \
elaV EVO<;
OUX aV
t he individual atoms: EX u~~ 'tOU Xa't U~•J
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aA.D8wi;; no/\A.wv EV --325a36-37.
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47 History, II, 399.
48 Gen. et Corr. 1.8, 325a4-6: XlVD8f1VaL o' _oux tv ouvaoeal µ~ "O"\i1:oi;;-Xt:~XEXWPLOµEVOU 1 ouo' au TIOAAQ ElVUl µ~ OV'tO<;
't"OU 0 l E ( pyo V'toc; •
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separate void in which the atoms move the atomists felt was
-,

essential to their explanation of the generation of physical
objects and their passing away; 4 9 and they used it to explain
every other kind of alteration of physical objects. 50 All motions are reduced by the atomists to the locomotion of the
atoms in the void:

"none of the other types of motion (except

locomotion) belong to their primary bodies, but only to those
objects composed of them, for they say that things increase
and diminish and are altered ( aAAotouo8at) as atomic bodies
join or separate" (Physics 8.9, 265b27-29).

Thus a successful

refutation of a separate void as an explanation or as a necessary condition of the motion of the atoms is a refutation as
well of any explanation of all types of motion as posited by
the atomists.

We have so far, in connection with conceiving the void
as internal to physical objects and in some sense not separable
fro~

them, seen that in Physics 4.6-7, although the atomists

thought that void is necessary for locomotion, Aristotle validly contends that void is necessary neither for locomotion 51 nor
for an explanation of such phenomena as compression, expansion,
49Gen. et Corr. 1.8, 325a32-b5: )<.~' ouv,o't"aµeva µev
YEV£0LV TIO'Terv, OtUAUOµeva oe ~eopav • • • CLU 't"OU X£VOU ytvoµEVTJs 't"~~ otaAuoeW<;; xaL 't"D~ ~eopa~
, 50 Gen. ~t Corr. 1.8, 325b2-3: oo.,;w nCi.aav aAA.o(u)Otv xa'l

nav

't"O 1LUOX£LV 't"OU't"OV

y(vea8at 't"bV 't"ponov.

5lsee Physics 4.6, 214a28ff.

112
and growth. 52

We had (at pae;e 100, above) postponed the·argu-

. ment and refutation of the void as explaining the locomotion
of physical objects as something external and separate, for,
inas~uch

as the void inside of such objects is still a void in

which locomotion takes place, it is for all intents and purposes separate; and, as such, will be open to precisely those
criticisms which tell against any separate void--whether in
the universe at large or in physical objects.
Aristotle's refutation of the atomist position on void
as an explanation of motion is formulated most fully in Physics

4.8 and in On

~

Heavens 3.2.

And here, as Cherniss rightly

points out, the refutation is for the most part formulated in
terms of 'natural' and 'forced' motion. 53

Inasmuch then as

physical objects do in some sense have weight, the refutation
will apply more obviously to them.

But, since there is a

thorny question as to whether the atoms themselves have weight,
its application to them is not so clear.

And so, in view of

the fact of this controversy, it seems inevitable that before
proceeding with the refutation we come to some sort of conclusion about the weight of the atoms and hence about the appropriateness of some of Aristotle's arguments to them also.
52Fhysics 4.6, 213al5-21, and 4.7, 214a32-bll.

53

l

Op. cit., p. 194. Althoueh Cherniss does say that the
difficultTes-wii'ich Aristotle raises depend for their validity
on Aristotle's concept of these two kinds of motion, I will try
to show that this is not necessarily so, that the difficulties
are valid, independently of the uniqueness of Aristotle's concepts of such kinds of motion.
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There are two items in the doxographic tradition which
seem explicitly to deny weight to the atoms of Democritus:
Aetius Placita 1.3.18 and 1.12.6. 54 These statements have led
various scholars to tamper with the statement of Aristotle at

-on Generation and Corruption 1.8, 326a9-10:
a1pe~wv--the

xa(~oi

~apu~epov

most obvious meaning of which is that the weight

of the atoms increases in proportion as their size increases.
Cherniss, for example, interprets this as meaning that each
atom has relative weight when compared to any other. 55

Both

Brieger and Liepmann admit weight as an original property of
the atoms; 56 Liepmann says that this weight only comes into
effect in the vortex and in the world of physical objects.
This is the view adopted substantially by most scholars. 57
Although Zeller argues that if they do have weight they must
54As cited in Hermann Diels, Doxographi Graeci (Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter, reprinted in 1958), pp. 285 and 311.
55.Q.E.. cit., p. 97, note 412. Cherniss is concerned to
show that Aristotle says nothing about size in regard t9 the
weight of atoms because he does not want size as a factor in
the amount of heat a spherical atom may have. But their size
may be inconsequential to that particular argument in Aristotle and may have been introduced to explain the weight of
the atoms. But their size too is important, though not to
the argument about heat in atoms, but to the softness and
breakability of atoms; the larger they are the more vulnerable
to division.
' n der Atome und die Weltentsteh56Brieger, Die Urbewe
bei Leucip"Q, uiiCrDemokrit 18ffi; Liepmann, Die Mechanik
er te'Ucinp-Demokrrtischen Atome (1885). I have not seen
these Y:orks; they are cited from Burnet, .Q.E.• cit., p. 345,
and from others.
57For example, Bailey, 2.E.• cit., and Alfieri, .2.E.• cit.

fg
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fall, the original fall of the atoms is likely to be a postAristotelian correction of atomism, and may for that reason be
discounted. 58 Burnet 59 points out that Liepmann's view might
be better expressed by saying that, since the weight produces
no effect, it does not exist, that the concept of absolute
weight as an essential attribute of body did not occur to the
early physicists. Kirk60 basically accepts.this view; and
this also seems to be the view of Guthrie, although he does
not explicitly say so. 61
In what sense then is weight to be attributed to the
atoms?

It certainly does not seem to function when they are

simply in free motion in the void; their 'free motion' in the
void is nothing but a mechanistic 'forced motion'.

But even

in this free motion it seems doubtful that Democritus felt
that his atoms ceased to have weight simply because they did
not tend to move downward.

For the atoms obviously do have a

weight which does function when the atoms form physical objects, for Guthrie rightly argues that otherwise Aristotle
would certainly have criticized Democritus for forming heavy
objects out of weightless atoms. 62 Their weight seems to
function as well in the vortex, with atoms moving by size to

58Guthrie, History, II, 401.
'
59
.
.Q.E.. cit., pp. 342ff., especially p. 345, note 1.
60
rn Kirk and Raven, .2.E.• .£!!., pp. 415-416.
61 see his History, II, 403, 410.
62 Ibid., p. 403.
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different positions.

To suppose that the atoms had weight

only on those occasions when that weight functioned might indeed have given Aristotle reason to see here an anticipation
of potency and act--with the non-fUnctioning weight being in
effect a potential weight.

Hence it seems more reasonable to

agree more substantially with the position of Liepmann, that
is, that the atoms have weight, although it does not always
function.

Thus these atoms can, when considered in isolation

and apart from their free motion in the void, be said to have
weight.

Thus Aristotle's criticisms apply not only to physi-

cal objects, but in principle as well to the atoms.

..

Furthermore, if we accept this view, the divergence of
opinion on this matter in the post-Aristotelian era might be
more readily explained as being due to Aristotle's own view of
weight functioning as a natural downward motion.

In this way,

in one sense, Democritus' atoms had weight (when considered by
themselves); but again, in another sense, they did not, in
that such weight did not fUnction as the cause of an original
motion, nor did it influence in any way the free movement of
the atoms in the void.

It is in this latter context of their

movement in the void that the two passages from the Placita
mention the weightlessness of the atoms of Democritus. 63
To return to the

qu~stion

of an explanation of motion

63At 1.3.18 it is mentioned that Epicurus added weight
a property Of atoms, UVQyXl') yap, ~no(, XlVEl08Ul ~a owµa~a
~oo ~dpouc TIAl')y~.
1 .12.6: ~dpoc µ~v o6x 1XElV, XlVEio8al

a~
~~
OE xa~' QAAl')Ao~un(av

EV

~Q ane(p4l.
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and the role of an external void in this explanation, Aristotle's most extensive treatment of this problem and the difficulties involved in using the void for such an explanation
is at Physics

4.8.

The beginning of chapter eight (214bl2-28)

offers what Aristotle considers to be an overview of the general difficulties with positing a separate void.

Aristotle

considers first the question of how void can explain motion
(214bl3-23--this corresponds roughly to the more detailed
criticism later in the chapter at 214b28-216a26).

And this

latter explanation involves conceiving of the void as a separate place into which movement takes place (214b20-22).

He

then goes on to consider the basic question of the void by itself, apart from the question of motion, void as a separate
and empty place (214b23-28--which corresponds to 216a26b21). 64
Let us then consider first what Aristotle has to say
about void as an explanation for motion in his 'general overview' at the beginning of this chapter (214bl2-28).

Aristotle

in effect asks here in what sense void can be an explanation of
motion.

He considers various alternatives and finds each of

them inadequate.

The first alternative which he suggests is

that the void is to explain the natural motion of the elements,
the type of lqcomotion

whi~h

is most important to Aristotle.

It is quite likely that Democritus admitted some such move64 r will be concerned here with the question of an explanation of motion as presented in Phvsics 4.8 and in parallel
passages, and will postpone the question of void in itself.

r
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ments and attempted an explanation of them either in terms of
'
65
mechanical pressure or of an 'upward surge'.
It is on this
point that Aristotle feels that Democritus is particularly
vulnerable; the question of natural motion becomes quite critical in the more detailed refutation to be taken up later
(215al-24).

Here Aristotle feels that it is quite sufficient

to say that an external void offers no more an explanation of
s::.. -"\
u
,
,,
\
'
,,
,,
.
( vD~ov
sue h na t ura1 mo t ion
0~1 oux av ~o xEvov at~lov ElD ~D~
~opac--214bl5-16)

than did the internal void (On the Heavens

4.2).
Well, if void, Aristotle says, cannot explain natural
motion, What does it explain (~(voe oJv Ul~lOV eo~at ~O XEVOV;
--Physics 4.8, 214bl6)?

It seems most reasonable to assume

that the question is general in nature ana is, not asking about
void being an explanation of a particular direction or kind of
motion.

Aristotle continues after this question:

"For it

seems to be an explanation of locomotion, but it does not even
explain this" (214bl6-17).

His point seems to be that void

was posited simply to account for locomotion, as a necessary
condition of it; but, since it does not account for this,
there is nothing left for which it can account, and hence no
reason to assume its existence.
W. D.

Ro~s

in his com!nentary on the passage seems to as-

sume two things in regard to this passage which tend to weaken
65 For an explanation of upward movement by pressure, see
On the Heavens 4.2, 310al0, and On Breathing 4, 47lb24ff.; for
the 'surge' see On the Heavens 4:b, 313al4ff.

r
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Aristotle's
~(vo~

First of all, he seems to assume that

argu,_~ent.

(214bl6) refers to a specific kind or direction of move-

ment, for in his 'analysis' of this passage he summarizes:
V1hat then can be the locomotion of which it is thoueht to be
the cause? 1166 Furthermore, he supposes that there is evident11

ly an ambiguity of the word

ai~tov

supporters of the void posit it as

at stake, for, he says, the
ano.'l~tov

in the sense of

•necessary condition', but Aristotle says that void cannot be
an ai~tov in the sense of 'determining cause' of locomotion in
any particular direction. This, he contends, makes Aristotle's
argument here worthless. 67 But neither of these assumptions
are necessary or warrented.
As to Ross,· first

assu,~ption,

out that it is not necessary to take

it has just been pointed
~(vo~

· particular direction or kind of motion.
have Aristotle says:

as referring to some

Ross apparently would

external void does not determine (cause)

the direction of locomotion of a body (214bl7), and furthermore
(eLt) void does not determine the direction of locomotion of a

body placed in it (214bl7-24); all this in spite of the fact
that Ross himself lists these two as separate arguments (p.
380).

But Aristotle's point is evidently that void v1as sup-

posed to be a necessary condition of locomotion.
not, and Aristotle had

jus~

But it is

shown that it is not in the previ-

66 Ross, Physics, p. 380.
67Ibid., pp. 587-588; Cherniss' reference to the passage,
.2.12.• cit., p. 151, offers no comment or explanation of the refutation.
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vious chapter. 68

And he had done this by showing that locomo-

tion can be explained by a mutual interchange of bodies, and
he had supported this by empirical evidence for such locomotion.

And this holds for any void.
Now, as to the

a,~biguities

of the word

ai~tov,

Aristotle

was quite evidently aware of the ambiguities of that word and
is hardly likely to have traded on it, to have gone from one
meaning of the word to another, simply for the sake of an argument.

If anything, the void for Aristotle was a 'material

cause' (see Metauhysics 1.4, 985b9-10, where the void along
with the full is described as

a'{~La

•••

w<;; uA.T)v ) and not as

any sort of an efficient cause, if this is what Ross means--as
he seems to--by "determining cause. 116 9 But the whole assumption of an

a..~biguity

seems unwarrented; the passage, as has

been shown, makes perfectly good sense without it.

Aristotle

is quite justified in saying that, although the void seemed
68 Physics 4.7, 214a28ff.
691 see no difficulty if the 'determining cause' is to be
explained in terms like 'the grain of the wood 11 determines 11 the
structure of the wood-carving' or 'the density of the mediu..~
"determines" the speed of an object passing through it', for,
as Aristotle points out, void is undifferentiated and cannot
thus affect the direction or speed of movement of an object.
Althoueh the void was not intended to give this sort of an explanation of motion, it is certainly not inappropriate or
"worthless" to mention this point, for, as we shall see, along
with the other.parts of th~ refutation, it will tend to show
that there is no sense in which the void is an explanation of
motion. 3ut this matter of the void explaining the direction
of motion is evidently not the point which Aristotle is making
here; he rather begins to make it in the following argument
(214bl7ff.), as had just been pointed out in the discussion of
Ross' first assumution. This internretation seems more consistent with what Aristotle says in the whole passage.
.

~

~

r

'
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only to be a necessary condition of locomotion, it is in· fact
not--and that leaves nothing for the void to explain.
Having now established that the void cannot explain
natural motion and that it is not a necessary condition for
motion at all, Aristotle goes on with a new point in his refutation ('b: 1--214bl 7):

void, conceived· of as simply being an

empty place (ofov ~ono~ eo~Ep~µfvo~ a6µa~o~ --214bl8), contributes nothing at all to an explanation70 of the direction of
locomotion.

Aristotle asks, "Where will the body that was set

into i t ( the void ) move? ( nou-

,

.A

01081JOE~a1

',

~o

\,

E10~E8Ev

El~

,,

au~o

oWµa--214bl8-19), for void is undifferentiated and the object
placed in it cannot move into all directions.

This is, in

effect, to reduce the void to a separate place into which an
object can move c~ov ~onov •
~€pE~at--214b20-21),

•

•

a place for an object--any object of any

kind--and nothing more than that.
Thus far, apart from the objection raised by Aristotle
to the effect that the void is not a necessary condition of
70Cherniss, on. cit., p. 151, without further explanation, reduces the argument at 214bl7-24 to "but motion requires absolute differentiation of direction which is impossible in a void and inexplicable on the theory of separate
position."
But Aristotle's point here does not seem to be·that the
void displays no differentiation of direction; it is the limitless void which entails ~ denial of any such absolute direction like ,·up' or 'down', i.e., toward or avmy from some
specific boundary. Aristotle does not here bring up the notion of the limitlessness of the void. His point is rather
that the void, as that which is absolutely nothing, cannot
contribute anything to an explanation of the direction or
speed of locomotion--as a differentiated medium (like air or
wood) might help explain the motion of an object in it.

r
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locomotion, many of the other refutations may eeem to be
pointless, or, as Ross puts it, "not convincing. 1171 Indeed,
taken as separate 'refutations', they may be or border on
being pointless or unconvincing.

But we may need to remind

ourselves that these separate points are not in fact to be
taken as though they had nothing to do with one another; they
are part of the fabric of one larger and whole refUtation.
And this 'whole refutation' culminates (as does the brief
overview given by Aristotle at 214bl2-28) in a consideration
of the void as nothing but a place for a body and in a questioning of the validity of positing such a void or empty place
as existing separately.

But, before proceeding to that point,

there is still more to be said in detail about the void as an
explanation of motion.

And that more detailed account occu-

pies the greater bulk of the central portion of this chapter
on the void in the Physics (4.8, 214b28-216a26).
And in this more detailed account at 214b28-215al Aristotle repeats substantially the same point that he.had made
earlier in his refutation at 214bl7-22.
is void, is materially undifferentiated

'E:xe:'

Bl acpopa~-214b33-215al)

Void, inasmuch as it
(~

yap xevov, o6x

and hence cannot in principle

contribute anything at all to our understanding of why things

'
should have a tendency to move
in one. direction rather than
another.

But, if the void cannot explain that, then it does

71 Ross, Physics, p. 587.
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not help us to understand as well why they should move at
all. 72 Thus, if one is to eXplain at all the variety of motions that evidently take place, that explanation must lie
somewhere other than in the void itself.

And in this sense

the void is completely otiose.
At 214al3 Aristotle had pointed out in a preliminary way
that the void could not account for the natural motion of the
elements, namely, the movement of fire upward and that of
earth downward toward the center of the universe.

Now at

215al-13 he takes up this position afresh and attempts to show
more specifically how this fact of natural motion and the supposition of a void are incompatible.

Aristotle introduces

here an important distinction between natural and forced (which
is one kind of unnatural motion) motions (215al-6).

72AristotJe says at 214b30-31:

But the

µ~ evolxeoea1 µ~o~ tv
x1veroea1, eav ~ X£Vov.
This Cherniss, .21?.· cit., p. 151,
takes to mean that motion is impossible (as contrasted to 'inexplicable') in a void. Ross' position ia not as clear; in
his 'analysis' or summary of the content of this passage he
writes: "Instead of void being necessary if there is to be
movement, it is incompatible with movement."(p. 380) This is
milder than his statement in the 'commentary' section (p. 588):
"The first reason why a void makes movement impossible was given in 214b3l-215al." Likely the latter statement is to be interpreted in the light of the former, that is, to take 'impossible' in the sense of 'unintelligible' (see Metathysics 5.12,
1019b32-33 and Ross' comments on evosxoµEVOV as i ogically possible' in his Metaphysics I, 322. What Aristotle does indeed
show is not that motion is impossible in a void, but that it
is impossible to explain; it is unintelligible.
And what.Aristotle points out here is that the atomists
assume that the void is a necessary condition of locomotion;
but, he further says, even if one does assume the existence of
the void, one can argue as validly--and, indeed, with more
cogency (µffAAov--214b30)--that in a void all things must be
and remain at rest. The positing of a void not only does not
help explain motion, but it impedes that explanation as well.
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void, he shows, makes such a distinction impossible in principle, particularly so if that void is boundless; for, inasmuch as the void is boundless, there is no point of reference
from which we could say that any place was up or down or in
the middle.

And, inasmuch as it is truly void and undifferen-

tiated, there is no difference between up and down in it
{215a6-ll).

But natural motion, Aristotle points out, has

such differentiation (D

oe

cpuae& cpopa 6ldcpopo, --215all-12).

Thus the concepts of void and of natural motion are mutually
exclusive; and it is for this reason that the positing of void
denies the fact of natural motion and thus any real distinction
between natural and forced motion.
But it is precisely this sort of a distinction which one
needs in order to explain the action under the influence of
'forced motion'--x(vT)o&, '3(q. or napa cpuo&v--(215al4-24).

Aris-

totle takes the obvious example of 'forced motion'--a thrown
object.

The movement of that object when the force is exerted

against its natural motion is evidently the excess of the exerted force over the natural motion.73· The 'forced motion' of
such an object diminishes until it ceases altogether.7 4

But

this sort of motion cannot take place in the void; it requires
a positive medium, both to give some account of the mechanics
(
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73see also On the Heavens 3.2, 30lbl8. The 'force', when
it works in the same direction as the natural motion, accelerates the motion (8a~~w no,~o£&--30lb22).
74see Physics 8.10, 266b27-267al2.
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ea~~w x(v~oiv--215al5-16, if these are actually two 75 alternatives) of such motion and to explain why the object should
stop at one place rather than another; it would in the void
simply continue moving on indefinitely (215al9-22).
The object may indeed stop in a void if something more
powerful gets in its way, and, in that case, it (either will
stay stopped and unsupported in the void, which is impossible
if it has weight, or) must start off anew in a different direction.

It will obviously move into the void because the

void is that which will give way.

But now there is no expla-

nation of the new direction of its motion; it might just as
well move in all directions in an undifferentiated void.

This

(215a22-24) is still part of the refutation of an attempt to
account for the two evident kinds of motion which present
themselves in connection with a thrown object. 76 Thus the
void not only fails to explain the gradually diminishing motion and eventual stopping of the thrown object, it fails as
well to explain the 'new' motion that occurs after the object
has temporarily stopped.
75Ross, Physics, p. 589.
7 6Ross, Physics, p. 589, suggests that Aristotle is arguing as follows: the atomists say that objects move through
air faster than they do thr~ugh water because there is more
void in the aiF; but void is undifferentiated, and so the objects would move in all directions. Ross then labels Aristotle's argument as unconvincing. But Aristotle has been
talking about an object for some reason coming to a halt; and
now he adds that, once stopped, if the object is to move again,
it must move in all directions precisely because the void is
undifferentiated.
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The previous part of this refutation of the existence of
a separate void to account for motion (215al-24) was formulated in terms that show void incompatible with the notion of
natural motion and with any distinction between natural and
forced motion.

In this next part of the refutation (215a24-

216a26) Aristotle considers what the concept of the void can
contribute to an explanation of motion quite apart from a direct consideration of natural motion.

There are, Aristotle

says, two factors which contribute to an explanation of the
motion of objects (6,a ouo

a{~(a,

--215a26):

the first is a

variation in the medium in which motion occurs
'\

~o

Ol

I

(~~ o'a~€pt1v

\

oU--215a26, which is considered more fully at 215a24-

216all); the second ie a variation in the moving object itself
(~~ 5,a~~pttv ~o ~epoµevov--215a27, which is taken up again at

216all-20).

Both of these factors are matters derived from
empirical evidence. 77 And Aristotle will show that the theory
of the void is incompatible with each of these factors.
Aristotle takes up first the matter of the medium as a
factor in the explanation of the movement of an object (~o µ[v
oJv lh' oJ ~€pe~al a'{~tov --literally: "that through which (an

object) moves is an explanatory factor", 215a29), that is, an
explanation of its speed.

His discussion is lengthy and de-

' substantial agreement on what he
tailed, but there seems to be
says here.

For Aristotle all the evidence that he had avail-

7 7 one notes in particular the prominence of the word
opwµev at the beginning of each of the two sections, at 215a25
and at 216al3.
t
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able to him points to the fact that there is an inverse relationship between the speed of the moving object and the density of the medium in which it is moving.

Considering the

evidence available to him, his conclusion is certainly reasonable. 78

He further shows that there is in principle no pro-

portion between void and some specific density.

Thus speed in

pure void would exceed all proportion, and hence all calculation (Tiav~o~ ~TIEp~aAAEL Aoyou--215b22), and the time taken to
move through some fixed distance of void will be small beyond
measure.

There is thue no way in which one can give a rational

and understandable account of movement in a void.

So, when we

consider the medium as a factor in the explanation of the motion of an object, the theory of the void will abolish any idea
of proportion between density and speed and time, and so will
not only fail utterly to make motion understandable, but will
also contradict empirical evidence.
The second factor in an explanation of the movement
(that is, in the rate of speed) of an object ie its bulk; and

7 8 stephen Toulmin, "Ideals of Natural Order" in Philosophical Problems of Natural Science, ed. by Dudley Shapere
1New York: Macmillan Company, 1965), pp. 112-117, points out
rightly that Aristotle was not attempting to arrive at a theory
of 'velocity' in the modern sense; and so it would be unfair to
criticize his attempts in terms of modern science and modern
concepts; Aristotle, he say~, may al:;so have been right about
the void, for we can either create or find (in outer space)
conditions which only approximate void.
Cherniss, on. cit., p. 152, is concerned to find fault
with Aristotle precisely because he did not arrive at a modern
theory of velocity: "the real error in this argument is the
assumption that velocity varies inversely with the density of
the medium."
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this factor is now considered in relation to the void at
216all-20.

Again there is empirical evidence which seems to

warrent positing a fixed relationship between the size and the
speed of objects composed of the same substance (
oµo(w~ ~X'Q--216al4).

eav

~dAAa

If there is to be any coherent and under-

standable motion in the void, this same relationship ought to
hold there too.

But it does not and it can not, for objects

ought all, regardless of size, move at the same speed in void.
But such a supposition flies in the face of all the evidence
available. 79
Finally, at 216a20-26 Aristotle summarizes this attempt
to account for motion by positing the void by indicating that
the concept of the void is totally incompatible with the two
factors which all the evidence shows contribute to an explanation of motion.

In the light of both these factors the void

fails to account for motion in any way; it only serves to make
motion unintelligible.

Democritus' void was meant, Aristotle

says, to account for sense experience, one of the items of
which is motion.

But it cannot account for it, for the suppo-

79Ross, Physics, p. 591, says that what Aristotle thought
absurd is now known to be a fact. But we must remember that
this does not affect the validity of Aristotle's argument (on
the basis of the evidence he had), but only the correctness of
his conclusion. Ross also Jllentions here Cornford's statement
that Epicurus divined this fact without experiment. But this
is unlikely, for Epicurus probably got it from Aristotle (as he
did some other variations on Democritus' atomism). One might
compare Aristotle's use in this present passage of (ao~ax~
(216a20), which Epicurus apparently merely changed to the appropriate feminine form {ao~axef~ when he proposed this doctrine in Epistle 1.61 (ed. Usener).
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sition of a void contradicts sense-experience, contradicts all
that we can see and know about the motion of physical objects.
In the light of this failure to explain motion, the positing of a separate void can amount to nothing more than the
positing of a separate place, which does nothing at all to
account for motion.

And this is the aspect of the void which

Aristotle discusses.next· in this chapter (216a26-b21).

But,

before going on to thie, there are two further passages in On
which deal with the question of motion.
-the Heavens
The two passages in question do not deal directly with
the problem of the void, but, inasmuch as the theory of the
void has been shown
to make impossible
any account of natural
.
.
motion, they do present further difficulties, as Aristotle
points out, in explaining in terms of atomism motions which
are seen to be natural •
.In the first of these passages--.Q!!

~

Heavens 3.2,

especially 300b9-30lb30--Aristotle presents a general refutation of a position which will not adequately account for natural motion.

begins by showing that we have empirical evidence for natural rest. 80 But this, he says, implies a natural
He

motion to that place of rest.

And this is why Democritus ought

to have specified what sort of motion--natural or unnat1lral--

'

.

the atoms have· ( ()& 0 xa) Aeux{rrn~ xa'l LiT)µoxp (,,;~,. 'tO r' A.tyoUOl v
UE~ XLVeio8aL 'ta np&ta owµa'ta ev 'tQ XEVQ xai 't~ ane(py,

A.ex,,;tov ,,;(va

x(VTJOLV

B0300a30:

xai ,,;(' ~ xa'ta ~oa&v au,,;wv x(VTJOL' --300b9-

~a(ve,,;a( 'tl µtvov eni 'tou µtoou.
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r.

11) and what is their natural motion. 81 . But Democritus had

said that his atoms are in everlasting motion (net x1vetoeal-300blO) and so made a prior natural motion impossible, for
there is for him only an endless series of forced motions; and,
since one cannot exhaust the series of forced motions, one can
never arrive at a natural motion:

aei

~o npo~epov p(q

xlvou- ·

µevov XlV~OEl--"the earlier atom will always set the next in
motion qua itself being in forced motion"--300bl6. 82 And so
again the void and eternally actual motion in it involve a
denial of any real natural motion, and hence a denial of our
empirical evidence.
But even more than this, there is a further sense in
which this sort of motion denies sense-perception (300b3230lall), for there are as many different motions, Aristotle
says, as there are movers; and this number in atomic theory
would be boundless:

el o'

~nelpa ~a xLvouv~a

avayxatov ane(pou, e(val --30lal.

xa!

~a~ ~opa~

And this boundless number is

disorderly, for order and system require some limitation.

But

we perceive order in natural objects and the order that we perceive there is natura1. 83 But Democritus, Aristotle says,
81 see also Metaphysics 1.4, 985b4ff. and 12.6, 107lb32ff.
82 simplicius' explana•ion, de Caelo, pp. 583-584, is substantially the ·same: the infinite regress that this generates
makes it impossible that any atom can ~onceivably be (originally) set into this 'forced' motion (ouoev xlv~e~oe~a1 ).
· 83 301a6-7: ~ y~p ~asl' ~ olxe(a ~wv a{aeryi;wv ~uol~
eo~(~-"for that order which belongs properly to what is perceived is their nature." ~wv aloerytwv, is evidently important
here.

r
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claims in effect that the disorderly movement of the atonis is
natural, and the order that we see is unnatural:

301alO-ll.

'
'tT)V
µ 'E:Y

Thus atomism not only denies the validity of some

items of sense-perception, but also the order that we perceive
in nature. 84
The second passage, which shows another difficulty with
Democritus' account of what Aristotle would call •natural motion', is to be found at On the Heavens 4.6, 313al4ff •. There
Aristotle attributes to Democritus what Democritus himself had
evidently called a •surge' (oou~ ), 85 which Aristotle here
seems to identify with upward-moving warm elements ('ta avw

~e:poµe:va 8epµa--313a24). 86 With this 'surge', as Aristotle
reports it, Democritus had attempted to account for the floating of heavy, flat objects on water.

But this •surge', Aris-

totle points out, ought--as Democritus himself recognized
(~one:p

ev(aia'tal xaxelvo~ UU't0~--313b4)--to occur to a higher

degree in the air, for, since all kinds of atoms are in all
elements, 87 air ought to contain more of such 'warm' elements

84 cherniss, on. cit., p. i94, claims that these difficul-

ties "depend for their validity upon Aristotelian concepts of
'natural' and 'unnnatural' motion. 11 But they rather depend on
empirical evidence for such a distinction between 'natural'
and 'unnatural' motion.
8 5see Kurt von Fritz,' .2.E.· cit., p. 29.

86 see also 313b5:

µevwv awµchwv.

AEywv aouv 't~V XlVT)OlV 'tWV ~vw ~e:po

7see the use~of na~one:pµ{a; also Sim~licius, de Caelo,
p. 730, line 10: e(val yap TIQV'tWV onepµa'ta ev TIUOl.
8
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than water.

But Democritus• reason for claiming that the

•surge' does not cause heavy objects to float on air is that
in the air the 'surge' is more scattered.88 . But this explanation, Aristotle says, is weak ( AUel

µaAaxw,~313b3)

evidently

because there are more spherical atoms in air {for breathing)
than in water.

Aristotle then goes on to show that there is a

better and more consistent explanation if one does not suppose
that void is a factor.

Both the body in motion and the medium

into which the body is placed are continuous; they have no
void in them.

The heavy body has a natural motion downward,

but its natural downward motion is resisted by the continuity
of the medium (water, for example).

And when the resistence

of the medium is greater--because of the flatness of the heavy
body--the body will float (313b5-22).
Thus Aristotle has shown that Democritus' attempts to
explain motion in terms of void were abortive; they did not
survive closer scrutiny, for either the explanation was weak
and there was a demonstrably better and more consistent one,
or it made motion unintelligible, or it contradicted empirical
evidence.

The objections raised by Aristotle against the void

88 Both Guthrie, On the Heavens, p. 369, ("the surge does
not work in one direction only
and Cherniss, £:E.• cit., p.
203, note 231, ("does not t~ke place in a single direction'')
seem to be adding the idea of different directions of the
'surge•, whereas the •surge' was supposed to be a specifically
upward movement. But oux cC, £v ~pµffv ~ov oouv seems only to
mean that the concentration of atoms in the •surge• is less
unified; the atoms are more scattered. See also Simplicius,
~ Caelo, ad loc., p. 730, lines 21-22: 0L£OTiapµ£vwv ouv au~wv
11

OUX E(~

CV opµq

~ XlVDOl' UU~WV.

)
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v

as any sort of an explanation of motion are cumulative and convincing.

We are now ready to abandon as untenable any use of

the void to account for motion and pass on to considering the
void as simple, separate place; that is, we are ready now to
take up again and continue the refutation of Aristotle where
we had left it at Physics 4.8, 216a26.
Void EI. Itself
-SeparateThroughout
his whole detailed discussion of the void in
Physics 4.6-9 Aristotle had been repeatedly concerned with the
question of the simple, separate existence of the void, quite
apart from its role in explaining motion or anything else.

On

each such occasion the matter of a refutation had been taken
up quite summarily, if at all.

The more full

·left for discussion primarily in Physics 4.8.

refutatio~

is

The following

then will briefly survey such preliminary remarks by Aristotle
before taking up his fuller discussion of the question.
Immediately at the beginning (Physics 4.6) of the excursus on the void Aristotle points out that those who posit the
void confuse it with 'place' (

~6nov ~tva

•••

~o

xcvov

~,ef-

a.en V--213al6), which, when it has no body in it, .is simply
empty (o~aV

oe

O~Ep~8~,

XEVOV--213al8).

And Aristotle's pre-

liminary reply here is simptly that 'void' and place refer to
essentially different things: ~o o' elvat au~or~ OU ~a6~o
("they have an essence which is not the same")--213alg. 8 9
8 9This is taken up at Physics 4.8, 214b23-28.

ov
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The matter is again brought up at Physics 4.7, 213b31
(Ooxer o~ ~0 xevov ~ono~ e?va1

EV

~ µ~6tv eo~t ), for void

seems to be a place in which there is nothing, that is, no
body.

In order to substantiate this apparent identity of

•void' with 'place' Aristotle then goes on (213b30-214a22) to
show that void for the atomists fits quite well with that
which he himself thinks of as place, only deprived of a body.
Void, Aristotle says, is certainly not tangible (dn~ov),90 and
thus would not have any kind of weight in one direction or another (E:v ~ µ~otv E:o~L ~apu -fi' xouqiov --214a2-3).

The only at-

tribute that can possibly be ascribed to it is that of extension (otao~Dµa--214a5-6),9l otherwise it would have a definition which would also fit a mathematical point, which would be
a~onov

absurd:

el

DO~Lyµ~

xevov --214a4-5.

Thus Aristotle

feels that he has now established as a logical fact (6.vayxD-214al6) what earlier had only seemed (ooxei--213b31) to be the
case:

void, if it exists at all, is place deprived of body.

90This is taken up at 4.8, 216bl3-20; though most of this
passage has been bracketed by both Bonitz and Ross because of
its doubtful support from the Greek commentators, I propose to
consider it, since it does have universal manuscript attestation. But how it could have (as noted in the first Basel edition) come from Averroes (who lived in the twelfth century)
when the earliest manuscripts (E and J) date back tQ the tenth
century, is beyond me.
91 .Aristotle (214a9-10) half in jest, I believe, asks whether the void as such extension could contain something nontangible and yet perceptible. There is no doubt in Aristotle's
mind that for Democritus all perceptible qualities are tang~
,L
'
'
>
'
'
i. bl e~
uDµuxpt~o~
ue xa1 • • • nuv~a
yap
~a
UL08D~a
dn~a
no1ouo1v (On Sensation 4, 442a31-442b2). This is an essential
and consistent part of Democritus' theory.
A

S:. '
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This brings us back to the preliminary remarks of Aristotle at Physics 4.8 (specifically, 214b23-28).

There, in the

process of his refutation of the existence of a separate void,
he brings in an argument to show that 'place' and 'void'. must
have meanings which are quite distinct. The subject of the
argument is a continuous9 2 physical object in a separately
existing place.

Although, as such, this argument or refuta-

tion does not apply directly to the physical objects of the
atomists, because for them physical objects are not whole and
continuous (any atomic part of a physical object for them can
at best be in contact and hence will not be continuous with
other parts), still it applies to their atoms themselves, for
these are what are for them precisely whole and continuous.
The argument goes like this:

any conceivable part of any

whole object (or atom) must simply and only be in that object;
its place there is coextensive only with the room it takes up
in that object; its place there is not the room it takes up
plus some surrounding area.

The part is not inside of some

surrounding area which is its place; it is thus not
rate place.

!!!

a sepa-

If 'place' and 'void' are synonymous, if the

statement •a part is in its place' means 'a part is within a
·separate void', then--to apply the refutation specifically to

' of an atom, since that part must
an atom--any conceivable part
92 compare SiDplicius, In Physicorum, ad loc., pp. 665,
line 36 to 666, line 1:
ot µ6pla a6rcou --r;1lciDV'Exfi.
It is
important that the parts of the object be continuous, for, if
each part were in a separate place (i.e., in a separate void),
then the object could not be a continuous whole.

'ta
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also be in its place, must also be separate, for it too must
then be in a seuarate nlace.

Thus not even the atom itself

would be exempt from further analysis into an infinite number
of sub-atoms. 93

Thus the outcome of Aristotle's argwnent is

that, if unity is to be retained anywhere at all, at any level,
whether in physical objects or in atoms, then 'place' and
•void' must be kept di8tinct.

This argument alone does not

prove that there is no separately existing continuous extension, 94 but only that 'place' and •void' must refer to essentially different things.
The detailed argument against the void as a separately
existing place is to be found at Physics 4.8, 216a26-b21.
seems to be presented in two parts.95

It

In the first the void

is conceived of as occupied by a body; and when it is so

con~

sidered the void is indistinguishable from the volume of that ,
..
body; it.amounts simply to the bulk of that body, the body's
volume abstracted from all the other attributes of the body.
93r suspect that it is from this· argument, among others,
that some later atomists or commentators felt that the atoms
cannot have parts •
. 94 cherniss, .2.E.• cit., p. 149 (especially note 28), objects that this is not a cogent argu.~ent against separately
existing continuous extension and that it further compounds
the difficulty by involving the problems of the whole and its
parts. But I maintain that this particular argu..~ent was not
by itself meant to disprove any separately existing continuous
extension, but only to show that there is a real distinction
between 'place' and 'void'. And it is precisely the concepts
of 'whole' and 'parts' that make this distinction clear.
9 5The second part I take to be the passage at 216bl7-20
referred to above (note 90), which hae good manuscript evidence
but is not cited by the early Greek commentators.
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.Aristotle illustrates this by the example of a cube placed into the hypothetical void; the cube would actually displace
nothing (though it would displace some water or air, if it were
place in one of them) and -the formerly empty void would then
penetrate the entire volume of the body;

the size of the cube

would be exactly the same as the size of the formerly empty
void.

Thua we would now have two different

thing~--void

and

volume--in the same place, or, more likely, these two things
the same, and void in this case
nothing more than the
-are
volume of a body. The void that the cube now occupies is inis

distinguishable from its volume.

Furthermore, the cube con-

tinues to have that same size, bulk, volume, or place, no matter where it goes.

For this reason it is more likely that we

have throughout been talking about an attribute which belongs
to a body rather than about something separate and distinct
from that body.

Thus, when void is occupied, there is no rea-

son for assuming that it is something distinct from the body
occupying it; it amounts to nothing more than an attribute of
that body abstracted from it, and so has only mental status.
Secondly (216bl7-20.), when this hypothetical void is not
occupied by a body, we have in principle no evidence for it at
all.

The only evidence that we can have is, on the principles

of atomism

them~elves,

that "of touch, and that gives us evi-

dence only of that which is touchable
dn~ou--216bl9-20);

(~~ d~~ yap ~ xp(crt, ~ou

and void is by definition not touchable.

Thus Aristotle has shovm that whether it is filled or

r
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'

not, there is in neither case any evidence for. the void.

So,

as far as evidence goes, it is clear that there is no separate·
void:

"
'
I
I
,,
O'tl
µEV
'tOlVUV
OUX
EO'tl

~
XEXWplOµ~VOV

XEV 6 v,

t

~X

.f
'tOu'tWV

lo-r l ofii\o v --216b20-21.

But, if all this is reasonably accurate, if void is not
necessary to an explanation of motion, if using the void in
one's attempt to explain motion contradicts evidence and principles derived from evidence, if there is indeed no evidence
for the void, then perhaps there is some other justification
for supposing that the void exists.

And in refuting the posi-

tion of Democritus Aristotle also considers this 'other justificatipn' for positing an existing void; this he does in two
places, the one in the Physics (1.3, 187al-ll), and the other
in the Rietaphysics (4.5, 1009a22-38).
On two separate occasions (though in the same works just
mentioned) Aristotle attributes specifically to Democritus a
teaching that the void exists as 'that which is not':
xpl'to'

•••

XEVOV • • •

ck

oux

~riµo

o'v e'f va( cp'T")Ol v (Physics 1.4,

188a22-23), and tiriµoxpl'to<;; • • • -ro xevov elva( cpaa', • • • 'tb
oe' µT")' ,,ov {i'.ietauhysics 1.4, 985b5-6). But in neither of these
passages is there a refutation of the existence of· the void as
'that which is not'; this refutation is taken up instead in the
two passages just mentioneJ prior to these latter passages
(namely, at Physics 1.3, 187al-ll and at I.Ietaphysics 4.5,
1009a22-38); and both of these passages undoubtedly refer to
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precisely this doctrine of Democritus.9 6
Atomism, or, to be more specific, the teaching that there
is a void, was formulated with a two-fold consideration in
mind, a consideration engendered by Eleatic arguments:9 7 it
was an attempt account for motion (the refutation of this
aspect has just been considered), and it was an attempt to
respond to Eleatic arguments on 'what is'.

And it is now from

this latter point of view that Aristotle criticizes those who
assume that the void exists as 'that which is not•.
The atomists,9 8 Aristotle says at Physics 1.3, were influenced by ('gave in to', 'made some concessions to'--tv€oooa\L--l87al) to one particular Eleatic argument99 on the meaning
of 'what is' (-ro ov).

The Eleatic argument is the following:

'what is' has one meaning (fv o~µa(vel --187a4),lOO namely,
'what simply exists', and cannot . at the $ame time refer to the
contradictory of this, that is, 'what is not•. 101 But on the
.· 96nemocri tus is mentioned
passage; no one ·is named in the
cit., pp. 480-481, given in his
quite cogent and have been most
.212.· cit., p. 63.

specifically in the Metaphysics
Physics passage, but Ross*, .2.E.•
commentary on this passage, are
recently accepted by Charlton,

97see On Generation and Corruption 1.8, 325al-32.
9 8 see note 96, above.
99This argument had ju.st previously been ascribed by
Aristotle (186a24-25) to Parmenides. The whole argument is separated in this passage into two parts (187al-2 and 4-5); I
have put them together for the eake of convenience.
100see also 186a24-25: dnt-wi; Aaµ~avel [napµev(o~<;;] rc6
,,
ov Aeyeo8al •
101 charlton, .2.E.•

.£l!., p. 7: "can both be and not be."
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phenomenal level, the Eleatics would claim, such contradictory
statements are possible; for example, at one time one can
truly say 'this apple is green•, while on a later occasion one
can, evidently referring to the same apple, say the contradictory, 'this apple is not green' (when it has turned red).
Since contradictories cannot in reality be true, 'what really
is' is one and undifferentiated and refers to something only
in the simple and absolute sense of 'is'.

Furthermore, 'what

is not'--as the contradictory to 'what is'--cannot therefore
exist; all that tnere is is simply and absolutely 'what is'.
This then is the argument to which the atomists made some
concessions, in that the 'what is' of the atomists is evidently formulated in terms of the Eleatic 'what is', as is now
more generally admitted. 102 'What is' in the atomist sense is
something quite distinct, as we have seen, from physical objects; it is, like the Eleatic 'what is', simple and absolute.
But for the atomists 'what is' (an atom), while it cannot be
seen or, perhaps, felt in isolation, it can affect us physically and thus indirectly can be known.
The Eleatics had further argued that if 'what is not'
(that is, the void) does not exist, then motion is impossible.
Here the atomists were more influenced by the empirical evidence for motion than by di~lectic; 10 3 they contended that, if
there is motion (which is evidently the case), then 'what is
102 see Guthrie, History, II, 389-392.
l03comparc Gen. et Corr. 1.2, 316bl0-14; 1.8, 325a25-28.
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not' must indeed exist just as much as 'what is'.

And the·

atomist 'what is not' is likewise used in a simple and absolute sense of 'is not'.

The atomists had under Eleatic influ-

ence argued from a simple and absolute sense of 'is' (and from
empirical evidence for motion) to the existence of 'what is
not':

'
·'
,~ oriµa.t, Vel, o'O
v
"
'
el, -ro
ov
ev
eO'tl -ro

'
µT)

ov

--187al-2.

But in the first place Aristotle points out in refutation of the atomists that they were misled by the Eleatic argument, because, as he had been showing throughout the chapter
(1.3), the premise is not true, that 'what is' has only the
one meaning of 'simple existence'.

Hence the atomists are

totally unjustified in drawing from such a premise the conclusion that 'what is not' (that is, the void) exi·sts.
And furthermore, Aristotle goes on to point out that.
their conclusion is evidently false too

~187a5-6),

for 'what

is not' may in any case simply refer to what is not some specific thing

'\

(

µT')

ov

II

'tl

)

; it does not even follow from the fact

that 'what is' has only this absolute sense that 'what is not'
has it too.
Aristotle presents a similar criticism of the existence
of the void as 'what is not'--again, along with such a criticism of the existence of 'what is' as he had in Physics 1.3-at Metaphysics·4.5, 1009a22-38.
"

The 3ubject under discussion

here is the various attempts to account for the contraries and
contradictories which appear to be true of the same physical
object.

Then what is likely to represent Democritus' train of
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thought in considering this question is presented at 1009a2530; and, as we follow that train of thought as presented
here, let us consider at the same time an example as a case in
point, a given identical apple in which we see contraries
arise (OpWO&V

ex

~a6~oU ylyVoµsva ~UVUV~(a --1009a24-25); it

is now green, and then it turns red.
where there was none before.

Now there is a red apple

But 'what is not' cannot come

'
into being (µn'. evotxe~a&
y(yveaea, ~b µ~ ov --1009a25-26), and

evidently the atomists would take this 'what is not'--as in
· Physics 1.3--in only an absolute sense.

Furthermore, the

atomists would go on to say, since such contraries are seen in
the phenomenal world, there must be another level at which the
'law of contradiction' holds, a non-empirical level which is
accessible to the intellect.
level of atoms and void.

This latter level is the real

Thus the full and the void, that is,

'what is' and 'what is not', are to be found at any given section ( xae'

o~&ouv

• • • µtpo~ --1009a28-29) of the phenomenal

object; and these atoms and void can help to account for the
occurrence of phenomenal contraries without themselves being
in violation of the law of contradiction.
Now Aristotle at 1009a30ff. begins his criticism of this
view which led Democritus to suppose the existence of the void
as 'what ie not'.
right

(~ponov

µtv

He firsi admits that in a sense they are
~&Va op8w~

Aeyouo& --1009a31), evidently in

the sense that 'what is not'--in.the absolute sense of the
word, 'what does not exist'--cannot come into being.

But, in
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another sense they are wrong (ayvoouotv--1009a31), inasmuch as
both 'what is' and 'what is not' are used in two senses (Al-

ye~at otxw~--1009a32) 104 and are not restricted to the single
meaning which they give them.

There is a sense in which some-

thing can come into being from 'what is not' (

evoexe~at

y(-

yveo8a( ~' EX ~OU µ~ ov~o~--1009a33), that is, when 'what is
not• is used in the qualified sense:

a red apple can come in-

to being out of 'what is not' a red apple, but a green one.·
Thus the refutation here in the Metaphysics, directed more
.specifically at Democritus, is essentially the same one that
had been raised at Physics l.3.l05
Cherniss raises the objection to this refutation106
that it is a logical analysis which does not affect the atomist physical theory itself, though some others may have used
this physical theory as a foundation for logical nihilism;
Aristotle should not have claimed that the physics was false
because the logical consequences mistakenly drawn from it by
others were untenable.

But Cherniss seems to be in error on

l04The summary that Ross, metaphysics, I, 273, presents
makes it seem that the tTio senses nentioned here are 'potential' and 'actual'; this is misleading at this point, for the
distinction between potency and act does not come in unt~l
the question arises about the same object being contraries
simultaneously.
·
l05This evidently esttl.blishes even more firmly Ross'
identification.of theevtot mentioned at Physics 1.3, 187al
as the atomists, though no one, as far as I know, cites this
passage in making that identification (likely because the
citation from Qg_ Generation and Corruption 1.8, 324b35ff.
makes it certain enough).
106.QE.. cit., pp. 78-79.
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this point.

Aristotle's attack is quite to the point and

quite valid; the physics of atomism depended in part on the
mistaken logical consequences drawn from an observation of the
physical world in combinat-ion with Eleatic influence; and he
is pointing out precisely where those principles of the Eleatics are in error.

They are in error inasmuch as they without
'

warrent assume only an absolute and simple meaning for 'what
is' and 'what is not' and in the end they force a denial of
empirical fact.

And, since the physics of the atomists is

founded in part on that specific error, their theory rests on
weak ground.
Furthermore, Aristotle goes on to point out at 1009a3338, contradictories can be true of the same. thing at
time:

~

same

·-

the apple in question may be at the same time both

actually green and potentially not green.

And this is because

of Aristotle's distinction between potency and act.

For De-

mocritus 'what is' and 'what is not' were and remained forever
actual; and it was this lack of a distinction between potency
and act which kept Democritus from retaining the same continuous substance in the midst of change; had he recognized this
important distinction, he would have seen that there is no
necessity at all for the absolute existence of 'what is not•.
And so, beside .the fact thai th.e positing of the void as 'what
is nott rests on a mistake and so is untenable, it is in addition absolutely unnecessary.
Thus Aristotle's refutation of the existence of the void

r
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is complete; he has shown that both as part of an account of
motion and apart from accounting for motion, the void of Democ-·
ritus is unnecessary, unempirical, and untenable.

CHAPTER III
ON THE STRUCTURE OF PHYSICAL OBJECTS, SOUL,
SENSE-PERCEPTION, AND KNOWLEDGE
Introduction
Democritus, in order to solve the difficulties posed by
the Eleatic dilemmas, had posited the existence of atoms and
void, and he thought that by doing so he had devised.a systematic explanation which was completely consonant with the phenomenal world of motion, change, and its variety of objects.
But, since the atoms and void were central to that systematic
explanation, Aristotle by his criticisms of them--as we have
seen in the first two chapters--had struck some telling blows
against the very foundations of atomism as it was espoused by
.Democritus.
The importance of atoms and void to the theories of Democritus is obvious enough, but Aristotle saw a third area of
critical importance to atomism, the problem of the relationship
of physical objects composed of atoms and void to our perception of those objects, the problem which essentially has come

'

up in connection with the British empiricists, that is, if we
perceive only sense-data, in what sense--if any--do we perceive
or know the physical object.

Democritus thought that his ac-

count was consonant with phenomena, but, as Aristotle and
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others have shown, it leads to a sceptical position about
physical objects in this phenomenal world.
Aristotle quite explicitly says that Democritus took as
the starting-point of his account of his theory the phenomenal
world of nature just as it is ~Px~v not~oaµevol xa~a ~UOlV
~nep eo~(v--Gen. et Corr.

1.8, 325al-2), that he was convinced

by arguments founded on the nature of things
nenefo8al--~.

(~uotxor~ Aoyo&~

et Corr. 1.2, 316al3-14), that he was con-

vinced that his arguments were completely consonant with what
we perceive, that is, with generation, corruption, change, and
'
,,
.
multiplicity ( npo~ ~~v ala8~o&v oµoAoyouµeva • • • ytveo&v •
\

• • ~8op~v • • • x(v~o&v xat ~o nAD8o~ ~wv ov~wv --~. ~
Corr. 1.8, 325a23-25). 1
It was this concern with the phenomenal world which Aristotle says led Democritus to posit his atoms and void; his
theory proceeded from what he had perceived.

Like Anaxagoras,

he was puzzled by what he saw; the same physical object seemed
to take on at various times contrary qualities; but 'what is
not' could not come into being, and so both 'what is' and
'what is not' had already from the first to belong to the
physical object in question, but in some sense other than the
merely phenomenal one.

Democritus' solution was to distin-

guish the physical from th~ phenomenal object and to identify
1 Paul Natorp, ..2.E• cit., pp. 164-179, denies this; see
especially p. 178, "Aristoteles also referirt nicht uber Demokrits Lehre, sondern beurtheilt sie, und er beurtheilt sie
aus einem falschen Gesichtspunkt, wenn er Demokrit zum Sensualisten macht. 11
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•what is' and 'what is not' respectively with atoms and void
which make up the physical object. 2
But Aristotle also tells us that Democritus argued from
phenomena not only to the existence of atoms and void, but
also to the shape of atoms and to their arrangements in objects, for he tells us that Democritus says that it is evident
what sort of thing man is structurally, since a man is recognized as such by his shape and coloration;3 and this, as we
shall see more clearly later, is likely an argument from appearance to atomic structure.

Or again, at Metaphysics 1.4,

985bl3 we find that the differing shapes and arrangements of
atoms were meant to account for all other objects and their
qualities. 4
Thus, since there is for Democritus a relation between
the object as it is perceived and as it really is--that is,
atomically structured--we shall be examining in this chapter,
first of all, Aristotle's critique of the real structure of
physical objects, as that structure is explained in the system
of Democritus.
We have indeed already considered briefly some of Aristotle's major objections to Democritus' teaching about the
structure of physical objects in connection with both the doc-

'

Meta. 4.5, 1009a22-30: EA~AUBE •• • r1 oosa Ex -rwv
a&?8~'twv-:-:--• . . op~OtV EX 'tUU'tOU y&yvoµEVU 'ta Va V't (a •
• • •
XU& yap OU'toc;. 'tO XEVOV xa\ 'tO TIAnpec;. oµQ(W, xae' ~'tt ouv un"L
,
'
1'
,
'
upXE&V
µtpo,,
xa&-ro&
'to' µEv
ov
'tOU'tWV
E&Va&
'tO' OE' µT)' "ov.
,

2

3Part. Anim. 1.1, 640b32-34.

4-ccic;

tilacpopa<; a{-r(a.c;.

'tWV aAAWV Elva&•

r
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trine of the atoms and that of the void; there we have seen
that Democritus, in positing atoms and void, fails to account
for--and, indeed, denies--the obvious unity of the object, and
that he does not give an adequate account of either the weight
or the locomotion of objects.

Furthermore, we shall see in

the next chapter what Aristotle considers to be another failure in the attempt to give an atomic account of the structure
of physical objects, that is, that it fails as well to provide
an adequate 'formal cause' for the object.
It hardly does justice at all to the total impact of
Aristotle's criticisms to separate them under different headings, if their separation from.one another gives the impression that they are to be taken in total isolation from one another.

But these are not totally separate criticisms, but

varying aspects of a single criticism artificially isolated to
give us a better understanding of the criticism as a whole and
of its various implications.

It is for this reason that I

have chosen to err on the side of repetition rather than that
of absolute isolation of arguments.
Aristotle's major objection to the atomically structured
physical object is basically that such a theory does not do
justice to the physical object as it is, that is, as it is
t

perceived, as it is a matter of empirical fact.

What we per-

ceive are in fact physical objects with certain qualities.
Next we shall consider briefly the nature of soul for
Democritus; since it is atomically structured, it suffers from
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some of the same defects that Aristotle sees in other objects
which Democritus explains by means of atoms:

it is reduced

for Aristotle to the absurdity of producing a purely mechanical and primitive type of motion.
Sense-perception next seems equally mechanical and
should entail no error; but, as Aristotle points out, this
mechanism breaks down and there is by this theory no real correspondence between the object as it is and as it is perceived
by the senses.
Finally, knowledge in the atomic system is reduced to
being another kind of sensation, and, although its object is
claimed to be 'what truly

exi~ts'

as distinct from what is

perceived by the senses, such knowledge as proposed by Democritus cannot judge truth in its object.
The Structure of Physical Objects
Democritus had explained the structure of physical objects and the phenomenal characteristics which are related to
that structure in terms of three kinds of differences which
•
,
-A
F=.
-A
Aristotle
appear among th e a t oms: puoµo~,
~pon.
vlU8lY1J•
11

cites these very terms and rightly traces them baclr to Democritus.

There is no question here of whether these are them-

selves terms loaded with

~istotelian

implications, for they

are not the ones which Aristotle himself uses; they are quite
distinct and unique; and Aristotle does indeed offer an explanation for each term and does give what for him would be its

r
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equivalent. 5 All three of these terms, as von Fritz points
out, 6 are related to .concepts of motion, so that, if we accept Aristotle' e translations of oxfiµa, e ~al c;;

,

and ,,;<1.; L c;;

,

we

are not to imagine these as characteristics of a solid and
purely static structure, but rather imagine with Aristotle
that we consider their 'position' and 'order' in a given isolated instant of time.7
Of these terms, the second (we have already considered

puoµov oxf)µa)

Democ~i tean word ,,;pon~ seems to indicate the

direction in which an individual atom is turned at a given
instant; 8 and it thus describes a relationship to another atom
or to other atoms, and it is not to be considered as pertain
ing to one atom in isolation.9

The idea of a 'turning' does

not seem to make any sense at all if the atom is taken only
with regard to itself and is to be

thoug~t

of completely apart

from a reference to some other thing, whether object or atom.
5tietaphysics 1.4, 985b4ff.; 8.2, 1042bllff.
6von Fritz, .2.P.• cit., pp. 26-28.
?Aristotle does not fail to do justice to this dynamic
aspect of atoms in constant motion, for he describes their mot~~n as an eternal actuality: ae1 8v~pyElav • • • UEl yap
dva{ <pUCTl x(vT)otv--Metaphysics 12.6, 107lb32-33.
8 This is the way von Fritz, .2.1?.• cit., p. 28, uses the
term: "Vielmehr wendet das,Atom jeweils eine seiner Seiten
einem anderen Atom zu. 11
9Bailey, .2.1?.· cit., p. 80, says it indicates "the position
of an atom with regard to itself." Wilhelm Schmid, "Der Ausgang der altionischen Naturphilosophie: die Atomistik" in
Schmid-Stehlin, Geschichte ~ ~iechischen Literatur (Munich:
1943), Vol. 2, Part 1, pp. 224- 9, simply says, 11 wie sich I
Von H unterscheidet. 11 These descriptions are too vague.
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'

In an absolute void there is no permanent place with reference to which the 'turn' can be made; and Aristotle's example
as a distinction like that between H and I certainly requires
that the term be thought of in relationship to something else.
And, furthermore, Aristotle is here concerned with the position of atoms in physical objects as an explanation of the
phenomenal qualities of that object--such as color--and it is
quite unlikely that most atoms taken in isolation give the impression of any color at all, no matter which way they are
turned.

Thus, the only reasonable conclusion which one can

draw i5 that both for Democritua' theory and Aristotle's understanding of it, this -~pon~ involves the relation of one
.

atom to another, as Ross had already rightly pointed out.
The third term,

61a81y~,

10

is more likely to be connected

with the idea of 'touch' {81y) than

with_8DxD/Oeo1~,

as both

Bailey and Ross have pointed out, 11 in spite of the fact that
the relationship of 81yD to

8Dx~/8eo1c;

might provide an at-

tractive connection with Aristotle's use of the term eto1c;in
this context.

But it is

etaic;, not 61a81yfi.

' that Aristotle translates as

~poTID

Bailey's reason for rejecting the connec-

lORoss, metaphysics, I, 140.
11Bailey, £1?.· cit., 1'•

79, note 4; Ross, Metaphysics,
cit.
John I. Beare, Greek Theories of Elementary: Cognition: from Alcmaeon to Aristotle (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
'I"90'b'), p. 37, note 2, approves the relationship to G~xD •
Liddell, Scott, Jones, Lexicon, citing Hesychius, note that it
may be related to ct a8ijKrJ • Sextus Empiricus, adv. Math. 7 .136
(Diels-Kranz 68B9) uses the term 61aG1JxD, but there that term
seems to be used in a meaning which combines both ~ponii and
~·

Ol0.8lYD·
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tion of 81y with 8T}xT}--because "contact with neighboring atoms
is so vital an element in Atomic composition"--seems a bit
artificial and thus less satisfactory.

Still, since the sup-

port for a connection with 8T}xT} seems weak and the relationship to 81y is more obvious and likely, 12 our best course is
simply to proceed from that point of view.

The element

further indicates a movement 'through' something.

01a

So the pic-

ture presented by this term is likely to be as follows:

as an

atom moves on through another group, there is an instant in
which the whole group is in a certain order or

~a~&~,quite

apart from the 'side' which they turn to one another.
Of these three Democritean terms which mark the differences which we see in physical objects puoµo<; -- oxfiµa, for
Aristotle--seems to be the most basic.
Aristotle, translate it as 'shape'.

I shall, following

In so doing I shall

furthermore assume that it includes not only what we might
call 'geometrical figure• or •outline•, but 'size' as well.
Thus not only will, for

exa~ple,

a cube of a given volume dif-

fer 'in shape' from a sphere of that volume, but so also will
a sphere of a greater or lesser volume or size.

In thas sense

then all of the traditional elements--particularly earth, air,
fire, and water--will differ for Democritus basically 'in
shape'.
One issue which Aristotle sees as dividing the 'school
of Empedocles' from the 'school of Anaxagoras' is the question
12Ross, Metaphysics, loc. ill_.
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whether the traditional four elements are simple or composite.13

And on this particular question at least Democritus

may certainly be reckoned as belonging to the 'school of Anaxagoras'; for Democritus did take some account of the four elements, and for him these--just like every other physical object--were composite, composed of indivisible bodies:

~x

owµa~wv ao&a.&pl~wv ~JAAa ouyxeroea( cp aa ' --- Gen. e t Corr. 1 • 1 ,

-

-

314a21-22.
Thus, since for Democritus there is no essential difference between the structure of the traditional elements, or
simple bodies, and that of other physical objects (other, perhaps, than complexity), and since Aristotle is more interested
in and gives more information about Democritus' view of the
elements, we might then use the structure of these elements as
a prime paradigm of the structure of all _physical objects.
And this will further imply that any valid criticism leveled
by Aristotle against such a theory of structure will also apply with equal force against any and all physical objects so

.

structured.
Of the traditional elements 'fire' for Democritus is a
special case, for to it alone of the elements Democritus assigned a specific 'geometrical figure', the sphere. 14 But in
what sense then is fire to "be characterized by the spherical
l3Gen. et Corr., 1.1, 314a25-30.
14For example, Caelo 3.4; 303a14: µovov ~Q nup1 ~~v
Ocpa&pav anlowxev.
Also Anima, Eassim; for example, 1.2, 404alff. and 405al2-13.
N
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ehape?

The spherical shape is the most mobile of the atomic

shapes (eux,vrrro~a~ov --Anima 1.2, 405al2), and for that reason
it above all is constantly in motion

(o,a

~o ne~uxtvaL

µnot-

no~e µ€veLV--Anima 1.3, 406b21); and as a sphere it has a par-

ticular ability to penetrate everywhere and thus to divide and
impart some of its high mobility to oth~r atoms. 15

And it is

likely in this sense--in the sense that it particularly

~ene

trates, sets in motion, and divides--that the sphere is sort
of an angle and so 'cuts•. 16

'Heat' is evidently for Democritus the sensation which is
produced in us by the highly motive and dividing power of the
spherical atoms; and this is in principle no different from
making the flavors as we taste them effects in us of specific
other atomic shapes. 17 In hie Qg the Soul 1.2, 403b30ff.,
Aristotle rightly claims that Democritus made the soul, inasmuch as it is composed of spherical atoms, warm, because those
atoms are particularly in motion and produce in us the

sensa~

· l5Anima i.2, 404a7-8:
0,a ~0 µaA1o~a 0,a nav~o~ ouvaoeaL OL~60vELV ~ous ~o,co~ou~ puoµou~.
One might note here
the use of Democritus' ovm term for 'shape'; compare also
David Ross, Aristotle De Anima (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961),
p. 175; also W. K. C. Guthrie, History, Vol. 2, p. 430, note 5.
16 Caelo 3. 8 ' 307al7-l 8 : w~
. . yWVlO.
, ~'~ ouaa
.
~~µVEl <1:.~
euxlv~~ov.
The angle cuts because of its acuteness, but the
sphere cuts because of its@obility and its ability to set
other atoms into motion.
17 sensu 4, 442a3lff •. Schmid, .2.E· cit., p. 272, claims
that this makes the spherical atom fiery and so negates the
atomists' monism: "den Begriff des Monismus tatsachlich aufhebt." But the fact that the atom produces this .aenaation
(heat) does not mean that the atom itself is hot.
I

,

.

r
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tion o:f heat. 18

Thus :fire.is hot because its spherical

atom~

in abundance produce that sensation in us by their movement.
The sphere is thus for Democritus precisely what makes the
moving soul motive and what moves the animate body; the spherical atoms in it give both fire and soul their primary characteristics.
This is not to say that any single small spherical atom
taken in isolation is :fire or even a small piece o:f :fire, any
more than this was so :for Anaxagoras.

.

Fire, like each of the

other traditional elements was for both Anaxagoras and Democritus a composite.

The small spherical atom taken individual-

ly was to be found as part of the air we breathe; 1 9 it is likely to exist in the aqueous nature of the eye, if there is to
be 'soul' there sensitive to visual images, 20 and to be in the
.

~

sea:

Meteorology 4.1, 379b4:ff. speaks

o~

atoms left as a re-

sidue of 'putrefaction' which provide the basis for animate
life, although there is here no explicit statement attributing
-..,
18-i;,wv XlVouµeVWV 't"t 't~V IJ!¥X~V U'ITe/..a(3ov e{Val.
o8EV
nup -rt xal 8epµov ~~01v au-i;~v Et vat.
Thia is not to say

1

•

•

•

that
soul, fire, and 'what is hot' are in all respects identical, a5
Cherniss, .2.E.• cit., p. 298, note 3, seems to assume that Aristotle wrongly "C:i'Oes, but only that they are in some respects
identical.
.
There may indeed be an effect of 'heat' produced 1n us
by a single spherical atom, although that effect may very well
simply go unnoticed--and i"tt-may indeed be noticed only when
there are a goodly number of such spherical atomic shapes producing the same effect in us.
l9This is to replenish the supply of 'soul-atoms' which
are constantly escaping from us; on this matter see Reap. 4,
47lb24ff. and Anima 1.2, 403b3lff.
20 sensu 2, 438b5:ff.
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this to Democritus. 21

Indeed, their existence in the universe
at large seems to' be pretty strongly implied. 22 Now this
spherical atom, or any random number of them--inasmuch as they
are part of air or water or any other element or compound--is
not fire, nor does Aristotle say th~t it is. 2 3 Only in epeci21 But compare Caelo 4.6, 313a24ff., where Democritus
claims that warm particles rise up out of water.
22 And thus the criticism of Aristotle at Anima 1.5,
4lla7ff. seems to apply to Democritus as well as to others.
23cherniss, .2.E• cit., p. 289, note 3, claims that Aristotle does. But what Aristotle does say is that soul and fire
are the same in that they contain the same matter, spherical
at~ms (see ~· 4, 472a35), that soul is 'fire of a sort'
(nup ~'), that soul and fire have some characteristics in common. But this does not imply total identity; and Cherniss
seems wrong in assuming that Aristotle jumped to unwarrented
conclusions. Nor does Aristotle say, as Cherniss says he does,
that the atom was hot; soul and fire and the spherical atom are
only 'hot' in the sense that they produce that sensation in us.
The passage in which Aristotle seems to come closest to
saying that the spherical atom is hot is Gen. et Corr. 1.8,
326a5 (though Cherniss does not cite this passage here). This
passage will be taken up later, but we might say this much
about it now: what Aristotle does say is that Democritus assigns 'what is hot' (i.e., what produces the effect of heat) to
the spherical figure; and what is illogical about that attribution is not that it is assigning a quality as a property to
supposedly qualitiless atoms (that would have immediately produced a self-contradiction in Democritus which Aristotle would
not have failed to notice), but that Democritus does not assign 'what has a cold effect' to a contrary figure.
Aristotle raises a second and separate objection to Democritus' atomism at 326a7ff. .Aristotle there points out that
if one assigns one set of contraries to atoms--such as degrees
of heat and cold (and this Democritus did not do)--then it is
illogical not to assign ot4er sets of contraries to those atoms
as .. well. But Democritus, he says, did.assign varying degrees
of weight to his atoms (with the weight increasing as the size
increases). - And so, Aristotle says, if weight is assigned to
them in degrees, then degrees of heat (apparently varying with
the shape) ought also be assigned to them as a property; and
if these properties belong to them in degrees, then so might
softness and hardness; and, if the latter, the atom can be
affected.

r

t

157
fic--though, as far as we know, unspecified--combinations do
these spherical atoms become what we perceive as fire and call
fire.

And we might further asswne that such a combination in-

cludes their being rather highly concentrated, since their
heat is obviously more intense than the warmth of the soul or
of the air.
The further question as to whether only spherical atoms
-

constitute what we know as fire or whether such fire is composed of non-spherical atoms as

well~-with

the spherical pre-

dominating--is unanswered by Aristotle and by later tradition
about Democritus; and the answer to this question may not indeed be essential.

It does, however, seem more likely--if

Democritus had carried his inquiry about fire that far--that
any given and observed example of fire, inasmuch as it is the
burning and dissolution of some object, might grow both by
releasing further spherical atoms already in the object and by
setting non-spherical atoms into violent motion.

And these

latter non-spherical atoms may very well have been considered
as part of the phenomenon which we call fire.

In any case,

the essential part of fire, that which primarily gives it its
nature, is the spherical atom.
The other traditional elements--earth, air, and water-t

are composite·as well, although, unlike fire (for which a specific geometrical figure determines the character) their nature is determined by the size of the atoms of which they are
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constituted. 24

But this does not prevent them from--like fire

--being differentiated from one another by 'shape' ( puoµo_c.;). 25

And, since it is the size of the atom which determines the nature of the element, ite 'geometrical figure' may vary greatly, and so present a great variety of sense-data to us.

Water

may thus taste bitter or sweet depending on the 'geometrical
figure' predominating in the atoms of the water tasted without
really affecting its nature as water.
The differentiation between 'elements' on the basis of
the size of atoms making up any element is not to be taken to
mean that a given element is composed of atoms all of one size;
rather any one element must contain atoms in a variety of
sizes.

For

Democritu~,

air, for instance, must contain not

only spherical atomic shapes, but also both larger and smaller
atoms--enough of a supply and variety to provide for the generation of water from air, for it is precisely in connection
with this differentiation by size that the mutual generation of
elements from one another is formulated. 26 If one element is
to be generated from another by the separating out.of the larger atoms, as they claim, then each element must contain the
2,4caelo 3,.4.J 303a26-27:
a€pa xat YDV xat uowp.

µc:y€ec:i xa't µ1xpo't"ryo 01acp€pov

2 5 On illeli·ssus, Gorgia~, and Xenophane s 2, 975b28 claims
that Democritus said that also water and air and each of the
multitude of things, though their material is generically the
same, differ in shape: 't"~ oowp 't"E xa\ 't"OV a€pa EXOO't"OV 't"E 'tWV
nOAAWV, 't"aU't"O ov, pueµy oia~EpEtV.
26
'
caelo 3. 4 t 303a27-29: 't"Ct µ Eyl C'tQ owµa't"a. exxp' voµ c:va,
u~
<paoi u OU't"W yiyvEo eat uuwp
xat' uEpa xaL YDV c:~ UAA1JAWV.
$:.I

,

L_,

'

-

I

L_
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sizes of atoms requisite for any other element; 27 and the differentiation between the elements by size of atoms must mean
that one element is distinct from another because one particular size of atom predominates among the variety, there being
more of that particular size either than of all other sizes
or than of any other size.

So the nature of any element is

determined by the proportionate mixture of the various kinds
of atoms in it.
Furthermore, the so-called elements in the traditional
sense, Democritus claims, are not limited to four in number;
indeed, there is a limitless number of them, as Aristotle reports in a number of passages. 28 And this claim is quite con2 7Whether this sort of variety also holds true of fire
is, as was mentioned, in doubt. Fire is not mentioned in this
mutual generation. But the argument from silence, though
strong--especially when taken together with the unique position of fire in being assigned a special geometrical figure-is still not absolutely conclusive. It is certainly likely
that fire may be generated from other objects; but the reverse
process is more in doubt.
28 rn some of these passages there may be some preliminary doubt vn1ether Aristotle's term o~o,xerov refers to the atom or to the •traditional elements' which for Democritus are
composites; the latter seems the case in these passages.
At Physics 3.4, 203a20 Aristotle says that_ Anaxagoras
and Democritus make the elements limitless (ane,pa n:olouo' 1:a
01:o,xera), and these, Aristotle says, Democritus forms from
atoms: o o' lx 't~~ Tiavonepµ(a~ 'twv ox~µa~wv (what is meant by
n:avon:epµ(a will be taken up later).
· At Caelo 3.4, 303alJ Aristotle says that the atomists
an:e,pa xa, 'tQ QTIAU owµa'ta ~~OlV e(val.
The owµa'ta are evidently not atoms here; their limitlessness had already been
es~ablished (303a5-6), and this is an additional point (xaJ
npo~ 'tou'to,~--303all); theowµa'ta must be the traditional elements, as what follows shows--a discussion of fire, water~ and
such (again, interestingly enough na vcn epp. (a is mentioned J.
At Gen. et Corr. 1.1, 314a22-24 Aristotle says that the
atomists ex Ou)µCl'tu'V ao la l p£-rwv ~crAAQ ouyxercEJa( q:ao'' i;aiha 0
I
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eistent with Democritus' view of the mutual generation of the
elements; for any one element by the addition or subtraction
of a single atom would have the proportion of atoms in it
changed, and thus its essential nature would be changed; it
would thus become a different element.

Thus, with the wide

variety of possibilities of change inherent in such a system,
the number of possible elements would quite consistently seem
limitless.
In connection with Aristotle's explanation of Democritus'
theory of the mutual generation of the elements at .Q!:!

~

Heavens 3.4, the term.navonepµ(a had been used and was seen to
recur in other pertinent passages as well, indeed, more in
'

'

connection with Democritus than with Anaxagoras, with whom the
term is more usually connected.

Although it seems appropriate

to the teaching of Anaxagoras as well, Trend~lenburg 2 9 suspects
anetpa XUL 'tO TIAD80s slvat xa) 'tas µopcpa,, ao'ta oe npos au'ta
6tacp£petv 'Lou'Lots et;, wv do\ xa\ e£oet xa't 'tasn 'Louri;wv.
The
't'aiha, I take it, refers to 'LcIA.A.a ' and so does UO'La; mht is
to be taken as aA.A.~A.a, compare Verdenius and Waszink, QE.• cit.,
p. 1. The 'LoD'Lots and 'Lou'Lwv obviously refer to atoms; thus I
would translate this passage as: "It is out of indivisible
atoms that they say (any) remaining objects are composed, and
these objects are limitless in multitude and in their structure
and they differ from one another in three respects, by the
atoms which compose them and by the placement and order of
these atoms. 11 And once again 'Jmvon epµ (a is mentioned in this
context. Compare also Hermann Langerbeck, Doxis Epirhysmie:
Studien ~ Demokrits Ethik"und Erkenntnislehre (reprinted at
Frankfurt am. r1Iain: Weidrnann, 1967), P•'·-99.
29rn'his commentary on De Anima, p. 214; as cited by G.
R. T. Ross, Aristotle De Sensu and De ifomoria (Cambridge:
University Press, 19061';-·p. lb"3. Joachim, QE.• .£!.!., p. 66,
also agrees, although it seems that most modern scholars prefer to connect the term with Anaxagoras, if they commit themselves at all to connecting it with one of the two.

~
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that the term is Democritean and is quite appropriate to·Democritus' view of the traditional elements. 30 Therefore it
seems fitting to survey briefly its use and its applicability
to the teachings of Democritus, with the expectation that it
will help clarify those teachings.
outside of Aristotle and his commentators the word is
used in philosophical contexts as early as Plato, Timaeus 73c,
where the god mingled triangles capable of producing the four
elements and thus contrived a navonepµ(a;3 1 thus, interestingly enough, it refers here to a mixture in which the constituent parts of the four elements are present.

Plutarch says

that for Zeno the 8uµo~ was a navonEpµ(a of 'passions', a mixture drawn from the various faculties of the soul.3 2 In
Lucian's Hermotimus, 61, philosophy is like a navonEpµ(a, a
sack with all sorts of grains in it; a seller may take out
some of the grains to show a prospective buyer a sample, but
one cannot tell what the other grains are like just from this
sample;33 each part of the navonepµ(a shows something differ30Guthrie, Histort, II, 414, says that Aristotle used
the term "somewhat care essly" in connection with Democritus.
3l,;plyWVWV oqa npG'na • • • nup ~E xa\ UOWp xa\ aepa xal'
• • • µaAtG~a ~v napaoxetV 6uva~a, ~a0~a o Geo~ • • •
µEiyvu~ • • • navonEpµ(av nav~\ evryi;Q yevei µ~xavwµEvo~.
3 2Iiioral:ia, De Cohi benda Ira, 463a.
y~v

33The point of the comparison is that philosophy is not
like a skin of wine, the same throughout, from which you can
take one sip and thus judge all the rest of the wine in the
skin; but it is like a sack filled with all sorts of grain,
all of which one must examine in order accurately to determine
the nature of the whole.
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ent, and one cannot tell about the whole until one examinee
all of it.

This passage is interesting in that the grains

may provide close parallels with atoms in a conglomeration.
In general it seems best to say that this term describes a
mixture of a great number of various and distinct parts, some
of which, when isolated, give us only an incomplete knowledge
of the whole.

Thus far it seems that the term can apply with

equal appropriateness to the teachings of both Democritus and
of Anaxagoras, and there is no reason in usage outside of
Aristotle for applying it to one in preference to the other.
Indeed, tradition has it that Democritus was a pupil of Anaxagoras, and they may well be close together on this subject.3 4
This brings us to the usage of that term in Aristotle
himself.

At ,Physics 3.4, 203al6ff. Aristotle is talking

about the traditional elements fcwv Aeyoµ€vwv o'to&xe{wv,

o~ov. uowp -fi\ <i~pa 1)

'to

µe'tasu 'tmhwv --203al 7-18); and Aristotle

then adds some information on how Anaxagoras and Democritus
thought of these traditional elements; both held that they
were composite.

Anaxagoras taught that any such element was

further composed of more basic bodies which Aristotle calls
il

..,

oµotoµep~,

bodies whose parts are like the whole; and the tra-

ditional elements for him were not such basic bodies.

Democ-

't

ri tus, on the· other hand, is said to ha:ve held that any such
traditional element is a composite as well, consisting of the
seed (or atom) combinati·on of all atomic shapes ( ~x 'tf1' n:av-

9.34.

34 see Diogenes L_aortius, Lives Q.:f Emminent Philosophers,

"'
~;

a'IT tpµ( ac;; 'l:"WV

oxriµ&iwv). 35
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Aristotle then goes on to describe

the nature Of the oµoLcµepf) and how the generation Of Objects
(and 'elements') were explained in Anaxagoras' terms (203a23-

33); he then continues and does the same for Democritus' theory very briefly (203a33-b2).

But this description of Democ-

ritus' view, I believe, presents a difficulty which may be
better postponed until we have considered at least one more
passage in which Aristotle uses the term navontpµ(c.

But, so

far at least, we may say this much about navonepµ(a in Democritus:

it describes for him the nature of the traditional
element;3 6 navonepµ(a, it seems, ought to be connected with

Democritus' theory of the mutual generation of the-elements,37
for, since the element contains--as navanepµ(a--all the shapes
or sizes necessary for its generating other elements, it was
obviously meant to explain, for one thing, such mutual generation.
At _Qg Sensation 4, 44la4-ll Aristotle gives three theories as to how 'tastes' may originate from water; the first of
these is specifically connected with the name of Empedocles,
and the second describes wat'er as a 1ravon tpµ(av xuµwv, but is
35Note here that the term navonepµ(a is used explicitly
in connection with Democritus and in contrast to Anaxagoras,
with whom this word is mora usually connected.
·
36Ross mentions nothing at all about the nature of the
'element' as related to navonepµ(a.
3 7 r have not seen in any of the modern accounts any attempt to consider these two theories in conjunction with one
another.
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assigned to no one in particular.

Tn both of these theories

it seems implicitly agreed that the water in que3tion pre-

sents no particular flavor to us, but is itself still responsible for flavors in other things, as, for instance, in the
plants that 'feed on' it.3 8 Each of these two theories have
been ascribed to Democritus.
Although Empedocles is specifically mentioned in connection with the first of these theories, Cherniss argues that,
since the second is obviously that of Anaxagoras, it is better
to connect Democritus with the first.39

The first theory then

is that "the water has in it (various) kinds of flavors which
are imperceptible due to their size. 11 •40 But, if this theory
is to be distinct from the second, it implies, as nearly as we
can tell from the statement of the theory and from Aristotle's
criticism of it, that any given amount of water--for example,
any amount of water from a specific source--has in it a specified and unvarying (as long as the general conditions are constant) flavor in it; the 'kinds' of flavors may vary as the
source of the water varies, but the flavor of that specific
3 8The third theory, that the responsibility for the
taste is to be sought outside the water, need not concern us
here.
39.QE. cit., p. 320, ~ote 116, probably because here the
'kinds of flavors' are "imperceptible because of their small
size;" there seems to be no real reason beyond this. But it·
is also implied in the second theory that the taste in the
water is too small to be perceived.

40lv a~~Q ~0 uowp EXelV
µ' xpo-rryi; a --44la5-6.

Ta

y€v~ ~WV xuµwv ava(aeryi;a

o,a
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I

2!5Upply of water stays the same.

This flavor 'comes out'. in

the fruit of .the plant which gets its water from that source;
and the flavor apparently becomes noticeable as it becomes
more concentrated in the fruit.

That which distinguishes this

theory from the next is that the flavor lurking in any given
source of water is constant.

Aristotle refutes this by saying

that any given fruit can by cooking, drying, and other processes acquire a great.variety of flavors.

And this is the the-

ory which Cherniss would ascribe to Democritus.

But it is

quite well agreed that for Democritus contraries are present
in the same object; and this was on the particular basis of
empirical observation. 41 But this first theory seems to allow
less lee-way on the variation of the flavor of the same water
than would seem appropriate to Democritus' theory.
The second theory is that water provides the material
for flavors and so is an (atomic) seed-combination of all flavors.

Alexander in his commentary, although he admits that
the theory is Anaxagorean, 42 still connects it with Democritus;
and he is, I believe, right in doing so.

Democritus is men-

tioned .in this same chapter of On Sensation as reducing the
41 meta. 4.5, 1009a23ff. Contraries may be true of an
object because the full and the void (contradictories) are at
any given part of the phys~cal object; any object may also present contrari6s to us because the shape, placement, and order
of the atoms may differ at any part of the object: 'e-r1 e~ae1,
ox~µa-rl, -rasel. -ra\ha of; yeVT') cvavrc(wv --Physics 1.5, 188a23-

24.

42 Page 68 (as cited in Ross, Sensu, p. 163, and Cherniss,
.2.E.• .£!.!., p. 320, note 116).
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flavors to 'shapes'; 43 and, if we substitute crxTJµ&twv for

xuµwv in 44la8, we have precisely the expression uaed in the
above-mentioned passage in the Physics describing Democritus'
theory of the elements:

navanepµ(a

crxTJµa~wv.

Water, we have

seen, is differentiated from other elements only by the size
of its atoms, with the geometrical shapes likely remaining var•·.

ied; this means that any given portion of water (no matter
what the source) may have a variety of atomic shapes, with the
...

largest number of a given geometrical figure determining the
flavor that we may taste in the water or in the ~lant.44

The

atoms may differ from part to part in the water, and so one
portion of water may give rise.to one flavor and another portion to another flavor:

UAAa a' ls aAAou

µfpou~

--44la21-22.

The theory and its refutation seem appropriate enough to Democritean atomism. 45
Upon noting at Qg Sensation 4, 44la9 that for Democritus
different flavors may arise at different parts of water due to
there being a predominance of a specific kind of geometrical
figure in one portion and a predominance of another kind of
atomic figure at another portion of water, we are ready now to
43 4, 442bl3.
44compare Beare, 21?.· eit., p. 166. He agrees with Alexander that this passage applies to Democritus and states that
the atoms of taste have their noticeable effect as a group
with "the predominating kind fixing the quality of the whole."
See also Ross, Sensu, p. 163.
4 5Ross, Sensu, p. 164, assigned the third theory mentioned in this passage to Anaxagoras.
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return to the account at Physics 3.4, where at 203a33-b4 we
have a parallel explanation of 'traditional elements' in general for Democritus.

There Aristotle claims:

"But Democritus

(in contrast to Anaxagoras) says that none of his primary bodies (atoms) comes into being out of another. 1146 Now, in spite
of this permanence of the atoms, we nevertheless do have some
account of the 'traditional elements' quite like that of Anaxagoras to explain the varied phenomena of the world.
text, according to Ross, is as follows:
XOLVOV

aAA

oµw~

1

The

ye au~y ~o

owµa nav~wv EO~lV apxD, µeye8£l xa~a µ6pla xal OXDµa~L

oia~epov.

Ross, following Simplicius here, 47 takes ~0

XOLVOV

owµa as 'the body that is common to all atoms' or 'the univer-

sal bodily

subst~nce•, 48

and

~laims

that this 'common body'

differs in size and shape in its parts.

This is indeed a

strange way to say that atoms are one in kind, but differ in
shape and size; and hence one might well hesitate to accept
such an interpretation.

Furthermore, neither Ross nor Sim-

plicius gives any really satisfactory explanation of what is
46...o~µoxpl~O~
,
u OUuEV E~Epov Es E~Epou YlYVE08aL ~WV
np&r:wv ~~a(v.
Or, perhaps, since the contrast is to Anaxagoras, a better translation would be: "No atom is composed of
'sub-atoms'." The argument of Zeno might well have convinced
Democritus of this. But in either case the point is that an
atom is and remains the same, a permanent actuality.
47Ross, Physics, p. ~46; see al~o Simplicius, In Physicorum, ~· 462, lines 12-13: xae6aov ~o xoLvov owµa ~o ~wv
S:: I

IS::.. '

<I

I

•

,

'

a~sµwv ev ~av~wv EAEYE ~~v Ola~opav a6~wv xa~a µeyeeo~ xai

ox~µ a ~le£ l ~.

48 Ross, Physics, p. 363.
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meant by xa~~ µop1a,

.

'in their various portions•. 49

Aristotle

had told how for Anaxagoras the elements, being composed of
...

oµo&oµepD, can account for mutual generation and, from there,

the generation of everything else; so what we are looking for
here is some similar explanation in the case of the 'elements'
for Democritus, as being constituted as a navonepµ(c of shapes;
and this, I believe, we have at 203a34-b2.
The

navonepµ(a~ ~wv oxDµa~wv

of 203a21-22 seems to be

. wi•th th e phrase atYtwv
, ...
t a k en up again

'

~o

'
xo, vov
owµa
• 50

This

navonepµ(a oxDµa~wv, this common body which contains (or, is

shared by) a great variety of atoms, does indeed provide an
explanation of the mutual generation of the elements--or, of
the generation of anything else for that matter--and it can do
so because any given portion of it contains a variety of atoms
which differ in size and in geometrical figure.

And this is

precisely the kind of explanation which the context in this
passage would lead one to expect to find; it justifies the
linking of Anaxagoras and Democritus, and it points out as well
exactly where the difference between their doctrines lies-4 9simplicius says nothing at all about this. Ross, Physics, p. 363, in his 'analysis', writes: "whose parts differ
only in size and shape," which I can only take to mean that the
parts (i.e., atoms) of this universal bodily substance differ
in shape. The Oxford trans~ation of Hardie and Gaye, "differing from part to part in size and shape," is of no real help
either.
50r accept, along with Henri Carteron, Arietote Physique,
I, 97, the reading of manuscript E over against the reading of
J, which Ross accepts. Simplicius, In Physicorum, p. 462, line
12, seems to agree with E; he has: wxo&vov owµa 'to ~wv
6.~0µ0w.

r

169
primarily in the continuing actuality of the atom for Democritus.51
There ia in the Generation of Animals another passage
which involves navonEpµ(a; and I suspect that this may very
well also belong to the teaching of Democritus; nothing that.
I can see would prohibit it from being identified with him;
it would be quite consistent with the rest of his theory.
But, be that as it may, if this particular theory does not in
fact belong to Democritus, it is at the very least an excellent illustration of what navo'ITepµ(o:

likely meant for Democ-

ritus as well as being a good indication of what this term did
mean for Aristotle.
Democritus had taught that a child is born a male or a
female according ae the seed from either parent prevails; for
instance, male, if the seed of the father is predominant
(xpa~~o~--~. ~.,

4.1, 764all).

The semen of both mother

and father are factors to be reckoned with in determining at
least the sex of the offspring.
again at 4.3, 769al8-19.

And this theory is mentioned

And several lines after this, though

no specific theorists is mentioned, the matter of parental
semen being a navo·1tepµ(a is introduced as a possible explanation of a

nu.i~ber

of other differences which may occur in· the

'
5lcompare Schmid, op. cit., p. 229: "Von dernavonEpµ(a
des Anaxagoras unterscheidet sich die Atomwelt dadurch, dasz
die Teilbarkeit des anaxagorischen Stoffes unbegrenzt und
dasz in jedem seiner Bestandteile die ganze FUlle der empirisch vorhandenen Einzelstoffe enthalten ist und aus ibm herauagebildet werden kann. 11
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offspring, which is in some respects like the father and in
other respects like the mother; so the semen of each is in
fact a sort of combination of a larger number of ingredients.
Peck translates Aristotle's explanation quite adequately:5 2
"It is as though someone were to mix and blend a large
number of juices into one fluid, and then take off some
of this mixture; in doing so he could take off not always an equal amount of each juice, but sometimes more
of this one, sometimes more of that, and sometimes he
might take some of one and nothing of another: So, they
say, it is with the semen which is a mixture of a large
number of ingredients; and in appearance the offspring
takes after that parent from whom the largest amount is
derived."
The parallels to the explanation of the constitution of water
in On Sensation--as well as to the sack of all sorts of grain
in Lucian--is striking. 53 A 1i:<:tvone:pµ(c:. would then be a combination of all sorts of atoms, with the dominant kind determining the nature of the substance; one may take out a portion
of these (at random) and thus have'a substance with different
qualities on two different occasions--with some one kind now
predominating and determining its nature, now some other kind.
One can in this way account for a seemingly limitless number
of differences in what appears to be basically the same sub5 2A. L. Peck, Aristotle Generation of Animals (London:
William~Heinemann, 1963), pp. 415 and 417:
4.3,c. 769a29-36-,
,,
,

"'
,
'
\
,
4,\
wone:p
ouv
E:l,, ~l< xe:paOE:lE
TIOAAOU<
xuµou<
E:l<
EV
uypov, XUTIE:l~
1
-e
"\
(
.
)
.
L
'I
I
1\
,L
"
1
,
1.
I
EV~EU e:v nUµpuVOl, XUl 6uvai~
av "Aaµ~uVElV µn 11lCTOV UEl
u~
txdo~ou, a"A"A' ~~~ µEv ~oG ~~loG6e: n"Afov cl~~ 6~ ~oG ~oloG6e:,
o~e
~ou µEv t..a~e:iv ~oG Be µne£v "Aa~e:iv ~ ~oG~o ouµpa(ve:lv
xai en\ ~~< yoV~< TIOAUµlyoG< OUOTI<"
a~· 00 yap
~~v ye:vvwv~wv nt..e:ro~ov eyy8v~al, ~OU~~ y(ve:o8al ~~v µop~~v EOlXO<·

6e

av

53compare, for example, El<

EV

uypov

at 769a30.
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stance.
In .Qa Generation and Corruption 1.1 the term navonepµ(a
is connected more closely with the name of Anaxagoras, and it
is with this connection that most commentators feel more comfortable.

In this chapter Aristotle raises the question as to

whether the traditional elements are simple or composite.

The

issue is drawn between two 'schools'--that of Empedocles and
that of Anaxagoras. 54 It is the school of Anaxagoras that
claims that the traditional elements are composite
314a29):

navonepµ(av

yap

(oov8e~a--

e{va1 ~oo~wv --for each of these tra-

ditional elements, they•claim, is a "mixture of all sorts of
seeds;" and for Anaxagoras himself those seeds are the 0µ010µEpD.55

That Democritus himself belongs to the 'school of

Anaxagoras' in respect to the composite.nature of the traditional elements is certain enough; and he had indeed been mentioned immediately prior to this remark by Aristotle on the
controversy between the schools, and there (314a22-24) Aristotle quite clearly claims that Democritus taught that every,
541.1, 314a24-26: fvav~rw, 6~ ~a(vov~ai Afyov~~' ot
nepi 'Avasayopav ~or, nep\ 'EµneooxA€a.
One might note that
even in this passage Aristotle makes no specific and unique
identification of the term with Anaxagoras. Verdenius and
Waszink, .2.E.• cit., p. 1, specify A...~axagoras in spite of this,
likely because-'both Anaxagoras and the oµoioµepD have been
mentioned. But Aristotle,lI believe, sees the issue as a
larger one than the debate between two pe~sons; two schools of
thought are mentioned.
5 5Following Verdenius and Waszink, on. cit., p. 1, and
against Cherniss, .££.•£ii., p. 108, note 444, who takes the
~ou;wv as referring to composite objects and not to theoµo10µcp~o

r
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thing else beside the atoms--and that includes the 'elements•-ie-

a composite:

ex

awµ&rwv UCLO.Lpf,;wv 'tc:h.A.o. cuyxe:roea( q:>O.OL.

So here, though the term navone:pµ(o. aeeme more closely connected with Anaxagoras, it i·s not specifically and uniquely identified with him; and Democritus even here is still connected
with it as much as Anaxagoras is.
In .Q!! the Heavens 3.4 the teaching about the element as
a 1l:avone:pµ(a is a little more closely connected with the mutual
generation of the elements.

At 303al3 Aristotle mentions in

regard to the structure of the traditional elements that Democritus had assigned the spherical atomic shape to fire; "but he
and Leucippus distinguished air, water, and the other elements
from one another by the largeness and smallness of the atoms
Which Constitute them:
xa'L µL Y..po'tTJ'tL 6t d''A.ov. 5 6

afpa Oe XO.) UOWp XO.l ,;&A.A.a µey{80.L

This, as we have seen, means that

Democritus distinguished the elements from one another by positing a predominance of a specific size of atom for a spebific
element; and he did not differentiate them by claiming that all
the atoms of a given element are of a uniform size or shape.
And Democritus made this kind of a distinction between these
elements "on the ground that each element is by nature a sort
of a 'mixture of all sorts of seeds'--the seeds necessary for
all of the traditional elem~nts. 1157

The matter of distinguish-

56 303al4-15.
57 303al5-17. Guthrie, on. cit., p. 414, takes o't'oLxe(uw
here to refer to the atoms and concludes that Aristotle is here
using the term navcnBpµ(a somewhat carelessly. But I take it
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ing 'elements' by size of atoms is repeated at 303a25ff. along
with the claim that for Democritus there was a mutual generation of the elements by the separation out of the larger atoms.
The elements thus were distinguished by 'size' and not specifically by geometrical figure--except, of course, for fire.
There were in any mixture which constitutes an element all
sorts of geometrical figures; and the proportion of geometrical figures in one element seems to remain pretty much the
same when another element is generated from it by the removal
of some atoms of a specific size.5 8 navonepµ(a is thus a term
quite closely connected with the name of Democritus and indicates a mixture capable of producing all the elements, for it
has all the necessary kinds of atoms.
This leaves us with one more important passage to account
for, in which the doctrine of navcrnepµ(a. is connected with
Democritus; the passage is at On

~

Soul 1.2, 404a4.
.

I have

-~;

postponed considering this passage because it is the subject
of much controversy; the meaning of the passage is in doubt;
that the seed-mixture needs to be thought of as one that at
least in a preliminary way may supply seeds for all the elements in mutual generation and still have each new element retain a roughly similar proportion of shapes (i.e., geometrical
figures). Leo Elders, on. cit., p. 302 fails to explain this
altogether, only indicating that the word has reference to some
primitive state in which all kinds of atoms were together.
58 This s~ems to be what Simplicius, de Caelo, p. 610,
lines 24ff ., makes of this passage: oux~'t~xa'ta -co oxDµa.
Ol 0.<PEPOV'tWV, a"'AA. tx 'JlUV'tOOO.'JtWV OXT)µ&rwv xai 'tWV a6-rwv £xt1o'tOU -rou-rwv Yl voµ~vou --"No longer [as is the case with fire]
differing by geometrical figure, but composed of all sorts of
~eometrical figures which remain constant when each of these
Lelements) is generated. 11 Additions mine.
I
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and, indeed, as a result of that doubt, a number of attempts
have been made to manipulate and excise portions of the text.
The following is the text as it appears in Ross' edition
(403b31-404a6):
~08E:V ~T)µoxpl'tOt; µev XOp 'tl XQl 8e:pµoV q>T)01V a6't~V

e:{v~1· - crne:_lpwv '(clP OV'tWV O)fT)µa:wv xa1 a-roµ~v 'tel ocpai po-

OT) xup Xf1 *UXTJV Aeye:i (oiov e:v 'tQ aepl 'ta XUAOUµe:va
EV -rai<; 01 a 'tWV 8up(owv <ix'tt01 v)
~v -r~v µ~v xavoxe:pµ(av o-roixe:ra A~ye:1 -r~<; OATJ<; cpuae:w~
(oµ~(wt; OE xa1 Ae:uxixxo<;), 'tOU'tWV
acpa1poe:16D
\j!UXTJV • • •
E:l

~uoµa.'ta, d cpa(ve:-rai

oe 'ta

Ross 59 summarizes the dissatisfaction with this text as it
stands on the grounds that the sentence is a muddle, because
1) the antecedent of ~v ought to be 'spherical atoms' or
'fire and soul', while the sense requires it to be 'atoms',
and 2) it makes Aristotle say twice that Democritus identified soul and the spherical atom.

Diels had tried to remedy

the situation by excising most of the offending portion of
6
the text: -ra xaAouµe:va • • • 6.x1:Tai v ~v •
Cherniss agrees

°

that the passage is certainly corrupt. 61

Brieger has appar-

ently made a more constructive attempt 62 by proposing that
the suoµa-ra are to be pictures of the atoms in general, and
not of spherical atoms specifically; thus the suoµa'ta are the
antecedent of ~v.

This thus meets Ross' first objection; but

he is still left with assuming a lacuna in the text.

Langer-

59Ross, .Anima, pp. 174-175.
60 niels-Kranz, 67A28, II, 78.
610
~·

•t

~-,

p. 290, note 4.

62 At Brieger "Demokri.tos' ~ngebliche Leugriung der Sinneswahrheit" Hermes, XXXVII (1902;, p. 12, note 1.
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beck 63 has followed a similar course; the suoµa~a, he says,
are atoms in general and, as such, are themselves in constant
motion; and the special motion of the spherical atoms is due
to their shape.

Thus he manages his interpretation without

assuming any basic change in the text as received.

But even

so he does not meet Ross' second objection to the text as it
stands, and he neglects the meaning of navonEpµ(a here.
Both of Ross' objections ought to be met; and I believe
that this can be done without any real change in the text.
Now the only way in which the second objection can be met is
to extend the comparison--or, rather, illustration--through
the second identification of the spherical atoms with soul.
The first objection can be met, as has been pointed out, by
takingsuoµa~a as the antecedent of ~v.

we do not have here a comparison or

But this means that

simi~e,

lustration, meant to be taken literally.

but an actual il-

The

sucrµa~a

are not

like atoms, but are in fact combinations of all kinds of atoms,
including spherical; they are themselves navonEpµ(a1

contain-

ing spherical atoms which give them their movement.

Thus the

thought of the whole passage, including the context, would be
something like this:

Some have said that soul is primarily

that which causes motion and can only do this by itself being
l

63.Qp_. cit., pp. 78-79. His interpretation avoids making
the particles an equivalent of soul, as some Pythagoreans had
done; and it was the fact that this made the teaching of Democritus the same as the teaching of the Pythagoreans that
gave Diels his excuse to excise the passage where this doctrine is attributed to Democritus.
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in motion (403b28-31); this led Democritus to say that the
eoul was a sort of fire (403b31-404al), because, though there
is a limitless number of atomic shapes, the spherical shapes
are what constitute both soul and fire (404al-3); this is the
case with the (moving) particles in the air, for each part.icle
has a 'mixture of all kinds of atoms'--a mixture which for Democritus would be an 'element'--and in this mixture the

spher~

ical atoms are what moves it, its 'soul' (404a3-6); and this
is quite like what the Pythagoreans say, for some of them say
that the5e

suoµa~a

are soul, and others that what moves these

suoµa~a

is soul, moving them even when the wind is calm
(404al6-20). 64 Democritus has thus taken a Pythagorean doctrine and explained it in atomic terms.
Thus the structure of the traditional elements is described in Democritus' teaching by the term 11:avcrnepp.(a. as a combination of atoms of a great variety of shapes (that is, both
size and geometrical figure).

While this is primarily true of

64 r would thus translate the passage cited above (p. 174)
ae follows: "(Assuming that what is soul is in motion--oeev )
Democritus says that aoul is a sort of fire ~nd what is warm,
for, although the number of atomic shapes is limitless, he
claims that the s~herical atoms are both fire and soul; this is
the case (he says) with the so-called particles (moving) in the
air, particles which appear in sun-beams which come in through
windows; he claims that the 'mixture of all sorts of atoms' of
these particles are the elements of the whole of nature--Leucippus does too--and that the ~pherical atoms in these particles are their soul (i.e., that which gives them their movement).11 T:n;i.s ~ran~lation and interpretation has the advantage
Of taking £.0v "L'T)V µEV 1taV01repµ(av O'tOl XElC!. A.~yel • • • X~t
,
Aeux1n11:0~ as appropriate to the context.
By the other interpretations the remark would simply need to be taken as repetitious and parenthetical.
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the elements, or simple bodies, other physical objects are in
principle the same, only their structures seem more complex.
All this is quite in keeping with what Aristotle says
about the origin of atomism in the Eleatic problem of 'what
is' and 'what is not' and in the problem of how contraries may
be true of some physical object. 65 'What is' and 'what is
not''may both be true of any given portion of a physical object because one may find both atoms and void there.

Further,

at Phyeics 1.5, 188a24ff. Aristotle describes the three basic
terms of Democritus--shape, placement, and order--as kinds or
eenera of contraries:

yEVT) EVOV't(uv.

And it ia quite true of

Democritus that he uses these contraries as principles for explaining physical objects

('tcivav't(a. n:u.i, nciV'te<; n:oloUoL 'ttr<;

&pxd<; ), principles for explaining how it is that such contraries arise; and this attempt is a quite reasonable one (xa1
'tou'to

e6Aoyw<; ).

'What an object is' in atomic terms means no

more than giving a reckoning of the atomic shapes that constitute it; it is or is not a specific object (e.g., a man, a pig,
a stone, a fire) only because and inasmuch as it ha.s a specified number of various atomic shapes.
But this still does not by itself explain how contraries
may be true of the same physical object; we do need to use all
three of the basic terms.

' We

have already mentioned how the

first of these, shape (as geometrical figure), may explain some
contraries.

While the size of atoms which predominate in the

65 For example, Meta. 4.5, 1009a22ff.

-
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mixture determines the eseential nature of the navcrnepµ(a, it
may contain any variety of geometrical figures, so that some
water may taste bitter and a different portion of that same
water may taste sweet, depending on the predominance of a certain geometrical

f~gure

in the portion.

And these are pre-

cisely the kinds of contraries that Aristotle specifies for
ehape (geometrical figures):
I

'

eo8o

~

nept~ep~'--Physics

crx~µa'to'

yeywviwµ.evov

1.5, 188a25-26.

~yWVlOV,

And likely all, or at

..

least a large number, of these geometrical figures are mingled
in everything.

'

.

And thi8 seems to be evidently what Aristotle

has in mind when he says that Democritus--as well as Anaxagoras--taught that everything wa~ mingled in everything. 66
But these explain only some of the contraries, and we
have not yet taken into account the contraries which may be
\

generated by the other two terms,_o&a8lYD. and
are y~VD evav't(u)v.

'tpon~;

they too

These have no role at all in determining

for Democritus 'what a thing is', but only what might be
called 'accidental qualities', such as color.

With them we

must begin to consider the void as well, for they indicate a
given placement in the void in some position relative to other
atoms; and there is both atoms and void at any given portion
of a physical object 67 to explain contraries in the -~ame ob-

66 rbid., a27: µEµrxeat nav ev nav't( ~Dot xa~ 6Dµdxpi'to,.
This is mentioned precisely in the context of attempts at explaining the presence of contraries in the same physical object. And this is quite consistent with the teaching about
navcnepµ(a.
67 Ibid., a28-29.
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ject.

Any 5hift in placement or order engenders only an ap-

parent change; though the object in question may 'look like' a
different object, it is structurally, atomically, by nature
still the same object, because it still has the same number of
epecified atoms.

When such a shift of placement occurs, other

sets of contraries may become true of the 5ame physical object
(e.g., it may be blue and then not-blue, soft and then
hard). 68 Thus what for Aristotle would be generation and corruption is explained by Democritus in terms of adding and subtracting atoms; and other changes are due to a shift in the
placement of the object's atoms. 69

..

All of this, the atomic structure of physical objects
and the role of placement and order of the atoms, was quite
obviously meant to explain physical

object~

as we perceive

them, to account for change, motion, and_multiplicity.
totle is quite right in saying that Democritus and

Aris-

Leucippu~

made their principle_ or beginning in accord with nature, that
they presented accounts which accord with sense-perception,
that Democritus was convinced by arguments founded on the study
of nature. 70
And it is precisely on this score that Aristotle criti68 Gen. et Corr. 1.9,, 327al8-20; an.object becomes solid
by 't'po7tf,ixal OTa(h yij, according to.Democritus;. at 1. 2, 316al-2,
color is by 't'pon~. For a fuller account of Democritus' teachings on such differences compare Theophraatus, De Sensibus, in
Diels-Kranz 68Al35.
69 Gen. !,! Corr. 1.8, 325a32-35.
70ibid., 1.8, 325a3, 24; 1.2, 316a14.
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cizes the atomic theory of the structure of physical objects:
it annuls or abolishes many of the opinions and impressions
that we have by sense-impression.71 Democritus had made a
proper beginning in starting with objects as they are perceived
and known, 72 but he was in difficulty about contraries being
true of the same object, and he saw no other alternative than
to account for these in terms of atoms and void.

And this

means that for Democritus--for no justifiable reason--the phys'

ical object is not at all what we perceive it to be; its unity, its being subject to alteration, its differentia, its persistence while changing--indeed, all that we can really know
about it--all of this he must deny about the physical object
itself.

These, as we shall now see in some detail, are the

criticisms which Aristotle levels against this theory of the
structure of physical objects.
When we perceive an object, we perceive it as a single,
continuous, whole object--a unity.

The theory of the atomic

structure of things, as we have already pointed out, denies
that this is really true of any physical object, whether 'comlex' or a 'simple body'.
~

To repeat one example, at On Genera-

and Corruption 1.9, 327a8ff. Aristotle cites the example

of water freezing (or some similar phenomenon):
t

the same object as a continuous whole

we see that

(ouvext~ ov)

is on one

71 caeio ~.4, 303a22-23: noAAa 'twv tvooswv xa& 't"wv ~a'
voµtvwv xa'ta 't"TJV a'{o8T)OlV 6.vaq:d'v.
72 see especially, Phy~ics 1.1 (e.g., n~~uxE B~ ~x 't"wv
yvwplµW'ttpwv Dµrv D ooo~ xaL oa~eo'ttpwv).
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occasion water, on another occasion ice; Democritus claims
that thie happens by a shifting of the individual atoms.

But

· thia means that the change must be occurring piece-meal, one
part at a time, until the 'whole' object is finally changed.
But this, Aristotle objects, is. contrary to the evidence of
the senses, 73 for we see the object~~ whole on one occasion liquid and then solid: &nav uyp6v, O'tE

Oe

OXAT)pov

xal

rcenwoc;; EO'r J V--327a22-23 •

And furthermore, the atomic structure of the physical
object in conjunction with its dynamic atoms, leaving, coming,
..

'

.!

and rearranging themselves, leaves no permanent ouo(a for the
physical object, no real grounds for continuing to call the
object the same thing.

And this is the criticism which Aris-

totle is making against Democritus and others at Metaphysics
4.5, 1009a37:

"And furthermore, we.shall demand of them that

they suppose that there is some other kind of ouo(a which does
not have the characteristics of change, corruption, or generation at all. 11 7 4 These men are so intent on explaining the
73cherniss, .2.E.· cit., p. 105, says that Aristotle's criticism is naive, in tha=r-he should expect to see invisible
atoms at work. But this is to miss the point of Aristotle's
criticism.
74_e'tJ o'~slWOOµEV au'tOU~ UTIOAaµ~~VElV xa1 ~AAT)V 'ttVa

o~a(av d~o.l rcwv ov'twv ~
Yt.VEot~ 'to

oo(E

x(vT)al~ ~napxtl

ou'tE cp9opa ou'te

Philip Merlan, "Hintikka and a Strange
Aristotelian Doctrine" in Phronesis, XV, 2 (1970), takes the
~AAT)V -rtva oua(av as 'some other realm of being', that is, as
the supralunary world referred to by Aristotle at 1010a25-32.
But the major i5sue which Ari5totle is discussing in this chapter (and we ought not lose sight of it) is the problem of
change and permanence in the phenomenal world (in connection
With the 'law of contradiction'). What seems to be required
napchrnv.

r
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contraries in the srune object that they lose sight of the aspect of 'the same object'; they need to recognize as well this
aspect of permanence about an object.

The whole context seems

to require this interpretation rather than that of Merlan.75
One may summarize the context in which this passage occurs as follows.

Democritus and others had noted the appear-

ance of contraries in phenomenal objects and had tried to account for them without violating the 'law of contradiction'.
Democritus believed that he had solved the problem by proposing that such contraries are properties only of the phenomenal
object; the physical object, on the other hand, is not a unified object, but actually consists of .a large number of atoms
in various positions in a void; and the contraries in the phenomenal object are due to the contradictories (atoms and void,
'what is' and 'what is not') in any given portion of the physin this passage is the introduction of something permanent
about a given physical object, something about the object
which remains stable in the midst of accidental change. This
permanent aspect of the object would seem to be its essence or
fo,rm. Merlan himself discusses the .possi bil~ ty P~~ ta~Jng
ouo(c,and cpuo'<; in this passage as e'Bo<; orrro 'H fiv dva'
(p. 98)--which seems to me to be right; but he prefers to let
a subsidiary point introduced later dominate his interpretaof the passage at 1009a37.
75Indeed, Democritus did recognize a 'real of being'
which--like Aristotle's supralunary world--has only locomotion
(of the atoms in the void~, though the motion of the atoms
does not present the regularity of the motion of the supralunary realm. So evidently this recognition of such a realm
of being is not what Aristotle has in mind to demand of Democritus. But the point that Aristotle is making against Democritu5 and other5 is that Democritus recognizes nothing permanent and stable about the physical object; the addition or
deletion of a single atom makes it a different object.

r
'

183
ical object (1009a22-30).

But, Aristotle objects, 'what is'
,

is not limited to the simple and absolute sense of 'what exists'; it can also be used in a particular sense, as 'what ie
some particular object'; and even the same object can both
'be' and 'not be' at the same time, as long as it is not both
actually.

For example, the same apple can both 'be red' and

'be not red' at the same time, provided that it is one of
these contraries only potentially; it can be both potentially
red and actually not red (1009a30-36).

But this still does

not solve the problem of contraries, for we also need to account for the identity of an object in the midst of change; we
need some other

ouo(a

of the 'things that are' (i.e., of phys-

ical objects) which is not subject to change; and that permanent aspect of a given physical object is its essence (1009a36-

38).
Aristotle then goes on to speak about •truth in appearances', the problem of recognizing and knowing what is permanent about an object (1009a38ff.).

The question of the supra-

lunary wo.rld is raised in this chapter only at 1010a25-32, and
there only to make the point that what may be true in our sublunary world may

~ot

be true in another realm, that there may

very well be (and evidently is) a realm in which there ie no
change from· one property to
' another and from one substance to
another.

The supralunary realm with its regularity belies the

undue emphasis on change which Democritus and others had made
in reference to the whole universe.
Democritus then is liable to the criticism that, while
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all the evidence points to something permanent about physical
objects--and we also continue to speak of it as the same object--his theory would reject such permanence.

This, Aris-

totle seems to claim, is due to the fact that no one had yet
developed the ability or inclination to distinguish properly
the essence of an object from the contraries which may at various times be true of it.7 6 Democritus, Aristotle had said,
made some attempt at defining the essence of an object; 77 and
Democritus defined it in terms of a certain proportion of
atoms of a .particular kind, and he also defined what is hot
(this, he said, was due to spherical atoms).

Democritus does

seem to have made some beginning at distinguishing essence
from the contraries, inasmuch as contraries were for the·most
part due to the geometrical figures of the atoms and "their
relative positions, while essence was basically specified in
terms of the number of atoms of a certain size in that object •.
This was indeed an attempt, but it still left the •essence• of
an object as something quite variable--and this is contrary to
our impression of something more permanent in an object.
Furthermore, Democritus• theory of the atomic structure
of physical objects, Aristotle says, neglected potency altogether.

A given whole object cannot in principle be something

else potentially.

For instance,
"
a given volume of water can

76metaphysics 13.4, 1078b25-27, though Democritus seems
to have made considerable progress in this direction.
77Ibid., 1078bl9-20.

r
~
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not change completely into air (vapor)--a change which quite
obviously takes place. This, Aristotle explains, 78 is because the atomic theory itself of the structure of physical
objects forbids it.

On atomic principles the generation of a

new element must stop short before the 'old' element is completely exhausted: avayx~

oe

ytve01v--caelo 3.7, 305b20.

xat unohe(neiV ~~v ~s UAA~AWV
And the reason for the generation

stopping short lies in Democritus' own theory of atomic structure; according to him one· element (e.g., water) differs from
another (e.g., air) in that they each contain a different mixture of atomic sizes--water evidently contains more larger
atoms than does air, earth contains more larger atoms than
water.

Thus when water changes to air or when earth changes

to water, there will always be a residue of larger atoms
which cannot be accommodated into the new element.

Thus the

physical object as a whole cannot potentially be some other
object.
Democritus had thus neglected potency as a factor in explaining the problem of change.

An object, Aristotle claims,

may be one thing actually and at the same time be potentially
something contrary, or it may be actually qualified in one way
and potentially qualified in a contrary way (Meta. 4.5,

'
1009a34-36). ·This means that
the law of contradiction continues to hold for the physical object as perceived, and Democritus was in error when he felt that it was necessary to posit

78 caelo 3.7, 305b20-27.

r
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unperceived atoms, to deny the unity of physical objects, and
to annul what sense-perception gives us.
And, beside failing to account for complete generation,
the generation which Democritus does describe is no real generation at all; it is only: apparent

(~atvoµEVDV

3.1, 305b3), for nothing new comes into being.

ytveotv--Caelo
The new ele-

ment is already actually there, present in the old element;
and thus the process of generation amounts to nothing more than

taking part of the old material out--like taking pieces of
something out of a jar. or out of a sack full of various
pieces. 7 9 Cherniss objects that this is not fair, for Aristotle "overlooks the fact that for the Atomists segregation
would be only part of the process of which the moment of recomposition is at least an equally important part" and that one
cannot therefore trust this sort of an account~ 80

But the ac-

count of Aristotle is quite fair, for this is the way in which
Democritus in his preliminary attempts at definition defined
substances, the essential natures of objects; .and the 'recompo'

.

sition' which Cherniss mentions accounts for contraries,, for
various and changing (secondary) qualities that the object apparently has, and has nothing to do with its essential nature.
With the reduction of all these changes to shifts of
atoms, the atomic system r~duced all motions to locomotion.
19wanep El=;, ayye(ou 'i;f)<;; ye:veaew<;; OUCD<;; (305b4-5). One
might note the striking similarity to Lucian's descript·ion of
a navone:pµ(c as a sack filled with all kinds of grain.

800

~·

cit., p. 119.
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Thus they unnecessarily neglected other kinds of 'motion'--as
the alteration of a physical object.

And this is the criti-

cism which Aristotle brings against Democritus at Metaphysics
1.4, 985bl9, for Democritus, he says, neglected 'I(W~ [x(VT)oic;;]
uTI<1pl;el 'Lo&~ oJo,--"how motion will be a property of physical

objects."

This has reference to the kinds of motion other

than locomotion, and it is not the same criticism which is
leveled at Democritus at _Qn; the Heavens 3.2, 300b8-16. 81
Physical objects change at times without there being any apparent locomotion; and Democritus might have accounted for
this change without resorting to a non-apparent locomotion.

It was thus unnecessary and unwarrented to assume an atomic
structure for physical objects and to assume that all change
was a change of place--assumptions which in effect do away
with empirical evidence.
Democritus had evidently been impressed by the unusually
large number of differences in various phenomenal objects, and,
in order to account for this vast variety in phenomena, he had
l

claimed that there was an indeterminately large number of
'simple bodies'.

But this, .Aristotle says, is where he and

others are in error, 82 for an unlimited number of such principles ('elements') is not necessary.

'

Democritus could just

81 As Cherniss, .21?.• cit., p. 171, note 120, claims. In
the passage in On the Heavens locomotion seems to be as~umed,
and the kinds of motion there in question are 'forced' and
'natural' motions.
82 Caelo
.
L
3.4, 303al7-l 8 : 't"au't"ov dµup'LT)µa
'LO' µT)' 1(EnepacrI

µ€va~ Aa~£lV 'LQ~ apxa~.

'
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as well have posited a limited number of such 'elements' without any real inconsistency with the rest of his theory.
Secondly, beside it being unnecessary to make the number
of elements unlimited, Democritus' reasons for doing so are
totally unwarrented if the specific differences are not unlimited in number (Caelo 3.4, 303al9-20).

But the atomists can

not claim that either the differences in atoms or the differences in the phenomenal world are infinite.

Atoms differ from

one another in shape; but shapes can be reduced to a limited
number of simple shapes (303a32-b2), and thus the kinds of
atomic shapee will be limited too. 83
And, further, the differences in the phenomenal world
are limited too. 84

And, just as a large variety of atomic

shapes can be successfully reduced by analysis to a comparative few, this is true as well of the phenomenal world and the
large variety of changes and differences that occur there.
Those phenomenal differences can

al~o

be successfully reduced

to a comparatively small number; and when these changes or
differences are reduced to the simplest level, these will be

83Aristotle seems to put this critici:sm in a way which
is likely extreme, for he claims that on these grounds the
atomic elemental shapes ought to be one or two or more. But
whether all shapes can be so reduced or not~ the criticism
that the numbe! will be limited is quite reasonable and proper.
84303b3-8.

The question of qualitative differences was·
introduced by Aristotle at 302b33ff. (even though Elders, .2.E.•
.£.!.!., p. 19, says that only locomotion is dealt with in On the
Heavens), and this is precisely the question that leads immediately to consideration of the atomists' theory of an unlimited number of 'elements'.
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changes or differences which are elementa1. 85

These types of

change are limited because there can be only two directions
of change (up and down, when applied to locomotion; toward or
away from some point of ref erence--hotter or colder--when
other changes are in question), and the number of place8 is
limited as well (as points or degrees of change between contraries). 86

Thus the differences in physical objects cann~t,

as Democritus assumed, be limitless, either when considered
from the point of view of the atoms or from the point of view

85Most commentators assume that this passage (303b4-8)
deals exclusively with the question of locomotion. Cherniss,
.2J2• El:.!·, p. 7, might be cited as an example; and he rightly
sees that an argument by Aristotle only in terms of locomo_tion would be naive and would not affect Democritus' position.
Such an interpretation would have Aristotle argue thu3:
there are only two directions of locomotion (up and down; see
Simplicius, de Caelo, p. 615, lines 4-6) and a finite number
of places; therefore the number of directions of locomotion
are not infinite. This would indeed seem to be naive, for it
has Aristotle argue from two simple motions to a finite number
of motions.
.
But x(v~a'~ here evidently does not refer only to locomotion; Guthrie, de Caelo, p. 293, translates this as 'motion',
which is properly vague. x(v~ot~ refers to qualitative change
as well as to change of place (see Phzsics 3.1, 20la9-16) and
might better be simply translated as change'. Phenomenal·
changes seem to be numerous, but Aristotle claims that they can
thus be reduced by analysis to a comparatively small number.
I would translate the passage here as follows:
"And furthermore, if, in the first place, each element
has its own type of change, and the change of such a simple
body is simple, and if, in the second place, these simple
change3 are not limitless (because there are no more than two
simple directions of chang~ and a finite number of degrees of
change), thus the elements would not even so be limitless in
number."
86 Aristotle at On Sensation 6, 445b24-33 makes the same
point as he does here-;-that there are only a limited number of
degrees of differences between two contraries. Stocks, as
cited by Guthrie, ~ Caelo, p. 290, and Elders, .£.E.• cit., p.
300, had rightly referred to this parallel idea.

r
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of phenomena.
Furthermore, the elements could not be limitless in number, Aristotle points out,# because of the very meaning of
'what is limitless'.

If they are 'limitless', then there

could be no exact knowledge of 'what is':
l.
,
uTIElpou,

!':. '

u

189al2-13.
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Indeed, such a limitless number is, besides, high-

ly suspect, because it always remains potential; it never becomes an actual number because one can always think toward a
. h er num b er:
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The number can by definition never be attained.

The infinite

then is in principle beyond our experience and impossible to
grasp, and cannot thus be used as a principle to explain
things.
Democritus' atomism had also forced him, Aristotle says
at On Generation and Corruption 1.7, to a one-sided, limited
view of action and passion.

For Democritus atoms and void.are

complete contraries; atoms cannot in principle affect the void,
nor can void in any way affect the atoms.

The only things in

Democritus' atomic system which can either produce an effect
or be affected are the atoms themselves; and they can act or
be acted upon only inasmuch' as they possess the common property of body; and atoms and void cannot in principle affect one
another, for they have nothing in common (1.7, 323bll-15).
Thus, Aristotle says later, Democritus belonged to that group
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of thinkers who "with a view to matter thought that agent and
patient must have some identical property. 1187
But this view, Aristotle contends, is too limited, for
it takes no account of contraries affecting one another--as,
for instance, 'that which is hot' heating that which is cold
or that which is one color coloring something of another color
or that which is bitter making something else bitter.

And

these are precisely the kinds of effects that are given in empirical evidence.

Democritus had only considered the sameness

of agent and patient, but had neglected the difference between
them.

And an account of both the sameness and the difference

between objects which affect one another is necessary for a
complete explanation.
Furthermore, since these contrary properties and effects
of physical objects can be explained without re5orting to an
atomism of which we have no real evidence, Democritus' teaching in this matter is unnecessary and unwarrented.
For the most part this is what Aristotle's criticism of
Democritus' explanation of the structure of physical objects
amounts to.

Democritus was unduly influenced by Eleatic argu-

ments on the meaning of 'what is' and 'what is not';- but he
also--like Anaxagoras--felt that he must give account of phenomena.

'

.

But phenomena provided the problem of explaining con-

traries in the same object.

These contraries, combined with

87 Gen. et Corr., 1.7, 324a23-24: of µ~v oJv e{, ixervov

,,[i.e.,-r;!Jv ~'AT)V] 0"A€1.)lavrr.c:<;; -r;au'toV 'tl oeiv 4rfi8TJOUV 'to 'JIOlOUV
exe'v xal -r;o Tiaaxov.
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a limited Eleatic meaning of 'what is', seemed to Democritus
to eliminate the possibility of explaining objects and their
properties adequately on the phenomenal level and to necessitate an explanation on a sub-phenomenal, atomic level.

But

Aristotle has consistently and in various ways pointed out
that this 'leap' to a non-empirical level was not necessary.
Its only apparent necessity rests on a mistaken notion of the
meaning of 'what is'; one need not resort to an atomic structure, because objects and their properties are quite intelligible without it.
Once Democritus had begun his explanation on the atomic
level, he was quite consistent in applying its various consequences.

Aristotle praises him for his consistent method:

ev 'Cl~ 'TCW<; 01 acp Ep El

("he excells in his method of explanation"

--Gen.~ Corr., 1.2, 3l5bl);ne:pl rcav't:wv lvl AOY~ 01~p(xao1
("they have made distinctions about everything in a single accountn--Gen. et Corr., 1.8, 325al).

But, in spite of this ad-

mirable consistency, Democritus' system, Aristotle claims, itself breaks down when one tries to apply it.
We have already touched on some of the aspects of the
break-down of this system of atomic

~tructure.

And one of the

most obvious .examples already cited is that of the attempt of
Democritus to.account for \he mutual generation of the elements.

In Q!!. the Heavens 3.4, 303a25-29 Aristotle points out

how the system itself contains an internal contradiction.

De-

mocritus had claimed that this generation of one element from
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another takes place by the separation out of the largest
atome; but, Aristotle replies, since every element must contain all the variety of sizes for mutual generation, the process of separation out of the largest atoms will on each occasion bring about either a lack of smaller atoms in the new
element or a lack of larger atoms in the old element. 88 Under
the specified conditions such a· mutual generati.on can in fact
not take place.
To stay for a moment with the criticisms presented in On

~ Heavens, 89 Aristotle says that Democritus' system is further not adequate, because it only accounts.for the dividing
or destroying function of fire; it neglects and, indeed, must
fail to account for fire's capacity to unite things.

The

sphere was assigned as a specific shape to fire precisely because of its power to penetrate and break things up.

But fire

obviously unites and welds things of the same kind; indeed,
this to Aristotle is an even more essential function than that
of separating:

xat ~ µev auyxplOl(; xae' au~o ea~,

Ol<ixplOl(; xa~a auµ'3E'3TJx6<;--3.8, 307b4-5.

..•

~

Be

At the very least

then Democritus ought to have assigned a shape to fire which
would be consistent with both functions: npot;;

~µ~w

zxpDV

--rn µ~yta-i;a--Caelo 3.4, 303a27. If
the 'new element' is the residue left after the largest are
separated out, the 'new element' will lack the largest atoms
and thus not be an element capable of generating others; if the
'new element' is to be composed of the largest atoms separated
out, it will lack the smaller atoms. Thus in both cases the
new element is not an element at all; it will lack the requieite variety of sizes for mutual generation.
88 u'ITOAE.(¢EL yap aE',

89 3.8, 307a32-b6.
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a~ooouvaL--307b4-5.

Thus there is again a aeriou5 defect in

this system.
Again, in the same chapter, several lines later,90 since
hot and cold are contraries, Aristotle points out, in the same
category of temperature, and since Democritus had assigned· a
shape to what is hot, he ought logically have assigned a contrary shape to what is cold.

But he could not and wisely did

not, for there are no contraries in shapes.

Aristotle repeats

precisely this criticism in .QB. Generation and Corruption 1.8,
326a3-6 in connection with a more elaborate analysis of the
logical consequences of Democritus' version of atomism.

And

it is now to this latter passage as a whole (1.8, 325b33326b6) that we turn our attention.

It is often claimed on the basis of this detailed analysis of atomism that Aristotle mistakenly claimed that for Democritus the spherical atom was hot.9 1
careful about his. language.

He

But Aristotle is quite

had just been discussing the

matter of the atoms not being hard, and says:

o~ov ~·

el'v-a&

ou~e oxA~pov

(326a3--"nor can it be hard"); and a few lines

further on he makes mention of heat and cold as examples of
90307b7-10.

91For example, Cherni~s, .21?.• cit., p. 97, note 409:

"Democritus, evidently, did not believe that he was assigning
a quality to the spherical atom • • • and the re5ulting quality amounts almost to making the quali:ty primary." Cherniss
goes on to argue that Aristotle feels it established that for
Democritus the atom itself has the quality of heat as a property of it. Likewise also Verdenius and Waszink, .2.E· cit., pp.
42-43. But this is premature; that is not established until
later in the logical analysis.
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qualities in sets of contraries as possible properties of

d 'taih;a µE:v uTiapxe'

atoms:
ties").

(326a7--"if these are proper-

But in the passage primarily in question Aristotle

speaks quite carefully about referring what is hot
sphere:

a:rrooouval '~Q nt:plcpepei' ox'Dµa'tl

'to

12. the

8epµov--326a4-5.

Aristotle does not say that for Democritus the spherical atom
was hot, though this may very well have been deduced as a logical consequence of the theory.
I believe that it is important to recognize that we have
at 326a4-6 and at 326a7-14 two separate criticisms, each of
which traces a separate consequence of Democritus' system,
each introduced by the criticism, Ci'tonov --"it is paradoxical. 1192
In the first criticism at 326a4-6, what Aristotle considers as paradoxical or illogical is to assign a shape to 1what
is hot, but none to what is cold, its contrary.93

We have al-

ready seen that Democritus did not attempt to do so, and wisely, Aristotle thought, because there are no contraries in
shapes.

But it is nevertheles3 qu.i te right that it makes no

sense to assign a shape to hot but none to cold; they are quite
obviously degrees in the same category.
But it is the second criticism at 326a7-14 that is the

'

92This term ie found at both a4 and a7; the next criticism as well is introduced in this way at 326al5.
93rf the atom itself were hot, the first illogical consideration would certainly have been that Democritus makes·
some qualitiless atoms have a quality such as heat; but that
is not the case here.
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subject of some controversy.

The interpretations vary in the

first place on the issue of whether the atoms themselves have
weight and how that weight varies.9 4 A second point of variance is on Aristotle's argument itself, the question of how
Aristotle can deduce logically atoms that are affectable from
the concept of an atom which is anae£~ (326al).95

Let us

then follow the argument and see how Aristotle can logically
come to the conclusion that the atoms must be capable of being
affected.

We begin again with atoms which are incapable of

being affected and use in the argument nothing but what is
explicitly attributable to Democritus and its reasonable consequences.
Aristotle's first and major point is that it is unreasonable for atoms to have a quality in one set of contrary
properties, but none in other sets--or, if we may put it that
way, there is no real difference between the sets of primary
94cherniss, .QE• cit~, p. 97, note 412, concludes that
"each and every atom has relative weight when compared (with
any other);" Verdenius and W~szink, ~· cit., p. 42, rightly
retain the relationship of size to weigh':f";°see my previous
discussion of the question of weight in chapter two.

95cherniss, .21?.• cit., p. 99, says that atoms yield to

pressure bec~use of their 'hardness', and being hard implies
some degree of softness and thus "the inconsistency here developed in the Atomistic theory is due to the implications of
Aristotle's.technical terminology." Verdenius a~d Waszink, £12.•
.£!.!., p. 43, see the reason as being the fact that the atoms
themselves have temnerature and thus can interact. This may
be indirectly so, but it seems to me to miss the point of the
argument~ which hinges on the first sentence in this passage
(326a7-8J, and not so much on the previous argument, which did
not establish that the atoms are hot or cold--in which case
Aristotle would not have needed the point he raises at 326a7-

8.
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and those of secondary qualities.

If atoms have one set, they

can reasonably be expected to have the other sets as well
(326a7-8).

And yet Democritus does claim that they have qua-

lities in one eet of contraries. in that their weights vary;
thus they evidently have other set·s, and one atom must therefore .!?!:_hotter than another (326a8-ll).9 6 But, if this is so,
they must also be affected by one another, for they must then
also have the set of contraries softness and hardness; and, if
softness, then affectability (326all-14).

I would thus trans-

late the passage as follows:
"And it would aleo be strange if atoms have these sets
of contraries (which I mentioned in the first argument)
--I mean heat and cold--while other sets (heaviness and
lightness, hardness and softness) are not going to belong
to them. Now Democritus does say at least that each atom
has a weight in proportion to its size; and so (with one
set of contraries as inherent properties established)
the others must also be, and so evidently the atoms must
have heat in varying degrees. 'But, eince ·they are such
(qualified by these different sets·of contraries), they
cannot help but be affected by one another, for example,
the slightly hot atom will be affected by one whose heat
far exceeds it. Nay rather (being affected will be their
very nature with these sets of contraries as inherent
properties, for) if one atom ia (relatively) hard, it
will also be relatively soft; and now what is soft already contains the meaning of suffering some effect, for
what yields to some force ie soft."
9 6 rt is first here, as a logical consequence of having
weight, that atoms also ought to ~ heat; this point further
establishes the fact that logically that heat ought to vary in
degrees among various atoms, just as the weight varies. Cherniss, .Q..E.~ cit.,- p. 98, note 413, and Verdenius and wa·f'mink, .2.12.·
£!!., p. 42, rightly reject Joachim's contention of a specific
reference to spherical atoms. It is not necessary to bring in
here, with Cherniss, the point made at Caelo 3.8, 307al3-18
that the degree of heat ought to vary as the shape approaches
that of a sphere; the arguments are only parallel in that they
are both concerned with varying degrees of heat •.
J
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!

Thus it is not the technical meaning for Aristotle of the word
ox'AT)pov which allowed the affectability of the atoms, but the
fact that hardness and softness are qualities in a set of contraries, and the admission of qualities in one set of contraries as properties of atoms reasonably allowed the admission
of other sets, there being no reason for admitting one set and
refusing others.
The third argument, at 326al5-25,97 presents a triple
paradox, with all three of the elements of the paradox together exhausting the possibilities of ascribing properties to the
atoms.

It is strange and paradoxical:· l)--326al5-16--if the

only property that an atom has is shape (and this, as will become more evident, is Democritus' basic position); 98 and 2)-326al6-18--if an atom did have some other quality like hardness or heat,99 (for then all atoms would not have the same
nature:

060 ~ yap

6.'v

µ (a

'Cl

c; e:'l T)

1i

cpuo l c; au-cwv --326al 7); and

9 7 verdenius and Waszink, .£.E.• cit., p. 44, divide this
into two distinct objections to atomism; they had also combined into one those which I refer to as the first and the
second objections; I prefer to follow the divisions which Aristotle himself made by introducing each with a~onov.

gBAristotle does not raise any specific objection to
this; likely the objection is taken to be self-evident, either
on the grounds that Democritus himself felt uncomfortable with
so bald a statement and indeed did ascribe weight as well to
atoms, or, more likely, on the general grounds that such a
physical objec.t, though at~m-sized, would without any other·
qualities not seem to be a physical object at all, but a totally abstract concept, like 'circle'.
99with Verdenius and Waszink, .212• cit., p. 43, who prefer the reading of the text to the suggestion of Joachim·and
Forster to read wuxpov in place of OXAT)pov.
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3)--326al8-25--if any one atom had more than one of these
qualities as properties, then, since atoms are indivisible,
they would have these properties in the same place (ev

~~

a6~~~-326al9); and, if it was affected in one quality, it

would need to be simultaneously affected in all its qualities
as a whole, for without any void in atoms they could not vary
in density and so be more or less affected at one place in one
quality rather than at another place; as indivisible they must
be affected as a whole in all respects.

Thus both the attri-

bution of some property--one or more--to atoms and the failure
to attribute any property to them is paradoxical.
There seems to be no problem of interpretation of Aristotle's fourth argument at 326a25-29; Democritus seems to have
·made size a criterion of indivisibility.lOO

But, Aristotle

objects, there is no good reason for making only small objects
indivisible.
Aristotle's next objection to the atomism of Democritus
(326a29-b2)lOl is raised in connection with the disjunction:
either the nature of all the solids is identical or some of
the atoms are of a different nature than others:

µ(a nav~wv ~

lOOThis would seem to me to cast into doubt the teaching
.attributed to Democritus that there might be atoms of extremely large size, a teaching which is referred to in Aetius,
Placita 1.12.6.; see Hermanrl. Diels, Doxographi Graeci (Reprinted in Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Associates, 1958), p.
311, lines 21-22. It seems likely that this attribution of
the teaching was due to the criticism of Aristotle in this
passage.
lOlAristotle has now stopped using a~onov to introduce
his new sets of criticisms.
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~UOl~ £xe(vwv ~WV o~epewv ~ OLa~~PEl ea~Epa ~WV ~~Epwv;

(326a30-3~.

With the one alternative--if their nature is one

and the same--there is no logical reason then for their stay....
(
xwp oav;; (326a33).
ing separate and distinct parts: ~ l, ~o
On
the other hand, if the atoms are different in nature--e.g.,
one group with fire-like qualities, another with earth-like
'
qualities ( ~a\ µEv

,,
EL~

-~
nup1va,

'
~a

OE\ YD&va--32 6a32 ) --then these

sub-groups of atoms will be the true basic constituents of
things; they will be the principles and reasons for the things
that come from them.

In either case the. atoms cannot remain

atomic; they will either merge and lose their identity or they
are not themselves as such the most basic unit.
Furthermore (326b2-7), if they are different in nature
(with their differences describable either in terms of sets of
contraries--as in the second criticism

a~

326a7-14--or more

briefly-.-as at 326a32 as 'earthy', 'fiery' and such) then they
mutually affect one another on contact. 102 But this also
raises the question of what it is that brings about this
change.

If it is the other atoms, then atoms can be affected

by something else.

If it is the atom itself which is undergo-

102 cherniss, .Q.12.• ..£!.!., p. 101, note 422, claims that
Aristotle here disregards the attempt to distinguish mechanical interaction and qualita~ive alteration. But if the atoms
have qualitative differences--e.g., 'softness' and"'"'hardness',
as above, or the 'fluidity' of water--they will certainly be
affectable on contact. If one allows these qualitative differences as real differences between atoms, one must allow as
well for qualitative alteration.
Cherniss is here right in rejecting Joachim's claim that
Leucippus taught the mutual affectability of atoms.
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ing the change that brings about the change, then, either the
atoms will be divided with one part causing the change and
the other part undergoing the change, or--with contraries
103
.
present in the same atom
--the atoms will have a material
base which is numerically one
real unity.

~

only potentially one, not a

Thus Democritus would in this case have to admit

that such atoms different in nature are either capable of
being affected or are not the solid and permanent units which
he had supposed they were.
Such are the reasonable consequences of Democritus'
atomism; it cannot be held consistently without opposing strenuous objections; the consequences of this logical analysis lead
to a more unified matter (326a33), elements with qualities
(326a32) and divisibility (326a25-29)--all striking at the very
roots of atomism.
The Soul
-

From Democritus• view of the atomic structure of physical

objects and Aristotle's criticism of it we now proceed to consider Democritus' ,teaching about the soul.

For Democritus

'soul' meant that which is uniquely capable of producing motion
in the animate body and is as well extremely sensitive to motion.

The production of motion in the animate body was evi-

l03we must remember that the one major thing that Democritus was trying to avoid in positing his theory of the atomic
structure of physical objects was the difficulty posed by the
presence of contraries in the same object.
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dently the primary consideration. 10 4

Democritus belongs to

that group which claimed that the principle characteristic of'
the soul was to set things in motion: xa'i npC:rtwc; wux~v elvaL
~o XLVouv--Anima 1.2, 403b29.

This group was further con-

vinced that the only thing which would produce motion was
something which itself was in motion (403b30). 105 It was on
the basis of this consideration that Democritus arrived at
his theory of the nature of the soul (404al-3).
Soul, Democritus said, consisted of spherical atoms,
because these cannot really stop moving--it is indeed their
very nature to be in motion106 --and because of their being
very sensitive to motion (Anima 1.2, 405all-12), and because
of their ability to set others into motion (404a8).

Thus,

what made soul what it is for Democritus, that which was the
one really essential ingredient, was the spherical atom.

This

meant quite rightly that what made the soul soul was the same
thing that made fire fire, spherical atoms which have the effect on us of 'heat':

-

warm"-..TIUp

~l

"the soul is some sort of fire and is

, cpT)OlV
xaL' 8Epµov

' '
au~T)V

- --404al.
dvaL

Aristotle

nowhere assumes that the spherical atom for Democritus is hot
l04Anima 1.2, 404a8-9: unoAaµ~avov~Ec; ~~v \jlux~v elvaL ~o
napexov ~ofc; ~¢oL~ ~~v x(VT)OLV.
Cherniss, .2.E• cit., p. 290,
is right in maintaining t4at the atomist view of the soul was
not formulated primarily to account for the warmth of the
living body.
105 This was quite necessary with Democritus' reduction
of all motion to what is purely mechanical locomotion; com-.
pare Anima 1.3, 406bl6-21.
106 Anima 1.3, 406b21.
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or that Democritus taught the complete identity of soul and
fire, 107 but only that they had the same essential ingredients and some similar functions.

It is furthermore not unlike-

ly that Democritus himself was quite aware of this similarity
and may very well have used it to account for the warmth of
the body. 108
But 'soul' for Democritus does not exist in isolation
from the body any more than the spherical atoms in the air
function as fire.

Fire is only fire when it is burning some-

thing, when penetrating some object and setting its constituent atoms into violent motion and breaking up.

So soul is on-

ly soul when it is functioning as part of an animate body, for
spherical atoms are likely to be found anywhere in the universe
without their there necessarily constituting what we would
strictly speaking call 'soul'.

They are in the air, in fires,

in water, and likely in other objects as well; and they quite
apparently do not function as 'soul' in such combinations.
But there is no further statement that really specifies
at what point a group of spherical atoms really became 'soul'.
They are present in and explain the movement of 'motes in the
air' (Anima 1.2, 404a3-4); they are intermixed in the body with
other 'body-atoms', apparently are in the various sense-organs

' they are, for example, in the
in various kinds of mixtures;
aqueous nature of the eye and there are likely sensitive to
l07As Cherniss, .£!?.• .£11., p. 289, claims.
108 compare Guthrie, _H_i_s_t_or~y_, II, 432.
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visual images. 10 9

And it is quite likely that the particular

formula for the mixture and arrangement with 'body-atoms' was
intended to vary somewhat with the nature of the object or of,
the organ in question; but no real formula for mixture seems
to have been specified.llO
It is likely that the high degree of mobility and the
penetrating power of the spherical atoms, while perhaps more
appropriate to the characteristics of fire, provided some difficulty in the body, for they would be very likely to escape.
There is at both .QE. Respiration 4 and at .Q!!.

~

Soul 1.2 an

account by Aristotle of Democritus' attempt to integrate this
into his systematic explanation of the soui. 111 Soul atoms
i

are constantly escaping from the body due both to their own
penetrating ability and to pressure from the air surrounqing
the body;

but the supply of soul-atoms is maintained by

breathing, which brings in with the air the spherical atoms
contained in the air.

And this renewed supply restores the

balance between the pressure from the outside and the counterpressure from within.

Thus the animate body requires a certain

proportion of spherical atoms not only for motion, but also for
life itself; and it is only through breathing that this dynamic
equilibrium is maintained.

"

l09sensu 2, 438a6-8.
110' f
Lucretius De Rerum Natura 3.372-373, gives a more general account in saying that they simply alternate with the
body-atoms.
111 The fuller account, followed here, is at Respir. 4.
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If we may come to any conclusions about Democritus•
teaching of the soul from this account, it is likely to be
this, that no spherical atom by itself or in any random intensity (i.e., a specific number of spherical atoms per specific
volume) is likely to be soul any more than it is likely to be
fire.

For there to be fire the intensity of spherical atoms

is likely to pe very great--as witnessed by the great heat of·
~

fire--whereas the intensity of spherical atoms as soul in the
body (that is, the proportion of spheres there) is likely to
be less.

Apart from that, the constituents of both fire and

soul might well be the same.

'Soul' then is to be explained

as a specific (though unspecified) proportion of spherical
atoms in a body, sufficient to produce motion and offset the
external pressure on the body, and yet not. great enough to
break up the body (which is evidently what 'fire' would do).
And now, as Aristotle begins his criticism of Democritus
and others like him who say that soul produces movement by itself being in motion, his first concern is to show that this
sort of an account is not necessary--and, indeed, may be impossible--namely, that the soul have motion as an essential property:

~v ~l ~WV a5ova~wv ~0 UTIUPXElV a6~~ x(V~OlV

1.3, 406a3.

--Anima

First of all, Democritus had claimed that the_ pro-

ducer of moti0n needed to "be in motion.

But this is not at all

necessary; that one thing can cause motion in another without
itself being in motion is not an impossible notion (406a3-4).
Secondly, an object may be in motion only indirectly, as the·
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passengers in a ship; the ship is directly in motion in the
water, but the passengers are only in motion inasmuch as the
ship is.

Thus, even though the soul may indeed be in motion,

it may be so only indirectly and in a way not essential to it
or to its operations (406a4-12).

Thirdly, its movement need

not be locomotion, as Democritus specified, for there are
other kinds of movement:
(406al2-14).

alteration, decrease, and increase

Thus Aristotle legitimately concludes that it

is certainly not necessary for the soul to be essentially in
locomotion, even if it produces this in the body; its effects
can be explained without recourse to the soul's being in locomotion as an essential part of its operation.

Democritus'

conclusion was thus not justified (Anima 1.2, 403a29-31); and
here at the very foundation of Democritus' atomistic explanation is where the error lies.
Furthermore, Aristotle claims, such a mechanistic explanation of the action of the soul, aside from appearing more
characteristic of the lines one hears in a good comedy (Anima
1.3, 406bl5-20), has presented only one side of the picture of
the soul, for such a theory will find it hard--if not utterly
impossible--to have the ever-active soul-atoms account for
the body's coming to rest.
never to stand still (

The same atoms whose nature it is

ne~~xevai

µ~oeno~e

not cause rest ( TJP €µ~a' v no' e t--406b23).

µeveiv--406b21) can
Such a limited view

of the soul and its functions cannot be adequate.
Beside the fact that the soul and its motion are not ad-

r
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equately explained in this account, there remains the defect
that Democritus' theory of breathing, which is intimately connected with the soul and its operation, is weak as well.

In

the first place, it totally neglects one obvious purpose of
breathing--to cool oneself.

For we breathe, Aristotle says,

more heavily the hotter we get, whereas in cool weather we
tend to check our breath and breathe less (Respir. 4, 472a3135).

Thus, Aristotle concludes, we obyiously breathe in order
to cool ourselves; 112 but, according to Democritus' explanation, breathing would have the opposite effect--to bring in
more spherical atoms which produce the sensation of heat, that
is, to make us feel hotter, when we are already too hot in the
first place:
µevov

TIOlEi

~~ ava~OsEW~ xaplV avanvlov~e~, O~E ~0 AEyo-

TIUp

tTil

TIUp --472b4-6.

Secondly, such an account of the soul and of preathing
admits at least in principle the possibility of resurrection
of dead (Anima 1.3, 406a31-b5).

With the ability of the soul

at least in part to enter and leave the body, there is no reason why it may not do this as a whole and thus allow for the
dead to come back to life again:

~00~~ 6' ~TIOl~'

a\

~b

av-

(o~aa8al ~a ~e8vEW!;a ~wv ~~wv (406b4-5); and such resurrection

is contrary to the evidence which is available.
Then again Democritus' claims that breathing is the mark
112 Thus Democritus is criticized here for neglecting the
'final cause'; his neglect of this as a factor in explanation
generated many mistakes, according to Aristotle. This matter
will be taken up in more detail in the next chapter.
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of animate life (Respir. 4, 472all-12).

But Aristotle says

that no.t even this is a valid claim, for not all animals
breathe (µ~ nav-i;a -i;a .;4Xl. 6.vanverv--472a28), and hence this
cannot be a real mark of animate life.

Here at least Democ-

ritus was consistent, for he claims as well that they all do
indeed breathe

(~

nav-i;wv 6.var.:veov-i;wv --Respir. 2, 470b31).

But Aristotle replies to this by showing that fish, obviously
animate creatures, do not and cannot breathe in any way really
identical to the way in which all other animate creatures do,
by taking in air by alternately inhaling and exhaling (Respir.
2-3).

Fish are thus unique and what they do is distinct

enough that we have good reason not to call it 'breathing';
at any rate they do not breathe in the way in which Democritus
had described breathing.
There is a further criticism by Aristotle at .Q.!! the Soul
1.5, 4lla8-16 which affects Democritus' position, though Democritus himself is not mentioned.

If the universe in general

and fire and air specifically have soul (that is, spherical
•'

atoms) in them, then logically the air or fire or the universe
ought to be a living creature: Ola -i;(va yap al-i;(av €v µev
atpL ~ ~Q TIUpl oJoa ~ ~UXD 06 noLet c;(iiov; --4lla9-10.

~Q

Lines

eleven through thirteen seem to be peculiarly appropriate to
Democritus in view of his'connecting the soul so closely with
air and breathing:

"For one might ask why the soul in air is

better and more deathless than that in living creatures."
mocritus (and others) are· caught on the horns of a dilemma:

De-
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it is unreasonable to call fire or air an animal, and unreasonable as. well not to call them that if there is 'soul' in
them.

This criticisms assumes, inasmuch as it applies to De-

mocritus, that Democritus did not specify any real distinction
between fire and soul--and Aristotle says precisely this very
frequently--in terms of the amount of spherical atoms it took
to make fire instead of soul.

Thus, as far as we can deter-

mine, the criticism is justified, for.we have no information
either in Aristotle or in any other part of later tradition
as to whether or how Democritus made this distinction clear.
It is reasonable to assume that he did not; he was likely

..

satisfied with a vague and general principle of greater or
less intensity of spherical atoms to distinguish soul from
either fire or air.
Finally, such a theory of the soul negates a series of
obvious unities.

First of all (Anima 1.5, 409a31-b4), the

ensouled body is a unity.

But Democritus claims that the body

is moved by the soul and is thus distinct and separate from
it; he claims' furthermore that the soul is scattered throughout the percipient body:
409b2.

£v

nav~\ ~~ aloeavoµ~v~ aWµa~'

If soul, Aristotle replies, is a 'body'--even in Democ-

ritus• sense, though not itself a unity--then there must be

' (409b3), the soul-group and the
two bodies in·the same place
body-group of atoms.

Secondly, there seems to be in this pas-

sage a further implication that, since soul itself is like any
oth~r

body or physical object, it itself will not be a unified
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thing.

And last, but not least, Aristotle says in an earlier

passage (Anima 1.4, 409al0-15), .even the soul-atom itself;
inasmuch as it both causes motion and is moved, will be divided and then endlessly sub-divided, one part moving and the
other part being moved, as is the caee with anything continuous (wonep ~v ~y ouvexer--409al4), anything which is a quantity.quite apart from how big it is: 06 yap
Bta~lpElV

\

·.

D µ,xpo~rytl

o,a

~o

µeytee 1

ouµ~a(VEl ~6 AEX8fv, &AA 1 O~l nooov

409al4-15.
Thus, in general, Aristotle claims that Democritus' theory of the soul is not an adequate one:

it was based on the

mistaken notion that the soul puts the body into locomotion
inasmuch as it has that same k:ind of· motion its elf; it fails
to recognize the purpose and scope of breathing; it neglects
specifying the distinction between soul and fire and between
soul and air; it· fails to make an ensouled body or the soul
itself a single, unified object.
Sense-nercention
Democritus' theory of sense-perception11 3 is to be closell3Langerbeck, ~. cit., pp. 100-112, is convinced that
there is no developed theory in what we have of Democritus (p.
112); it arose as Aristotle and Theophrastus examined the implications of atomism for such a theory. In order to arrive at
this position he must asffi:une that Aristotle is in effect simply
combating· a theory that was not held in order to confirm his
ovm theory; and he unnecessarily weakens the meaning of •true'
and •truth' to 'distinct' and 'distinctness' (see Helene Weiss,
"Democritus' Theory of Cognition" in Classical Quarterly, XXXII
(1938), p. 48). This seems a totally unwarrented assumption,
as I expect to show that what Aristotle says of Democritus does
reveal a consistent theory.

r
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r

ly connected with his positing of what come to be kno'wn as
e&BwAa. 114 Aristotle himself says very little about these
atomic eT5wA.a; he rather focuses his attention on the fact
that because of them all perception is reduced to contact.
The El ~wA.a are assumed; and those

e'{ owt..a

provide that contact

between the perceiver and the physical object; they make it
possible for atomic formations of the physical object to have
an effect on the 'soul' of the sense-organ.

To this ext.ent

Langerbeck may be right in saying that Democritus' theory of
sense-perception was not a highly developed one, in that, as
far as we know, explicit details of the theory were not worked
out; .but to suppose with him that most o:f what little we do
have about the theory in Aristotle and Theophrastus is their
reconstruction of what Democritus' theory would have been if
he had developed one is going a bit too far!
that there were

eiBwt..a

At any rate,

coming from the physical object and af-

fecting the senses and causing sensations can hardly be in
doubt and is generally acceptea. 11 5
ll4More likely Democritus' term was oe:{><.EA.ov (see DielsKranz 68Bl23), '~1ich·is likely broader and referred to an image as something more than seen or visual; see also Beare, .2.E.•
cit., p. 29, note 3. It likely indicated something more like
a:-7"representation of the physical object' (von Fritz, .2.E.· ..£.!.!.,
p. ·23, SJ?eaks of an "Abbild der Struktur der Gegenstande
sel bst. 11 J
.
.
.
·

'

ll5comp.are Guthrie, History, ,,II, 438ff. Langerbeck, .Q.I?.•
cit., pp. 52-54, argues that the ElBwt..a are to be connected
only with religious exp~riences: 11 w8.hrend fur sie die Imagines
nur die Funktion einer Ubermi ttlung vom .transzendenten Gott zum
menschlichen Erkenntnisvermbgen haben." But it does not follow
from the fact that the atomists used eiowt..a to explain religious experiences that this was their only function.
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If sense-perception is to have any meaning at all in the
atomic system, there must be some sort of effect of the physical object on the percipient, either direct or indirect.
This is not to attribute to Democritus any sort of advanced
notion of action and passion in Aristotle's sense. 116 But for
Democritus what 'action' and 'passion' there was was on the
principle of 'like to like':

~~µoxpt~o~

• • • ~~o' yap ~o

One atom
could only affect or be affected by another atom, and the only
kind of effect that the atom might have on another is to
change its direction of locomotion or its position.

So the

effect involved in sense-perception must be the effect produced by the atoms of the physical object, directly or indirectly, on the atoms of the percipient's sense-organs.
We might first of all take a look at the effects produced by individual atoms which, though unnoticed because of
their smallness, still do apparently produce an effect on the
percipient.

We have already noted that the effect of the
spherical atom is the sensation of heat. 118 Now this is a

general principle which Democritus followed through in regard
116 see Langerbeck, .<2.E.· .£.!.!., p. 102, "Der Einwand des
Aristoteles ist f~r ~eden, der das Ut08avea8at als ein TIUOXe'V
erkannt hat, vollig uberzeugend." The only real alternative
to making sensation an effect of the physical object is to
make it an effect of something incorporeal, and this would be
totally inappropriate to Democritus' system.
11

.££!:!:.

7~. et Corr. 1.7, 323bl0-12.

118For example, Anima 1.2, 404al, 405al2-13; Gen. et
1.8, 326a4-5; Caelo 3.4, 303al3.
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to some other sensations of qualities as well.

For instance,

Aristotle claims at Qg Sensation 4, 442bl0-l3:

"But these

men refer 'specialized properties' to these (common properties
of shape and size), just as Democritus does, for he says that
what is white and what is black are (due to) what is smooth
and what is rough, respectively, and he refers the flavors to
the shapes of atoms. 1111 9

The various geometrical figures and

sizes have certain consistent effects on us.

This seems to be

more specifically the case with flavors, where Theophrastus
assigns a list of flavors to specific shapes (.Q!! the Senses,
\

63-67).

But it is not limited to these, for a few colors and

at least one other effect--heat-- is due to a specific shape
as well.
Aside from the effects of individual shapes of atoms,
there are furthermore effects which groups, patterns, or combinations of atoms have on us.

This, for instance, is the way

in which the unnoticed effect of a certain kind of a geometric
atomic figure is in fact perceived:

a sufficiently large num-

ber of atoms of a certain shape have their effect on us and we
notice it.

And, if that which makes an impact on our sense-

organs contains a variety of atomic shapes--which most objects

ll9Theo~hrastus, De Sensibus 64-68 (on flavors) and 7378 (on colors.), expands-greatly on what Aristotle gives. Aristotle, although not going into detail, gives as much essential
and basic information as anyone and enough, at any rate, to
form an intelligent judgment about the theory. I shall here,
as elsewhere, restrict myself to Aristotle's account (since
this will best specify what is at issue), unless there is good
reason to suppose that Aristotle is in error or that his information is too scanty or misleading.

r
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apparently do--then the atomic shape which predominates in
the group determines the perceived effect on us.

But these are

still mechanically fairly simple ways of producing an effect
or sensation in us.
Other qualities, as they present themselves to us, are
due to specific patterns in which the atoms which have their
effect on our sense-organs are arranged; and these patterns or
arrangements are described in terms of 'tponTi and OL a8Ly~.

One

physical object differs from another not only in its constituent atoms (which gives the nature of the object as such), but
also by 8€01~ and 'td~1~; 120 and it is by change in this placement and order of atoms that Democritus claims alteration,
change in qualities, takes place. 121 And this is the reason
(~O'tE--Gen. ~Corr.

1.2, 315bll) that the same object may

seem (ooxerv) different to various people; some small shift
may bring about a different appearance: xa\ OAW~ ~'tepov ~a(veoea, ~Vb~ µe'tUXLV~8EV'tO~ --315bl3-14.
More specifically, a little later in the same passage·
(315b33-316a2), Democritus is said to make (a change in) quali ty due to the

'
'tpon~

and o' ae' y~' of atoms--and here Democritus'

own terms are used--and to assert that "an object takes on
.color because of the placement of atoms":
~eoea,.

'tpo11:i,1 yap xpwµa't ( -

Theophrastus' lis~ing of the various arrangements of

120

~·

et Corr. 1.1, 314a24.

121 Gen. et Corr. 1.2, 315b9: 'taseL ot xa& etoel &AAo(~~1 v.
This is im.~ediately thereupon connected with the claim
that there is 'truth in appearances'--to be taken up shortly.
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atoms for various colors has already been cited; this list
provides examples of what is simply stated here.
But it is not only color as a sense-impression that is
so explained.

The resistance of the physical object to our

touch, the feeling of hardness and softness is as well due to
the ~pon~ xai ota8ty~ of its constituent atoms; the resistance
of the object varies as the arrangement of its atoms varies.
An object may seem now liquid, now solid or frozen for that

.
122
reason.

Again Democritus' own terms are used in the latter

passage, and the identification is made more precise by the
words xa8dnep

~fyet

6~µ6xpt~o,.

To turn for.a moment to

~he

matter of the passage about

the image or representation from the physical object to the
percipient, there is one place at which Aristotle indicates
that for Democritus the medium through which the image must
pass to reach the percipient affects the accuracy with which
he 'sees the object•. 123 But Aristotle does not say in what

1 22~. ~ Corr. 1.9, 327al6-19.
12 3Anima 2.7, 419a15-21. The interpretation of and confusion with this passage varies considerably. Its more de~
tailed meaning will be taken up later.
But we may note here some of the divergence of opinion.
Langerbeck, .£E.• .2.i!·' p. 102, contends that this has nothing
to do with a theory of sense-perception, on the grounds that
this says nothing about imqges from the object to the percipient; for, if that were the case, Aristotle's criticism of it
on the grounds that there was no contact between the percipient
and the object would be meaningless. Guthrie, History, II,
443, feels the same difficulty in tha~air was for Democritus
a medium and that Democritus for once must have been using the
term xevov loosely to mean 'empty air'. Ross, Anima, p. 244,
has a basically correct interpretation, but says nothing about
the type of difficulty about the medium which had been raised

r
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respect the 'accuracy of seeing' is affected.
Perhaps one might nevertheless ask at this point what
sort of an effect did Democritus think that the air as a medium would have on the accuracy of vision.

Cherniss assumes

the 'second theory' which he finds in Theophrastus and contends that the medium could "cause blurred and distorted images in the eye; 11124 but this would make nonsense of .Aristotle's claim that for Democritus there was 'truth in appearances•, even-in Langerbeck's diluted sense of 'distinctness'.
Cherniss then continues by saying that .Aristotle's objection
to this is that the "intermediate body is necessary which • •
• itself affects the organ of vision. 1112 5 But this is precisely what is involved in Theophrastus' 'second theory'--a
by Langerbeck and Guthrie.
There is what is called a 'second theory' ascribed to Democritus apparently by Theophrastus in his De Sensibus, which
seems to say that the image from the objectli°nd an effluence
from the eye meet in the air and the image which enters the
eye is not the original image from the object, but a 'stamped
copy' of it. Tlugler (cited by Guthrie, History, p. 444, note
1) asserts, rightly I believe, that Democritus had not taught
such an effluence from the eye and suggests that Democritus
made the claim about seeing an ant at such a distance to forestall the criticism that the object would soon be exhausted
with all the effluences necessary to account for seeing an object. Guthrie may be right in feeling discomfort at the account, but the fault seems to me to lie in Theophrastus' 'second theory' rather than in the accuracy or appropriateness of
Aristotle's account or in Democritus' supposed 'loose usage'.
124
. '
.QI?_. cit., p. 165, note 100.
12 5Ibid., p. 165. One might also ask Cherniss what he
thinks one saw in the void without his vision blurred, assuming a 'second theory'. Surely not the atoms themselves! If
simply a clear vision of an ant at that distance, why not the
atoms themselves in things close at hand?
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medium.

Thus it seems highly unlikely that Aristotle here

knew of or made use of a 'second theory•.
But this still leaves unanswered the question of huw the
air in general might affect the image.

Perhaps one ought not

attempt an answer, but there is a tempting solution that seems
fairly obviously at hand to one who--like Democritus--took
proper cognizance of the objects around him.

And such an an-

swer might well be that the air somehow diminished or compressed the size of the image--the greater the distance, the
smaller the image.

This would certainly allow images from

obviously large objects like elephants--about which Guthrie
wonders--to enter the eye; it would also explain the fact that
images from such large things as planets might enter our eyes
and why a group of them, although they are extremely far apart
in space, might seem to us to merge and appear as a single
comet. 126 This notion of the apparent size diminishing with
distance is certainly not in disagreement with, and is more
likely supported by, the reference in Vitruvius, who cites a
composition by Democritus in which he describes in principle a
theory of 'perspective' applied to scene-painting for tragic
presentations. 12 7
126 Meteor. 1.6, 342b28.

The planets appear to be in contact (ooswol StyyavElV ), ~emocritus claims.
12 7De Architectura VII, pref., 11: "quemadmodum oporteat
ad aciem oculorum radiorumaue extentionem certo loco centre
constituto lineas ratione naturali respondere, uti de incerta
re certae imagines aedificiorum in scaenarum picturis redde~
rent speciem et quae in directis planisque frontibus sint figu.rata, alia abscedentia alia prominentia esse videantur."
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Now to get back to Aristotle's account, this means that
under normal conditions an ant on the vault of heaven would
give off an image, and the image passing through the air would
be continually decreased, so much so as finally to be imperceptible.

But with no air--only void--intervening the image

would remain the same size and so would be seen 'full scale'.
Such a solution as to what here constitutes accurate

~xpl~~

--419al7) and non-accurate vision is certainly plausible and
contradicts nothing else that we know about Democritus' teaching in this regard.
And so, in order now better to understand what is at
issue in the so-called 'second theory' of images--as explained
by Theophrastus, On the Senses, 50--we need first turn our
attention to another passage in Aristotle, Qg Sensation 2,
438a5ff.

There Aristotle had just finished giving an account

of Empedocles' theory of vision which, he says, at times involves some light leaving the eye to meet the object:
~oo ~u..Yto~--437b26.

es&ov~o~

Aristotle then concludes his account of

Empedocles temporarily by saying:

"Sometimes he says this is.

the way in which we see, but at other times he explains it by
a theory of effluxes issuing from the objects seen. n 12:8 At
this point Aristotle introduces the account of Democritus,
apparently not. because Demcfori tus, like Empedocles, held a
theory of something like light or fire issuing forth from the
eye, but because Democritus--Aristotle claims--was right about
128Ross, Sensu, p. 49; 438a4-5. ·
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the eye being water:

O~L µEV

u5wp e{va( ~~OL, Afyel XUAW~

438a5-6; and thus Democritus was presumably at odds with Em.pedocles on this point.

The eye, Democritus would say, func-

tions as water (~ u5wp--438al4) and not as what is transparent, and thus displays in it what we call a 'reflected image',
just as would be the case with water in general or, for that
matter, anything else which displays such a reflected image.
Thus far there is no hint at all of a teaching of Democritus
that the eye emits its own fiery (?) image, 12 9 but a rather
strong intimation that Democritus rejected that first alternative of Empedocles and simply adopted the latter.
But what then does Aristotle attribute to Democritus in
this passage?

Democritus did believe--and in this Aristotle

claims that he was wrong--that 'seeing is the appearance of
'"N
•;
' , ,eµ~aotv
opav eLVaL
~~v
the image in the eye': ~o
( 438a6 ),
that is, that this visible image occurs in the eye because the
eye, being water, acts the way water does in this case too.
This is explained by Alexander as follows:l30
12 9compare Ross, Sensu, p. 140; Robert B. English, "Democritus' Theory of Sense Perception" in Transactions of the
American Philological Associaton, XLVI (1915), pp. 218-220;
Guthrie, History, II, 443, and note 1. But such an interpretation involves the supposition that all water and reflecting
surfaces emit such fiery effluxes as well, since the eye functions as water. And it is highly unlikely that Democritus
taught this or. that Aristotle thought or implied that he did.
l30Diels-Kranz 67A29. The translation is basically that
of Guthrie, History, II, 442. I have substituted for his "reflexion" "visible image" because 11 reflection 11 seems to me to
anticipate the criticism of Aristotle and prejudice the meaning and intent of Democritus.
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"Democritus says that to see means to receive the
visible image from what is seen. The visible image is
the shape which appears in the pupil, just as it does
also in any other bright things which are capable of
retaining a visible image. He believed (like Leucippus
before him and the Epicureans after) in certain images
emanating from things and similar in shape to the things
from which they emanate (i.e., the objects of vision),
which enter the eyes of the beholder, and that this is
how vision occurs."
Again, there is no notion here of ari emission from the eye or
of a 'second theory•. 131 Aristotle's remark at 438a26-29
about a theory of something leaving the eye
\,

II

't"T)V 0 1 ~l

4,

(~b ls&oV~l ~lVl

N

is a direct reflection of Empedocles' theory,
and there is no reason to connect this with Democritus. 1 3 2
v opav

)

Thus vision for Democritus was to be explained in terms of an
,,
Eµ~ao&~, a visible image which results from the impact of the
£'{ cwA.ov

on the watery nature of the eye; and he likely felt

that this was supported by the image (visible to others as
well) which appears on the pupil of the eye--likely assuming
that a person's sense-perception at a given time was the same
in appearance as the image which others saw in the pupil of
his eye.

Thus there would be some significance which Democ-

ritus might attach to this visible image, this

eµ~ao&~.

We may now, I believe, more profitably return to this
vexing matter of what is reported to be a 'second theory' to
l3lAs Guthrie, Histo;y, II, 442, rightly implies.
l3 2As Ross, Sensu, p. 140, does. Aristotle has finished
with Democritus at 438al7 and--having established with the
sup:Jtort of Democritus (which was his prime reason for citing
him) that the eye is composed of water--continues simply with
the criticism of Empedocles.

r

221
be found in Theophrastus' account.

Theophrastus begins his

account of Democritus' theory of vision in a way which is obviously and quite precisely just the matter which .Aristotle
had brought up in the passage from On Sensation 2:

"Democ-

ritus explains vision by means of the visible image in the
eye (opav µEV oJv 'JtOlE:l 'tf.} eµq>'10E:l )l33 but he gives a unique
account of this 'visible appearance•. 11

Theophrastus then

goes on to give an account of how this 'visible appearance'
occurs at the eye and in the eye, an account which has nothing to do immediately with the passage of the ElOWAOV from
the physical object to the eye, which is evidently assumed
here.

And what is assumed as well here, I believe, in Theo-

phrastus' account is that 'what is seen'
the physical object, but the e:'{ owAo v •134

(

t
)
'to' opwµe:vov
is not

So, when the

e:'{ OWAOV reaches the eye, some air betwee_n the water of the
eye and the e1owA.ov is trapped there, compressed, and impressed there by the e:!cwAov; this impressed air is then what
'shows up' in the water of the eyes (as well as in other 're133 Paragraph 50.
l34This is the only way, it seems to me, that any sense
can be made of the assertion that "the air is compressed by
'what is seen' and by 'what sees' (i.e., i;he eye)": ouo'tEAAoµe:vov uno 'tOU opuµevou xal 'tOU opWV'tO~.
The physical
object out in space certai~ly is not to be conceived as itself contributing directly to the compression of the air.
And it is this image (as something physical) that,~heophrastus
feels obliged to explain in renarking that for Democritus
anav'to~ yap ae:i y(yve:oea( 'tLva anoppo~v : some effluences or
images are constantly being produced by every object (and
this image for Democritus, but not necessarily for others,
would be 'what is seen').
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fleeting objects', I suppose).

Thus there is no warrant at

all here for assuming a special effluence from the eyel35 or
for any alternate theory which has the c.:'{ owA.ov meeting such
an effluence in mid-air, but we only have a more detailed
mechanical explanation of precisely how it is that the c.:iowA.ov
affects the eye; at the eye the eiowA.ov compresses some air,
and this compressed air 'shows up' in the moist pupil of the
eye.

It is only a description of what happens in the act of

seeing, which is precisely what Aristotle had said Democritus
was explaining by

eµ~ao,~,

and nothing more.

Thus I would

translate the passage in Theophrastus as follows:
"So Democritus explains the process of seeing by his
'visible appearance' (in the eye), but he gives a unique
account of this. For he says that this 'visible appearance' does not occur directly in the pupil of the eye,
but that the air between the eye and the 'image' is
compressed by the eye and the 'image' and imprinted by
the 'image'--for some effluence (or 'image') is constantly coming from every object; then this air which
is now (more) solid and altered is what shows up in
moist eyes."
So Aristotle's account is quite accurate, though it is not
nearly as detailed a description as we have in Theophrastus.
,, i;:.

"\

Furthermore, these e'uwAa are responsible, according to
Democritus, not only for all instances of visual perception
while awake, but also for the dreams that people see as well:
eiowA.a xai a~oppo(a~ a{~,~µEY0~. 1 3 6

"

That people do have vis-

ual presentations while asleep, that there is something which
l35As Guthrie, Histor;y:, II, 443, does.
l3 6Div. somn. 2, 464a6; the whole passage now under consideration is 464al-12.
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even then affects their sense-organs, the soul, or the spherical atoms in them, seems quite certain; and that the physical
object as such is not immediately present in such cases seems
just as evident.

And it is because of these facts, Aristotle

says, that Democritus posits images and

effluences--&~· ~v

~xervo, ~h eYBwAa no, er x~ ~a, dnoppo(a, (464all-12)--as the

reason why we have such visual presentations which we call
dreams.

And it may very well be that these considerations

prompted Democritus to posit eYBwAa as the reason for all visual presentations, awake or sleeping; and Aristotle's statement can certainly be taken in that sense.

The problem of how

to explain dreams in a mechanical and atomistic system might
well have occasioned such a solution.

Then, there being in

effect no real distinction between dreams and other visual
presentations from present physical

obje~ts,

that solution

might well have seemed appropriate to the latter instances of
seeing as well.
We are now left with the task of considering the meaning
of Aristotle's statements on a number of occasions1 37 that
Democritus supposed that 'what appears is true'.

One major

attempt to come to grips specifically with this problem is
that of Helene Weiss. 1 38 A number of observations which she
~

~·

l3 7 Anim~ 1.2, 404a27; Meta. 4.5, 1009bl2; and Gen. et

1.2, 315b9-10.
l3 8.QE.. cit., pp. 47-56. She is followed in substance
by Guthrie, History, II, 454-465, who promoted the publication
of her paper.
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makes are worth considering.

One might well share her dis-

trust of the validity of earlier attempts to solve the problem either by denying the reliability of Aristotle and so
making Democritus out to be a rationalist pure and simple or
by making of him a sensationalist and so denying any real concern of his with reason or with Eleatic problems.

She is

certainly right in her attempt to do justice both to Aristotle's account and to that of Sextus Empiricus.
is much to be said for the role of
ory of knowledge.
tory either.

A6yo~

And there

in the atomist the-

But her solution is not really satisfac-

She ends by saying that Aristotle did not really

mean to imply that this was a Democritean proposition at all,
that what Aristotle was doing in those passages was subjecting
the

11

Atomists' views as a whole to thorough criticism," that

Aristotle was really saying that, because the atomists had
not come ·to his own understanding of

vou'

and.vorrr;a--as its

non-perceptible objects--this meant that they were seeking
truth in appearance. 1 39

In order to avoid the Scylla of di-

luting the meaning of •true', she steers into the Charybdis
of giving it so precise and .Aristotelian a meaning that it
cannot apply to Democritus at all.
Granting for a moment that the meaning of 'true' might
be in doubt in.the two majo'r passages which she considers
(the ones at On the Soul 1.2 and at Metaphysics 4.5), she
introduces the passage at On Generation

139 0

~·

•t
.21:,_.'

pp. 55 - 56 •

~

Corruntion 1.2 as

r
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parallel statement, but fails to explain what Aristotle means
here by saying, "they think that what is true is in appearing" (315b9-10), only assuring us that it is not a purely
sensationalist meaning.

Are we to suppose then that these

atomists themselves thought that what is the object only of
thought is in appearing?

That is hardly satisfactory.

How

could Democritus have concluded from sense-appearance something about the atoms by supposing that connection alone?
Her position is under the further disadvantage that she must
outright deny any validity to the witness of Philoponus.l40
What then?

Perhaps it is best to begin with the passage

at On Generation and Corruution 1.2, 315b9-10:

"Since they

thought that what is true is in appearing and that appearances are both contrary and limitless, they made their (atomic) shapes limitless."

If we accept this statement, we need

ask then what sense of •true' will allow us to make reasonable
sense of this as a description of Democritus' theory. But to
argue at all from sense-perception to atoms141 requires that
they be related, that there be some sort of fixed and constant
correspondence between the two realms; and this, I contend, is
here the meaning of 'true' and 'truth'; it is a 'correspondence
theory' of truth; it is somewhat like speaking of a proposition
as being true.if it corresponds.!£, correctly represents, some
140 Ibid., p. 55.
l4lThis kind of an argument from sense-perception 12,
atoms and void is in the background of the parallel passage
at Netauhysics 4.5.

r
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f'

observable fact.

There is a correspondence between the spher-

ical shape and the feeling of heat that it produces, between
a given pattern of atoms and the sensation of a specific
color which it produces.

And this 'truth' or 'correspondence'

is insured by the eLOWAov, which is an accurate representation
of the physical object.14 2
And this meaning of 'true' is appropriate too to the
passage at Metaphysics 4.5, 1009bl2:

"Because they suppose

that our knowledge of a phenomenal object is nothing more
than our perceiving it, and that this is a (mechanical) alteration, they claim that our sense-impressions must necessarily
correspond to the object as it actually is" (or we have no
way of coming to know its atomic structure).
At .Q!!

~

Soul 1.2, 404a27 Aristotle ascribes to Democ-

1 4 2Much of this is also to be found in Cherniss, on. cit.
But he describes this (p. 82) as a way out of a difficulty,~
that is, an ad h2.£ explanation. But it rather seems to me an
essential and basic point in Democritus' teaching, as we may
see by the background of the statement in Meta. 4.5. Cherniss
further speaks of deducing atoms from sensation; Bailey, on.
cit., p. 182, speaks of inferring them. But Cherniss alsO"falees back this meaning of •true' first by calling it acertain degree of truth and then by reducing Democritus' meaning
to "truth to be involved in perception." Bailey's account is
closer to the mark (p. 184), but he restricts the meaning of
'true' somewhat, in the sense that it gives us information
about atoms, void, and atomic complexes, if we will only disengage it from sensations that we get. I maintain that truth
for Democritus is preciselJ" this correspondence; for Democritus, in the midst of contrary sense-iapressions, claimed that
no one set of them is more true than another, if indeed truth
is to be sought simply and solely on the phenomenal level;
and this is why Democritus said that either nothing is true in
this sensationalist meaning of true, or, if it is true in that
sense, we have no evidence at all for it (Dµfv y' &B~Aov )-T!Ieta. 4.5, 1009bl0-12. So for Democritus 'what is true' must
refer precisely to the correspondence of phenomena to reality.
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ritus the teaching that 'what is true is what appears•, and,
if we take •true• again in the sense indicated, that there is
a persistent correspondence between sense-impressions and the
state of atoms, then the identity of soul and mind in Democritus' theory is established inasmuch as the mind has no more
to work on than simply is given to the soul in sensation.
Thus, since the mind cannot perceive or judge truth as something special and distinct from what is given in senseimpressions (it cannot judge the correspondence, for it cannot
'perceive' or judge a resemblance when it is acquainted only
with the 'picture' and not with the •real object•), it is in
this respect reduced to being nothing more than the soul; in
perceiving by the senses one already receives and has what is
•true'. Hence Philoponus is right; 143 Aristotle deduced the
identification of o/UXl) and
\

-

vou~

from 'correspondence•, the

truth of sense-impressions.
There is one further passage which may lend some support to a meaning of •truth' as a correspondence between the
object as perceived and as it is structured atomically; and
this is at On Parts of Animals 1.1, 640b32-35:

"(Democritus)

says that the evidence is available to everyone (nav~i ofjAov)
as to what sort of an object a man is in ftis (atomic) structure (~~v µop~Dv ), becaus~he is recognizable as such by his
shape (oxfiµa) and his coloration."

We do know that for Democ..;.

ritus color was due to a certain pattern of atoms, and this
l43Diels-Kranz 68All3.
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correspondence does hold here; nor is there any reason why
others should not hold as well.

So, because these correspond-

ences exist, there is much that one can in:fer about the structures of physical objects; we can recognize a man for what he
really is.

But without precisely this theory there is no way

to argue from sense-perceptions to atomic structure.

Such

•truth' was a necessary part of Democritus' atomism.
Now to return to On Generation and

-

-

Corru~tion

1.2 and

consider what directly follows upon the claim for truth in
perceiving, the matter of appearances of contraries in the
same physical object--which was a major concern in his positing this theory (r.Ietaphysics 4. 5 )--Democritus solved by positing minute shifts and changes in the atomic structure of
those objects:

~o't"e

'tar,

µe't"a~o"Aar,

'too

ouyxetµ~vou

'to

a6~o

E:vav~(ov ooxerv aA.A.cy xa1 aA.A.<t)' xa'i µe't"ax& vei'aea, µ&xpou eµµ LY V1J µc~V ou

xa&'

Y '"I
UAW'

e't"epov

"

,

~a&vea

8 a&

.l \
cvo,

~

.

µe't"axtv~8cV't"o'
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An eiow"Aov from the object was at any given moment a representation of the structure of that object.

Thus, when a given

percipient sees an object at two different moments, the object may have changed from one moment to the next and emitted
two different

ei6w"Aa, each an accurate representation of the

structure of ·the object at the time they were emitted.
visual contraries in the same
" object are explained.

Thus

Differ-

ences in taste in a given container of water may well be due
to the predominance of atomic geometrical shapes in the parl44Gen. et Corr. 1.2, 315bll-14.

r
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ticular portion of the water tasted; and so, even under normal conditions, the same water may taste sweet to one, bitter
to another. 145 Thus even in Democritus's theory the appearance of contraries in the same physical object is not at all
inconsistent with there being •truth in appearances•.
Now Aristotle's criticism of this theory of senseperception rightly centers not only on the mechanics of effecting the sensation (the process of transfering the image
into the resulting sensation), nor alone on some of the principles involved in these mechanics, but as well on the failure of the theory of correspondence as a whole to account for
phenomena.
In reviewing this criticism we turn first to the passage in which Aristotle deals specifically with the etOwAa so
necessary for sense-perception, On Prophecy in Sleep 2, 464a520.

Democritus had claimed that

e'low/...a are responsible for

dreams, and likely even, as we had noted, he had based his
more general theory of t1owf...a on this explanation of dreams
(if not that, he had at

any

rate used what he had said in

this specific account of dreams in his more general theory of
vision).

And Aristotle's criticism on this specific issue

strikes at the roots of the atomists' explanation of perception.

What Democritus had' done, Aristotle claims in effect,

is to bring the t1ow/...ov as the efficient cause of sensation
l45This is not to deny that sickness or abnormality of
the atomic structure of the person may also affect the sensation he gets; and even such a person's sensations are •true'.
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right to the percipient; and this is unnecessary, for the
•seen physical object• can affect a medium like air or water
which can in turn produce the sensation in us; and this
'chain reaction of motion' can make it possible for senseperception to take place without having the 'seen physical
object' present:

nauoaµevou exe(vou • • •

napov'"Co'--464a8-9.

~OU XtV~aav~o,

06

The precise fact that sense-perception

takes place in sleep and when the 'seen physical object' is
obviously not present had likely brought Democritus to the
point of explaining dreams by

t'{ owA.a

which themselves are a

present cause of perception, and thus to explain perception
in general in that way.

And so the whole theory rests on the

mistaken assumption that the object of sight needs to be present for sense-perception to take place. 1 4 6
But, Aristotle further claims at

On~

Soul 2.7, 419a9-

25, that not only is a continuous medium a better explanation,
but is itself a necessary one.

If the physical object is seen

at all, it is seen in or through 'what is light':

o6x opa'"Cat UVEU

<pW'rO(;

--419a9.

Oto xal

And this 'light' must be a

potential characteristic of something continuous as a medium:
~

o' EV'rEAEXElU

'!;OU

Cla~avocr, cpW<; ea~(v --419all.

But why such

a medium at all?

Because what evidence there is seems to re-

quire it--oT)µ.Ei'cv

ot

ri;oth~u

q>avtpov

(419al2)--for if the

146 Aristotle's criticism here is thus much broader than
is indicated by the interpretation of Cherniss, on. cit., p.
166, for he claims that the t1BwA.ov is only unnecessary in the
case of dreams.

r
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'seen object' is placed onto the eye itself, 147 no 'seeing'
will occur (oux owc~a&); and this means that the only alternative is to have the 'seen object• 1 48 affect th~ transparent
mediUi~

which in turn affects the eye.

And this is precisely

why Democritus is wrong, he says, about seeing by

c.'{ owA.a

in

the void; the eye needs to be affected, but cannot be affected by the 'seen object'--and that, for Democritus, was the
c.iowA.o~ not the physical object.

And so the only alternative

left is to have the eye affected by the medium, which is thus
established as necessary.

And that is why with only void be-

tween the physical object and the eye, no vision at all will
take place (oueev·

o~e~at:.~a'

), because vision with the 'seen

object' directly by contact affecting the eye results in no
.vision at all (oux

oo/t:.~at

).

It is the evidence of no vision

resulting when what is (to be) seen is put directly into contact with the eye that refutes Democritus' theory and, incidentally, serves to establish Aristotle's own. 14 9
The very fact that the 'seen object' must directly affect the sense-organ means that sensation is reduced to contact with what is seen, the ciowA.ov (Sensu 4, 442a30ff.).

nqlqse
au~DV

l47Hett's translation in the Loeb edition, p. 107,
~p ~o the eye" does not do sufficient justice to en:'
~DV

Oo/t~.

'

l4 8 r use this term here for clarity, because for Aristotle precisely that which one 'sees' in the strictest sense
is color (Anima 2.7, 418a29-30).
14 9cherniss, £1?.• cit., p. 165, more simply makes it the
necessity of the medium which refutes Democritus' position.

r
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But it is not difficult to see how such reduction of all sensations to contact is impossible (442b3-4). 150 But even beyond this, Democritus• system must use properties recognized
by more than one sense-organ for each of the sense-organs.
For instance, shape and roughness are obviously recognized by
both sight and touch.

But only in cases in which a property

of the object is the peculiar function of only one sense-organ
to perceive is there no possibility of error about it; there
is no 'check' for it.

But there is a possibility of error

about what is recognized by more than one sense-organ; and
these are the very properties which Democritus assigns to what
is perceived, the very ones about which people make mistakes:
'
~
.f
L
oto
xat' nept' µev
'TOu'Tcuv
una"CWV'Tat

"Cau"Ca civayouatv, C0onep ~~µoxpt'To~

'
• • • ot• OE:

--442b8-11.

most damaging part of the criticism.

Th~y

'-

"Ca

,,

1
t6ta ett;

And this is the

use for all the

senses the very kinds of properties about which there is the
greatest general error.
There is also here a second criticism (442b13-18), in
that it is obviously more the function of sight than of any
other sense to recognize and distinguish 'common properties•.
But Democritus obviously would assign this function to 'taste',
since he refers 'flavors' to the various shapes (442bl3),
which are the-characteristics of the various atoms themselves;
150 There is no further explanation here as to how it is
'impossible'. The reference here most evidently is to the
passage in On the Soul 2.7, which we have just examined. The
specific arguments presented here in Sensu 4 are presented as
additional considerations--'£'T' ot.

r
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and so it ought to be particularly sensative to all the other
properties capable of being perceived by more than one senseorgan:

~~€ exp~v ~~v yeuoiv xa\ ~WV UAAWV xo,vwv aCoea-

veoea, µaAlo~a--442bl7.

The other common sensible include

such characteristics as size, roughness, sharpness, unity,
number, motion, and rest; and taste ought thus to provide the
final criterion for these too.

But this then is quite evi-

dently contrary to experience.
When one comes to consider the sense-impression itself,
Aristotle objects to Democritus' theory on a number of grounds.
First of all, there is the mistake which lies at the very
heart of atomism:

the inability to deal with contraries at

the phenomenal level.

Democritus (and others) had gone on

the assumption that, because contraries are perceived in the
same object and because there is no reason to accept one contrary over the other, we cannot accept sense-impressions at
face-value (I:Teta. 4.5, 1009bllff).

But this is to malre a

very basic mistake about the meanings of the word 'is'.

A

specific apple now green and later red is still the same
apple; the apple, Aristotle would say, has not changed substantially, even though at one time it is a green apple and
at another time it is a red apple.
it fails to distinguish

th~

This is a mistake in that

object in itself,

~that

object,

apart from its accidental properties (Meta. 13.4, 1078b25-26).
This mistake thus led to an unwarrented interpretation of
sense-impressions.
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Furthermore, this mistake also led to another one, a
(~.

one-sided view of action and passion

et Corr. 1.7,

323bl0-324a9); it involves a denial that a thing can be affected in some sense by something contrary to it.

But this

is precisely what sense-impressions tell us is going on--something warm affects something cold.

In opposition to what

sense-impressions indicate, Democritus held that only like affects like, only another atom can affect an atom; and for him
evidently this is also the way in which sense-impressions are
made on soul.
While this, Aristotle says, may allow the soul to perceive the elements of which things are composed (Anima 1.5,
409b30ff.), still this atomic explanation allows no way of
recognizing the phenomenal object as a whole object (409b3233).

Nor does it account in any way for recognizing qualities

in objects; and so it is unreasonable

(a~onov--410a23)

that like is perceived only by like (410a24).

to say

The atomistic

explanation of the sense-impressions is defective in this
sense too, for, while it assumes that our sensations of 'secondary qualities' are due to atoms, it does not--and, in Aristotle's opinion, cannot--show how those qualities are derived
from atoms and how they are recognized as such qualities. 1 51

' real attempt to account for such
Moreover, in his only
l5lThe attempt to do what Aristotle thought could not be
done was impossible at the early stage at which biology, psychology, and chemistry were at the time of either Democritus
or Aristotle.
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sensed qualities, Democritus had taught that the

elOWAov~

when it reaches the eye, is made visible in the eye, and that
the appearance of the e'C owA.a
sion.

there is what constitutes Vi-

In response to this teaching Aristotle shows at On

-

Sensation 2, 438a5-15 that this must be wrong, for what Democritus is talking about here is obviously only a case of
reflection.

But, he objects, the water of the eye evidently

does not act primarily

~

water, as that which casts a reflec-

tion under such circumstances, but acts

~

transparent.

Hence

the reflection seen in the eye is quite incidental to the
functioning of the eye in vision; if it were an essential in
seeing, surely other water and other reflecting surfaces
would 'see' as well, for such images become visible there too.
This is one thing which makes his position an unreasonable one:
a~onov oe xa& ~o µ~ eneA.8eiv au~Q anop~oa& B&a ~( d o~SaAµo~

opq µovov,

~WV

o' aA.A.wv OUOEV EV

ol~ Eµ~a(ve~a& ~a

e&OwAa

(438al0-13); Democritus uses a phenomenon which occurs in a
variety of circumstances as though it were unique only to the
phenomenon of seeing.

Thus he has come to no clear differen-

tiation between 'reflection' and 'becoming visible in'
(438a9-10).
But there is one further problem raised in connection
with

Democrit~s'

• • bl e--~o' ~a'
VJ.Si

theory

"

f:.
"!.
e&uw~a

exist in the eye (

he~e,

and that is that the image made

I
,
eµ~a&veo8a&,

ea~&V

or

~ eµ~ao&~--is

said to

• • • EV exe(v~--438a8), which then

r
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both reflects and sees it. 1 52

But this, Aristotle claim·s, is

wrong, for there is no e'l OCJ.:A.ov --as a physical object--there
in the eye at all, inasmuch as what occurs as an image in the
pupil of the eye is simply a case of reflection, and that is
visible only to the man who sees it there (438a8) and not to
the person in whose eye it appears. 1 53 What Democritus had
taken for evidence for the existence of such a separate and
visible image in the eye--and so evidence for what occurs in
the act of seeing--has no reasonable basis at all.

But beyond these special criticisms of Democritus Aristotle shows that his theory of 'correspondence' breaks down
in various ways and so is wrong; and it now remains in this
section to give an account of these criticisms as they affect
the theory of Democritus.
We may note first of all the way in which this correspondence theory breaks down by outlining a portion of the
criticism of it by Aristotle at .Q.g the Parts of Animals 1.1,
640b29-64la9.

Democritus had said that there was a correspondence between the (atomic) structure (µopcp~ )154 of a human

l5 2 Thus again it is the e:iowA.ov in the eye which for Democritus is the 'seen object' and not the physical object.
15 3For.a discussion of various interpretations of this
passage, see Ross, Sensu, pp. 138-139.
"
154 cherniss,. on. cit.,
p. 344, note 27, claims that the
'form' here for Democritus is the outer limits of the body.
But I take oxi')µa to refer to the outline of the body (when
abstracted from color), ·w'hile µopcpl) refers to its structure.
Thus Aristotle can speak here of a µopcp!) of the oxflµa , a
structure that,belongs to the outlined shape; Aristotle had
just used µopcp~ in that sense at 640a29.
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being and the shape (oxDµa) and coloratiori which this structure presents to our senses (640a29-35).
that in that case a corpse (o

~e9vew~)

Aristotle objects

has the same structure

corresponding to that shape and coloration; the corpse and the
man look alike, they present the same coloration and shape,
but in that case they must be the same sort of physical object,
have the same atomic structure; but they are obviously not the
same: UAA

1

oµwc;.

oux EO~tV avepwno, --640b36.

Democritus would

likely say that the corpse is different from the man in that
the soul-atoms have left the corpse; but that would mean that
the structure has changed without any visible evidence for it,
and that too would leave him with no real correspondence between the physical object and its visible representation.
Aristotle then goes on to list a number of other examples of
correspondence; for example, the bronze hand--either abstracted from consideration of color or, more likely, colored-though it still bears the name 'hand', is not really a hand,
even if it look ever so much like a hand; and these further
illustrations of his point go on to show why in such instances
correspondence fails. 155 But the point of Aristotle's criticism is clear enough; such correspondence will not work, and
such appearances cannot themselves tell us enough about an ob-

' atomic structure.
ject and very little about its
A further break-down is indicated by Aristotle at .Qg

15 5we may just briefly note here in anticipation that
this takes no account of the function, purpose, or final cause;
this will be taken up separately in the next chapter.
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Generation and Corruntion 1.8, 325b34-326b6, the whole point
of which is to show the general unreasonableness with which
Democritus says that sensible qualities are due to atomic
shapes.

It is not necessary to go through the argument again;

an overview of the points Aristotle raises in opposition to
the theory should be sufficient to show that these assignments
of qualities do not in fact correspond with our senseimpressions.
First of all, our senses tell us that hot and cold are
contraries; it is thus unreasonable to assign a shape to hot,
but none to cold (326a3-6).

Then too it is unreasonable to

attribute to the atoms themselves the property of weight relative to their sizes without attributing other properties such
as heat and hardness to them in the same way, so that one atom
be harder or hotter than others.

Or, why should one quality,

weight, be due to a property of atoms while other qualities
are not? (326a6-14); this certainly does not correspond with
our sense-impressions.

Nor again is there any reasonableness

in attributing to them shape alone, for this is but one way in
which they do correspond to larger physical objects; if in
that one respect, why not in others (326al4-24)?

Furthermore,

our sense-impressions tell us of objects as divisible, and so
it is also unreasonable no~ to attribute this too to atoms;
size should be no objection (326a24-29).

Our senses tell us

of objects with a variety of qualities, reduced to their simplest form in earthy or fiery or similarly qualified objects;
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why then should atoms not correspond to this?

Or we see

things of a like nature merging, and yet the atoms show no
correspondence to this (326a29-34).

All in all, any real cor-

respondence between the world of atoms and void and the world
of our sense-impressions breaks down completely. 1 5 6
There is also a general criticism of this sort by Aristotle at Metaphysics 8.2; this is in general an accounting of
the kinds of differentia in physical objects.

The chapter is

introduced by mentioning Democritus specifically and his reduction of the kinds of real differences in physical objects to
three

~per~ Ola~opa~

--1042bl2), shape, placement, and order.

In contrast to this teaching of his Aristotle says that our
sense-impressions indicate a great many (more) differences:
~a(vov'tal

oe

noAAaL OJa~opa& oJoal --1042bl5.

He then goes on

to list a great number of such specific differences; and he
indicates that the perceptible ones present themselves as arranged in degrees in sets or categories of contraries:
0 Xl\.,pu't~l
"\Tl
,L

"\
,L
xa'' µal\axu't"T)'t:l

~xAe(~El--l042b22, 24-25.

o~ov

"
'
'
,... 'ta
'
• • • xal' OAUX
'ta' µev
unepoxr,i
Be'

These are the kinds of differences

given us by sensation; and the implication here, particularly
if we compare the passage to On Generation and Corruntion 1.8,
325b34ff., 15 7 is that Democritus' atomism cannot and does not
't

l5 6This interpretation, which sees in the criticism of
Aristotle a rejection of Democritus' theory of correspondence,
has the advantage of providing a unified object for the apparently wide range of criticisms offered.
l57Especially on sets of contraries and Democritus' unreasonable account of them.
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account for them or for any real and thorough-going correspondence between the atomic system and our sense-impressions.
We may now go back to further criticisms that Aristotle
offers at On Sensation 4, 442bl9-26.

Here the point is again

raised about contrariety in sense-data, while there is no
corresponding contrariety in atomic geometrical shapes:
~
"While all the sense-data ('ta µev aicrGT}'ta nuv'ta
\

'

I

\

)

have contrari-

ety, as, for instance, in the realm of color white is contrary
to black, • • • while one shape does not seem contrary to another (442bl9-22)."

And a second objection which Aristotle

voices here is that Democritus teaches a limitless variety of
atomic shapes; thus, if each shape produces a specific flavor
--and there is no reason to suppose that it would not--there
should be a limitless number of flavors; and this is obviously
not so. 1 58 So we have here two further ways in which the theory of correspondence, as held by Democritus, breaks down.
Finally, the irrationality of assigning perceived effects to shapes is the subject of the entire chapter at On the
Heavens 3.8; though the chapter is devoted more specifically
to a

cr~ticism

of Platonic views, especially as they are ex-

pressed in his Timaeus, some of Democritus' views are criticized as well, for in this respect the views of Plato and De-

'

l5 8 chernlss, .££• cit., p. 316, objects that Aristotle
simply refused to recognize the possibility of imperceptible
variations in color. But Aristotle is proceeding on the
grounds of empirical evidence; how could we see or taste the
difference if it is imperceptible? Besides, Democritus' theory is supposed to show correspondence to what we do perceive,
and this is precisely where Aristotle says the theory fails.
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mocritus are alike.

For instance, the impossibility of assign-

ing cold to a shape contrary to the sphere is repeated (307b710).

There is as well the failure of the sphere to account

for the uniting function of fire (307a32-b6).

If anything at

all the criticisms of Aristotle here show that by these theories there is no correspondence between elemental shape and
phenomenal effect; they are totally inadequate to account for
differences which we perceive in objects: o~l

µtv oJv 06

~or~

307b20-21.
One might rightly extend this list of criticisms to include all the instances in which Aristotle shows that atomic
explanations do not correspond to what is given in senseimpressions.

These, after all, are the most telling objections

to a teaching that holds an atomic system of explanation and a
theory of •truth in appearances'.
~

Intellect and Genuine Knowledge
Our information as to what Democritus taught about the

intellect and its functions is even more sketchy than the information we have on his theory of sense-perpection.

This has

in recent years generated a number of attempts to reconstruct
Democritus' theory of the intellect and the method of getting

'

at 'genuine knowledge', the knowledge of the world of atoms and
void.

I have already indicated in the section prior to this

on sense-perception some of the framework around which I believe an intelligible theory of Democritus is likely to need

r

242

to be formulated; it centers around the meaning of 'truth in
appearances', which on several occasions is attributed to Democritus by Aristotle.
But, since these attempts by various scholars at such a
reconstruction offer some valuable suggestions, I propose in
this section first of all to outline some of these attempts
and the progress that has been made in this respect, and then
to examine briefly Democritus' two kinds of

yvWµ.~

of which

Sextus Empiricus informs us, then also to examine the picture
which Aristotle provides us of Democritus' teaching (under the
conviction that there is no inconsistency between it and the
later witnesses), and finally to examine Aristotle's objections to this theory.
Langerbeckl59 proposed a gulf between 'genuine' and
'bastard' knowledge; all that empirical fact tells us is that
we are separated from what is really true; and in this sense
he interprets the statement of Sextus Empiricus:

"Der Mensch

musz aus dieser alles bestimmenden Beobachtung lernen, dasz er
vom Zuverlassigen entfernt ist. 11160 Thus he would hold that
for Democritus empirical fact is a xavwv or criterion only in
this sense, and not in the sense that there is some sort of
logical relationship between the realm of atoms and void and

'

l59.QE.. cit., especially pp. 112-118. This and other reconstructions are limited to the ones which tend to take seriously both Aristotle and later witnesses; this seems to be the
only reasonable course to take.
160Diels-Kranz 68B6~ in Langerbeck, ££· cit., p. 116;
his interpretation of xavwv as 'observed fact•-r8 on p. 115.
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that of sense-perception; he denies the latter explicitly. 161
One comes to genuine knowledge only by instruction (5l5axfr-Diels-Kranz 68B33); and, since he does attempt to account for
Aristotle's information, he is driven to dilute the meaning of
•truth' and 'true'--as we have seen--to

11

Deutlichkeit', an un-

usual and totally unwarrented meaning.
Vlastos162 follows Langerbeck in the observation that
teaching is instrumental in changing us physically, and indeed
of 'changing our mind'.

And this, I suppose, is a valuable

insight, the strong emphasis on the physical alteration produced by teaching; this may very well be the means by which
we come to understand the relationship between the realm of
atoms and that of sense-perception.
We have already said much about the article by Helene
Weiss.

She argues that what Aristotle means by 'what is true'

is 'being gua being'--or, at least, as close as Democritus got
to that notion--and that this 'what is true', as a body with
size, is still perceptible, though not perceived.

She intro-

duced a parallel passage from On Generation and Corruption 1.2,
but had failed to show how her proposed meaning of 'what is
true' applies to this passage, content to indicate that here
161 rn taking up the m~tter of a xavwv in this fashion he
is forced to alter the text of the title given in Thrasyllus
(Di els-Kranz 68Bl0b): TIEPI AOfIKQN to read TIEPI AAf\OI S!N, "da
es sich eben nicht um 'Logik' sondern 'Naturphilosophie'
hand el t. 11 (pp. 116-11 7)
162 Gregory Vlastos, 11 Ethics and Physics in Democritus"
in Philosophical Review, LIV (1945) 578-592, LV (1946) 53-64.
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Aristotle saw nothing wrong with speaking of 'truth in appearances' and atoms together. 16 3 Had she searched out the meaning of this passage in more detail, she ought to have come to
a clearer notion of what 'what is true' evidently means in
these contexts.
A.oyoi

She rightly emphasizes the importance of

in Democritus' system, but says that "the A.oyot are an

indirect grasping" or a "faculty of cognition," though not
identified with vou~ • 164 But this meaning does not apply in
the passage from Qg Generation and Corruption 1.8, which she
uses to illustrate her point; there she more appropriately
uses the translation "reasons" for A.oyot.

One ought really

take A.oyot in that sense consistently, and then the •reasons'
would evidently be •accounts of correspondence' between the
two realms, atoms and phenomena.
Bailey, as we have already noted, is right about working
from sensations to atoms to attain true knowledge by inference; but he proposes that the critical method of attaining
that knowledge is the sense of touch; using it as the most
valid, we must strip impressions gained by the other senses of
their 'secondary qualities•, and thus by a method of abstraction and inference gain a 'genuine knowledge' of things. 16 5
The idea of inference is certainly valid here as well as the
163.QE.. cit.,
:
p. 52.
term.

'

164Ib"d
__i_.' p. 51; she takes A.6yot as being a Democritean

16 5Bailey, E.E.• cit., pp. 182-185. But the sense of
touch is itself in the same state as the other senses.

r
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[

primacy of touch.

But for Bailey 'what is true is in what ap-

pears' is reduced to 'appearances contain the data for true
knowledge'; this is inadequate, for we require a meaning which
will allow us to go from one realm to the other, that is, we
require some sort of formal relationship between them. ·
Guthrie for the most part follows Weiss, but still feels
dissatisfied with her account.

Bailey had considered and then

rejected the notion of atoms by-passing the senses and affecting the mind directly.

Guthrie takes up the principle, but

speaks of atomic films after passing through the eyes and ears
being dispersed throughout the body, and then he goes on to
say that "something like this is perhaps what Bailey and others have meant by. 'inference ' • ~• 166 · But again, some such
process as this certainly cannot be of help in arguing from
sensations to atoms, as the passage at .Qg Generation and

£2.!:-

ruption 1.2 seems to require.
Finally, Taylor indicates that 'truth in appearances'
comes down to saying only that any one sense-impression is as
true as any other--and this is entirely subjective--while the
only non-subjective truth is the scientific (atomic) explanation.167

But the 'scientific explanation' is itself always

subject to correction by empirical evidence; whenever one has
a sense-impression for which the scientific explanation fails
166 Guthrie, History, II, 465.
16 7c. c. w. Taylor, "Pleasure, Knowledge and Sensation
in Democritus" in Phronesis, XII, 1 (1967), p. 24.
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to account, the scientific explanation must be corrected.
Thus 'truth in appearances', while it here at last seems
rightly to imply a real correspondence, is reduced to a totally solipsistic sense: 1 68
"Every individual has his own common-sense picture of
the world, none of which is truer than any other; the
only inter-subjectively true picture is the scientific
one, which can however claim to be true only in so far
as it provides an explanation of every common-sense
picture, an explanation moreover which depends for its
verification on the same potentially conflicting data
of perception."
Several objections can be raised against this interpretation.

One thing that seems to make Taylor's analysis sub-

ject to suspicion is its apparently artificial parallelism to
the 'theory of pleasure'; he himself looks upon this as a confirmation of his analysis.

Furthermore, there is no real evi-

dence that sense-impressions for Democritus were as private
and totally subjective as Taylor makes them out to be; indeed,
there is indication to the contrary.

The very passage in·

which Democritus claims that the 'secondary qualities' are not
'real properties' of physical objects certainly implies that
they are not merely subjective:
n'xpov,
'

e~e~
v~
1

I

11

a~oµa

v6µ~ xpot~,

v6µ~

yAuxu,

v6µ~

I
t b i tt er ex1s
• t
xat xevov --'color,
swee,
\

1

only by convention, but atoms and void exist in reality. 1116 9
This evidently implies

tha~

there is some one kind of sensa-

tion that all (or a majority) call either 'red' or 'bitter• or

168 Ibid.
16 9Diels-Kranz 68B125 (=B9).
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'hot' or 'cold'; and the detailed account in Theophrastus·, De
Sensibus, certainly confirms this, for this system was evidently meant to account for all our sensations of red, bitter,
and such.

Taylor, I believe, was right about the truth of

sense-impressions, but wrong about their being subjective; any
number of people certainly can look upon the same green object
and get the same sensation of greenness simply because there
is an objective atomic configuration which accounts for all
such sensations; there is nothing in Democritus to indicate
the contrary.

There is indeed an objective reality which sen-

sations represent directly.

Sensation, Democritus would ob-

viously say, are indeed relative--relative to the objective
structure of the physical object, relative as well (in cases
of abnormality in the percipient) to the soul-structure of the
percipient, and perhaps relative as well to some other factors; but it does not follow from the fact that they are relative that they are also subjective. 1 70
Sensations are true for Democritus not because they are
l70rncidentally, Taylor, .2.E.· cit., pp. 14-15, weakens
the sense of Diels-Y:...ranz 68B33, emphasized by Vlastos, by
down-grading the mechanical implications of "Teaching changes
a man, and in changing him forms his character"--~ otoax~
µE~apuoµoi ~ov avepwnov µE~apuoµo0oa oe ~UOlOTIOtEi.
Taylor
prefers to take this simply as a traditional saying with little distinctive meaning and apparently little or no connection
with Democritus' physical theory. But then it is strange that
Democritus wouid bother using a verb based on puoµo~ (a distinctive Democritean term), even though the term would not be
here used precisely for 'atomic shape'. There may well be a
sense in which 'teaching' forms our thinking in a sense appropriate to Democritean physics; it may for one thing form our
thinking to recognize a correspondence between sensation and
atomic structure.

r
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subjective and private, but precisely because they are grounded in objective reality, because they are a mechanical altera-·
tion of a specific kind.
According to Sextus Empiricus there are two terms which
have come down to us from Democritus, signifying two kinds of
knowledge, genuine and obscure: yvWµD YVDO(D and

oxo~(D. 1 7 1

yvwµ~

There is little doubt about their meanings; both

are instances of 'knowledge•, but each of a different sort.
yvwµD
(~DV

axo~(D

oe Ola

is the knowledge that comes through sensations

~wv alae~acwv axo~(Dv ), which gives us all sorts

of information on the phenomenal level.

But there is a point

in fineness beyond which this perception on the level of sensation can not go, and it is beyond this point that the world
of atoms and void lies, the world of things as they really
are, genuine being and non-being.
which

yvwµ~

This latter is the world

YVDO(D knows.

But here is precisely where the problem lies:

how does

one get from 'obscure knowledge• to 'genuine knowledge'?

I

would briefly add here to the already long list of attempts to
bridge that 'knowledge gap' by what seems to me can reasonably
be learned about Democritus' teaching and from Aristotle's
criticism of him.

Evidently the existence of contraries in

the same object provides dissatisfaction with 'obscure knowledge•.

If Aoyol is a Democritean term, it is likely that it

refers to accounts of correspondence between the two levels of
1 71 Diels-Kranz, 68Bll.
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knowledge; for example, that sensation which we call 'heat'
corresponds to the spherical atoms.

It is somehow our nature

--evidently by convention--to accept at face value the picture
of the world received through sense-perceptions; but we may be
trained by teaching

(otoax~),

perhaps by teaching the i\oyo&, to

recognize that the correspondence exists between the two levels, and thus to know by inference--the way one would know the
conclusion of a syllogism, though he had no direct experience
of it--the world of atoms and void.

And this latter knowledge,

including knowledge of the atomic structure of things, would
be 'genuine knowledge'.
As we now go on to the report of Aristotle on Democritus'
teaching about intelligence and knowledge, we have a most
striking statement made by Aristotle, that for Democritus mind
and soul are the same thing; 172 and it is striking because we
have thus far been led to expect that they would be· distinct
for Democritus.

On the other hand, Philoponus, in his

.commen~

tary on _Q!! the Soul, says that Democritus had explici t·ly denied ·
their identity, and that Aristotle had only concluded their
identity as a logical consequence of other teachings about
mind. 173 While Philoponus is evidently quite right in his
statement, this is not to say that Aristotle was evidently in

'

1 72For i~stance, twice within a few lines in Anima 1.2,
404e.28, ,31: _d'J'(A.w<; 'tau'tov wuxilv xa\ vouv, • • • 'tau'tb i\eyEL

lJ!uxriv xa& vouv.

_
~ 73p ._ 71 l,ine,s .).9f:t;., Di els-Kranz 6§All3: 'cx.oµev ~Jv
'tOU'tO EVEpyw<; ~ap aU'tWV ElPDµEVOV O'tl 'tQU'tOV VOU<; xa1 wux~
OUoaµw~, ai\A.'ex OUi\i\oy1oµou 'tOU'tO XU'taOXEUUsEt.
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error on this point.

'Same' for Aristotle does not necessar-

ily mean absolute identity; things may be the same inasmuch as
they have some accidental or essential property in common;l74
thus things may be 'the same'

in~

respect.

So this means

that when Aristotle says that for Democritus mind and soul
are the same, we are not to conclude necessarily their absolute identity; we are rather first to inquire as to the respect in which they are the same.
are not at odds on this point.

Aristotle and Philoponus

With this in mind let us then

examine Aristotle's report.
According to Aristotle the intellect in Democritus'
teaching is the same as the soul, in the first place, inasmuch
as they are composed of the same material, the same kind of
atoms--small and spherical.

Aristotle says this twice.

Soul

and intelligence, he claims, are the same in the atoms of
which they are composed, "moveable because of (the atoms')
small size and shape, and the shape he (Democritus) claims is
the most mobile of atomic shapes. 111 7 5 This is repeated,
though not as precisely, at On Breathing 4, 472a7-8, where
Aristotle speaks of Democritus' teaching that we breathe in
from the air those atoms which he identifies with intelligence
and soul.

Thus both are identical in their matter.

" 5.9 on ri;au-r;a. This may be the
l74compare i'iietaphysics
problem as well when Aristotle says that two philosophers have
the same teaching on some particular issue; we must then also
be careful to distinguish precisely in what respect they are
the same.
l75Anima 1.2, 405al0-12.
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Again Aristotle says that for Democritus the operation
or activity of both the soul and the mind are of the same sort;
they both consist of a mechanical alteration; thus, since the
process is a purely mechanical one, the impression which the
senses get must be true. 1 76 This statement of the mechanical
relationship between sense-impressions and the object again
gives Aristotle reason for declaring the identity of soul and
intellect in On the Soul 1.2, 404a28-30.

Here Aristotle adds

the remark which to him seems to establish what he had just
said, that for Democritus the vouc;; does not function as a special capacity which can distinguish and judge truth:

06

o~

XP~~a' ~Q vQ we;; oovaµEl ~lVl TIEpl ~DV UA~8£tav,--404a30-31.

What is true is the sense-impression itself; thus the soul
takes from vouc;; a function which the latter should have if
both are to be distinct, and vouc;; its elf simply infers atoms
and void in certain positions.

Bothvouc;;

and ~ox~ are identi-

cal in their functioning mechanically by alteration.
Finally, there is a third respect in which intelligence
and soul are alike, in having the same 'object'--a body with
size, and hence perceptible even if not actually perceived or
noticed.

Aristotle shows at On Sensation 6, 445b3-446a21 that

even when one gets dovm to the atomic level
8

(a~oµa

• • • µe:yt-

"

~--445bl9), as long as one is dealing with magnitudes, there

are still objects perceptible at this level--whether or not
they are perceived in isolation.

Again, at .2£ the Heavens 3.7,

1 76rnetaphysics 4.5, 1009bl2-15.
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306a28-30 there is mention of some who will not yield divisibility to what is perceptible:

Ol OE

ouoe

~b

aloerp;ov anav
In neither

passage are the authors of the theory in question mentioned,
but the remarks are quite appropriate to Democritus.

Inas~uch

as an atomic figure has size, it is at least potentially perceived.

And in that respect at· least, in that the object of

intelligence is to some extent perceptible, the object of perception and of thought is the same.
Thus Democritus' soul and intelligence are the same, but
the same only in the above respects, the same inasmuch as they
are composed of the same matter, as their operation is of the
same kind, and as their objects are basically the

sa~e.

But

this ought not lead us, as Philoponus rightly warns, to assume
a complete identity of both.
There is at least some indication that Democritus argued
from sense-impressions to atoms; and this may also be the way
in which he thought that intelligence operates:

it uses a

phenomenon and, by the theory of correspondence, infers something about the atomic world.

This is vflJ.at Aristotle describes

as taking place at On Generation and Corruption 1.2, 315b9-ll:
"Since they believed that what is true is in appearance, and
since appearances are cont~ary and limitless, they suppose
that the atomic shapes are limitless. 11177 It was the limit-

l77tn~ 6, ~ov~o ~&A~el, fv ~~ ~a(vEo9al, tvav~(a 6~ xa\

~~ ~alV6µEVa, ~~ OX~µa~a ~XElpa fXOlDOUV.
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less variety of appearances which, in conjunction with the
further premise of truth in appearances, allowed a conclusion
about atomic shapes.
Furthermore, later in the same book, Aristotle commends
Democritus for "making his starting point accord with nature
just as it is, 111 7 8 that is, the object as it appears. In the
world of nature just as it is he had found motion, and concluded from that that on the atomic level of explanation there
must be a

•d•
V ol.
•

.t,.

w~

L'
,
T
'1.
oux uv
x'vna'v
ouaav
uveu xevou- • 179
I

And

his argument in this passage goes exactly in the opposite direction from the Eleatic argument (which goes from the nonexistence of the void to the non-existence of motion) from
the fact that there is motion in the phenomenal world to the
existence of void on the atomic level.
And it may well be that this is how Democritus thought
that intelligence in general operates, using the information
of the senses--and assuming a correspondence (which amounts to
a 'programming' of the mind as one might program a computer)-to arrive at an atomic world which truly is.
What then are we to make of Democritus' quotation with
approval from Homer:

~~,

eno(nae

~ov VEx~opa,

w~

€s~o~n. ~TIO

178 Gen • .£!. Corr. l.8i 325al-~: upxnv
l.
'
noLnoaµevo' ~a~a'
!fUO' v .Ypi: Epeo't.L v. There is, I believe, no need to read 'f.ln: e:p
e:o~,v, as Joachim, op. cit., p. 159, suggests just to accord
with Parmenides; what we have in the lines that immediately
follow this remark is more of a contrast with.the Eleatics
than a similarity with them.
l79Gen. et Corr. 1.8, 325a27.
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~n' nA~yn,, xer0ea1 aAAo~pov€ov~a? 180 This citation with approval is presented in the passage from

On

~

Soul as a con-

sistent consequence of 'what is true is what appears' c~o yap
&Ane~, e{va& ~b ~atvdµevov, 6&~ xaAra, no&nca&

• • • --404a28-

29), and so ought probably be connected with drawing inferences from phenomena to the actual or real situation.

What

Democritus probably conceived to be the case with Hector was
something like this:

Hector was receiving sense-impressions

just like anyone else might, but because of the unusual state
of his physical condition

(w,

~stc~~ ~n6 ~n' nA~n'

) he was

drawing wrong conclusions from them about objective reality,
as if an instance of false knowledge were an instance of knowledge:

w,

~povouv~a,

~au~&--Meta.

µev xat ~OU' napa~povouv~a, 4AA

4.5, 1009b30-31.

1

OU

One might conclude from this

that each of the following were instances for Democritus of
the functioning of vou' or

~povnc,,:

intelligence inferring

from phenomena the reality of atoms and void, intelligence inferring from sense-data that physical objects have all the
qualities as properties which we perceive them to have, and
intelligence inferring from sense-data conclusions contrary to
both appearances and atomism.

The second is the common-sense

view of the world, but, because of contraries in the same object, cannot Qe the real sltuation; and men apparently are
180rrieta. 4.5, 1009b29-30, though here there is no specific attribution to Democritus. The information, however, is
repeated at Anima 1.2, 404a30, where this is more explicitly
referred to Democritus. The quotation as made is not in our
texts of Homer.

r
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habituated to this kind of inference.

The first is the genu-

ine functioning of knowledge and must be instilled, likely by
teaching, to change us and get us out of the habit of using
the second kind of inference.

The third, likewise mistaken,

is due to a derangement of our atomic structure.

The mind or

intelligence then is not a special faculty concerned with
truth; its functioning in this respect is not distinguished
from the functioning of soul in general, for it too, like the
soul, is liable to error--mechanical errors, but errors neverOU 6~ xpfrcal 'CQ vQ we;; ouvdµt:& 'Cl v'1 Tit:p) 'tlJV &.A.'D8el l..
1\
./..
'\,
'N
av, uA.Aa 'tau'Co A.~ye& ~ux~v xa& vouv --Anima 1.2, 404a30-31.

theless:

The above reconstruction of the teaching of Democritus
on intelligence and genuine knowledge--though it remains only·
a reconstruction--has the advantage of the consistency for
which Aristotle praised Democritus, of taking the reports of
Aristotle seriously, of being consistent with later witnesses
to the teaching of Democritus, and thus of not giving Aristotle a •straw man' to 'knock down' without any difficulty.
As we begin then to account for Aristotle's specific
criticisms of this teaching, we may not that one important aspect of that teaching has already been taken into account.
Aristotle, as we have seen, had raised his objections to the
theory of correspondence ~etween sense-impressions and physical objects; he had quite rightly shown that this proposed
correspondence breaks down at critical points.

Without re-

peating those criticisms here we might yet note that this is
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probably the most telling objection which Aristotle raises
against such a theory of knowledge.
Now aside from this, there is another criticism which
Aristotle uses against Democritus, one which is probably the
most well known, that is, that Democritus' teaching implies
the identity of mind with soul and fire.

This criticism was

raised, for instance, at On the ~ 1.2, 404b27ff.

As was

mentioned above, this is not to be taken to say either that
Democritus taught their complete identity or that Aristotle
thought or implied that he did. 181 The point that Aristotle
raises here is only the identity of their material--spherical
atoms--and that these atoms are meant to explain the extreme
mobility involved in explaining the operation of all three
kinds of objects.

But, in view of their sameness of material

and of operation, this amounts to a practical identity of the
three, especially since we--and Aristotle as well likely--lack
any information on specific differences between them.

This is,

it seems to me, what allows Aristotle to identify them by syllogism; only their sameness was specified and expanded upon,
but not their differences.

Perhaps we may use here a state-

ment made by Aristotle in another context, for it does summarize neatly the force of his criticism here:
Ola~opav,

UAA

1
•

AEx~eov ~~v

oux dnAW~ o\1t-w AEX~EOV w~ Aeyouo&v --"one ought

to specify the difference and not make as simple a claim as
they do 11 --Caelo 3.8, 307a23-24.

The identity of mind with

181As Cherniss, .££.• cit., p. 289, does.
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soul and fire is a theoretical one, due to Democritus' failure
to specify specific differences between them.

Democritus is

at fault for failing to make a distinction which is important
to his theory.
We now turn our attention to another passage in Qg the
Soul where Aristotle offers a further major objection to Democritus' teaching about mind and knowledge; this he does at
1.2, 404a25-31.

But, before proceeding with the major criti-

cism, this passage also brings up another matter:

Aristotle

mentions Anaxagoras and anyone else who has claimed that mind
sets things in motion, and then Aristotle continues by claiming that Democritus too taught the capacity and function of
mind to set things in motion: xal e:1 'tt' &AAo' e:1pT)xe:v
'tO nav ex(VT)OE: vou,·
404a26-27.

w'

OU µnv naV'tE:AW' y' Wo1LE:p ~T)µoxpt'to, --

So for Democritus the mind is no better off than

the soul in this respect; and the criticism which Aristotle
had offered against this teaching of Democritus about the soul
applies as well to the mind:

since movement is a mechanical

one, and since the spherical mind-atoms are naturally in motion, it will either be impossible or, at least, quite difficult for it to cause rest and cessation of motion:
lpun~ooµe:v e;{
"\

'

XU/\E:TIOV

1\

T)

\.

xa\ ~pEµT)OlV TIOtE:i 'tOU'tO au't6·
I

,

I

'

nw, OE

~µe:r,

o'

TIOt~OE:t,

..,

xat .QO\JVU'tOV E:lTIE:l V --Anima l.J, 406b22-24.

Now to return to the major objection at On the Soul 1.2;
we have there the statement that for Democritus what appears
is what is true, Democritus' approval of the Homeric descrip.- ..... •··
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'

tion of Hector lying wounded with his thoughts elsewhere; and
it is in this context that Aristotle makes the simple critical
statement that Democritus does not use the mind as a faculty
or power concerning the truth (404a30-31), with no further
explanation other than the fact that vouc;
in this respect.

is the same as \lmx'h

So we need to turn to the parallel passage

in the Metaphysics for details and elucidation of this criticism.
At metaphysics 4.5, 1009bl2ff. the claim that for Democritus there is truth in what appears is repeated, then the
quotation from Homer is cited a number of lines later.

There

then follows a more detailed account of Aristotle's objections
to this teaching.

And his objection is generally this:

by

Democritus' theory no more is given from the object than what
is given to the senses, or, in another

w~y,

that what intelli-

gence has as its object is precisely the same--no more, no
less--as what sense-perception has as its object; or again,
more simply, that as to its object intelligence is sense182
.
,
\ ~~v
' a,oe~a'v
,,
percep t ion:
~pov~o'v
µev
--1009bl3 •
More specifically Aristotle claims on the basis of the
approval of the passage from Homer that this teaching involves
the claim that an instance of mistaken knowledge is an instance
of knowledge, ·or, perhaps, " that error is an instance of truth:
182 cherniss, £.P.• .£!!., p. 83, assumes that it is only on
the grounds of the material of which vouc; is constructed that
Aristotle claims the sameness of soul and mind. It is not a
matter of material, and the intellect does not stand "in judgment over sensation," as Cherniss claims; it uses sensation.

r
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1009b30-31.

But this means further that, since both are ac-

tivities of the mind and each 'sees' truth as something contrary to the other, contraries are in fact and actually true
of the same physical object at the same time:
~µa ou~w ~e xa\ oux ou~w~

EXE' --1009b32-33.

xa\

~a ov~a

Thus they are no

closer to any fixed truth than they were before, when just
using sense-perception; the pursuit of truth, of what physical
objects are really like, on this theory is a 'wild goose
chase':

\
~o

..
yap

'
..t
~a
Tit~uµeva

_,_
OLwxeJv

'
~o

~rytetv

uPv

tin

'
~~v

Furthermore, Aristotle goes on to say, the reason for
their mistaken point of view is that these men assumed that
only perceptible objects exist: ~a o' ov~a ~TIEAa~ov e(vaL ~a
alo8ryta µovoV--1010a2-3. 18 3 This undue emphasis on senseperception brought on a neglect of that in a physical object
which remains constant in the midst of accidental change, its
essence; they look only at what is changing about an object,
not at what is permanent about it in the midst of such change,
and therefore they can find nothing true about the object which
presents itself to the senses:

OpWV~E~ ~ao~nv

XLVOUµevnv

'

~nv

~UOLV • • • Tiep( ye ~o nav~~ TiaV~W' µe~a~UAAOV oux tvoexeo8al

to,neeutLV--1010a7-9.

But'it is the distinctive function of

the intellect to 'percefve' that permanent nature of a physical

lB3s ee Ch ern1ss,
.
1 oc. c1"t • ,

" • • • assumed that only

sensible things had real existence."
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object--and that, for Aristotle, is what is true and lasting
about a given physical object.

And in this sense Democritus

fails to use the intellect as a power concerning truth; his
intellect had no distinctive power to 'perceive' what is true
and permanent about an object--in contrast to what is changing
about it--precisely because intelligence had absolutely no
more to work with than was already given in senseperception.184
If what is true is to be permanent and the attainable
object of intelligence, then Democritus' theory is thus deficient on two counts:

it allows two contrary truths about the

same object at the same time if both a correct and a mistaken
<pp6v~ol,

are instances of real intelligence; and, secondly, it

allows for nothing permanent about an object, although this is
the way we see the object and speak of it; on Democritus' theory the apple now green and later red is not the same apple,
but is on each occasion a different object.
Democritus' theory of knowledge and of correspondence
breaks dovm and cannot arrive at a sure truth, and thus on this
critical point the whole world of atoms and void is thrown into doubt along with his theory of knowledge.
18 4The point about there being no knowledge of what is
merely perceptible, and so,' changing, that there must be some
more permanent nature (qioot,) of an object which is given to
<ppoVT)Ot' (or vou,) is repeated at i.Ietauhysics 13.4, 1078bl2-17.

r
r

CHAPTER IV
ON FORMAL, EFFICIENT, AND FINAL 'CAUSES'
Introduction
The final fundamental issue which divides the teaching
of Aristotle from that of Democritus revolves around the question of the kinds of explanations they give of physical objects and events.

To put this into traditional Aristotelian

terminology, this is the issue of the four causes--material,
formal, efficient; and final--all of which the natural philosopher must consider, Aristotle says, if he is to render an
.adequate account of the world about us. 1
Immediately at this point we run into a difficulty;
there is still active discussion on precisely what is meant by
'cause' in Aristotle, particularly in reference to the 'final
cause'.

On the one hand, Ross, for example, tends to describe

the 'final cause' as one of "the external conditions of natural process," and, at that, as a force working on a par with
the efficient cause. 2 This interpretation makes in effect a
1 Physics ·2. 7, 198a22-~4: br e'i o' at.. al re ( ai 't t-rrcap ec;;,
·~
\I~
I~
nepl naowv -rou ~uotxou e1o~va1,
xat_etc;;
nuoac;; avuywv
rco vla
-r( &noowoet ~uo1xwc;;, -rDv ~ADV, -ro elooc;;, -co xivnaav, rco ou
'Evexa.
2Ross, Physics, p. 36; also W. D. Ross, Aristotle: A
complete exnosition of his works~ thought (New York: meridian Books, 1959)s p. 7b,where the final cause is a '~'·
\

-

-

\s:,\

-
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second sort of efficient cause out of the 'final cause'.3· On
the other hand, Charlton contends that is is misleading to
talk of these Aristotelian causes as all being ones which actively operate and produce effects, that .Aristotle's doctrine
of the "'four causes' is an attempt to distinguish and classify different kinds of explanation, different explanatory
roles a factor can play. 11 4
It is this latter sense of 'cause' which seems to me to
come closer to what is meant by the term in Aristotle's doctrine of the 'four causes'.

The word 'cause' has come to mean

for us in ordinary language something more nearly like what we
shall see it meant for Democritus--an 'efficient cause•.

But

it is obvious that its meaning for Aristotle is much broader:
whatever can contribute to the explanation of a physical object
or event would for Aristotle be an

al~(a,

a reason, an

exp1~-

3There is, of course, a sense in which the efficient
cause may be at times identical with the final cause, just as
a particular musician may be identical with a housebuilder,
when he builds a house. But in that case the musician is not
acting ~ musician, but qta housebuilder. Similarly the efficient cause qf~ efficien must be kept intellectually distinct from the ,in~l ~a~se ~ua,final. ~ee also Gen. et Corr.
1.7, 324bl4: ~o 0 OU EVExa OU TIOl~~lXOV.
4.QE.. cit., p. 99. This same sort of c?ntention is also
the substance of a very recent article on Aristotle's 'unmoved
mover', which by this interpretation is not a personal force
and thus an efficient causet! but is simply "an explanation for
orderly rational motion 11 --Dimitri z. Andriopoulos and James M.
Humber' II Aristotle's Concept of TO ITPQTON KINOYN AKINHTON:
A Reexa'llination of the Problem" in Classical Journal, LXVI, 4
(1971), p. 293. This article raises the basic question as to
whether for Aristotle the •unmoved mover' is to be conceived
as a personal god.

r
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tory factor. 5

This interpretation has the advantage of making

more sense of what Aristotle says, for instance, where he
vo0~

criticizes Anaxagoras'

as not being an adequate explana-

tion as 'final cause•; Anaxagoras'

vo0~,

though taken as 'the

good', still is only that which sets the universe in motion
originally as something separate and mechanical (
-re yap w11xavr.i XPY)'t"al -ry vy 1tpoi;
'

-

""'

-

-

' '

'tl)Y

xooµo1toL l# av

'Avasayopa~

--I1Ietaphysics

1.4, 985al8-19); although it is 'the good', it still does not
explain the present functioning and purpose of the universe,
that for the sake of which that original motion as well as the
present motion takes place.

Cherniss' objections to Aristot- .

le's criticism only hold when efficient and final causality
are confused, only when the 'final cause' is in effect another
kind of efficient cause, when there is no distinct purpose for
&.A.A.a Xlver eYEXU '!;lVO~, W<ne_ £rcepov --Metaphysics
12.10, 1075b9. 6 Thus, what Aristotle is saying against An.ax-

the motion:

5This meaning has been found for a('t(a already in Plato
and applied by Gregory Vlastos to Aristotle in his "Reasons and
Causes in the Phaedo" in Philosonhical Review, LXXVIII, 3
(1969) 291-325.
6 cherniss, .2.E· cit., p. 235, says: "To complain that he
lJi.naxagorasJ identified final and efficient causality in the
voui; is not only unhistorical but also inappropriate for Aristotle whose God, pure intellectual activity, is at once the
efficient and final cause of movement in the universe." Cherniss' criticism implies th8tt Aristotle is wrong in criticizing
Anaxagoras, beeause Aristotle's own teaching is the same. But
this fails to distinguish their differences. The fact that
vo0i; may be the only primary efficient cause of motion in general for Anaxagoras and not the proximate cause of any other
motion is in itself immaterial to the question as to whether
it is to be labeled as an efficient or final cause (contra
Cherniss, loc • .£1.!.).
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agoras is that his

vou~

only explains the order in the uni-

verse from the point of view of giving an efficient cause,
albeit a 'good efficient cause', but fails to give an explanation which takes into account its present order from the point
of view of its purpose and proper functioning.

The confusion,

it seems to me, is due to an interpretation which fails to
keep the final cause, gua final, distinct from the efficient
cause.

And this can likely best be done by remembering that

•cause' has a much broader meaning for Aristotle than it has
for us, that its meaning more closely approximates 'explanation' or 'explanatory factor' than 'cause' in the strict
sense.
But, if one does take all 'causes' in Aristotle--and
particularly the 'final cause•--to be in some sense 'efficient
causes', those which actively produce an object or an event,
there may indeed be some problem in establishing any positive
evidence for, for example, a 'final cause' qua final as active
in such production.

And it is quite certain that this might

seriously weaken some of Aristotle's own assertions and arguments, particularly against Democritus, against whom he levels
the criticism a
cause'.

nu.~ber

of times that he neglected the 'final

Not only that, but it would also seem to make Aris-

' of places much less intelligtotle's criticisms at a number
ible.
But Aristotle does indeed adduce positive evidence
against Democritus, even when he criticizes him for neglecting

265

this 'final cause'; Aristotle never simply and arbitrarily
says that Democritus was wrong in his assertions only because
he had neglected it.

But rather, Aristotle, as we shall see,

does regularly claim that Democritus' neglect of a 'final
cause' had seriously hampered his investigation, because it
had led him to some doubtful conclusion or apparent error in
some other respect, because it had led him to neglect some obvious and necessary factor in giving a fuller and more satisfactory explanation of the phenomenal world.

Thus not only

will the interpretation of 'final cause' as a factor in explanation be more firmly established in Democritus' case, but
also Aristotle's arguments will not give the expected evidence
of any noticeable weakness in this connection.
On the other hand, any argument which would hold against
Democritus, establishing a material, formal, or final cause,
gua material, formal, or final, as 'quasi-efficient' and active, will also hold a fortiori for 'cause' in the broader
sense of 'explanatory factor'.

Thus, in fact, the position of

neither Aristotle nor Democritus is unnecessarily weakened by
this approach and interpretation of the meaning of •cause' in
Aristotle.

And, indeed, this promises to give a fairer treat-

ment to the positions of both philosophers, and we shall be
able to get down more effic~ently to what is really at issue
between them in this matter of 'causes'.
On the whole, Democritus' position on this issue of
'causes' is a purely mechanistic one:

any object or event can
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be explained simply and absolutely in terms of permanent atoms
and void in a specific arrangement, which may be moved or
changed only in a predetermined way when bombarded from the
outside by another atom or set of atoms; this means, as we
shall see upon closer examination, that there is in Democritus' teaching an accounting to some degree of material, formal, and efficient causation.

This, Democritus is convinced,

is the only type of explanation feasible or possible.
It is, on the contrary, Aristotle's position on this
issue that this sort of explanation obviates and, indeed, denies not only an explanation by 'final cause', but also a
more important distinction between 'artificial' and 'natural'
objects.

This latter distinction seems to Aristotle obvious

enough, and he thus persistently tries to show how Democritus'
theory falls short of accounting in this respect for the phenomenal world; and the reason for the deficiency in Democritus' theory is regularly that he did not explain things from
a point of view of their 'natural development' and of their
proper functioning and purpose.
Of the four 'causes' of Aristotle we have already considered in some detail the 'material cause' in chapters one
and two; so not much more need be said about it..

Thus, though

'
we have already in fact touched
on the matter of efficient and
formal cause, these, along with the matter of the 'final
cause' remain for fuller consideration.

As was mentioned, it

will be the contention of this section of this paper that
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there are specific counterparts in Democritus' teaching t'o
both efficient and formal causes; and to these, as we shall
see, Aristotle objects on the grounds not only of their intrinsic inadequacy, but also of their failure to be supplemented by any analogue to 'final cause'.
Furthermore, the discussion of this chapter will also
involve us in the question of what is meant in Democritus'
teaching by 'necessity' and by 'chance', both of which, along
with Aristotle's criticisms, will be seen to find their proper
place within the question of causation.
The Formal Cause
The teachings of Democritus do evidently contain an accounting of physical objects which is analogous to Aristotle's
'formal cause'.

Aristotle himself testifies to this fact on

a number of occasions, all of which are aptly summarized in
the Physics where Aristotle in a parenthetical remark says:
"For to a certain extent Empedocles and Democritus touched
slightly on the matter of form and essence. 117 And to further
assure ourselves that this is really the intention of .Aristotle, he uses terms which are for him technical phrases for
'form' and 'essence':
£{vai
4.

,

~o £{00, (Physics 2.2, 194a21), ~o ~~ ~v

(Physics 2.2, 194a21t; Part. Anim. 1.1, 642a26), and ~6

op1oao8a1

'

~~v

,

#

ouoiav

(Part. Anim. 1.1, 642a26; and this term

7 Physics 2.2, 194a20-21: br\ µ1xpov yae ~1._µ€po' 'EµneooxA~~ xa\ 6~µ6xp1~0' ~ou e&oou' xa1 ~ou ~( ~v e(vai ~~av~o.
The other passages in which this is said are r,Ietanhysics 13. 4,
1078bl9-21 and On the Parts of Animals 1.1, 642a2b-28.
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seems to be the one implied in the passage at Metaphysics
13.4, 1078bl9-21).
But there is some difficulty in determining the nature
of Democritus' attempt to specify a 'formal cause' or 'define
the essence of an object'.

Ross, in his commentaries on the

passages both in the Physics and in the metaphysics, says
nothing to indicate the nature of Democritus' attempt; but in
his 'analysis' of the passage in the Metaphysics he does indicate that the attempt amounted to nothing more than Democritus' definition of heat and cold. 8 Cherniss agrees.9 But
it hardly seems appropriate to describe Democritus' account of
heat and cold as a substantial contribution to the development
of the concept of 't~ clooc:;,,
'
I
'tT)V
ouoiav.
#

'to

't(

~v tlva,,

and

'to

opfoaoeai

Aristotle's use of these terms in describing the

attempt' leads one to expect more than that, in spite of the
qualification

I

\

t'JU

µt xpov.

Langerbeck, on the other hand, begins his consideration
of the problem with the passage at On the Parts of Animals
1.1, 10 but he does not see any real connection between this
account and Democritus' teaching about atoms; it is only concerned, he says, with phenomena, and for this reason Democritus

8 Ross, 11Ietanhysics, II, 419. The text at Metaphysics
13,4, 1078bl9-21 reads: enl µtxpov ~T)µoxpt'tO(, ~WU'tO µ6vov
XUt ~p ( oa'to 'JU.l.l<;. 'tO e Epµo v x.a'i 'to wuxpov.
Under Ross t interpretation the first xai here is taken to be explanatory rather
than conjunctive.
9.QE.. cit., p. 227, note 44.
10.QE.. cit., pp. 83-84.
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had really failed to give the -r ( ~v

·;
f:LVat •

Democritus, Lang-

erbeck further claims, was primarily interested in physical
theory--atoms and void--and so did not pursue this matter of
definition by appearance any further. 11 But this seems not to
do sufficient justice either to Aristotle's witness to the
unity of Democritus' account ( nEpt nav'twv ev\ Aoycr-~. et
Q..Q.E.!:• 1.8, 325al) or to Aristotle's claim that Democritus did

indeed touch on

'T.(

~v elva& (Part. Anim. 1.1, 642a26).

Thus neither of the above views on the 'touch on form'
by Democritus is entirely satisfactory; the former, as was
said, because it seems too limited and narrow to apply at all.
And that this undue limitation of this view of 'definition' is
even more suspect is supported by Aristotle's statement that
Democritus' attempts at definitions applied to everything:

ooQ oe

µ~AlO'ta xa\ nepi

T(QV'T,WV

€v\ ACY~ 6twp(xao& Aeux&nno,

xaL 6~µoxpt'to,--Gen. et Corr. 1.8, 324b35-325al.
It will be helpful to examine a little more closely the
context in which the claim is made that Democritus 'touched on
form', in order to see more clearly what Aristotle likely had
reference to when he made that claim.

First of all, in the

passage just mentioned from On Generation and Corruution 1.8,
Democritus' attempt is closely connected with that of Empedocles; and the .link with

Em~edocles

is reiterated in two of the

11 Ibid. "Da Demokri t nur das norQv nicht aber das 't(
bestimmt hat, hat er das Wesen, das 't( ~v e{va&, ebe~ verfehlt" (p. 84). "Aristoteles sieht bei Demokrit Ansatze zum
op(seo8a&, die aber nicht durchgefUhrt sind--wohl weil Demokri t in der cpuo t x~ e ewp (a sein eigentliches Gebiet hat."
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other passages in which Aristotle deals with the question. 12
One point of contrast between Empedocles and Democritus in
this passage in On Generation and Corruution--emphasized by
' •
'
the µev
• • Be, is that Empedocles used his type of definition in a few cases, while Democritus is said to have done so
for everything:
'
lWl

1l Ep 'l

TIQV~WV

oi µev oJv ~n( ~&VWV
• • • Otwp(xaot

• • •

•••

ooQ

~~µoxpt~o'

Be

µaA&O~a

--324b32-

325al.
What then was the nature of Empedocles use of 'form'?
Aristotle describes Empedocles use of it as more or less unintentional (au~~ • • • neptn(n~El ) in On the Parts of Animals

--

1.1, 642al8ff.

-----

And it is in this passage that an example of

his 'definition' is described:

it consisted of accounting for

something by means of a ratio of mixture of specific elements

(Aoyo'

~~' µ(sew' au~wv [o~otxe(wv] ); and the specific example

cited is that of the 'form of bone•. 1 3

A specific ratio of

mixture of various kinds of elements--this is precisely the
kind of an account which we have seen that Democritus gave· of
some substances. 1 4 Thus, if the link with Empedocles is as
12Both in Physics 2.2 and Part. Anim. 1.1. In the only
other passage on this matter there is a reference to the
Pythagoreans (Eeta. 13.4).
l3This is substantiatlY repeated at :Meta. 1.10, 993al822; and the precise formula for bone is given by Aristotle
from Empedocles himself at~· 1.5, 410al-6.
l4The fact that Aristotle.linked Democritus'
form with the Pythagoreans (see note 12, above) is
striking. If one were to transfer the Pythagorean
(atomic) units, we get the same kind of attempt at
form'.

attempt at
equally
numbers to
'defining
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significant as seems likely, the analogue to 'form' or •essence' in the system of Democritus was an accounting of the
various sized atoms which make up that object; and this is
evidently what Aristotle recognized as 'form' in the teaching
of Democritean atomism.
In spite of the earlier reluctant attempt of Empedocles
at defining the form of bone, Aristotle describes Democritus'
efforts in this regard as those of a pioneer:
6~µoxpt'to~ npWi;o~--Part.

Anim. 1.1, 642a27.

~~a'to µev

It may be well

then to suggest a little more fully and clearly the steps forward which, from Aristotle's point of view, Democritus had
taken in his 'touch on form and essence'.
One reason that Aristotle saw which brought about the
ultimate failure of previous efforts to deal with form and
essence was the inability of philosophers to make any real
distinction between the essential form of an object and the
contrary accidents which may at various times be true of it:
'\, \
'
'
O&UAEX't&X~ yap &oxu~ ounw 'tO't
~v WO'te ouvao8a1 XUl XWPl~
1

'\

'tOU

't(

EO'tl

'tUVUV't(a

enioxonerv --Iil:eta. 13.4, 1078b25-26.

But

this is precisely the problem that Democritus had considered
and attempted to solve by positing atoms and void as those
things which truly exist, one as •that which is' and the other
as 'that which. is not•, and by making the appearance of con15
traries in the physical object due to shifts in the atoms.
In this respect he had gone beyond Empedocles and might rightl5Meta. 4.5, 1009a27-30; Q!:E.• et Corr. 1.2, 315b9-15.
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ly be called a pioneer.
Furthermore, Empedocles--in contrast to Democritus--had
only applied his definition to a limited number of objects
(en( ~tvwv--~. ~ ~· 1.8, 324b32), evidently because he
had only hit upon it unintentionally ( evtaxou • • • nep&n(n~et--Part. ~.· 1.1, 642al8); 16 whereas Democritus' attempt was likely a conscious one and applied more consistently
to a large number of objects (

1t

Ep\ 11:dv~wv ~v)

A.oyc.y--Gen. ~

Corr. 1.8, 325al), even though it was not really essential to
his physical theory (w~ o6x avayxa(ou
Part.

~·

OE

~~ ~UOlX~ Sewp(~ --

1.1, 642a27-28), likely, as we shall see, because

it was not constant in the ever-changing structure of physical
objects.

Thus not only Democritus' attempt to deal with the

basic problem of an object as distinct from its contraries,
but also his conscious, consistent, and wide application of
this kind of 'essence' justify the prominent place which Democritus has in this matter in Aristotle's eyes.
The broad scope of Democritus' attempt at definition is
indicated in connection with his treatment of the 'traditional
elements'.

As we have already se.en, Democritus had attempted

to account for the mutual generation of the 'elements', and in
so doing had evidently proposed a definition of those elements
in terms of set ratios of a'toms of specified sizes; a new element is formed by the addition or subtraction of atoms of a
16 The instance of Emuedocles' definition of bone seems
to be unique, according to.1Ieta. 1.10, 993al7-20, although
Aristotle says that Emuedocles would have applied it more widely.
~
-
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.
17
speci.f.1c size.

Thus this definition of simple bodies and,

by implication, more complex ones as well is in terms of certain proportions of atoms; and this is obviously the way in
which Democritus defined what physical objects really are,
that is, what their essential form is.
And this is evidently also the way in which he defined

--

the essence of man according to Aristotle at On the Parts of
Animals

-

1.1, 640b28-35; what is given is not simply a 'mate-

rial explanation•, 18 but a 'formal' one--the whole point of
the specific mention of Democritus' attempt being that he had
indeed given more than a simply 'material explanation':
"For the nature of a physiqal object which takes account of the structure (µop~~) is more essential that
its material nature. And so, if every animal and each
of their parts were determined by their outward shape
and their coloration, Democritus would be right, for
this is what he seems to suppose. At any rate, he says
that it is evident to everyone w4at sort of a thing a
man is as to his structure (µop~~) inasmuch as he is
known by his outward shape (axflµa) and coloration."
Thus Democritus would say that a man's real atomic structure

..

(µop~~)

can be determined by correspondence to the appearance

1 7see Caelo 3.4, 303a24-29; 3.7, 305b20-25.

This matter
is taken up in chapter three in the section on "The Structure
of Physical Objects. 11 This atomic structure, apparently simpler in the case of the 'elements', is thus evidently meant to
apply to other objects as well, although in those cases the
structure would obviously be more complex.
18 cherniss,
·
· ' p. 25 9, apparen tl yin
· th·is in·
.£12.• .£1:.!.,
stance follows Langerbeck in seeing a definition in terms only
of outward appearance and says that Aristotle's objection to
it is that this is an asnect of 'material cause'. But Aristotle does not here raise this objection, whereas he does
praise Democritus at the end of this chapter for his pioneer
attempts at a formal cause; and this latter point seems decisive.
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that he presents.
It seems evident from the above that the xa\ at Metaphysics 13.4, 1078b20 is not explanatory, but conjunctive;
Democritus had touched on definition and 'formal cause• far
beyond the scope of merely defining heat and cold.
Thus we may summarize in the following way what is in
Democritus' teaching the analogue of 'essential form•, that
which Democritus used in giving explanations of objects as
they essentially are, from the point of view of 'form', and so
in giving 'formal causes'.

The essential form for Democritus,

that which indicates precisely 'what an object really is'-apart from what it appears to be--is a fixed ratio of atoms,
with the size atom predominating determining more specifically
its nature.
Aside from this Democritus is said to have defined after
a fashion both 'what is hot' and 'what is cold'.

'What is

hot' is likewise defined in terms of atoms, this .time atoms of
a specific geometrical figure--spherical atoms which prqduce
in us the sensation of heat.

But what is meant by a defini-

tion of 'what is cold' is a bit more obscure; Democritus evidently did not define it in terms of atoms of a specific geometrical figure, thus providing a definition in the same category as 'what ~s hot•. 1 9 !he only indication that we might
have for such a definition--though it is highly conjectural-1 9compare Gen. et Corr. 1.8, 326a3-6, where Aristotle
specifically notes-Democritus' failure to do so in spite of
'hot' and 'cold' being contraries in the same set.

r
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is to be found at

Q£ Generation

~

Corruption 1.9, 327ai6-19,

where Aristotle describes the same body being now liquid, now
frozen solid (o~e µev uyp~v 0~£
seems likely, thenen~yo'

oe

nen~y6,--327al7).

If, as

refers to ice, and cold is indeed

to be connected with the 'contraction' which seems to take
place, 20 then 'what is cold' is likely to have been defined
by Democritus in terms of the arrangements of atoms in an object: ouot ~pon~ xa\ 5ta8ty~, xaeanep Atyel 6~µoxpt~O'
327al8-19.
Since this type of definition of the physical object's
'essential form' is made in terms of the real atomic structure
of such objects, we have in fact already considered a number
of Aristotle's criticisms of Democritus' theory of 'formal
cause', when in the last chapter we considered the theory of
the atomic structure of physical objects.
briefly, they are the following.

To review them

1) Such 'form' is inadequate

because it denies in fact the real Unity of physical objects;
for example, in the last cited instance of 'definition' Aristotle objects on the grounds that "we see the same body

~ ~

continuu.m now liquid, now frozen solid" opwµev OE ~o au~o
' ov
,, o~e
• \ µev
' uypov
• ' o~e
• \ oe' nenr)Yo<;
, ) • 21 2) Then
owµa
ouvexe'
t

...,

"

'

I

'

(

there is the objection at Metaphysics 4.5 that such an 'essential form' leaves no persi~tent aspect of the physical object,
20 Guthrie, History, II, 441, indicates that there is a
tradition for such a connection.
21

~. et Corr. 1.9, 327al6-17.
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because each minute change in the object makes it in fact a
different object:

e~L

o'

&~lWOOµEV a6~ou~ UTIOAaµ~aVelV

xa1

UAADV ~•Va o6o(av ElVal ~WV ov~wv ~ OU~E x(VDOl~ ~Tiapxel ou~e
'
"
L
'
~eopa
ou~e
ycVEOl~
~o

napanav--1009a36-38.

So on Democritus'

theory to seek a permanent truth about a physical object would
be like seeking something which is constantly fleeting:
TIE~oµEva OlwxElV--1009b39.

~a

3) Finally, in the same chapter of

the metaphysics, by Democritus' view there would be no real
way to know such a persistent truth or 'essential form' because only what is sensible really exists: ~a o' ~v~a un~\a~ov

'j

el Val

'

~a

I

'

a•a8n,rt:a µovov--1010a2-3.

In these criticisms

Aristotle's position seems certainly to be justified.
The second type of· criticism which Aristotle levels
against Democritus' theory of 'formal cause' is one apparently not leveled against Democritus'

'form~

gua form, but one

which is made on the grounds that it is inadequate and hence
unsatisfactory because it is not related to an attempt to explain in terms of 'final cause'.

Thus the basic charge made

is that this sort of explanation is incomplete and misguided
by the neglect of the 'final cause', that knowing what an object is for and what is its proper functioning does indeed contribute something substantial to our knowledge of that object.

'
But since this ·type of criticism
will be taken up in more detail in a separate section, it seems appropriate here simply
to point out this sort of reaction on Aristotle's part as it
occurs in contexts where Democritus' theory of 'formal cause'
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is brought up as an issue.
First of all, in Physics 2.2, after mentioning Democritus• touching on the 'formal cause•, Aristotle points out that
aside from knowing the matter and the form, it is also the
place of natural knowledge to know the purpose and end of any
object:
[cpuolxiii;;

'b;l

1:0 oJ

EVO<.a

xal 't~ 1:EAO<,; rrvwp(t,;e,v] -rii<;; au-rfj<,;

buo-r~µ-r)<,;] (194a27-28), because artificial -objects

are used to some purpose and natural objects are in the process of development to some end and are indeed (or, have) an
end in themselves:

L
\
""
eoµev yup
nw<,; xat
IJµEt<,;
-r€A.o<,; --194a35.
I

'

Again, Democritus' attempt at 'form' is mentioned at
Metaphysics 13.4, 1078bl9-21, but there is here no immediate
criticism or apparent reaction on Aristotle's part; but,
though it is not specifically directed against Democritus,
there may well be a reaction to his type of 'form' at Metaphysics 14.6, 1092b26-28:

"What is the good when things are

composed of numbers by the mixture being in a certain number,
whether that number is calculable or a complex ratio? 1122 Such
an account of form has no account of the object's good, its
usefulness for something, its proper function--and hence it is
not an adequate account.
And finally, at On the Parts of Animals 1.1, Democritus•
definition of form is agaitl mentioned, and, where an instance
is· given of Democritus' application of form to physical objects, Aristotle criticizes it on the grounds that if fails to
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consider the function of that object:
~o tau~n~ epyov--64la2-3.

Then later in this Chapter, when

Democritus' general attempt at 'form' is mentioned (642b26),
Aristotle immediately points to the contribution of Socrates
.

and his view of the 'useful excellence'

'

<~nv

XPDOtµov

ape~~v

--642b29) and the advantage of explaining things like respiration from the point of view of their purpose:
v

OU'tW~,

"<'
OlOV

v

O~l

•!..

~O~t

\
µEV

L

'

\

uVUTIVO~ ~OUOt

oe'x~eov

o'

L
xuptV
--642b31-32.

The Efficient Cause
The account which Demo.cri tus gives of 'efficient causation' is really quite clear and consistent; it is all reduced
to a mechanical, forced locomotion--one atom or set of atoms
in motion strikes another atom or set of atoms, and this induces in the latter either a movement or a new movement in the
void.
Since the atoms of Democritus are not capable of being
affected in themselves, they are only subject to change of
place; and so all real motion such as change, increase and
decrease, generation and corruption are reduced to a matter of
the locomotion of atoms.

This, Aristotle rightly recognizes

in a passage in the Physics; though the passage does not mention the atomists specific~lly, it obviously refers to them. 2 3
2 3Physics 8.9, 265b23-29. Motion is explained by these
men in terms of the void (eta ~o xevov--265b26) and the movement is that of atomic bodies ( 'tWV a-toµwv OWµ(h:;Jv--265b29) •
Simplicius, In Physicorura, p. ,1318.t line 32, describes them as
the 'school of Democritus•--c~ nept ~nµ6xpt~ov.
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These atomists, Aristotle points out, claim that the only real
motion that takes place is locomotion, movement in place:
oJ~o• ~~v .xa~a ~onov x(v~o1v x•vercea1 ~~v ~uo1v Afyouo 1v

(265b25); all other types of motion are reduced in reality to
locomotion of atomic bodies:

"They suppose that none of the

other types of motion are properties of their primary atomic
bodies, but are only connected with those objects which are
composed of these atoms, for they say that increase, decrease,
and alteration occur when atomic bodies join and disperse"-265b27-29.
This means, furthermore, that all accounts of motion are
accounts of 'forced' motion in the strict sense; there is in
Democritus no natural motion of atoms, as there is a primeval
and primary 'down-ward rain of atoms' in the systems of Epicurus and Lucretius.

In spite of the fact that Democritus'

atoms have weight, their weight in the vast, directionless,
infinite expanse of void does not give them a 'natural motion'
in some direction (Physics 4.8, 215a8-9) in and of themselves.
They are in fact under the influence of 'forced motion', with
'squeezing out'

(ex8A1po~1evov--Caelo

4.2, 310al0) describing

not only their accounts of upward motion, but also such physical processes as breathing (Resp. 4); one atom is only affected
in that it is qtruck by anoiher:
~(q ~wv 0~01xe(wv--Caelo

UAAO un' UAAOU

x1ver~a1

3.2, 300bll-12.

And this sort of mechanical, forced locomotion is held
by Democritus to apply consistently at all levels of complex-
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ity of structure; and it is in his view the only one which
really applies as an efficient cause.
This is most obviously true at the level of the individual atom, as Aristotle points out, for example, at _Q!! Genera~

tion

Corruption 1.8; an atom has no absolute heaviness or

lightness as an inherent property ( ~ap~~~~

... µn

oe

xa) xou~o~~,

~napset--326a7-8), and hence no natural upward or

downward motion; it likewise has no hardness or softness so
as to be inherently affected (326a8); it is indeed unable to
be affected (anaee,) apart from the fact that its locomotion
can be changed.

Any action and passion that occurs on this
level occurs by contact, 24 and is thus a 'forced', mechanical
change of motion.
It applies as well to such physical objects as complex
as human beings.

Democritus had said, according to Aristotle

at On the Soul 1.3, 406bl5-22, that the soul's own motion and
its setting the body into motion are to be described in such
terms of mechanical, forced motion, much like the wooden
statue of Venus is said to have been given movement:

the

spherical atoms in locomotion drag the whole body with it and
thus set it in motion. 2 5
There
esses which

:J.
~J

~re,

furthermore, a whole series of natural proc-

D~mocritus

24 Gen. et Corr. 1. 8 ' 325a32-33:

"'

i;\

TIOlElV vE

xat\

L

TIUOXElY

L
- an~oµeva.
---r--~uyxuvouotv

2 5406b20-22:
•

described as being caused precisely in

•

•

xtvouµcva~ yap cp~ot ~~~ ~otatp~~ou~ a~a(pa,

OUVE<pt°AXElV.XUl

XtVELV

~O OWp.a nO.v.
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this way.

All the way from conception and the cradle to. their

death animate creature and the natural processes that take
place in them are described by Democritus in terms of such
mechanical and artificial efficient causes reminiscent of the
'wooden statue of Venus' at On the Soul 1.3, "just as if they
were animals made of wood or stonen (wonep suA(vwv ~ At8(vwv
~~W'iL.-Gen. Anim. 2.4, 740al5-16).

And Aristotle also says in the same chapter (Gen. Anim.
2.4, 740a36-38) that Democritus claims that the foetus stays
in the womb because there its parts are mechanically formed
and modeled

(6LanAa~~~al--740a38)

after the corresponding

parts of its mother. 26
Later in the same work, at On the Generation of Animals
4.3-4, Aristotle cites explanations in the area of genetic
development which are likewise described in this same mechanistic way.

First of all, in the latter portion of book four,

chapter three of this work Aristotle describes a theory which
he fails to identify specifically with any individual; it is
an explanation in terms of navonepµ(a, which most probably be26 cherniss, ou. cit., p. 288, note 255, conjectures--on
the grounds that Aetius, Placita 5.16.1, says that Democritus
claimed that the foetus is nourished in the womb--that what
Democritus likely really said was that the foetus merely required food derived from its mother that it may grow into human form. But this interp~etation is only a supposition on
Cherniss' part; the citation from Aetius in itself does not
justify Cherni.ss' interpretation of Aristotle; and Aristotle's
statement is quite clear and is not at all inconsistent with
that of Aetius--the specific food that the foetus gets from
its mother as nourishment might very well determine mechanically the way in which it develops.
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longs to Democritus. 27

The term navonepµ(a certainly seems

strongly to suggest Democritus, and so does the context.

At

769al7-20 Empedocles and Democritus are distinguished from
those who cannot in principle show why a daughter may in certain respects take after her father; and one type of explanation which can account for such genetic developments is the
one in which the semen from which the child develops is described as a navonepµ(a (769a26-29).
says, seems quite artificial

This account, Aristotle

(nAaoµa~(a~--769bl),

a remark

which is certainly reminiscent of what Aristotle had said
about Democritus' reason for the foetus staying in the womb
(

01anAa~~rp;a1).

This theory, Aristotle continues (769b3-10),

though complex, does attempt to explain a number of genetic
developments; and the last on the list which this theory explains is the reason for monstrosities.

Then, after an expla-

nation of what is meant by 'monstrosities', the first theory
which Aristotle mentions is that of Democritus--4.4, 769b33ff.
All of these factors seem to make it highly likely that the
theory of navorrepµ(a here in question is indeed that of Democritus.
This theory of navonepµ(a explains family resemblances
to either father, mother, or oore remote ancestors by taking
the semen to b.e a 'seed-miiture' of great variety (navcrnepµ(av
elva( ~iva noAAWV--769a29); the semen is thus a random sampling

27 cherniss, op. cit., p. 284, note 243, denies that it
belongs to DemocritUs and would rather attribute it to Plato.
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of a large variety of ingredients (769a31-34); and the offspring's (atomic) structure resembles that of the ancestor
from whom the largest proportion of ingredients was derived:
a~' oJ yap ~v ~WV yevvwv~wv TIA£ro~ov £yy€vryta, ~OU~~ y(veo8al
~~v µop~~v eo,xo~--769a34-36.
'

\

I

Just as the predominance of

atoms of a certain size determines the nature of the element,
so the predominance of seeds of a given kind in a certain proportion determines the nature of certain features of the offspring28--and the explanation is purely mechanical.
And Democritus' explanation of 'monstrosities' is equally mechanical; it is now taken up at the beginning of .QE..
Generation of Animals 4.4, at 769b32ff.

~

Such monstrosities,

in Democritus' view, are the result of two copulations; when
the foetus has begun to develop as a result of the first copulation, the semen from the second comes and joins With it, and
some parts of the body are thus fused and altered. 2 9 The
efficient cause in this instance is again external and mechanical.
28 The constituents of the semen represent constituents
from each part of the body (compare Gen. Anim. 4.1, 764a6-ll)
and so it is likely that the nature of each part of the body
is determined by the predominance of a specific kind of atom
in that part. And, since both parents contribute materially
to the offspring, Democritus can thus explain why this offspring can resemble one parent in one respect and another in
another respec~.
'
2 9The text seems corrupt here, but the sense of the passage is clear enough. This citation certainly supports the
view of the mechanical formation in the womb as described at
Gen. Anim. 2.4; if the foetus were thought to have an internal
principle of development, it is not likely to be affected by
the semen of a second copulation.
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-----

Once more in On the Generation of Animals Aristotle

--

cites a further instance of this type of explanation by Democritus.

The matter under discussion is the 'falling out' of

front teeth in animate creatures.
remarks on the subject

Aristotle cites Democritus'

(~. ~·

5.8, 788bl2-14) as follows:

these teeth grow prematurely, and the explanation which Democritus gives for this is an external efficient cause--the suckling of the offspring is the cause of it (~o e~A~'E'v al~ta~a'--788bl4);

and this early growth of these teeth--a growth

which was mechanistically induced--is also the reason for
their 'falling out•:

£xn(n~ElV

µtv Ota

~0

npo

wpa,

y(VE08aL

(788bl2).
And this same sort of explanation is seen too in Democritus' account of breathing, which we have already outlined
in connection with his theory of the soul; this account is
found most fully at Q£ Respiration 4, 47lb30-472al6.

The ef-

ficient cause of breathing, according to Democritus in Aristotle's account, is external pressure from the environmental
air:
~o,.30

ouyxpLVOµEVWV oJv ao~wv

uno

~OU neplEXOV~o' ex8A(~ov-

Thus the entire process of breathing in and out is

described in terms of pressure, relief of pressure by the
counter-pressure of the spherical atoms which enter, and then

'
again by the external pressure
from the air.
Furthermore, in this same context Aristotle gives witness
30472a5-6; see also Aristotle's remark on this at
472a23-24: EOW8EV ~ apx~ ~YJ~ avanvo~~ y(VE~Ql xa' ~~' XLV~OEW'
oux ~, ~,a,oµfvou ~oG nEptfxov~o~.
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to a similar, utterly mechanistica1 explanation of death
(742al2-16) by Democritus.

Death, according to Democritus,

occurs when this dynamic equilibrium between pressure and
counter-pressure fails, when the pressure of the environmental
air gains the mastery (o'tav yap

xpa't~

'to

nepllxov cruveAr~ov --

472al2) and such soul-atoms which were once useful in maintaining the counter-pressure are squeezed out.
So in the system of Democritus not only the atoms, the
elements, and inanimate objects are subject to only a 'forced',
mechanistic efficient cause, but so too are animate creatures.
From the cradle to the grave even human beings are subject to
it alone--so consistently and persistently did Democritus apply this manner of explanation in terms of 'efficient cause'.
But not only does Democritus say that this is the kind
of explanation which applies now, but it has elso applied from
eternity.

For time, Democritus claims, is ungenerated; it

always was:
25lbl7.

'tOV

yap XPOVOV

ay€Vryt"OV

elva' --Physics 8.1,

And so, although the phenomenal objects of this world

are seen to come and go--to come into existence and to pass
out of existence--this cannot be so in the case of all things;
there must be some things which did not come into existence:
oia -i;o{ho tiT)µ.oxpl'to<; ye oe(x.vuoiv
vai __ 25lbl5-17.

we;

6.ouva'l:oV

ll.nav'ta

yeyovf.-

And these'ungenerated things--existing from

all eternity--are evidently Democritus' atoms; and their reaction on impact under the same circumstances has always been
the same.

And it is to this principle that Democritus refers

286
the Causes Of natural objects:

1

o' llT)µox.pl'tO<;

avc1y£l 'tat;

l ( VE'tO

TIEPL

cpuoew<;

35.

What is happening now on the real, atomic level has been

' ,

Ul'tlU<;,

E<p

, ,

..
W<;

OU'tW XUL 'tO npo'tepov
"

' '

~y

#

--252a34-

happening from eternity--this same mechanistic, forced motion:
any time.combination A of atoms collides in a given way with
combination B, C always has resulted.
This system of explanation does indeed go back to infinity; there is according to Democritus no prior efficient cause
of this motion of the atoms--none like the vou<; of Anaxagoras
or like 'Love' and 'Strife' in Empedocles system:
'
µev

ou10 £µ ( av

UL'tLUV--Physics 8.9, 265b23-24.
I

,

'tOLUO'tTJV

There is in this

system no original source of the mechanical motion of the
atoms, and the remark of Aristotle at ivTetanhysics 1.4, 985bl920 does in this sense apply to Democritus:

the atomists neglected the question of the source of motion.3 1
This statement about neglect of a primary efficient
cause is taken up again by Aristotle at Qg

~

Heavens 3.2;

and this deliberate neglect means, as Aristotle there points
out and as Democritus was evidently aware, that, since all
movement is forced, there is an infinite regress in looking
· for the primary efficient cause:

A's movement was caused by

B's, which in turn was caused by C's • • • ad infinitum:
.

'

el,

3lThe significance of this statement of Aristotle--nepl
0 E: XL VDO £W<; oe EV • • • UTCapl; E: l 'tO r<; oJa l
• • • &.cpd. aa v--I believe is broader and, as we shall see, will apply to Democritus' failure to distinguish natural from artificial objects;
the former have their source of motion internal to them, and
the latter have it external to them.
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UTietpov yap

aAA ael
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ElOtV,
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µ11 'ta
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-i;o Tipo-i;epov
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EO'!;Ul
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xa-i;a <pvOlV

XlVOUµEVOV

XlV~OEl

XlVOUV 'ITpmov,

--Caelo 3.2,

300bl4-l6.
This means in turn that this series of forced movements
is 'natural' (with a meaning which for Aristotle is somewhat
broader than his own); that is, he recognizes it in Democritus' system as that which is analogous to his own use of
'natural'.

He says at Qg the Heavens 3.2, 30la7-9:

"for the

'natural' state of affairs is that which most objects have
over the majority of time."

Thus for Democritus--as paradox-

ical as it sounds in Aristotle's terms--the 'natural' kind of
motion is 'forced' motion; and there is thus in fact no distinction at all between natural and forced motion.
We have already touched to a certain extent on Aristotle's criticism of forced motion in Democritus--and thus on the
efficient cause in Democritus--in the second chapter in connection with the void.

It will thus be appropriate here sim-

ply to recapitulate some of the objections which we have seen
that Aristotle had already raised against this kind of an account of efficient cause and then proceed to further criticisms of his particularly in terms of the efficient cause in

...

animate objects.
First of all, Aristoile points out that a theory like
that of Democritus, which recognizes only forced motion and
takes no account of its sources, offers in fact no rational
explanation of the motion in the universe.

With an infinite
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number of movents, there will also be an infinite number of
motions, as Aristotle points out at Q!! the Heavens 3.2,

d 6'

300b34-30lal:

U'ITEl

'j
xatov ane:tpouc; e:tvat.
-

I

#

pa -ra Xl vo0v-ra, xa\ -rue; cpopac; 6.vay-

This is--inasmuch as an infinity is in-

volved--in principle unintelligible and irrational; it amounts
to a claim for disorderly motion over an infinite period of
time.

Thus, in this respect, a primary movent like the

of Anaxagoras is more appropriate to the order that we see in
the uni verse:
A.a~erv·

'tot xe: o 'E -ro0-r6 ye a6-ro xaA.wc; 'Avac;ayopac;

axtv'f)'rwv yap ~pxe-rat xooµonoterv

tc;

--30lal2-13.3 2

The idea of xooµoc; in xooµono t e:rv is important, for we do see
orderliness of motion in the universe; and this orderliness
manifests itself, for one thing, in natural motion:
e:xov-ra

L
~upoc;

"
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'tUv'tDV

I

I
'
E'ITl

L
µ~oov,

'tO
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o~ xooµoc; e:xe:t
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-ra'

'
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XOU~O'tT)'tU

'
-ra' µe:v
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L
6tuO'taOlV
--300b24-2 6 •

We see

ordered and natural motion, but Democritus posited disorder
and forced motion as the only motion there is; and so Democritus' explanation has less basis in empirical evidence than
that of Aristotle.
Leucippus (and hence also Democritus) is said to have
posited motion as an eternal activity (Meta. 12.6, 107lb32--

aet

lvtpye:iav ), but does not explain motion:

xat 'tlVU OU
'

#

I

L
A~youotv,

ou6 , t
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aA.A.a 6ta -r(
'tDV Ul'tlUV --1 0 71 b 33'
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#

32This is brought up again by Aristotle at metaphysics
1.4, 985a18-b2, bl9-20. The contrast with Empedocles and
Anaxagoras is taken up in the remark toward the end of the
u
chapter in regard ta_ the atomists: ne:pt' oe:' xtv." '1oe:wc; oee:v
•
L
(:
'
• • • UTiup...,,et
'tOl<;
OUOl.

r
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34.

But Aristotle objects that motion is not simply random:

OOOeV yap~~ E~UXe X&Vel~Ul--107lb34-35; but it does indeed

show some distinction--and precisely a distinction between
natural and forced motion:

~~TIEp VUV ~UOEL µev

~~TIO vou ~ &AAou w6(--107lb35-36.

wo(,

p(q

oe

We have already cited

Aristotle's evidence for such a distinction; it is to be
found, for example, at Qg the Heavens 4.2 and at Physics 4.8.
In the former passage it will be recalled that Democritus'
theory of atomic immutables and absolute void cannot in principle account for the obvious natural movements of the traditional elements, either in terms of proportions of solids or
in terms of proportions of void in the object under consideration. 33

At Physics 4.8 the objection is raised that a thrown

object will display characteristics of both natural and
forced motion:

a higher rate of speed if the forced motion

is in the same direction as the natural motion, and an increasing take-over by natural motion when it is not thrown in
the same direction as its natural motion (215al4-l7).
But the evidence thus far adduced by Aristotle has been
related to inanimate objects and elements; but there is a further and more particular issue on the matter of the ·efficient
cause involved in the case of animate creatures.

These more

' have their principle of movement,
obviously and more uniquely
33see especially Caelo 4.2, 309a2-18. Even the mechanistic explanation of 'squeezing out•· (ex8AtPoµevov) is seen
to be obviously unsatisfactory, for it means that a large
quantity of air will be heavier than a small quantity of
earth; and this is contrary to available evidence--310al0-13.
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their immediate efficient cause, within themselves--whether
this be of mere growth, of locomotion, or of rational and
ethical activity.

But the consistent and mechanistic system

of ·Democritus seems regularly to deny this, since his explanation of efficient causality seems to operate primarily as
something external even to animate creatures.

And herein lies

a fundamental point of issue between Democritus and Aristotle.
In the first place there seems to be some real evidence,
Aristotle claims, to indicate that for animate creatures an
external and purely mechanistic efficient cause is not an adequate explanation of some events and processes which occur in
them.

This Aristotle points out in two separate but related

instances at On the Generation of Animals 2.4; there in the
latter part of the chapter the matter under discussion is the
development of the embryo in the womb.
The order in which the parts of the embryo are formed
Aristotle sees as important, for the development is obviously
a natural process with an internal principle of developmental
formation into something specific.

Democritus had, he says,

wrongly held that the external portions of an embryonic animal
are formed first, and the internal portions only later:
6T)µch.pt'to~, 'ta 'tt;,w np<i'nov 6taxp(VEa8ai 'tWV t;;~wv, UO'tEpov
'

"(;U

I
~
EV'tu~

-740al3-14.

~nEp

oe

'
But Aristotle
objects that animals evi-

dently have an internal principle of development; and that
principle of development Aristotle sees as supplied by the
heart or--in the case of bloodless creatures--its counterpart
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in them. 34

But not only does reason demand that some internal

principle be the first f ormed--because this internal principle
is what distinguishes it as a natural object--but this development of the heart first is also substantiated by empirical
fact:

--740a3-5.

Thus Democritus, he justifiably claims, is wrong

not only in principle, but also in fact; Democritus' mistaken
principle, Aristotle would claim, had led him to make a statement which upon closer examination is contradicted by fact.
Aristotle again raises a similar objection a little later in this sa.rae chapter.

Democritus, as we have seen (740a36-

38), had claimed that the embryo stays in the womb because
there it has its parts mechanistically molded to resemble its
mother.

This again is a denial of an internal principle of

the development of the embryo, and, furthermore, it runs counter to another piece of empirical evidence

~avepov--740bl):

animals produced in eggs have their parts developed inside the
egg quite apart from the direct mechanistic influence of their
mothers (740bl-3).

Thus in these two respects Democritus'

system of explanation by efficient cause in the case of animals
is directly contradicted by empirical evidence.

Evidently then

' there is likely something wrong
both in principle and in fact
3 4740al7-18: ~a ~ev yap ~Olau~· o6x EXEl ~PXDY OAW~,
~a oe ~Qa nav~· EXEl xaL EY~O~ EXEl. OlO npWi:ov ~ xapo(a
~a(ve~a' OlWplOµev~ TIUOl ~or~ eva(µol~.
Similarly at Gen.
Anim. 2.6, 742b35-38; one mi~ht note here that in the a'iirmal
realm this is a question of oeev ~ x(v~o(~ £o~Lv.
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with this sort of explanation.
Again roughly the same sort of criticism is.raised by
Aristotle at On the Generation of Animals 4.4 against Democritus' account of the development of monstrosities.

Democri-

tus had chosen to name the male sperm from a second copulation
as the external efficient cause of monstrosities.

But, Aris-

totle retorts, such monstrosities seldom occur in the case of
animals that produce only one offspring at a time and are much
more frequent in animals that produce a number of offspring at
a time--and that from one semen and one copulation:

~s

on~pµa~o~

Thus,

nAe{w

y(veoGat

xa1 µ&ff~ ouvouo(a~ --770al.

~vo~

Aristotle says, it seems preferable to suppose an internal
cause for the developing of the foetus also when monstrosities
occur:
auvto'taµevoi~ wJ-f)p.aotv

e{va&

--770a6-7.35

Furthermore, when

conjoined fetations do occur--as in twin eggs--these frequently develop into separate chicks and grow quite normally, while
a single f etation in an egg still does at times develop as a
monstrosity (770al4-24).
And finally, there is a similar neglect on Democritus'
part with respect to the cause of death.

There is an obvious

distinction between dying naturally of old age and dying con-

'
35cherniss, .21?.· cit., p. 285, claims that Aristotle's
objection is that this theory makes the male sperm responsible
for imperfection. Aristotle does not, however, see this objection as the most basic one; but it is considered because it
raises the larger issue of an internal principle of development and because the evidence points to the likelihood that
the cause is elsewhere than external.

for Democritus.

Hence it seems to Aristotle that any attempt

to explain things--particularly in regard to animate creatures--whi ch does not use purpose and function as explanatory
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factors is unduly limiting itself in its attempt to make
nature more intelligible to us.

So on these grounds too

Democritus' type of explanation by 'efficient cause' is inadequate; but such further inadequacies due to a neglect of purpose and functioning will be taken up more properly in connection with a separate section on the 'final cause'.
Thus Aristotle's criticisms of Democritus' 'efficient
cause' are in summary that Democritus' system of explanation
offers in fact no rational explanation of the motion in the
universe, that it fails to recognize an obvious distinction
between natural and forced motion, and that in animate creatures it persists in failing to use and internal efficient
cause which is evidently that which marks them off from nonnatural objects.

And finally, Democritus' system of explana-

tion unduly limits itself by not considering the function and
purpose of an object or a process in connection with 'efficient
cause'; indeed, most of Aristotle's criticisms of Democritus'
accounts of 'efficient cause' in animals are raised in conjunction with an insistence on the importance of considering the
'final cause' along with it.
Chance and Necessity
Closely related to Democritus' teaching on 'efficient

'

cause' is his teaching on 'necessity', for it is the motion
and impact of the atoms on one another and the mechanical
reaction of those atoms which are most precisely described by
Democritus as being 'necessary'.

Goedeckemeyer rightly dis-
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tinguishes three kinds of contexts in which 'necessary' is
used in reference to the teachings of Democritus:

the mechan-

ism of atomic impact, an eternal and indeterminate necessity,
and the necessity of the primeval whirl.3 6 And these three
types of usage of the term 'necessary', though distinguishable
in thought, are interrelated and are consistent parts of the
same teaching.
In this regard Democritus' general principle is formulated by Aristotle at Physics 8.1, 252a32-33 as "it is a sufficient principle if something either always exists in a certain way or always happens in a certain way" (apx~v e{vat
.l
c
./..
l. '
,, ,,
..,
,,
"
)
~au~~v ixav, 1v, 0~1 uet ~ ea~iv ou~w~ ~ y1yve~a1
; 37 thus,
ti

i· f

atoms and void and motion are eternal, they are simply and
absolutely necessary; one does not and ought not seek a further principle for them.

And the same is true of the mechani-

cal impact and reaction of atoms (under the same circumstances
they always happen the same way); this too is simply and absolutely necessary.

And, furthermore, Aristotle claims that

Democritus also refers his explanations concerning nature to
oc\

~

this principle:

e~

a{~(a~--252a23.

So, since the phenomena which we observe are

I

'

~~µuxp1~0~

I
L
avuyet

~a~
"

nepi'

~vaew~
.(

3 6 Albert Goedeckemey~r, Epikurs Verhaltnis zu Demokrit
in der Naturnhilosophie (Strassburg: Karl J. Trllbner, 1897),
pp. 32-34. He cites for each of these respectively Aetius,
Placita 1.26.2, Aristotle, Gen. Anim. 2.6, 742bl7, and Diogenes
Laertius 9.45.
~
37This passage does not contain the term 'necessary',
but for a similar statement of principle in which the term is
used see~· Anim. 2.6, 742bl7ff.
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in truth nothing but atoms moving mechanically in a certain
way in the void, phenomenal objects and processes obey the
same law of necessity; the fact that a given phenomenon has
occurred in a certain way under a specific set of circumstances in the past is a sufficient principle for establishing
its necessity:

w~ ou~w

xal

~o np6~cpov

ey(ve~o

--252a35.

But we need to examine some of the more specific evidence
in the light of this general statement of principle.

Among

those things which in Democritus' theory are necessary is the
motion of the atoms in the void; indeed, Democritus' claim for
the simple and absolute necessity of that motion provides the
reason for Aristotle's having mentioned Democritus' general
principle in the first place at Physics 8.1; this is the
subject-matter of the entire chapter--the question of the eternity of motion.

And motion is for

Democ~itus

eternal, but,

unlike Empedocles and Anaxagoras, he refused to attempt to explain it; it is one of those things which simply always is,
and any attempt to trace any particular motion of an atom or
the motion of all the atoms back to a beginning leads only to
a prior motion and impact of the same kind, and this again to
another of the same kind ad infinitum.3 8
Thus a further simple and absolute necessity is the law

' governs the atoms.
of motion which mechanically

And this is

what is described by Aetius in the Placita 1.26.2:

~~v av~i-

3 8 see the discussion of this above in this chapter at
pages 285ff.; see also Caelo 3.2, 300bl5-17.

r
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'tun(av xa't

cpopav xa'l nA.rwTiv 'tf)~ \JA.TJ<;;

and impact of the atoms."

--"the rebound, motion,

If this means anything at all, it

means that for any atom A which strikes atom B in a certain
way, a distinct and fixed kind of motion results; and this is
equally true for groups of atoms, whether simple or complex.
This endless series of motions and derived motions operates
under fixed mechanical laws which are described as absolutely
necessary; they are the ultimate and fundamental laws of nature; they are simply given as a first principle, and there is
no further reason for or explanation of them.
Now this absolute and fundamental atomic necessity manifests itself in phenomena and in the observable processes of
nature, for it is to this absolute principle of atomic necessity that Democritus refers his explanations about nature
(Physics 8.1, 252a34-35).

These natural phenomenal processes

are evidently true representations of the processes on the
atomic level, and so display an equally valid necessity; this
is a. direct corollary to the 'truth by correspondence' theory:
just as the phenomenal object is a true representation of the
object as atomically structured, so phenomenal processes are
true representations of atomic processes of movement.
This means, furthermore, that the other parts of the

' explanation ought to hold as well
general principle on atomic
on the phenomenal level of explanation.

One arrives at such

necessity on the phenomenal level by observing a number of
regularly occurring instances of the same phenomenal process;
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and when a given process occurs with sufficient and consistent
regularity, this may be taken as necessary, for it simply
ways happens in this way.39

al~

In these cases one ought to look

no further for an explanation, because, as Democritus says,
the instances of this process are limitless and indeterminate:
"the number of instances of what alvrays happens is limitless,
and to ask for a reason for such things is to seek a principle
for what is limitless (and so indeterminate). 1140

It is in

this way that on the phenomenal level one arrives at an ultimate and universal law of nature--something which is simply
'necessary'.
And it is thus quite likely that all of Democritus' explanations of natural processes--where they could indeed be
reduced to such a law of nature--were precisely of this kind.
Aristotle cites at least two such instances where such explanations were intended to be of a universal character.

In the

first such citation Democritus is said to have explained the
sterility of mules on the grounds that the mules' genital

'to

39 11 ~t regularly happened so in the PE}St"--ou'tw xa)
7tpO'tEpov £y1yve~o (Physics 8.1, 262a35).
avayx~ • • • O'tl
OU'tW<; ae\ y(VE'tU1 --Gen. Anim. 2.6, 742bl9.
40'tO
'

o,

u
'
I
'
'
anE1pov,,_WO'tE
'tO
epunuv
'tO
01u
't ( 7tEpl' 'tWV
'tOlOU'tWV 'tlVO~ 'tO ~rytElV e(va( ~~01 'tOU ane(po~ aP.X~V --~.
I

L '
UE~

"

Anim. 2.6, 742b22-24. It,seems evident that apx~ here does
not mean 'beginning', but 'principle'; the former meaning
would make nonsense of Aristotle's retort that in the instance
of a triangle there is some 'principle' and reason for its
having its angles equal to two right angles. Cherniss, .2£·
cit., p. 179, note 146, feels that Aristotle is tampering with
Democritus' meaning of cl Et.
But there is no real reason to
suppose this.

r
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passages were destroyed by the joining of two animals of different species

(~.

Anim. 2.8, 747a30-32).

And this explana- ·

tion Aristotle specifically says was meant to be a universal
one (tni nav~wV--747a28).

--

And again at On the Generation of

-

.

AniCTals 5.8, 788bl2-14 Democritus is said to have claimed
that suckling causes the front teeth to develop prematurely
and hence later to drop out; and this too was a universal
statement:

xa8oAou AEyEL ~~v a(~(av--788bl2.

And beside

these, it is implied at Qg the Generation of Animals 2.6 that
Democritus' account of the progressive development of the foetus was this sort of an explanation.

Democritus is said to

have held that the external parts of animals develop first, 41
and then several lines later (740a36-38) Aristotle notes that
according to Democritus the embryo stays in the womb in order
to be mechanically formed like the mother; and finally at
2. 6 ,; where the matter of the development of the foetus is still
under discussion, Aristotle raises the question of Democritus'
principle about explanation of things which always happen in a
certain way (742bl7ff.).

Thus it is certainly strongly im-

plied that all of Democritus' explanations of the development
in the womb of the mother were precisely of this nature--a
universal law of nature on the phenomenal level.
Finally; the cosmic 'whirl (

o(v~)

as a necessity referred

to by Diogenes Laertius at 9.45 is a special case.

It is quite

41 Gen. Anim. 2.4, 740al3-15; Aristotle remarks that this.
leaves them vii th no internal principle of development, and this
is the error of Democritus' 'necessity' at 2.6, 742b34-38.

r

300

likely that it was described by Democritus as 'being the result of chance', and so the matter will be taken up shortly in
connection with a discussion of 'chance' in the teaching of
Democritus.

But, to anticipate slightly, there is no .reason

to believe that it was any exception to the utterly mechanical
laws of impact and rebound of the atoms.

And if that law

holds, then this universe, according to Democritus, is and was
and evermore shall be from the lowest rock to the highest creature an unbelievably complex machine-like structure, a perpetual motion machine.

And this is indeed the tenor of Democri-

tus' teaching on necessity; and this is precisely the way in
which Plutarch summarizes it:

e~

ane(pou XPOVOU npoxa~txeo8al
•

42

Now Aristotle's criticisms of Democritus' teachings on
necessity are quite clear and hardly very complex.

First of

all, Democritus had claimed to be giving universal explanations, but for those examples of universal explanation cited
the facts do not warrent the claim for universality.

Democri-

tus had apparently made the claim universal that animals develop their external parts first.

And Aristotle's response to

this is that it just is not factual, for empirical evidence
tells us that the heart is the first part which becomes distinct:

'
Oto UTibxp(ve~aL np&'rrov

Dxapo(a

evepye(q.

'
xal

-

~ou~o

00 µovov ent ~Yi~ alae~aew~ O~AOV--Gen. Anim. 2.4, 740a3-5.

4 2l?lutarch], Stromateis 7 (Diels-Kranz 68A39).
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Again Democritus made a universal statement about animals
cross-bred between different species being sterile; and Aristotle's reply is again that this is simply not the case;
other animals beside mules cross-breed between species, and
yet their offspring do in fact produce progeny:
e~' ~~EpWV s~WV 't'OU~O µev unapXELV, yevvav
~·

Anim. 2.8, 747a33-34.

oe

ouµ{3a(ve, o'

µ~oev ih"'toV

And once more Democritus had made

a universal statement about the mechanical development and
later dropping of front teeth; and again Aristotle's counterclaim is that Democritus had simply not considered all or
enough cases

(

OUI

yap
'

I
'
L
L
ETil
TiuV'tWV
OXEWuµEVO~

--7 88 bll ) ; Aristotle

then simply goes on and cites a number of cases in which Democritus' claim just does not hold true.

Thus in general Democri-

tus' mistake in this respect lay precisely in that he had made
universal statements which were simply not universally true:
'tou'to

µev oJv

'fiµap'te xaeoA.ou A.eywv, ou oxe1Jtc1µevo~

'to

ouµ{3ar-

, '
..t
vov ETIL
nuv'twv
__ 788bl7-18.

In the second place, Aristotle says, Democritus' very
principle of necessity is itself a categorical statement:
there is no further explanation beyond the fact that something
either always is or always occurs in a certain way.

But Aris-

totle on two separate occasions shows that this very categorical statement is not unive;sally true. 43 In both instances
Aristotle cites propositions from geometry--the angles of a
4 3Physics 8.1, 252a35-b5; see especially 252bl-2: o'tt
o' en\ nav'twv, oux opew~.
Also~· Anim. 2.6, 742b24-30.
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triangle equal two right angles, and the side of a square and
its diagonal are incommensurate--which are always true and for
which there is a reason, an explanation, and demonstration.
And, lastly, at On the Parts of Animals 1.1, 642a3lff.,
as Democritus' theory and meaning of 'what is' and 'what is
not' was too limited, so, Aristotle says, is his notion of
'necessity' too limited.

Democritus' theory of necessity had

neglected a meaning of 'necessary' which involves purpose,
function, or 'final cause'.

There is, Aristotle claims, a

meaning of 'necessary' that does involve purpose:

if object

A is to have purpose or function or goal B, it is necessary
that it have or be characterized by C; if it is the purpose of
man to contemplate, it is necessary that he have a certain organ or capacity which will perform that function:
& 'µev
'
onµa ( veL

o~e

u
o~L

et exetvo
11

-

avayxn ~O~tY exetv--642a32-34.

"

eo~at

'\v

~o

ou evexa,

~ 0

1

avayxn

-

~au~a

Necessity is not at all incom-

patible with purpose or final cause, and Democritus' neglect
of the latter unduly narrov7S his view of 'necessity'.

But

more on that soon.
Now, in returning to the teaching of Democritus, we need
to consider briefly the further question of vn1ether in this
absolutely determined universe there is a factor like 'chance'.

' complicated by the fact that ArisAnd this question is further
totle at Physics 2.4--though he does not mention Democritus by
name--presents three apparently different views of the working
of 'chance'; and all three of these views have been identified

r
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with Democritus' teaching by later authors.
The first of these views is outlined at Physics 2.4,
196al-7; there Aristotle mentions the view that we would most
naturally connect with the teachings of Democritus in the
light of his relentless determinism, that 'chance' is not
really a factor at all in the operation of anything in the
universe, that in all the instances in which one ascribes
something to chance, one can in fact attribute it to some definite cause other than chance:
'tWV

ano

oµo(wc;

oe

xai ~Tit 'tWV UAAWV

'tUXT)c; Aeyoµlvwv ae( 'tL elvat AU~efv 'tO Ul'tLOV, aAA

1

oo 'tUXT)V--196a5-7.

This is the view which is attributed to
Democritus by Eudemus; 44 and this attribution is likely a correct one.
The second view is presented by Aristotle in the same
chapter at 196a24ff.

And this view is that the heavens and

the whirl (or vortex) which produced the universe (or universes) is a result of 'the automatic' and hence is due to
'chance'. 45 The meaning of this statement is in question.
44According to Simplicius, In Ph1sicorum, P.· 330, lines
'tO 0£ xaeanc:p 0 TIUAUL~c; A6yoc; 0 &:vat pwv rcr)v 1:~XT)V '
..t
"
TipO<; ui)µuxpt'l:OV eOLXEV ELpT)OOat
• • • OUuEVO<; <pT)OL d vat 'tT)V
'
'tUXT)V a{rc(av ava~£pwv £le; UAAU<; a{rc{ac; • • • oorcwc; yap
o'
E'uoT)µoc; io'topd'.

14ff.:
\

A

I

-

Is:,.

,

45r translate 'taurcoµ~1:ov as 'the automatic', following
Charlton, ££•·cit., p. 105, rather than as 'spontaneity' to
avoid "misleading connotations of acting out of free will."
Charlton, citing only the discussion of 3ailey, ££• cit., feels
that only this second view is to be attributed to Democritus.
The witness to the fact that this view also represents the
teaching of Democritus is again Simplicius, ~ Physicorum p.
331, lines 15ff.
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Kirk and Raven suppose that this means that the whirl does not
occur by the usual necessity and atomic laws of motion; they
claim:

"a vortex would presumably not necessarily arise out
of the circumstances of the first stage alone. 1146 And thus,
they say, the "whirl is called necessity because it produces
the necessary • • • collisions and unions of atoms"(p. 412,
note 1).

This view represented by Kirk and Raven seems to be

inadequate, for it does not explain why the heavens too as
they now are

(~oopavou ~ouoe--Physics

2.4, 196a25) are also

and apparently in the same sense said to be due to 'the automatic' or 'chance'; indeed, Aristotle makes much of the contrast between plants and animals close to us on the one hand
and the heavens on the other hand more remote from us in
space, of which Democritus teaches that the former are not due
to chance, while the latter is (196a28-b5); and the contrast
that Aristotle makes is not between 'necessity' and 'chance',
but between 'chance' and 'not by chance'.

And therefore, if

the whirl is called 'necessity' because it produces the necessary collisions of atoms, as Kirk and Raven claim, then this
certainly contradicts Aristotle's statement that 'the automatic' is responsible for the present heavens and universes
(196a25).

But surely we are not to suppose that both the

whirl and the·operating of' the present heavens are not subject
to the laws of atomic motion and are not the result of them!
And besides, what then are we to make of the statement that,
46 Kirk and Raven, .2.E.· cit., p. 411.
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according to Democritus, "everything from eternity is absolutely subject to necessity 11 (Diels-F..ranz 68A39)?

Certainly

this would have developed an irreparable inconsistency in the
system of Democritus, and Aristotle would surely have remarked
on it.
By far the most reasonable explanation of this statement
is that of Goedeckemeyer and the one accepted by Bailey;47
and that is to accept as well the third view listed by Aristotle at 196b5-9 as substantially that of Democritus too--that
'chance' is indeed a cause, but one unclear to human intelligence.

That this, as well as the first two views, represents

the teaching of Democritus is supported by a citation in Theodoret, stating that Democritus, among others, had named
a cause, but one unclear to human reason:

avepwn(v~ Aoy~.4B
'chance'?

a6DAOV

~UXD

al~(av

What then did Democritus really mean by

It evidently has a subjective meaning for an objec-

tive process which either because of its extreme complexity or
remoteness or both cannot be specifically attributed to atomic
movements and reactions of a definite kind.
describes it as a cause which

11

Goedeckemeyer

wegen der ari;al;(a ihrer objectiv

durchaus determinierten Bewegung dem Menschen zu einem Schluss
47 Goede.ckemeyer, .Q.E.,cit., pp. 37-40; Bailey, El?.· cit.,
pp. 139-143. .
· 48 Theodoret 6.15, as cited in Diels, Doxographi Graeci,
p. 326. One might note the striking similarity in formulation
to the passage in Aristotle vn1ich reads: a{~(a ~ -i;uxD,
a6DAO~ OE avepwn(v~ 6tavo(~ --196b6.
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auf ihre Wirkung keine Anhaltspunkte gewahrt. 114 9

And quite

evidently the disorder or chaos which preceeded the whirl was
precisely of this nature; hence the whirl can certainly be described as being due to the 'automatic' or 'chance'.

The

heavens then also quite evidently presented for Democritus
such complex motions that he could present no comprehensive
account of their complexity; they were, besides, far removed,
and this would in his view further complicate things, for, as
we have seen, their remoteness impairs our accurate observance
of their functioning:

comets themselves, although they appear

to be single objects, are really complexes of stars (r1Teteorol2irY.. 1.6, 342b27-29).

Thus Democritus' view of chance and ne-

cessity are not at all incompatible; they are precise and
technical terms quite consistent with one another. 50
Aristotle's primary criticism of this view of 'chance'
is one which applies to the whole theory, including all three
of the aspects of that theory which he had listed.

It is di-

rected precisely against 'chance' as a mechanical necessity;
this theory, Aristotle claims, is simply contrary to empirical
fact:

"it is even more illogical to make these claims when

people see nothing in the heavens happening as a result of a
49

.
Ou. cit., pp. 39-4Q.

50see also the account of Gregory Vlastos, "Ethics and
Physics in Democritus, II" in Philosophical Review, LV (1946),
p. 63, where he defines Democritus' 'chance' (1:\5XTl) as "events
uncontrolled by art. 11 Democritus' term for 'chance' in matters
not concerned with human endeavors and art was likely 'to au'toµa'tov. see Goedeckemeyer, .£!?.• cit., p. 37.
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(complex) 'automatic' chance, while among things which they
claim are not a result of chance, many things do occur as a
result of chance. 1151

It is not a matter of the heavens' by

Democritus' view having an inferior cause, as Cherniss suggests,52 but there is simply more order and regularity evident
in that realm there than there is here on earth with plants
and animals;53 the laws of motion should certainly more appropriately apply up there than among us where there is more evidence of complexity.

Democritus' theory, Aristotle thus says

with some justification, is not warrented by the observable
facts.
Furthermore, Aristotle says that Democritus' use of the
word 'chance' is contrary to ordinary usage; we do not, he
claims, use 'chance' in connection with things which always
happen in a certain way or which so happen for the most part
(Physics 2.5, 196bl0-13); and so ordinary usage is the direct
contrary of the way in which Democritus has been seen to use
the term, for, for him, 'chance' is indeed one of those factors
which really is a subdivision of 'what always happens', what
51 Physics 2.4, 196b2-4: E~l a~on&tepov ~0 AEYELV rraurra
dpwv~~s ty µ~v,~Q oupavQ ovoev ang ~a6~0µ,a1ou ytyvoµevo~, ~v
ot ~ot~ oux ano ~ux~~ noAAa ouµ~atvov~a ano ~ux~s· This is
repeated at On the Parts of Animals 1.1, 64lbl6-23 in more detail, but with the same cl~im for empirical evidence (~a(ve~at
--64lbl9).
.
52.Q.:E.. cit., p. 247, though I am in substantial agreement
with most of the rest of what he says on necessity and chance.
53 Part. Anim. 1.1, 64lbl9-20: ~o youv ~e~ayµtvov xal ~o
wptcrµtvov nOAU µciAAOV cpa(ve~al EV rroi~ o6pav(ots fl ne:pl 1)µffs.
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happens of necessity.54
Indeed Aristotle says that we ordinarily use the term in
connection with some set purpose or end--whether this is intention on the part of human beings or a normal end of development in natural objects.

For example, we may go to market

for some purpose, meet someone whom we wanted to see for some
other purpose, and thus be diverted from that original purpose; or a foetus may usually grow into a human being, but due
to some accident be diverted from that end and develop into a
monstrosity; and in both instances we call that which happens
accidentally 'due to chance'.

Thus, Aristotle says:

"as many

things as are done as a result of intention or happen as a result of a natural process, are for the sake of something; indeed, whenever such things happen accidentally, we say that
they happen as a result of chance. 115 5 Thus, it is Aristotle's
claim that Democritus' use of 'chance' not only fails to accord with ordinary usage (in that Democritus applies it to the
category of 'what always happens'), but it also fails to account for the factor of purpose or end in our ordinary usage
of that term.

And it is this very matter of purpose, end, and

'final cause' which we shall treat next.
5 4 Physics 2.5, 196bl~-15:
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mine, in order to indicate Aristotle's claim for 'ordinary
usage' of the term.
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The Final Cause
Democritus' teaching on this 'final cause' as a factor
in providing an explanation is not hard to indicate; he quite
evidently did not use it at all.

At best the only analogue

to 'final cause' in the teaching of Democritus is simply that
A results from B.

~

And precisely this is indicated at Qg

piration 4, 47lb30-472a2:

"Democritus says

that~§:.

result

of breathing some specific thing happens to creatures which
breathe, and he mentions that it prevents their soul from being squeezed out; but he has said nothing at all about the
fact that it was for this purnose .2£ end that nature did
this. 1156 Further instances of Democritus' analogue to 'final
cause'--or, better, his failure to take purpose or end into
consideration--will be given in connection with Aristotle's
criticisms, where they more properly belong.

It seems quite

evident that Democritus' failure in this respect was general
and consistent.
Inasmuch as Democritus had no posi-l;i ve teaching on this
point, it will be the burden of this section of the chapter to
show Aristotle's own justification for considering the 'final
cause' as an essential element in the explanation of the world
of nature and, in regard to Democritus specifically, to show
how his neglect of this factor
rendered Democritus' theory in"
56u.Jµ
. . 'Y'l Qxp&~o~ u o~& µev ex ~Tl~ uvanvon, ouµ~a&Vel ~'
~ore avanVEOUOl AEYEl, ~aoxwv XWAUElV EX8A(~eo8Ul ~~v *ux~v·
t
u
-1,
'
.t
ou µ~v~o& w~
~ou~ou y
evsxa no&,Joaoav
~ou~o ~riv ~votv oueev
e'{ prixev.
There is an obvious contrast between ~x ~fl<; avanvo'fic;
and ~ou~ou evexa, each placed at the beginning of its clause.
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adequate.
Aristotle's general case for including the 'final cause'
as an avenue of explanation is presented at Physics 2.8.
There is, Aristotle there claims, a purpose or an end in the
functioning of art
purpose:

npu~~E~al

(~exvD);

o' evExu

things are done for some specific
~ou--199all.

The example to

which Aristotle refers here is that of house-building (a fairly frequent example); its purpose is realized when the house
is in fact built.

Another favorite example is the skill of

healing (mentioned briefly at 199a34-35), and its purpose is
fulfilled when the person is in fact restored to health.

So

there are indeed things which are done for the sake of something, for some purpose or end.
And this 'doing something for some purpose or end', Aristotle further claims, is evident even among the lower animals,
such as spiders and ants--though on this level there is no
question of doing it as a matter of art or technical skill
(~exvD) or of deliberate intention (199a20-23). 57 And, as one
goes down the scale of nature to plants, the growth of plants
is a continuing process, and things that happen to it as part
of that process, happen to it in relation to some end or goal
of that process (ylyvoµtva npo,

~o ~€Ao,--199a24-25);

and thus

' goal with reference to which cerhere too there is an end or
. ~57rn the light of this remark we ought to divorce from
the ou evtxa as such any idea of intention or deliberate purpose; thus, i~the proverbial acorn succeeds in growing into
an oak tree and thus fulfilling its 'purpose', we ought not
anthropomorphize it or attribute to it any real intention.
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tain things happen in certain ways in the process of growth-thus its roots grow dovmward with reference to the goal of
constantly obtaining nourishment.

Thus considering the goal

or function of a plant or a part of a plant contributes to our
understanding of the process of its growth as a whole (199a2330).

More specifically, a consideration of the goal, end, or
purpose of a given natural physical object can help us to a
better understanding of that object or its parts; it can give
us clues to its matter, form, and efficient causes as well.
And this is the point that Aristotle makes about the hypothetical necessity which involves the final cause at On the Parts
of Animals 1.1, 642a31-34.

There might be some doubt, for in-

stance, about the constitution of some organ or part of a
natural object or about some other factor in some natural process; thus, by considering the end or purpose of that process
or the proper functioning of that organ or part, one might by
using the hypothetical necessity formula come to some conclusion about these other doubtful factors:

if its purpose or

end or function is A, then it is necessary that it have B.
Hence this 'final cause' too is one of which the natural

phi~

losopher must be aware and for which he must account (Physics
2.7, 198a21-24) and thus give a complete explanation of the
physical object in question (198b4-5).
A parallel which to some extent illustrates this approach to scientific explanation turns up somewhat unexpected-
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ly in a symposium devoted primarily to quantum mechanics· and
is worth quoting:58
"We are not aslrnd to look at what we cannot yet see
but only told to look at the given elements of the pr~b
lem in a particular way, namely as putative clues to the
unlrn.own solution. By concentrating our attention on an
unknown end in terms of the clues by ·which it may be
achieved, we may succeed in reorganizing these clues into a satisfactory solution of our problem; and we may
add that if we looked at the clues themselves, without
any purpose in mind, they vrnuld mean nothing to us."
Similarly for Aristotle, the end or purpose of a process can
give us valuable insight into other factors involved; it can,
as Polanyi in his own instance points out, help us to know
particulars focally; it can help us to settle what is in doubt.
And this is precisely the point on which Aristotle criticizes Democritus in regard to the 'final cause'.

Nowhere, as

far as I know, does Aristotle simply say that Democritus was
wrong only because he did not consider the 'final cause'; but
on all occasions of Aristotle's criticism of Democritus in regard to the 'final cause' Aristotle regularly says that Democritus' neglect of the 'final cause' led him to an accounting-which is on other grounds inadequate--of the matter constituting a part of an organ or an object, of the structure or form
of an object, and of the operation of a natural process.
58r1Iichael Polanyi, "Beauty, Elegance and Reality in Science" in Obse:rvation ~ l'hternretation in the Philosophy of
Physics: Vii th snecial reference to auantum mechanics, ed. by
s. Korner (New York: Dover Publications, 1957), p. 104. The
aim or end of a process, he says, can tell us much about the
given facts or particulars. The specific reference here in
this quotation is to a mathematical problem, and for this reason the parallelism breaks down at some points.
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Thus, according to Aristotle, in all instances Democritus'
failure to consider the 'final cause' is not wrong in and of
itself, but precisely because it generated other mistakes, as
will now become evident as we examine the instances in which
Aristotle does mention Democritus' neglect of this avenue of
explanation.
First of all, we have already noted that at On

~

Parts

of Animals 1.1 Democritus is said to have defined man's real
atomic structure as his form or essence and said that phenomenal man is an accurate and true representation of this real
form (640b29-35).

And Aristotle's reply was that on those

grounds the corpse and the man are actually the same thing
inasmuch as they look exactly alike (640b35-36).

Then Aris-

totle goes on to show in some detail that, had Democritus considered the problem from the view-point of 'final cause', he
would have obviously avoided this error; for the wooden hand
or the portrait of a physician are 'hand' and 'physician' by
courtesy of name only; they are not in fact the same as a real
hand or physician.

And this is made obvious by the fact that

they do not perform the proper function of a hand or of a physician:

06

yap 5uv~aE~at xotErv ~~ ~au~~' 1pyov

(64la2-3); a

wooden hand or couch has its ovm purpose (r(vo' £vExa --64lal3),
and so does a· real hand.

' And

this means that there is an ob-

vious distinction between them which must be made and which
Democritus in principle could not make.

Democritus' neglect

of 'final cause' had led him to make an obvious mistake, a
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mistake which he could have avoided, had he considered the
matter from the point of view of purpose and function.
Again, at On the Parts of Animals 3.4, 665a31-33 Democritus ia said to have thought that bloodless animals have viscera just like blooded animals do, but in the former they are
invisible due to their smallness.

This, Aristotle says right-

ly, is an unwarrented conclusion, because 'size' in other
cases is not a factor; such organs are visible in blooded animals as soon as they are formed and still very small--in eggs
as early as the third day, and in aborted embryos when very
small (665a33-b2).

Thus Democritus seems to be wrong in his

assumption c~~µoxpt~O~ o' EOtXEV OU xaAW~ 6taAU~ELV 1tEpl
ao~wv__ 665a31-32); but a consideration of the use (XPDOt~) of

different parts for different creatures relative to their ovm
life and movements--a consideration of the functioning of these
organs in relation to the cardio-vascular system--would have
helped Democritus to avoid making his unwarrented assumption
(665b2-17).
At On Resuiration 4, 47lal6 Democritus is represented as
having given an account of breathing which gave the 'efficient
cause' as an external pressure and specified that spherical
soul-atoms which produce the effect of 'heat' in us are in-

'
haled by animals as an essential
part of the continuance of the
process of breathing.

There is some legitimate doubt as to

whether this account is in principle correct or not, for the
'efficient cause' of breathing seems to be more likely inter-
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nal than external, and Democritus' related proposition that
all animals breathe is not in fact true (472a21-29).

Further-

more, Aristotle says in criticism of Democritus' theory, a
consideration of the purpose of breathing would have kept Democritus from this apparently wrong account, for evidence
points to the fact that we breathe to cool ourselves; and this
consideration would have led Democritus to reformulate his account of the material which we breathe, for by his theory what
we breathe has the effect of adding heat (472a30-b5).59

And

these considerations would perhaps as well have led him to reformulate his whole theory of the soul.
At On the Generation of Animals 2.4 Aristotle cites Democritus' view that the external parts of the embryo are developed first and the internal parts only later (740al3-15) and
that the embryo stays in the uterus because there it is mechanically formed like its parent (740a37-38).

The former view,

Aristotle says, is wrong on the grounds of empirical evidence
that the heart is formed early (740a4-5), and the second on the
grounds that some embryos receive their formation quite apart
from the mother, as is the case with those developing in eggs
(740bl-2).

But, even aside from the empirical evidence for

the early development of the heart, reason would have helped

'
Democritus avoid his mistake;
and the reason referred to is
precisely the hypothetical necessity involved in earlier crit-

6e

59see especially 472b4-5: a\t:asOV'tE(,
nvfouOl V, W(, 6.va~1ut;c(;)(, xoplV 6.vmi:vfov'tt:<;, O'l:E

TIOlEl nup ERl nup.
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icisms.

Once the embryo starts developing, it begins to func-

tion independently like seeds sovm in the ground (739b34-35);
and the independent development of an embryo in an egg should
have shown Democritus that.
function independently, i t

But, if it is to be such as to

therefore have an internal
principle of development (740a6-9). 60
~

Aristotle further criticizes Democritus at Qg the Generation of Animals 4.1 for his view of the determination of the
sex of an offspring.

Democritus had apparently said that

'semen' in both parents comes from all parts of the body, and
sex is determined in the offspring by whether the semen representing the genital organs of the father or the mother predominates (764a7-12).

This view, Aristotle feels, is v.rrong be-

cause male and female are not only different in their genital
organs, but are different as whole persons; and so, if that
which determines gender does so by predominance, this ought to
affect the whole person; and thus there would be no accounting
for how daughter can take after father in some respect and son
can take after mother in some respects (764b21-31.).
And in further response to this teaching Aristotle suggests first that a more satisfactory view could be arrived at
by an accounting of the relationship of the blood vessels to
the genital organs in terms' of a natural process--and thus with
60.Aristotle's hypothetical proposition here in the text
is a bit more complex, for, as he states it, he is also drawing an analogy to a son becoming independent and setting up
his own household.
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a view to their proper functioning as part of the whole person.

And this would account for the determination of sex and

the development of organs of sex as something contingent upon
a prior principle (764b32-38); and this Aristotle goes on later
to describe in terms of the functioning of male and female as
such (765b9-766b26).

And this approach allows Aristotle to

give a broader and more satisfactory accounting for all the
facts.

And from this point of view of accounting for all the

facts the approach which Aristotle took and which Democritus
neglected is certainly justified.
The same is true with regard to Democritus' account of
the development of monstrosities as outlined by Aristotle at
On the Generation of Animals 4.4.
-----

There Democritus had been

said to have attributed their development to a second copulation which resulted in the superfluous growth onto the developing embryo (769b32-34).

This view seems wrong in the light

of the apparent development of monstrosities in animals as the
result of a single copulation.

But a better avenue of ap-

proach, Aristotle says, is to examine the function of the semen from each of the parents; and again such an approach seems
to Aristotle to explain more of the facts in a variety of specific instances (770a6ff.). 61
Finally·, at On the Generation
"
of Animals 5. 8, 788bl0-14

goes
here
ties
what

61 The matter of interpretation in the light of function
back to chapter one of this book; it is simply intimated
by reference to ascribing the reason for such monstrosito the material constituting the embryo; the material is
Aristotle sees as the proper contribution of the female.
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Democritus is cited as having explained the early development
of front teeth as being due to suckling.

And Aristotle imme-

diately points out that Democritus' universal statement in
this regard is simply not warrented by the facts (788bl5-20).
And furthermore Aristotle retorts that Democritus was mistaken
because he failed to consider the development of teeth from
the point of view of the 'final cause'; and such a consideration would have led him to a more adequate account.
In the first place, with regard to his universal statement about the development of teeth, he would not have made
the error he did, if he had considered the fact that these
teeth do not have only one purpose or function.
. mals have them for the same reason or purpose:
'tou a6rcoG' ev EXEV

-ra

C";;Qa '£xouo l v --788b3-4.

Not all aniou6E nav'ta

In some cases these

teeth serve for obtaining nourishment, and in other cases they
are there with a view to self-defense (788b5); and the facts
of the case for each animal or kind of animal should be considered before drawing any general conclusion.
Secondly (788b20-29), in those cases, Aristotle says,
where such dropping of the front teeth does occur, it is important to remember that the development of those teeth is a natural process, and their end or proper function is performed

'
when they are ·used as instruments
for obtaining nourishment.
Whereas, on Democritus' theory, if they ordinarily developed
later in life, there would be a long period of time in which
the growing animal would have no means for obtaining nourish-
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ment after the period of suckling stopped.

The growing animal

therefore must have these teeth early in life, if he is to obtain nourishment:

avayxi)

Oe • • •

yaa(av 't~~ 'tpo~~<--788b23-24.

1

EXE'\I opyava 'ITpO<;

'tTJV

ep-

A consideration of the purpose

or function of these teeth would thus have led to a correct
interpretation, that is, that they are developed naturally at
that time of life.

In this respect too Democritus was led

astray by his neglect of 'final cause'.

Aristotle then goes

on to show how a consideration of function or purpose is better not for its own sake, but because it contributes to a
broader and more satisfactory explanation of the mechanics of
the growth of teeth (788b30-789b2).
This chapter of On the Generation of Animals (5.8) and,
indeed, the whole work ends--as does the first chapter of On

-the

Parts of Animals--with a criticism of Democritus' view of

-----

'necessity' as something in all cases absolute, though the
criticism is still made here with reference to the matter of
'dropping of front teeth'.

It is necessary that they drop,

but there is a contrast between absolute and hypothetical necessity; and Aristotle says:

11

It is of course true that they

are determined by necessity, but at the same time they are for
the sake of some purpose, some final cause, and for the sake
of that which.is better in' each case. 1162 There is, Aristotle
62 5.8, 789b4-6; the translation is that of A. L. Peck,
Aristotle Generation of A..~imals (London: William Heinemann,
1953), p. 559, although I refuse to follow Peck in capitalizing 'final cause•.
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claims once more, a use of hypothetical necessity which can
lead to a more satisfactory explanation of form, matter, and
efficient cause; and Democritus had consistently neglected it.
Thus Aristotle has shown the ways in which that neglect had
led him into error on other counts, and has shown as well that
a consideration of that factor or an approach to explanation
from that point of view has proved fruitful in a broader, more
detailed, and thus more satisfactory explanation of the given
facts.
But even beyond all this, there is in Aristotle one final criticism of the position of Democritus; it is a criticism
which is never quite made explicit, but is certainly strongly
implied.

'Final cause' implies for natural objects a natural

internal process to some end, goal, or function; and so Democritus' failure to take any account at all of the final cause
leaves him with no basis for any real distinction at all between animate and inanimate objects, between natural and artificial objects.

Charlton suggests--and the point is well

taken--that when Aristotle attempts to distinguish an internal
from an external final cause at Physics 2.8, he is attempting
to make precisely this distinction; Charlton says:

"Aristotle

is in effect trying to give an account of the difference we
feel there to. be between fiving things and the processes of
life on the one hand, and inanimate nature on the other. 1163
Granting this distinction on Aristotle's part, his
63.QE.. cit., p. 126.

crit~
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icism of Democritus becomes almost explicit in the light of
the expressions which he uses in connection with Democritus'
theory.

At

~ ~

Generation of Animals 2.4, 740al5-16, in

connection with Democritus' teaching on the development of
the embryo, Aristotle says that it is as if Democritus were
speaking of animals made of wood or stone:
Al8(vwv

~~wv.

~TI£p sUA(vwv ~

And this is likely taken up again in connection

with the theory of navonepµ(a cited at 4.3; the theory is described as a 'fabrication'

(rrAaoµa~(a~

--769bl).

It is taken

up again at On the Parts of Animals 1.1, where on Democritus'
principles there is according to Aristotle no real distinction
between a man and a corpse, that on this theory one could not
distinguish a bronze or a wooden hand from a real one:
[xet'pa] xat..x:~v 1)'

su"A(VTJV

--640b36ff.

o~ov

All of these instances

render even more significant the more familiar passage at On
~Soul

1.3, 406bl7-20:

"Democritus' account is quite like

that of Philip the master of comedy, for the latter says that
Daedalus made a wooden statue of Venus move by pouring in
quicksilver."

Animate life in Democritus' view is no different

from the mechanical and artificial 'life' induced into 'gimmick' statues.

Democritus in .Aristotle's view had come to the

point of denying one of the most obvious facts of the phenomenal

world--na~ural

life.

Thus all of Democritus' accounts of causes and of necessity had without sufficient warrent at all led him to deny
that there are in fact such real things as natural objects
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which could in principle be distinguished from artificial objects.

And Aristotle had shown in case after case precisely

how he went wrong and that the weight of the evidence certainly did point to the fact that Aristotle's account was more
satisfactory and more justified.

'

SOI\lill CONCLUDING REMARKS

It may be well at this point to append a few words in
retrospect, to see what--if anything at all--has been gained
by this review of Aristotle's accounts and criticisms of Democritus.

The fundamental issues--as Aristotle himself saw

them--dividing the teachings of these two significant philosophers of the ancient world have now been raised.

And these

are issues which are still of living concern to philosophers
today--the problem of 'what exists' and 'what does not exist•,
of what constitutes a 'physical object', of sense-perception
and knowledge, the problem of how we are to go about explaining and describing the world around us, and the very problem
of the meaning of life.
Admittedly, in regard to the basic thesis of this paper,
the reliability of Aristotle's accounts and criticisms of Democritus, there is no answer or resolution of the problem in
terms of absolute certainty--nor can there be short of finding
Democritus' ovm writings on physical theory substantially intact.

The fragments that we do have, although they are in fact

numerous, tell us even

les~

upon which we can rely with abso-

lute certainty; they have been torn out of context, and with
the context much of their meaning and significance has also
disappeared.

And perhaps with the passage of time, when these
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fragments were finally written down by the ancient authors who
preserved them for us, even their words and significance has
been contaminated with new meanings and related but foreign
teaching.

And so, when we consider them, we are still reduced

to engaging in a great deal of conjecture and sheer speculation.
But the distance between Abdera and Stagira--either in
terms of time or space or in concern for philosophic issues-is not so great.

Aristotle is indeed our first and fullest

explicit witness to the teachings of Democritus; he had evidently read Democritus thoroughly and he presents Democritus'
teachings in a philosophical context.

And it is here in Aris-

totle that the meaning and significance of the teachings of
Democritus take shape and form--to such an extent as they
could not possibly do from only the fragments.

If we are to

understand Democritus at all, we must go to Aristotle.

And,

though even here there is no absolute certainty, at least we
can by using Aristotle with caution arrive at what is most
likely and probable in regard to the teachings of Democritus.
And if Cherniss' book has taught us anything at all
about Aristotle's witness to the Presocratics, it has rightly
taught us caution, it has taught us to read Aristotle more
closely, and

~t

has taught' us not to take Aristotle's reports

and criticisms out of context.

And this is wholesome, for it

does indeed help us to a more reliable view not only of Aristotle himself, but also of Democritus and of the.other earlier
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philosophers.
More specifically though, in regard to Cherniss' charges
against Aristotle of misrepresentation of various sorts, we
have seen that Cherniss--at least as far as Democritus is concerned--certainly does not prove misrepresentation.

Indeed,

in all cases the likelihood rests with a reasonably accurate
representation by Aristotle of the theory of Democritus.

And

Aristotle's criticisms--in spite of some objections by Cherniss
--were seen to be warranted by the facts of the case and by
the evidence available.
Although the primary value of this paper is to counterbalance some of the extreme views critical of Aristotle's
treatment of his predecessors, there are several respects in
which our closer reading of Aristotle has, I believe, led to a
fuller and more complete understanding
mocritus.

o~

the teachings of De-

The first of these is the fuller integration of the

meaning of navoncpµ(a into the teachings of Democritus--as a
term used not only in connection with the atomic structure of
physical objects and the mutual generation of the 'traditional
elements', but also in

coIL~ection

with Democritus' solution to

the problem of the presence of contraries in physical objects.
And the other is a theory of 'truth in perception' which does

' to all that Aristotle says about
sufficient justice not only
Democritus' teachings, but also to the witness of later writers
and the fragments--taking 'true' to mean an accurate correspondence between what is perceived by the senses and the actual
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atomic structure of physical objects, a correspondence which
holds as well for the physical processes, and thus establishes
a connection between the 'necessity' which governs the atoms
and their movements and the •necessity' which we observe in
the phenomenal world as the objects in it move and change.
Thus, on the whole, this paper, I hope, has led to a
greater appreciation of Aristotle as a philosopher with integrity and to increased insight into the consistent and methodical teachings of Democritus.

'
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